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SYNOPSIS
This thesis aims at contributing to our understanding of how spatial-industrial 
processes take place in a southern European capitalist metropolis, Athens, and 
how those processes are shaped not only by economic forces and tendencies, 
but by social, political and cultural forces as well -forces which are i(n iq â  in 
the Greek case making, therefore, necessary a departure from the 
conventional theoretical corpus of urban industrial geography which has been 
almost exclusively centred around the primacy of economy and production.
In that context, a critical examination of conventional theories was 
advanced (chap. 1) and an alternative explanatory framework for interpreting 
the very "logic" of structuration and change of the Athenian urban-production 
space was tentatively constructed (chap. 2). Since industrial processes in urban 
space form constituent parts of the social reality as a whole, it was necessary 
to address some major facets of the contemporary Greek social formation and 
of its relations with spatial structure. Thus, aspects of the modern Greek 
society, its relations with urban production space, the role of the political 
sphere and the nature of urban planning was explored. Analysis was then 
concretised as the thesis* scope moved gradually in more detailed analytical 
levels to encompass the key-aspects constituting the multifaceted nature of 
the contemporary Athenian industrial spatiality. Therefore, an analysis of the 
post-war drive of Greek industry from development to crisis and "negative 
restructuring" was undertaken and the spatial implications of those changes 
were addressed (chap. 3) in order to help us understand the wider context of 
spatial - industrial change in Attica -the region of Greater Athens. 
Sub-regional and intra-urban industrial change was then addressed (chap. 4). 
Analysis starts from a historical perspective of the structuration of the 
Athenian production space and then it addresses the major trends of the 
industrial geography of contemporary Athens. A further inquiry into this 
industrial geography was then undertaken in a detailed survey of a growing 
suburban industrial locality (chap. 5). In the remaining chapters some crucial 
socio-political and cultural forces affecting the Athenian industrial spatiality 
were examined. Thus, an analysis of recent policies and measures for the 
reorganization of the Athenian industrial space was undertaken, and 
compared against European experiences (chap. 6). The analysis was followed 
up by an examination of the major social and political factors contributing to 
the creation and diffusion of ^ ^n ti-industria l culture in the contemporary 
Athenian society (chap. 7). This point was further concretised in a detailed 
analysis of the socio-political tensions and controversies arisen between the 
central government and various social actors over an official project aiming 
at a planned reorganization and renewal of a major part of the Athenian 
industrial space during the early 1990s (chap. 8). It was argued in concluding 
(chap. 9) that the major problems of the Athenian industrial space are not 
mostly linked up with structural deficiencies in the sphere of economy and 
production, alone, but, moreover, with the inability of Greek society and the 
state machine to "produce" even a minimum amount of consensus on how the 
production space of the Greek capital should be organized and in what 
directions it should develop in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem and the Thesis' Alms
After two post-war decades of a continuous economic upswing and 
uninterrupted capital accumulation, the late 1960s/early 1970s marked a 
turning point in the western economies: Manufacturing industry in most parts 
of the advanced capitalist world entered a state of combined crisis and 
restructuring (Peet, ed. 1987; Allen and Massey eds. 1988; Kafkalas and 
Komninos 1993). Traditional manufacturing branches and areas which 
sustained the first post-war decades of western economic prosperity, like steel 
industry, automobiles, chemicals, textiles, ship-building industry, etc., 
presented serious decline in their outputs, investment and employment, 
whereas new growth poles of high-tech activities started to emerge away 
from the former traditional clusters. For many analysts this phenomenon is 
associated with the decline of Fordism as a mode of production organization 
and a form of welfare state regulation, combined with a growing emergence 
of "post-fordist" structures based on production and labour flexibility and 
neo-liberal forms of regulation based upon the primacy of private over 
welfare state capitalism (Hirsch 1993; for a review of relevant discussions see 
Bonefeld and Holloway, eds., 1993). Bluestone and Harrison, two well-known 
analysts of the US deindustrialization phenomenon (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982), assert that one of the major causes of this "great U-turn", is the 
growing emergence of a "casino society" -a society in which "the expansion of 
the stock exchange speculation directs resources away from real productive 
investments" (Harrison and Bluestone 1994: 52). Whatever the causes and the 
specific forms of deindustrialization and restructuring in the various 
advanced economies, a common element is that this phenomenon is closely 
associated with geographical shifts of production from core to peripheral 
countries (Frobel et al. 1981; Lipietz 1990; CEC 1991), and/or with shifts within 
the economic geographies of the capitalist countries themselves -shifts which
16
have greatly transformed the past industrial configurations (Martin and 
Rowthorn eds. 1988; Allen and Massey eds. 1988; Scott 1988).
Since Greece is incorporated into the European capitalism as a full EC 
member, these wider changes affected its economy in general, and its 
manufacturing industry in particular (chap. 3, sect 3.1). In the post 1973/74 
crisis period the previous weaknesses of the Greek economy were immensely 
magnified and its past industrialization successes were questioned. As F.E.Ian 
Hamilton wrote in addressing the problems of industrialization in developing 
and peripheral regions,
the international economic crisis -deepened but not necessarily caused 
by the oil-price inflation of the 1970s and its multiplier effects- has 
sharply exposed the weaknesses of previous industrialization attempts 
and trends in those regions (Hamilton, ed. 1986: preface).
These weaknesses were further enlarged in the recent years. As stated 
in a report issued recently by the Committee of the European Communities, 
the development lag between Greece and the other EC economies was further 
widened (CEC 1994: 12). Chances for attracting direct foreign capital 
investments -which played in the past a considerable role in initiating the 
country’s industrial growth- seem to have diminished as the geographical 
position of Greece away from the major European economic centres, the lack 
of appropriate infrastructure networks (especially high-tech information 
transmission ones), the poor quality and the lack of specific skills in the 
Greek labour market, have brought Greece in a relatively disadvantageous 
position (CEC 1994: 85).
These problems have stimulated a growing concern about the prospects 
and possibilities of the Greek economy as well as about the orientation of 
industrial policies in a highly antagonistic international economic environment 
(Giannitsis ed., 1993). The ongoing deindustrialization of major cities and 
wider areas of the Greek territory -e.g. Lavrion, Patras, Egion, Kozani, 
Ptolemais, Evia, and recently Volos (Conference Organizing Committee 1993)- 
by raising pressing problems of mass unemployment, has revived interest
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and debate about the developmental and locational problems of Greek 
industry and about its future possibilities.
In spite of some views asserting that Greek manufacturing industry has 
no viability any more and that economic priorities should have been 
reoriented long before to other forms of economic activity in which Greece 
seems to have a comparative advantage as for instance tourism {Econgmikos 
Tact^omoSy No 35,1992: 27), the growing concern about the future of Greek 
manufadtûnng reveals that the central core of the country's economic system 
continues to be concentrated around the processes of material commodity 
production. The tone of public discussion and political debate becomes more 
''hot" when problems related to economic and industrial change are associated 
with problems of industrial location across urban space and especially across 
the Athenian space. The focused analysis of such public concerns undertaken 
in this thesis can reveal that although pure economic aspects continue to 
attract a major portion of interest, there are some other dimensions (social, 
political, institutional and cultural) which cannot be derived from purely 
economic considerations, and which seem to play a considerable role in the 
way the Athenian spatial-industrial processes are shaped and re-shaped under 
the dynamics of the Greek semi-peripheral capitalism^
In that context, this thesis aims at examining the fundamental 
geographical, economic, socio-political and cultural processes which in their 
mutual interaction underlie the structuration and change of the contemporary 
Athenian industrial space. Analysis is firstly focused on sketching out a 
comparative conceptual framework addressed to the examination of the 
extend to which the conventional approaches to urban-industrial geography 
are capable of providing adequate explanations of the unique urban - 
industrial processes in a South-European metropolis. Greater Athens. The
‘ The term "semiperiphery" was introduced first by Wallerstein in his analysis of the 
capitalist world economic system (for a brief but comprehensive presentation of Wallers- 
tein’s analysis see Henderson 1989: 13-6). Mouzelis (1987), also, makes use of this term to 
characterise capitalist societies like Greece that entered late the stage of industrialization. 
Although this term implies a rather "geometrical" than a socio-economic meaning, we will 
also make use of this term eventually in order to distinguish Greece from both the advanced 
countries of the capitalist "centre" and the third world countries of the "periphery" (see 
chap. 2).
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basic point is that those approaches are not appropriate for this (chap. IX and 
that what is needed is a retheorisation of the urban space - industry dynamic 
on the basis of a holistic and quite detailed research of the geographical, 
economic, socio-political and cultural specificities -specificities in which the 
social, political and cultural spheres tend to play an equally important role 
with economy and production in the organization of the Athenian industrial 
space (chap. 2). It was therefore explicitly accepted that modern societies and 
localities are integrated complex wholes whose internal dynamic necessitates 
an insight into the interaction between the various spheres -geographical, 
economic, social, political and cultural- which constitute those wholes (see 
also Labrianidis 1986: 232; IFRESI-CNRS 1993:11). This conceptual framework 
is then extended and put at work in concrete empirical research.
Industrial development of advanced capitalist cities, has been for long 
the object of scientific study and policy implementation. In Greece, however, 
it was only in the post-dictatorial period (1974 onwards), and especially during 
the 1980s-early 1990s, that the spatial organization of industry in Athens 
emerged as a concrete field of public policy and social concern (see chap. 6 to 
8). The central role of the Athens’ region -Attica- in the country’s economic 
geography is reflected on a growing number of studies addressed to the 
regional scale of activities (see indicatively Koutsoumaris 1963: chap.4; Kottis 
1980: part A; Wassenhoven 1980: chap.7, sect C; Wassenhoven 1984; Kintis 1982: 
chap. V; Stathakis 1983; Kafkalas 1984; Kafkalas 1990; Andrikopoulou and 
Kafkalas 1985; Katohianou 1984; Konsolas et aL 1985; Nikolinakos 1985; 
Vliamos 1988; Papamichos and Tsoulouvis 1987 and 1990; Labrianidis 1989; 
Andrikopoulou 1990). However, the study of industrial development and 
location within the Athenian space economy was not receiving much research 
attention at least till the early 1980s. A study published in 1970 by the 
National Centre of Social Researches (Burgel 1970), referred to the 
intra-metropolitan industrial structure of Greater Athens in a brief and 
descriptive way lacking adequate statistical support (see ibid: 197-201). 
Another study carried out by the same writer some years later (Burgel 1976), 
had the same deficiencies as the previous one. The most influential work of 
the 1970s, was a comprehensive and detailed study of the location of industry
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in Attica which was jointly carried out by the "Société Centrale pour 1’ 
Equipement du Territoire" and the Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development 
(SCET 1974). This study recorded and identified in detail the major 
characteristics and problems of the industrial spaces in the whole 
metropolitan region of Athens -Attica- as well as the developmental trends of 
the Athenian manufacturing, in order to identify the future needs for 
industrial spaces and to estimate the related costs in terms of infrastructural 
provision, land development works, investments, services provision, etc. 
However, this study is of a limited interest today, because the evidence on 
which it was based has changed significantly since then. Another research 
report -published in 1978 (TEE 1978)- referred to the location of industry in 
Athens as part of the broader urban structure and to the problems which 
were associated with the excessive concentration of population and 
production activities in the Greek capital (ibicL* 15-23). The major industrial 
concentrations in Athens were roughly identified on the basis of 1969 
industrial census data (ibid: 21-2) without proceeding in analytical details. 
Fortunately, the research "gap" of the 1970s was filled to a good extend by 
work undertaken during the 1980s. In a PhD thesis (Leontidou 1981a) exploring 
the urban history of Athens and the role of working class in land allocation 
patterns during 1880-1980, we can find a systematic analysis of the post-war 
spatial structuring and change of Athenian industry (see especially Leontidou 
1981a: chap. 5). This work was further concretized and updated in later 
contributions made by the same researcher (see Leontidou 1981b; 1982; 1983; 
1986; 1990: chap.5). Contributions made by other researchers during the 1980s 
(see Hadjisocratis 1983; Tsekouras et aL 1985; Agelidis 1989; Karka-Agelidi 
1989) were also important in sheding light into various facets of the Athenian 
in d u ^ a l  spatiality. However, most of the relevant literature -by over­
emphasising the role of economy and production- tend to underestimate the 
ro le^ f  political, institutional and cultural forces, which, along with economy 
and production interrelate and affect the structuration and change of the 
Athenian industrial space as a whole. Moreover, several important 
developments which took place during the last years, have still remained 
outside of any research concern. An analysis of such new developments in the 
context of this thesis, is hoped to contribute to the existing knowledge in the
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field by revealing new evidence and by advancing a critical understanding of 
the major forces and processes which underlie the changing industrial 
spatiality of a modern South-European metropolis, namely Greater Athens. 
The study is therefore a theoretically informed empirical research and in its 
chapters we try to present the existing scientific discussion on each of the 
examined issues, to evaluate new empirical evidence and policy priorities, and 
on this basis to develop our own critical interpretation. The time-horizon of
the studv is the decade of 1980s- early 1990s, but it is eventually extended 
backwards for reasons of coherence in the process of analysis.
It is broadly accepted that the development and location of 
manufacturing industry in urban space is a matter of crucial importance for 
any city’s life, since it affects (and is affected by) many other aspects of 
urban social and economic life. However, such concerns were rather rare in 
the case of Athens: Industrial location has mostly been faced by the official 
planning bodies as a matter of "proper" legislation alone (see chap. 6) 
separated in practice from other development programmes and initiatives, 
like, for instance, industrial parks. In other words, the planned location of 
manufacturing was never faced as a specific "tool" for the city’s 
industrialization and development, as it was in other, both developed and 
developing, countries (for the role of planned industrial location and 
industrial parks in economic and spatial development see Bredo 1960; UN 
1962; Roterus et aL 1969; UNIDO 1978; Buck 1980; Vliamos et aL 1991; 
Kourliouros 1991b).
However, during the decade of 1980s this situation seemed to change. It 
was the first time a socialist party came to office (1981) under typical 
electoral processes. For the first time, Athens acquired an institutionalised 
Structure Plan (Law 1515/1985) jO/Z/c/a/ Gazette 18A/1985) which proposed the
development of a system of industrial parks (VIPA) and handicraft parks
(VIOPA) within and around the Athenian agglomeration for promoting the 
planned location, relocation and modernization of the city’s manufacturing 
activity. Other relevant policy measures for this purpose were also ratified by 
Presidential Decrees (e.g. PD 84/84). An ambitious project -Enterprise of
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Urban Reconstruction (EPA)- aiming at planning the whole Greek settlement 
system, was undertaken by the Ministry of Environment and regional 
development plans were drafted for most prefectures (Wassenhoven 1993a). 
The institutional framework for urban and regional planning was legislated 
by the Law 1337/1983 {Official Gazette, 33A/14-3-1983). The development and 
location of industry in Athens was given a special concern: A "pilot project" 
for the organization and planning of two major industrial parks in Greater 
Athens was carried out by the National Technical University of Athens 
-Department of Urban and Regional Planning (RG 1988)- while many other 
industrial parks’ planning projects were carried out along the lines and 
standards set out by the NTUA pilot study. During the first half of this 
decade, a widespread sense of optimism was creating the impression that 
most of the urban-industrial problems of Greater Athens had got under way 
for solution. Nowadays, in the decade of 1990s, it has become evident that all 
this past optimism was mostly founded on ephemeral grounds. The "sorry 
reality" -to recall A. Losch’s (1954: 4) familiar words- evolved in somehow 
different ways. The following event is characteristic of that "sorry reality": 
The May Day of 1991, after the traditional labour demonstration in the centre 
of Athens, thousands of citizens, members of various ecological organizations 
and political parties, artists, mayors and MPs, gathered at Eleonas (an 
inner-city major industrial zone) and planted thousands of trees to the unbuilt 
spaces, demonstrating -by this symbolic action- their antithesis to a 
governmental initiative (PD 74D/1991) which -without taking into 
consideration that according to the Athens’ Structure Plan (Law 1515/85) the 
area of Eleonas has been characterised as "industrial park" with abundant 
open spaces for collective use- allowed for private appropriation and 
building-up of those spaces. This symbolic action was the prelude of a 
growing social and political mobilization against the governmental initiative 
-a mobilization that resulted to the submission of official applications at the 
Council of State requesting the judicial review of the governmental PD. (We 
will analyse in detail the socio-political debates and alternative proposals over 
the future of this area in chap. 8). What has happened, therefore, and why, to 
the optimistic prospects of the 1980s for a rational reorganization and
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development of the Athenian industrial space? This is the crucial question the 
thesis will try to answer.
Industrial development and location in contemporary Athens, set forth 
a number of related issues as fields of both theoretical and practical 
significance. First, it is the major problem of constructing an appropriate 
conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of the unique 
urban-industrial processes and location policy guidelines. Theoretical 
developments are roughly shared between those addressed to the study of 
urban - industrial processes in the core countries on the one hand, and those 
addressed to the peripheral world on the other. The lack of theoretical 
interest for socio-spatial phenomena in semiperipheral capitalist countries like 
Greece, sets forth the major task of sketching out a tentative conceptual 
framework for empirical investigation of the unique Greek realities -and this 
is what is attempted in chapter 2 of this thesis. The second major concern is 
the old "general-versus-concrete" issue: There is much work and debate on the 
role of the Greek capitalist state and of its relations to society and spatial 
structure -in general- but there is little empirical evidence on how state’s 
interventionism was expressed in concrete industrial location policy cases and 
how the involved social groupings reacted to those interventions. Detailed 
analyses of such issues will try to fill the "gap" -even partially- in this field.
The thesis’ subject, has, I believe, both theoretical and socio-political, 
aspects of interest The theoretical interest concerns the extend to which 
urban-industrial processes in Athens are determined by economic forces and 
structures (as the major conventional approaches to urban industrial 
geography indicate), and the extend to which some other non strictly 
^  economic forces the Greek case have also affected those processes.
The soÉ jan^ects of interest, stem from the fact that the changing geography 
of production in the Greek capital is by its very "nature" interconnected with 
the way of life and work of the city’s active population. To put the same issue 
in Massey’s words:
Changing geography compounds the challenge facing the labour
movement The changing location of industry breaks down established
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relations between workplaces, and between workplaces and 
communities. And the new locations are d ifferent The factory or 
office is situated in a different context, to which previous forms of 
organization may be inappropriate (Massey 1987:105).
Although the thesis does not aim at policy suggestions, its findings 
might have some definite pobticaL aspects of interest These aspects are 
linked to the role of the modern Greek state in organizing the capital-city’s 
productive base and to the "nature" of the relationships it develops with the 
various social groupings and collective organizations (political parties, local 
authorities, scientific and professional organizations, industrialists, etc.) 
involved in the city’s industrial development and change. The analysis of 
those socio-political and cultural relationships is of crucial importance for 
understanding the very "nature" of the modern Greek urban -  industrial 
planning interventions and for evaluating their role to the development of 
manufacturing activity in contemporary Athens.
The Approach
The problem of selecting an appropriate framework for analysis is one of the 
most crucial issues every research endeavour has to face from  the outset, 
especially when the researcher has been influenced by a variety of 
intellectual streams, sub-streams, ideological propensities and contrasting 
methodologies.^ The selection of the "proper" approach, therefore, is a 
tentative action whose validity is not given a-priori but has to be proved and 
substantiated throughout the whole research endeavour (see more analytically 
Bitsakis 1980; Vaillancourt 1986).
This thesis’ approach and its associated analytical tools have been 
tentatively conducted upon an effort to synthesise elements drawn from three 
major intellectual streams of thought
 ^ There are no such things as "neutrar methodological considerations in socio-spatial 
sciences as positivists might have believed. As Fahrenkrog (1984: 7) puts it, "in fact, what ap­
pear to be methodological questions are very often political issues couched in a ‘scientific’ 
debate"
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(a) The structural (or capital restructuring) school of thought in industrial 
geography studies.
(b) The basics of the Marxian conceptualisation of capitalist social
dynamic.
(c) The criticisms to economism and the efforts to substantiate the
specificity of the political, institutional and cultural spheres of
capitalist formations -as expressed especially in the work of 
professor Nicos Mouzelis (1987: chap. 4; 1992).
A detailed discussion of the above intellectual streams, with all their ^  
merits and demerits, is outside the scope of this study. However, it is ^  
necessary to address in brief the most fundamental points which stem from 
those streams of thought and which have been of a considerable validity in 
the way this thesis’ approach has been conducted.
The significance of the structural school in shaping this thesis’
approach, did not originate from an a-priori intellectual preference, but from 
some concrete ex^erienc)es and problems. A long planning experience on issues 
related with industrial location in Greece has been strongly convincing that 
changes in the spatial structure of production -changes that could be 
empirically defined and measured- are somehow linked by means of a 
cause-and-effect "chain" with more general changes in the country’s economic 
and production system as a whole. Field-works and surveys aimed at 
investigating the locational behaviour of manufacturing firms in various 
localities, were always ending in showing the significance of a multiplicity of 
individual factors which were taken into account by firms when locational 
and/or relocational decisions were to be made. The efforts, however, to 
generalize those factors as to grasp the aggregate processes of the surveyed 
areas as structured totalities, were always leading analyses to more or less 
contradictory results, which were giving the impression that the only forces 
prevailing in the sphere of the "spatial" were the forces of randomness, 
subjectivity and uncertainty. This, of course, was very annoying and 
inconvenient, since it was unable to lead to some concrete conclusions, or, 
much more, to spatial development objectives and planning guidelines. On the
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other hand, it was unable to offer convincing explanations of how and in 
what sense all those individual locational choices were added-up and 
"synthesised" as to formulate real aggregate processes of spatial organization 
and change, which, moreover, were in some cases at the centre of hot political 
b a te^an ^p u b lic  concern. It was therefore evi^ent^^that behind^tte 
"subjective" aspects of the examined spatial phenomena some more general 
processes were at permanent work, and that the task of any research 
endeavour was precisely the conceptual foundation and empirical 
substantiation of those underlying structural processes. It was exactly this 
point that necessitated the adoption of the structural approach in studying 
s^atio-indW rial phenomena. Of course, the various subjective factors of 
location were always taken into consideration in concrete empirical 
researches; however, the "window" through which these factors were viewed 
was expanded to include a wider optic linking them with their wider 
economic milieu. In other words, they were viewed as active elements of a 
broader network of determinations created by the prevailing economic 
dynamic.
However, the contribution of the structural approaches in surpassing 
the "individual actions -vs- structures" locational dichotomy, was not enough. 
Their main concern is still revolving around the central notions of economy, 
production and work process. But the economic concepts -by themselves- are 
analytical tools operating at a very high level of abstraction. In reality, these 
concepts are nothing else than social relations expressed in specific 
quantitative forms in the process of production, exchange, distribution and 
consumption of the social product (Marx 1973 edn: 83-100). Consequently, the 
exploration of the relations between particular spatial-industrial 
configurations and wider economic processes would be incomplete without 
taking into consideration the fundamental social relations in the context of 
which economic processes across space acquire a concrete dimension. As it 
will be revealed in subsequent chapters, there exist fundamental relationships 
between (i) the way modern Greek social relations are structured and 
reproduced, (ii) the way by which the various socio-economic interests across 
urban space are interlinked in alliance/conflict situations, and (iii) the way
26
those interests conceive the spatial organization of production and set forth 
their particular attitudes and prospects. The need to interpret these 
relationships in the context of this thesis, necessitated the adoption of the 
basic principles of the second intellectual stream, that is, of a Marxian 
approach to capitalist social dynamic and especially of its key-concept of 
"social interaction/conflict" as characteristic "moment" in the process of social 
evolution. This approach, expressed at the concrete spatial level of that study, 
sets forward the task of identifying the specific forms of social alliance/social 
conflict situations raised eventually over the use of the contemporary 
Athenian industrial space, as well as the concrete attitudes held by the various 
social groupings and organizations involved in the city's industrial 
development and change.
However, even the above intellectual contribution was not enough for 
an integrated approach to the thesis’ subject Any effort to examine the very 
logic of state’s industrial location policies and legislative measures, set forth 
from the outset the crucial question on the nature of the political sphere and 
on its mutual relations to economy and society. Here comes the contribution 
of the third stream of thought, i.e. the criticisms to economism and the 
efforts to substantiate the specificity of the political, cultural and institutional 
spheres of modern capitalist formations. This point needs to be more clearly 
addressed. As it is known, the weakest point of Marxist thought is its inherent 
economism (Mouzelis^I992: 11), the view that the sphere of economy 
determines -even in final analysis- all other spheres and aspects of social 
reality (politics, ideology, cultural values and attitudes, institutions, etc.) 
(dichotomous base/superstructure theory). The intellectual origins of the 
"specificity of the political" approach, can be traced back in the work of Max 
Weber and especially in a lecture he delivered on 1918 at the Munich 
University entitled "Politik als Beruf" (Politics as a Profession) (Weber 1987 
edn: 95-168). The specificity and relative autonomy of the political sphere in 
capitalist formations was further stressed in the work of Marxist writers such 
as Gramsci (see Glucksmann 1984; Trikoukis 1985), Althusser (1983) and 
Poulantzas (1978; 1982; 1984; Poulantzas ed. 1978 and 1984). As Mouzelis 
remarks:
27
At the methodological level, the view stressing the predominance of 
economy ~ ends in a refusal to formulate conceptual tools which could 
be able to take seriously into account the specificity and the relative 
autonomy of the non-economic institutional spheres. Thus, we are 
mathematically driven in endeavours identifying political and cultural 
phenomena by means of economic categories, that is to say (we are 
driven in the question) to what extend these phenomena are related 
with, and contribute to, the reproduction needs of the dominant mode 
of production or to the interests of the ruling classes (Mouzelis 1992: 
72-3).
If we transfer the "logic" of economism to the field of spatial analysis, 
we will have to accept that urban policies and the associated legislative 
frameworks -and especially industrial location policies- are nothing else than 
simple mechanical "reflections" of the dominant economic forces operating 
across urban space and expressed under a political-legislative covering. 
However, a number of Greek research works -with perhaps best example a 
detailed study of local problems and planning regulations (Pshychopedis and 
Getimis 1989)- have made quite clear that spatial policies have their own 
dynamic which cannot be directly derived from the prevailing economic 
situation in each examined locality. This does not mean that there are not 
cases of spatial policies that have been drafted out as direct political 
"reflections" or "photocopies" of dominant economic interests across spaces 
and localities. This means, inversely, that the relations between the sphere of 
space-economy and the sphere of spatial policies should be rather a matter of 
enquiry than an a-priori deterministic belief. On the other hand, the rejection 
of economism does not mean the adoption of the other extreme -that is, a 
"subjectivist" approach leading to a vicious cycle in which spatial policy 
decisions are "explained" through themselves and by themselves in isolation 
from every other aspect of the prevailing socio-economic and spatial dynamic 
(for a criticism see Castells 1977: 246-59). The broader significance of 
Mouzelis’ work in tackling with this economy/policy dichotomy -at least as I 
have interpreted it- can be resumed in the effort to identify the specific 
forms of political domination, administration of power ("political 
technologies") and ideology formation, as particular research subjects in their 
own terms and with their own conceptual and analytical tools. This approach
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does not contradict the need of analysing in detail the economic processes 
underlying the examined phenomena. It is rather an interdisciplinary research 
endeavour trying to establish conceptual links in the study of different 
processes which, however, "meet" each other on the grounds of the concrete 
reality. The acceptance of the specificity of the political, cultural and 
institutional spheres as distinctive study areas not only in the wider field of 
social thought, but in the particular field of geographical analysis, has led this 
study in an examination of the various state policies and legislative measures 
affecting the development and location of manufacturing industry in 
contemporary Athens, in connection with an examination of the various 
cultural attitudes, reactions, contrasting views and alternative proposals posed 
by various social groupings and organizations about the developmental 
prospects of the Athenian industrial space.
Methodology and the Thesis' Structure
The thesis has been based on the combination of a macroscopic and a 
microscopic methodological perspective assigned to both spatio-economic and 
spatio-political, institutional and cultural processes. The macroscopic 
perspective was necessary in helping us interpret the more general processes 
underlying the phenomena under exploration. However, because it may be 
contingent whether or how these processes are expressed and/or 
differentiated at the concrete levels, it was the microscopic perspective that 
helped in "grasping" the subject under exploration at its substantial unique 
dimensions. (On the relationships between "abstract" and "concrete" or 
"extensive" and "intensive" research in approaching "space" see Sayer 1985: 
49-66; Sayer and Morgan 1985:150-4; Duncan and Goodwin 1988: 55-6).
The first stage of the research was mainly devoted to an extended 
reading of literature related to:
Industrial geography (with special emphasis on intra-urban industrial V
location and change).
Issues and experiences of industrial location policies. ^
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Post-war Greek economy and society.
Regional processes (with special emphasis on the role of the Athenian 
industrial economy in the wider industrial system).
Urban processes (with special emphasis on Athens* industrial space). 
Planning and the role of Greek state in spatial development processes.
The next stage of the research involved analysis and interpretation of a 
wide range of primary sources of information. This information included*
Statistical data of the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) 
and of other reliable sources (Bank of Greece, National Accounts, 
OECD statistics, etc.).
Unpublished statistical data provided in computer print-outs by the 
NSSG computing centre.
Survey material collected in fieldwork by means of questionnaires (the 
format of the questionnaire is presented in appendix II) and 
complementary interviews (when needed).
Selected material from newspaper archives, periodicals, bulletins, 
reviews, etc.
Official documents and programs, statutes, plans, technical reports. 
Ministries* special studies and reports, etc.
Secondary material drawn from published work (books and articles, 
academic research projects, etc.) and adapted for the specific purposes of this 
study was also complementarily used.
The quantitative aspects of the research have been based on simple 
statistics, graphs and computations.
The writer of this study, is fully aware of his limitations in trying to 
approach the complex and multidimensional urban-industrial phenomena in a 
metropolitan area which concentrates around 1/3 of the total Greek 
population and over 1/2 of all country*s economic activity. Only parts of this 
''puzzle" are expected to be examined in this thesis. Much research work has
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yet to be carried out in order this "puzzle" to be completely "reconstructed" 
on paper. On these grounds, the thesis falls into 9 chapters. More specifically:
Chapter 1 advances a critical examination of the major conventional 
approaches to intra-urban industrial location and change in capitalism and 
argues that these approaches -as they stand- are inappropriate for 
interpreting the ( ^ i g j ’e^ nature of the contemporary Athenian iq d u st^ l ^ 
[ spatialityr An alternative explanatory framework is then sketched out 
(chapter 2), by examining the fundamental forces and processes shaping 
social and urban phenomena in Athens as well as the role of state planning 
policies in these processes.
The remaining chapters aim at putting the above framework at work 
in concrete empirical research.
Chapters 3 to 5 are addressed to economic-geographical considerations. 
Chapter 3 examines the fundamental aspects of the post-war Greek 
economic and industrial change in the drive of manufacturing from growth to 
crisis and "negative restructuring",^ and highlights the major underlying 
causes. It further examines the spatial changes caused by the successive 
restructuring phases of the post-war industry and identifies the role of the 
wider Athenian area in this changing landscape of production. Chapter 4 
examines the aggregate transformations of Athenian manufacturing and of its 
intra-metropolitan geography during the shift from development to crisis. 
Chapter 5 undertakes a further inquiry into the industrial geography of 
contemporary Athens by surveying in detail a concrete suburban industrial 
locality (Metamorphosis) situated at the northern fringe of Greater Athens.
Chapters 6 to 8 are addressed to the critical examination of the basic 
socio-political and cultural forces and processes affecting the Athenian 
industrial spatiality. More particularly, chapter 6 sets forth a critical analysis 
of basic policy priorities and legislative measures undertaken during the 1980s
 ^ This term was used first by Mandaraka and Papakonstantinou (1992: 35). For a pre­
cise analysis of what this term means, see chap. 3, sect 32  y   ^^
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for the development and reorganization of the Athenian industrial space, as 
well as a brief review of analogous initiatives undertaken in some European 
cities affected by deindustrialization and job loss. Chapter 7 examines the 
conditions and the ''motive forces" of the creation and reproduction of an 
anti-industrial culture within the major political parties, collective 
organizations and public opinion in contemporary Athens -a culture which has 
played a major role to the maintenance of the present problems of the 
Athenian industrial space. Chapter 8 concretizes the above issues by 
exploring the contemporary socio-political debates over the future of Eleonas 
-a major part of the Athenian industrial space.
In the last chapter of the thesis (chapter 9) a synthesis is attempted 
and the basic conclusions of the thesis are drawn.
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CHAPTER 1
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONVENTIONAL 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTRA-URBAN INDUSTRIAL
LOCATION AND CHANGE
1.1. Introduction
As it is known, the major theoretical evolutions in the field of socio-spatial 
sciences in general, and in the field of industrial geography in particular (at 
least in the Anglo-American literature), were addressed to the study of geo­
graphical phenomena in the., advancedLindustriai^world. That is, in societies 
which have based their development path upon the lines of industrial revol­
ution / economic rationalism - modernization and have long established tradi­
tions of democratic government and welfare state policies aiming at what is 
more or less broadly accepted as the "common good". Thus, as we will see in 
this chapter, all relevant approaches take as granted that there exists an in­
herent rationality in the structure of the social system, which directs the loca­
tional preferences of both individual production units and wider social 
groupings across urban space. This assumption stems from the cultural tradi­
tion of western enlightenment and rationalism that underpinned the historical 
development of industrial capitalism (see Rosenberg and Birdzell 1987; 
Kremmydas 1989). On the contrary, Greece -a semiperipheral social 
formation- entered the stage of industrialization late (Mouzelis 1978; 1987; 
1993) and this makes a considerable difference: The relations between social 
dynamic, production process, urban change and planning policies, developed 
across different paths from those followed in the cities of advanced capital­
ism The location of industry in urban space, as an integral part of those rela­
tions, followed, also, quite unique directions. This chapter’s aim is to advance 
a critical interpretation of the conventional approaches with regard to their 
methodologies and the socio-political assumptions they adopt, so as to ident­
ify their strenghts and weaknesses and to set the ground for the construction
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of a more appropriate framework for analysis which will be highlighted in 
the next chapter.
1.2. Industrial Location In Context
The main conventional theoretical approaches to intra-urban industrial loca­
tion and change in market economies -which will be critically examined in 
this chapter- fall into two major distinctive groups: A "location factors" 
school of thought, and a "structural" -or "capital restructuring"- one. Another 
major group of approaches -the behavioural approaches- is not discussed here, 
not because it does not deserve serious attention, but because these ap­
proaches are more interested in explaining "how" location decisions.are made ^  Ç> 
within complex organizations (firms) in various changing environments, than 
explaining "why" the actual spatial configurations of industry are being pro­
duced and transformed. (For a presentation of the behavioural approaches see 
Labrianidis 1982: 31-4; Lever 1985:19-28; Chapman and Walker 1987:19-22).
As it will be argued in the following analysis, both schools of thought 
have contributed to the understanding of industrial processes across urban 
space and both have their demerits as well in terms of their methodologies 
and the socio-political assumptions they adopt
The "location factors" group of approaches has drawn its premises 
from a variety of intellectual origins: The Chicago school of urban ecology 
provided a framework stressing the idea of an evolutionary self-balanced 
growth of urban land uses (Chapin 1965: 16 ff.; Nelson 1971: 78; Hoyt 197k 86 
ff; for a criticism see Castells 1977; Scott 1980. 71; Giddens 1989: 125; Cook 
1983:135-6). Urban economics -mostly of neoclassical origins- also included as­
pects of industrial location in urban centres (Lean and Goodall 1966: 153-72;
Hirsch 1973: 13-44; Richardson 1972, VoL A: 155-200; Kottis 1976: 280-301; Bal- 
chin and Kieve 1979: 30-1). Such approaches have treated urban-industrial 
location and change as an aggregate land-use phenomenon, and not as con­
crete spatial configurations of different types of industrial activity. More in­
fluential, however, has been the early work of the traditional industrial
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location theorists such as A.Weber (1969 edn.% E  Hoover (1948), A.Losch (1954; 
1964), LGreenhut (1956) and DM. Smith (1973) -just to name a few. Despite 
their differences in scope, their approaches have something in common: The 
assumption that the development of industry in space is the aggregate out­
come of rational individual locational choices and actions. Individual rational­
ity is, as Horkheimer (1987: 16) has written, the ability of the human mind to 
set forth alternative means-ends combinations, in order to decide which is the 
optimum one, i.e. the one that maximizes the subjective sense of satisfaction.^ 
In this context, the optimum location of an industrial investment is the one 
that is in accord with some individual criteria of economic rationalism -either 
these criteria refer to the minimisation of costs, or to the maximisation of 
revenues, or, to a mini-max combination of the two.
A. Weber for instance, regarded as the optimum plant location among 
alternative places the one that minimizes the total transport costs (assembly 
costs + distribution costs) with all other factors (e.g. labour costs) being equal 
across space (see also Hamilton 1971: 370-4; Lloyd and Dicken 1972: 59-63; 
Glasson 1978:127-32; Richardson 1972, Vol.A: 61-6; Holland 1979: 2-6; Chapman 
and Walker 1987: 32-9). He was one of the first location analysts to assume 
that by theorising one separate empirical aspect of the industrial location 
phenomenon (i.e. transport costs) it would be possible to "grasp" the "general 
laws" determining the geographical patterns of production in the early 20th 
century Germany. In this attempt, he adopted a mode of reasoning that ab­
stracted from any socio-political and other macroscopic considerations in fa­
vour of a monocausal optic focused upon transport costs influences upon 
industrial plants in various locations. Although he recognised the possibility of 
deviations from optimum plant locations due to differential labour costs 
and/or agglomeration-deglomeration economies across space, (critical isoda- 
panes is a Weberian technique for checking out these labour divergences 
from transport minimising locations -see Weber 1969 edn: 102-4, 122,144, etc.; 
Alonso 1964: 88-94; Bale 1988: 52-3), the dominant explanatory factor in his 
model remained the factor of transport costs minimization.
' The conceptual basis of these neo-classical assumptions is grounded on Bentham’s 
social and political philosophy. (For an overall criticism of these assumptions see Myrdal 
1985; Kourliouros 1989).
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Hoover (1948) attempted to make more realistic the weberian model by 
adding in its logic some variable factors (e.g. variable transport costs per dis­
tance and means of transport, varying production and labour costs, varying 
land prices and rents across space, etc.). Although Hoover tried to "relax" the 
strict monocausal optic of the Weberian theory, he kept the basic criterion of 
cost minimization in determining optimal plants* locations.
By contrast to the "cost minimization" approach, Losch (1954; 1964) ac­
cepted that the scale of demand for a given product varies considerably across 
space, hence the basic criterion for rational locational decisions is demand 
maximization in the context of perfect economic competition (see also Hol­
land 1979: 7-12; Glasson 1978: 132-4; Gore 1984: 30-6; Bale 1988: 63-5). In his 
analyses he adopted a pure geometrical formalism (crystallised in his ideal 
hexagonal economic landscape) in which producers attain the maximum profit 
on the one hand, and consumers the maximum amount of goods each one of 
them can buy on the other (maximization of both producers* and consumers* 
satisfaction). In this "equilibrating" ideal economic-spatial landscape, no one 
could improve his "position" without harming the position of another (Pareto 
optimal; on that optimal see Karageorgas 1979: 43).
Another well known industrial location theorist, L. Greenhut (1956) at­
tempted to overcome the monocausal logic of both "least cost" and "market 
area" approaches, by combining their central ideas in a "mini-max" conceptual 
scheme. In this scheme, Greenhut adds to the demand and cost factors the po­
tential impacts purely personal factors may have upon rational decisions (1956: 
279-80), making, thus, a step away from classical economism and geometrical 
determinism towards a more behavioural optic.
D.M. Smith (1973), in turn, tried to break with the abstract formalism 
of all past theory in favour of a more empirical one. As he stated, "industrial 
geography is concerned with the description and interpretation of the real 
world rather than with the derivation of abstract theory" (Smith 1973: 126). 
Going back to the "first principles" of industrial location theory, he
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introduced the concept of the "spatial margins to profitability". Having in 
mind that there are factors driving away from optimal plant locations (e.g. in­
formation constrains, entrepreneurs' abilities), he accepts that there exist defi­
nite spatial margins within which any firm can operate more or less 
profitably. These margins define the area in which the "space revenue curve" 
for a given firm exceeds its "space cost curve". The optimal location is the 
point where total revenues exceed total costs by the greatest amount All 
other locations within the area would be considered as sub-optimal ones. As 
he writes in concluding:
from the foregoing analysis it is possible to state the fundamental 
principle underlying industrial location in any cost/price situation. Spa­
tial variations in total costs and total revenue impose limits to the area 
in which any industry can be undertaken at a profit Within this area 
the amount of possible profit is likely to vary, and unless maximum 
profits are sought, the individual manufacturer is free to locate any­
where (Smith 1973:128).
1.3. Intra-Urban Industrial Location and Change
Despite the contradictory results of the empirical tests of the classical 
theories (Lloyd and Dicken 1972: 62-3 ), the contemporary "location factors" 
approaches to intra-urban industrial location and change continue to base 
themselves on the classical conceptual background. Bale (1988: 158-66) for in­
stance, identifies four different types of intra-urban locations, namely: (1) the 
weberian type locations, (2) the central locations, (3) the suburban locations 
and (4) the random ones. All these locations are identified by reference to 
various factors’ push-pull combinations upon different types of industrial ac­
tivity in urban space under criteria of individual economic rationality. For 
example, the m ate^aljy^^ented  industries, or those processing bulky raw 
materials, tend to locate along the waterfronts of the urban area, or near 
transport terminals and motorways in order to minimize the assembly costs 
(in accordance to the principles of the weberian model). The central-city in­
dustries have spatial margins that form a "ring" around the centre and have 
"traditionally operated in small units which have important linkages with 
each other" (ibicL* 159; see also Kottis 1976: 286; Chapman and Walker 1987:
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232). In such industries, the linkages are of vital importance for creating posi­
tive externalities that help individual firms keep costs down, while on the 
same time they are easily accessible by labourers, suppliers and consumers. 
Such firms, serve the basic needs of the urban population (i.e. clothing, foot­
wear, bakeries, typing and printing, furniture, etc.) and tend to cluster tradi­
tionally in small "niches" within the urban centres. Due to their small scale of 
operation and their low capital equipment, such firms are not usually affected 
by technological developments and economic restructuring that generate re­
location pressures, displaying, thus, a remarkable degree of "resistance to 
change" (Wassenhoven et al 1989: 11). Furthermore, central locations are 
usually of a small plot size with low rents, and seem to be preferable by firms 
serving the whole city-market In several cases, such central firms operate as 
subcontractors of bigger ones located elsewhere (Scott 1983). Because the la­
bour intensive firms often make use of female labour, they tend to cluster 
near the central-city residential areas in order to take advantage of the 
"housekeeping - shopping - children's care - working" time routine of the fe- \ 
male workforce. Factors of historical continuity and "tradition" do also play 
their role in keeping small firms linked to the central-city areas 
(Wassenhoven et al 1989). On the other hand, suburban industries, are nor­
mally independent of local inputs and markets, require large tracts of land 
that simply are not available to the centre, and seek close proximity to motor­
ways, container terminals etc. (Bale 1988:164-65).
A similar optic has been adopted by various studies focusing upon in­
dustrial movement and change instead of "patterns" -Le. upon the decentraliz­
ation/ suburbanization trends of manufacturing in the major urban centres of 
advanced economies. In these studies, industrial mobility is seen as the out­
come of the changing "mix" of location factors. Many of those studies are 
simple descriptive analyses. l.e. they tell us much about how these location 
factors change, but little about why they change -and this makes a consider­
able methodological difference: Although the "how" of changes is a necessary 
part of the explanation, jL isJhe  "why" that actually integrates our knowledge 
ofLthe social phenomenon-atissue (see Carr 1984: 88). As Massey states
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while location factors might indicate why movement took place from 
area A to area B rather than from area Y to area Z^they gave no help 
in explaining why there was movement in the first place (Massey 1988: 
66).
Such studies (for a brief presentation see Komninos 1986: 149-51) have 
regarded industrial mobility in the contemporary urban centres as the com­
bined outcome: (a) of plant "deaths" in the city-centres; (b) of the inability of 
those centres to attract new investment; (c) of the decentralization of produc­
tion in suburban rings and regional local centres. According to Bale (1988: 70), 
the excessive concentration of activities in central-city areas creates diseco­
nomies of scale and other negative externalities that push upwards the indi­
vidual production costs of central plants. This entails an increased relocation 
mobility to the suburbs. Moreover, the increase of their scale of operations, 
the expansion of their markets beyond the single city-market and the adop­
tion of technological improvements in production (automated assembly-line 
processes) unfreeze industries from local bonds at the city centres (suppliers, 
buyers etc.) and create strong pressures for migration to the suburbs (Bale 
1988: 195, 201; Chapman and Walker 1987: 110-13). Lever (1973: 194-205) ex­
plains the suburbanization of industry in terms of capital substitution for la­
bour, increased automation of production, need for single-storey land 
intensive buildings (in order to accommodate the assembly-line production 
process), transport space and car parking, office and landscape facilities. Such 
needs, he argues, create increased demand for space, which, in turn, drives to 
the abandonment of the old central locations and the development of new, 
suburban ones. Moreover, the establishment of industrial estates on or near 
the urban periphery provides positive externalities that reinforce the outward 
migration trend of central industry. Land cost variations have also been decis­
ive: As Lever states, the external economies available at the city centre, are 
insufficient to outweigh the differentials in rent between central and periph­
eral sites. Hamilton (1971: 410) remarks that there exists a dynamic relation 
between industrial inertia and migration. The locational behaviour of an in­
dustry, at any given time, is the combined outcome of the interplay of two 
contrasting forces -those associated with the benefits of existing locations on 
the one hand, and those associated with the potential merits of different ones
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on the other. The ability of a locality to maintain its industrial capacity is 
permanently threatened by strong forces of technological change, which, as 
Hamilton argues "is a major cause of migration". Such a change, disconnect in­
dustry from local bonds, while "motor transport and electricity transmission 
have further unfrozen industrial concentrations». This suggests a radial migra­
tion modeLin which inner or outer suburban firms construct branches outside 
the conurbation which are accessible by the line of ‘least transport effort’. 
This involves the shortest and most direct exit through the suburbs" (ibid»* 
412). The role of energy and transport networks expansion along the urban pe­
riphery in stimulating out-migration of centrally located plants is also under­
lined in some other works (see e.g. Lean and Goodall 1966: 155; Balchin and 
Kieve 1979: 30).
VeroQr
Other relevant studies, have been based upon the "product cycle" con­
cept (Chapman and Walker 1987: 110-13). The basic idea is that any industry 
passes through certain stages of development -the first one being its infancy.
at which industry is bred by the external economies offered at central-city 
locations, and the other being its maturity, at which industry prefers to de­
centralize as its operations become fully standardised and its needs for skilled 
and expensive central labour less pressing (Bale 1988:196-97). This decentraliz­
ation trend, is more likely to characterise big firms than small ones in two 
senses: First, big firms, due to their scale of operations, can internalise the 
necessary external economies of scale, hence they can easily become indepen­
dent of local inputs (suppliers, buyers, etc.), while, on the contrary, small firms 
cannot. This is why industrial growth, technological change and decentraliz­
ation were not able to totally remove small-sized manufacturing firms from 
their traditional "ecological" niches in the city centres -as mentioned earlier. 
Second, big firms can more easily afford the costs of moving materials, prod­
ucts etc. in greater distances.
It is actually meaningless to present in detail other contributions to the 
study of intra-urban industrial location and change within the "location fac­
tors" school of thought, because the main points of argument are to a great 
extend identical The slight variations do not change the underlying
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conceptual and methodological structure: Le. the reduction of the explanation 
to the study of separate individual location factors, and a certain explicit or 
implicit emphasis upon individual economic rationality as the fundamental 
mechanism underlying the location and mobility of industrial activities across 
urban space.
Classical industrial location theory has been thoroughly criticised so far, from 
a radical and Marxist political-economic standpoint (see e g. Massey 1973a and 
1973b; Holland 1979: 1-35; Labrianidis 1982: 22-6 and 1985: 114; Cooke 1984: 
111-19). What has to be underlined here, however, is that the "location factors" 
basic idea has been based on a profound formalism. It seems that one of the 
classical theorists, A.Losch, was fully aware of that formalism, but he con­
sidered it as primary with regard to reality itself. He believed that "the real 
duty of the economist is not to explain our sorry reality, but to improve i t  
The question of the best location is far more dignified than determination of 
the actual one." (Losch 1954: 4). In a similar perspective. Lean and Goodall 
have asserted that
location theory goes a stage further for it argues that the explanation 
of an actual location or pattern of land use must be distinguished from 
an explanation of a rational location or pattern of land use. Not only 
should society seek an explanation of what is present or has happened 
but it should also seek to improve upon existing situations (Lean and 
Goodall 1966:153).
These statements are partially true: Society, indeed, needs to improve 
upon existing situations on the basis of ideal ones that have been set as objec­
tives to be achieved. The element of idealism and formalism, however, is in 
that the ideal situations (as conceived in the classical approaches) have been 
ov^^l^"divorced" from what is currently taking place: The knowledge of 
how a future reality ought to be, cannot result from abstract reasoning, but 
only from the knowledge of the real processes and trends that are currently 
taking place.
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The excessive emphasis these approaches have put on the influence of 
individual location factors upon the intra-urban industrial configurations, 
stems from the adoption of a pure reductionist logic tending to dismantle the 
internal connections that constitute the complicated socio-spatial wholes and 
to project them as mere aggregates of separate elements. This logic has its 
origin to the Hobbesian philosophy and methodology that tried to reduce the 
complex social and political phenomena in fundamental human motives that 
were determined by the geometrical and mechanical movements of the infini­
tesimal corpuscles of matter (Oizerman et al 1%3:191-94; Maniatis 1979). Such 
"elementalist" and reductionist methodologies may have some relative value 
in the case of the mechanical sciences, but not in the social and geographical 
ones: The great ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (quoted in Gemtos 1985: 
166) had mentioned that the "whole" is something more than the mere aggre­
gate of its constituent parts (for a systematic critique of "elementalism" and 
"reductionism" in social and philosophical thought see Blauberg et aL 1977: 
15-28; for criticisms of the application of those methodological principles in 
spatial development and planning thought see Kourliouros 1987; 1989; 1990a; 
1990b and 1991a). And Massey and Meegan argue that this kind of "additive 
causality" in spatial analysis is mistaken, since, because of factors interconnec­
tions "there is no simple way in which factors can be first disaggregated and 
then added together again" (Massey and Meegan eds. 1985: 8).
The disaggregation of the complex socio-spatial wholes into separate 
location factors that correspond to the subjective motives of the "rational 
economic man", serves two basic ideological tasks: The first one, has been 
mentioned -in a different context- by Georg Lukacs. He stated that the em­
phasis of mainstream social and historical theories upon separate "facts" in­
stead of "wholes", makes impossible the knowledge of those underlying 
processes and causal relations, which, by guiding social evolution, show on the 
same time the possible paths of social reform (Lukacs 1975: 58-71). Thus, the 
emphasis of the classical approaches to industrial geography on individual 
locational choices instead of holistic socio-spatial relations, makes difficult 
for peoples and localities to understand that the problems they face (of, say, 
deindustrialization, disinvestment and unemployment) are not simply the
42
contingent outcomes of the one or the other individual locational/relocational 
decision, but are causally linked to wider socio-economic, political and terri­
torial restructuring. The second ideological task presents the internally contra­
dictory and conflictual spatiality of capitalist society (see Soja 1985) as a 
self-balanced linear process that takes place without severe internal tensions, 
breakdowns and dramatic restructuring. This logic drives analyses to the sort 
of a "social-darwinist" optic after Spencer’s and Pareto’s theories of balanced 
social evolution (Timasheff and Theodorson 1983: chap. 3,10 and 18), as well as 
after the more contemporary structural-functionalist approaches to social 
change (see Parsons 1951; see also Strasser and Randall 1981: chap. 4; Abraham 
1982: chap. 3, 4; Timasheff and Theodorson 1983: chap. 3, 10 and 18). By pres­
enting capitalist industrial spatiality as a self-balanced aggregate of rational 
individual locational choices, the classical approaches become advocates of 
those socio-political forces in capitalism that strive to disguise the conflictual 
nature of spatial-industrial development and to present it as a '’natural" and 
unproblematic evolutionary process.
The emphasis upon the role of purely spatial factors in determining the 
changing industrial spatiality of the capitalist urban centres, serves also the 
ideological task of presenting the urban social and economic problems as 
"technical" ones: The complex urban-industrial configurations are reduced to 
just one dominant "technical" factor -that of accessibility. As Lean and Good­
all assert
The amount and growth of economic activity depends upon its access 
at competitive costs to markets for the products. An individual busi­
ness activity will find that its production costs and sales revenues vary 
from one site to the other depending upon access to factors and 
markets (Lean and Goodall 1966:155).
Thus, as Gottdiener (1982: 59-60) remarks, in all classical approaches 
"the spatial generating factor of complex modern social formations is the 
quality of movement". In all these approaches, the notion of "access" or the 
"friction of distance" is considered to be the main factor determining the ar­
rangement and change of industrial activity in urban space (see Richardson 
1972, VoLA: 156; Hirsch 1973: 32). With regard to this, we can agree, along with
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the above approaches, that accessibility, transport and geographical distance, 
play, indeed, an important role in industrial location/relocation decisions, but 
in a different context than that proposed by the preceding approaches. Marx*s 
political economy does provide a useful conception of this role: Marx in VoLI 
of his "Capital" (1978 edn: 398-99) had emphasised the endogenous need of in­
dustrial capitalism to continuously revolutionise the general conditions of pro­
duction -the means of communication and transport- in order to facilitate its 
territorial expansion and exploitation of remote natural and labour resources, 
markets etc. In "Grundrisse" (1973 edn: 521-26, 533-55) and in VoLII of "Capi­
tal" (1978a edn: 146-49, 246-48) he connected directly transport and distance 
with the drive of capital to shorten its material circulation time and the costs 
of this material circulation -the costs of movement- and thus to accelerate its 
total turnover rhythms. As he wrote in "Grundrisse"
The more production comes to rest on exchange value, the more im­
portant do the physical conditions of exchange -the means of com­
munication and transport- become for the costs of circulation. Capital 
by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of 
the physical conditions of exchange -of the means of communication 
and transport- the annihilation of space by time- becomes an extra­
ordinary necessity for it (Marx 1973 edn: 524).
Thus, from the standpoint of capital, physical space and geographical 
distance is an "obstacle" that has to be overcome, and as Duncan and Goodwin 
(1988: 64) remark, it is a barrier which inflates turnover time. It becomes evi­
dent from the above, that what makes the difference between the classical 
conception of accessibility and that of a political-economic spatial perspec­
tive, is the different context of that concept in each case. For the cl^sical ap­
proaches, acc^SsiWlhy is an independent variable, a "technical" problem of 
physical city planning, which, if solved rationally, determines the scale of 
individual demands for potential intra-urban locations in the line of the least 
effort or maximum utility. On the contrary, for the p o l^ a l3 o n o m ic  spatial 
standpoint, accessibility is not a simple technical "rationale" of physical 
city-planning, but the product of a wider socio-spatial dynamic developed in 
macro - economic way in the sphere of the state’s urban development and ex­
penditure policies. It does not merely refer to the geometrical features of a
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socially "neutrar space, but to the collective investment (investment of social 
capital) in urban infrastructure and built forms for production, exchange, cir­
culation and consumption through which urban space -hence accessibility- is 
"produced" (see Scott 1980; Harvey 1982, 1982a, 1985a and 1985b; Roweis and 
Scott 1981; Smith 1984). It is, therefore, evident, that the concept of accessibil­
ity on which the classical "location factors" approaches have been ov^aUy 
based, cannot be the "point of departure", but, instead, part of^a wider socio- 
spatîaTdialectic which continuously shapes and reshapes the conflictual spa­
tiality of industrial capitalism (see Soja 1983; 1985).
In the above context, the reduction of the socio-spatial problems of in­
dustry in individual factors of location, has also some impacts upon the con­
ceptualisation of "planning rationality". No m atter whether planning is 
conceived as a process rather than as a plan, no matter whether it is conceived 
as a centralized (Up-Bottom) or decentralized (Bottom-Up) activity with or 
without citizens* participation, the principle of planning rationality, as Harvey 
remarks.
is an ideal -  the central core of a pervasive ideology - which itself de­
pends upon the notion of harmonious processes of social reproduction 
under capitalism-. Political struggles and arguments may -. be reduced 
to technical arguments for which a "rational" solution can easily be 
found (Harvey 1985b: 117).
This reduction drives to the ideological domain of "technological det­
erminism" which supports an apolitical posture with regard to the socio-spa­
tial processes.^
To the antipode of the "location factors" school of thought, another group of 
major approaches has been developing since the early 1970s. These approaches 
have been based on a radical perspective which has been part of a "wider
 ^ Such ideological views are still present among the planning fraternity in contempor­
ary Greece (for criticisms see Kourliouros 1990a and 1990b) but tend to fade away as the 
political dimensions of the so called "spatial problems" in contemporary Greece are increas­
ingly becoming evident (see especially the case of Eleonas in chap. 8).
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academic interest in the application of Marxist ideas in the social sciences" 
(Chapman and Walker 1987: 26). According to this perspective, "there are no 
such things as purely spatial processes; there are only particular social pro­
cesses operating over space" (Massey 1984: 51-2; 1985: 11). Because these ap­
proaches emphasise the role wider social structures and relations play in the 
changing urban and regional industrial geographies of capitalist society in­
stead of separate locational factors, they are also identified as "structural" ap­
proaches (Chapman and Walker 1987: 26) while others prefer the term 
"Neo-marxist" (Basset and Short 1989:180). Because such approaches view the 
changing industrial geographies of contemporary capitalist societies as out­
comes of wider restructuring processes that take place in the international 
and national economic spheres, they have also been identified as the "restruct­
uring of capital" approaches (Massey 1988: 65; Labrianidis 1982: 41; 1985: 114). 
Whatever the "label", however, the most significant contribution of this 
school of thought, "lies not in its mode of explanation, but in its challenge to 
the ideological basis of industrial geography" (Chapman and Walker 1987:
On the basis of the methodological departure from the separate "loca­
tion factors" to the changing relations of capitalist production and labour or­
ganization, a number of interesting analyses have been developed so far. With 
regard to the de-industrialization of the British economy and to its changing 
urban and regional industrial geography over the last decades (see Massey and 
Meegan 1978 and 1982; Massey 1981, 1986 and 1988; Allen and Massey eds. 1988; 
Martin and Rowthorn eds. 1988), the explanation is briefly the following: The 
loss of the old leading role of British industry in the international economy, 
imposed serious pressures for restructuring upon a series of industrial 
branches and companies. Each industry, and each company, separately, reacted 
in varying ways to those external pressures in order to retain their profits. 
The decentralization of production (or of sections of it), has been part of 
those restructuring strategies. For some firms, in example, the urgent need to 
reduce their immediate labour costs pushed them to move from central con­
urbations to peripheral areas of cheaper -and less militant- labour. This move 
was more urgent for labour intensive firms. For others, the rationalization of
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production through the application of technological improvements, shifted 
their labour requirements, released them from ties to the traditional skilled 
central labour and pushed them to decentralize elsewhere.
The post-war internationalisation of capital and associated develop­
ments in the intra-firm divisions of labour between R+D, manual and assem­
bly processes, have also resulted in spatial segregation and decentralization of 
industrial activities from core to peripheral countries, regions and local 
centres, leading, thus, to the emergence of new forms of socio-economic and 
geographical inequalities (see Palloix 1978; Frobel et al 1981; Peet 1987: 9-32; 
Hamilton ed. 1986; Henderson 1989). As Ross explains:
viewed from the office towers of the global cities at the centres of the 
world communication and control system, the space economy of capi­
talism is a mosaic of regional opportunities for investment w. Each part 
of the mosaic represents a conjunctural outcome of world systemic 
tendencies and local historical and geographical particularities (Ross 
1987: 249).
In this context, the problem of de-industrialization of the traditional 
industrial cities and regions, cannot be interpreted as problem of those cities 
and regions themselves, but rather as the necessary outcome of wider changes 
in the international division of labour and in the role of the separate national 
economies within it as they strive to adapt themselves to the changing in­
ternational environment
Other analyses based upon identical methodological lines (see e.g Dun- 
ford and Perons 1988), consider spatial restructuring and geographical uneven­
ness as resulting from functional differentiation in the process of 
accumulation and social reproduction -Le. as the spatial expressions of the 
changing social division of labour within an economy. The historically chang­
ing "regime of accumulation", has been considered the major cause of change 
in the industrial geography of advanced European and North-American capi­
talism (see Scott 1988). As Dunford and Perrons assert
the historical development of the capitalist mode of production has 
been associated with the establishment of a succession of broad phases
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or regimes of accumulation characterised by the conditions of produc­
tion, the pattern of technical change, and the nature of the labour pro­
cess in the main areas of economic activity, by the leading sectors of 
the economy, by the ways of life and the mode of consumption of the 
wage earning class, by a whole set of institutional forms and pro­
cedures and by patterns of behaviour that enable the economic and so­
cial system to function, by a pattern of territorial development, and by 
a system of international relations^The material side of the labour pro­
cess is of necessity and more obviously constituted in space, and is of 
considerable importance in explaining the geographical location».of 
economic activity (Dunford and Perrons 1983: 227-28).
The historical changes in the accumulation process as the motive forces 
of intra-urban industrial change have been considered in two relevant studies 
of the American cities. D.MGordon (1984) links the three phases of capitalist 
accumulation (Le. commercial accumulation, industrial (or competitive) accu­
mulation, and corporate (or monopoly) accumulation) with corresponding 
forms of urban development and industrial location. He further argues that 
"the transitions between stages of urban development have been predominant­
ly influenced by problems of class control in production, problems erupting at 
the very centre of the accumulation process" (1984: 22). In this context, Gor­
don explains the intra-urban industrial mobility in the American cities by 
means of a monocausal factor -that of class struggle between industrialists 
and labourers over the control of the accumulation process. According to him, 
the transmission from commercial to industrial capitalism, brought about new 
relations to the organization of industry and labour discipline in places where 
the control of production by the industrialists would be easier -the big manu­
facturing plant in the urban centres. As he states:
a major reason for the concentration of manufacturing in the largest 
cities flowed from the dynamics of labour control in production. At its 
more general level, the hypothesis proposes that large cities became in­
creasingly dominant as sites for capitalist factories because they pro­
vided an environment which more effectively reinforced capitalist 
control over the production process (ibid: 33).
However, as capitalism was gradually shifting to the corporate (or 
monopoly) stage, the concentration of labour force and production in the big 
city-centres was increasingly causing severe problems to the "normal" process 
of accumulation: The concentration of labouring people’s residential areas
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around the dow ntow n factory  districts was m aking it easier fo r them  to  or­
ganize their resistance against capital's com m ands over production and la­
bouring processes. The growing m ilitancy of th e  cen tral labour, forced 
industrialists to relocate the ir plants to  th e  suburbs hoping th a t th is would 
isolate w orkers and break down the ir class-organization and m ilitancy. The j 
decentralization of industry released dow ntow n d istricts w hich gradually  w ere 
allocated to te rtia ry  uses and caused a grow th o f  the suburbs. The form , 
therefore, of the  corporate city has s tarted  to  emerge.
P.J.Ashton (1984) follows the sam e lines of argum ent, but he adds some 
"technical" factors in order to explain the  suburbanization o f m anufacturing  
industry in the A m erican cities. As he points out, "the conditions w hich m oti­
vated capitalists to move the ir industrial facilities ou t of the  cen tral city w ere 
both technical and social" (1984: 60). By th is it is m eant th a t "despite capita­
lists’ strong m otivations to leave the city, however, th e  decentralization  o f in­
dustry would not have been possible w ithout facilita ting  econom ic and 
technical developments". In those "facilita ting  developm ents" he includes: (a) 
The wave of mergers th a t provided the  fo rm  of th e  giant corporation w hich 
was able to invest big am ounts of capital to  the  building of new big plants in 
the  suburbia, (b) Scientific m anagem ent and assembly line form s o f produc­
tion organization was facilitated  by a new, m ore technically  e ffic ien t factory  
arch itecture (spread-out, one, or two storeys factories). The existing old m ulti­
storey plants at inner-city  areas w ere inappropriate fo r th a t purpose; fu rth e r­
more, th e  cost of land in the  city centres was too high fo r such land-dem and­
ing operations, (c) The expansion of electric  pow er and electric  trolleys 
released industry from  inflexible locations, (d) The gradual "invasion" of m on­
opoly capital in the cen tral areas in the  fo rm  of an office-bu ild ing  boom, 
forced industrial land uses o u t (e) The developm ent of truck  transport in­
creased fu rth e r the locational flexibility  of industry. However, these factors, 
Ashton admits, ''facilitated but did not create suburbanization, as so many 
bourgeois social scientists would have it" (ib id j 63). For Ashton, as previously 
fo r Gordon, the m ajor force underlying the  suburbanization of industry  is the  
class struggle between industrial capital and labour over the  contro l of the 
accum ulation process.
49
Instead of emphasising the influence of class struggle upon the exodus 
of manufacturing industry to the suburbs, other structural theorists adopt a 
more "economistic'' perspective that takes into account the historical changes 
between capital and labour ratios (organic composition of capital) in the de­
velopment of the capitalist commodity production. For instance, in A.Scott’s 
(1980: 87-109) approach, the central idea is that urban-industrial processes pass, 
in a historical perspective, from an initial stage of labour intensive activities 
to a stage of capital intensive ones (see also Bull 1985: 86-8; Chapman and 
Walker 1987: 232-33). That is, "a basic dynamic involving the progressive sub­
stitution of capital for labour in the internal structure of commodity produc­
tion" (Scott 1980: 88). This production shift entails associated shifts in the 
intra-urban locational preferences of industry: Le. shifts from the traditional 
central agglomerations (which presented in the past marked comparative ad­
vantages for labour intensive and small scale interlinked activities) to outward 
locations which favour capital intensive assembly-line and vertically inte­
grated processes making use of large tracts of land and standardised semi­
skilled or unskilled labour. This development is not a linear or unproblematic 
one: The historical process of the increasing organic composition of capital 
due to technological improvements in production, displaces living labour and 
thus undermines the only source of surplus value, -causing, therefore, system’s 
instability and crisis prone development This is why Scott (1980. 87) claims 
that the evolution of production space "encounters internally generated 
breakdowns".
M.Webber (1984: 90-2) also, adopts a similar perspective to explain the 
locational shifts of industry in contemporary capitalist cities. He asserts that 
the competition between firms leads them to reduce labour inputs by mecha­
nisation of production and increasing plant size, as well as to the search of 
new markets outside the main conurbation. Moreover, these changes have 
been accompanied by increased concentration of market power in a few big 
firms, so that most plants do not serve a single city any more, and the accessi­
bility "push-pull" variations are likely to play less important role than that of
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spatial variation in production costs -and especially the cost of land. As Ball 
points out:
The importance of changes in methods of production and the means by 
which they occur place agglomeration economies in context The sig­
nificance of agglomeration economies depends on: the production pro­
cess in question; the degree to which it can be segmented spatially; and 
the conditions of commodity exchange in which production is placed 
-including workforce requirements, as well as the buying of other in­
puts for production and the selling of the final output w. cases arise 
where changes in production involve a segmentation of its location. In 
this way, the new production methods may enable the firm to take ad­
vantage both of centrality and of locating elsewhere (Ball 1984: 73).
Bull (1985), drawing from Massey’s (1978; 1979) "successive layers of 
economic activity" concept, states that "industrial change may be usefully 
conceptualised in terms of successive rounds of investment (and disinvest­
ment) through time. That is, in terms of a process in which each new round of 
investment alters the industrial geography of an area -a change which itself is 
strongly influenced by the existing distribution of investment from previous 
time periods" (Bull 1985: 84). He also follows Scott’s (1980) emphasis upon 
capital/labour shifts in explaining the intra-urban industrial dynamic, but he 
proceeds a step further by incorporating NortcUffe’s analysis of fixed and 
circulating capital costs in relation to plants’ locational variation. He distin­
guishes three groups of manufacturing activities in contemporary urban areas 
according to their "mix" of labour cost-fixed capital cost-and circulating capi­
tal cost The first group (central locations) has low labour and circulating 
capital costs, with relatively high fixed capital costs, and favours labour 
intensive activities. The second group (suburban locations) has low fixed and 
circulating capital costs, but relatively high labour costs, and is favourable to 
capital intensive automated operations with increased demand for space. The 
last group involves non metropolitan locations, where labour and fixed capital 
costs are low, but the circulating capital costs rise along the site’s distance 
from the urban area.
The preceding analysis makes clear that the "restructuring of capital" 
approach represented, indeed, a remarkable development in the interpretation
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of the contemporary urban-industrial processes in advanced capitalism. By 
contrast to the individualistic "location factors" logic, these approaches 
stressed the influences wider structural economic changes might exert upon 
the location of manufacturing industry in urban space. However, these ap­
proaches take as granted the predominance of the "rationale" of capital’s 
accumulation and reproduction in shaping spatial processes over all other as­
pects which in their interaction characterize the complex spatial-industrial 
realities.
1.4. Conclusion
It becomes evident from the above, that both schools of thought, in spite of 
their relevant d if fé re n ts , have been based upon a couple of common explicit 
or implicit assumptions:
(a) The assumption that the locational preferences and choices of indus­
trial capital determine to a great extend the structure of socio-eco­
nomic interests across urban space as a whole.
(b) The assumption that there exists an inherent rationality in the struc­
ture of industrial society, which directs the locational preferences of 
individual production units ("location factors" approaches) or the "ra­
tionale" of capital’s accumulation and systemic reproduction as a whole 
(structural approaches).
Both assumptions are incompatible with the specificities of the Greek 
socio - spatial and industrial realities, as we will see analytically in this thesis. 
More particularly, the "location factors" approaches -despite their unquestion­
able analytical contribution to the concrete study of manufacturing in urban 
space- cannot form a satisfactory framework for the analysis of the unique 
particularities of the Athenian industrial spatiality, because, as the presented 
evidence will reveal, the development and location of Athenian manufactur­
ing is affected not only by economic, but by a nexus of non strictly economic 
(social, political and cultural) forces as well Forces that cannot enter in the
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manufacturing units* economic calculations when making locational or re- 
locational decisions, but which -by shaping the "environment" of those 
decisions- play a much important role in determining real spatio-industrial 
processes.
The structural -or "restructuring of capital"- approaches, on the other 
hand, represent, indeed, an important development in the field of the geogra­
phy of industry. By considering the impacts of wider processes upon the 
changing geography of production, they adopt a holistic optic which is better 
suited to the complex nature of the urban space - industry dynamic in the 
capitalist mode of production. However, because structural approaches are ad­
dressed to spatio-industrial phenomena in the advanced capitalist world, they 
are also inappropriate -as they stand- for countries like Greece, whose capi­
talist transformation developed in essentially different ways as we will see 
in the next chapter. They have to be retheorized on the basis of the unique 
Greek socio-spatial political and cultural realities. In the following chapter we 
will try to set forth an analysis of the most fundamental facets of those 
realities.
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CHAPTER 2
MODERN GREEK SOCIETY, PRODUCTION 
AND URBAN SPACE
2.1. Some General Characteristics of the Greek Society
There has been a lot of discussion on the differences between urbanization in 
the advanced capitalist world and in peripheral, less developed economies (for 
a critical review see Leontidou 1981a: 22-39; 1989: 256-71). The most striking 
difference is the reverse relationship between industrialization and urbaniz­
ation: While in advanced societies industrialization "produced'' cities and 
urban growth -19th century Manchester as analysed by Engels (1974 edn.) pro­
vides a good example of such a relationship- in peripheral world, instead, it 
was population concentration and the external economies of urbanization that 
generated comparative advantages for the emergence of city industries, and 
hence for "creating" industrialization (for Latin American cities see Furtado 
1970: 82-6; Santos 1979).
Such explanatory models, although used occasionally for the Greek 
case (see e.g. Burgel 1976), are definitely inappropriate for interpreting the 
contemporary Greek socio-spatial realities. Greece, along with other South 
European countries, is historically and geographically situated at the cross­
roads between core, periphery and the former socialist European societies 
(Leontidou 1990: 1). In its territory various cultural currents, attitudes and so­
cial behaviours meet each other in numerous combinations. Patriarchal or ma­
triarchal remnants of social organization still survive (mostly in remote rural 
areas), albeit not as much as active elements of social Ufe, but rather as "folk­
lore" elements.* Due to the growing incorporation of agriculture in modern
' For instance, in Ikaria island, there is a folklore matriarchal tradition in which one 
day each year all men stay home doing all homework while women walk around in bars and 
cafes playing backgammon and cards, drinking ouzo, and generally behaving in an extreme 
"masculine" fashion.
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capitalist relations and production methods (Moisidis 1986) -  a process streng­
thened by the inflow of EC funds in the agricultural sector since 1981 
(Maravegias 1989)- precapitalist forms of social organization in the country­
side are being permanently destroyed by being incorporated into the "cru-
sible" of the dominant capitalist mode of production on a growing scale, 
^whfle^ urban populations have long before adopted western values in econ­
omic, social and cultural terms. As a survey of modern Greece published in 
The Economic (22 May 1993) remarks:
The Greeks _ are not quite like anybody else, anywhere, and they are 
especially different from the Slavs and Turks and Arabs who occupy 
so much of the neighbouring part of the worlcL.
These 10m people live at the south-eastern edge of the culture-area 
called the West Their Parthenon-building ancestors began that culture, 
and their Byzantine ancestors kept it alive when the rest of Europe 
had fallen into the dark ages. If the West eventually gave the World 
the Enlightenment, it was Greeks who had provided much of the lights
The Greeks of 1993 are still recognisably their ancestors’ descendants. 
The original blood has been blended with the blood of Turks and Slavs 
and others, but the face in a modern A tbens street or a rural corner o f 
the Peloponnese is not a face from  Istanbul or Belgrade (Beedham 
1993: 3; emphasis added).
Although the capitalist transformation of Greece was never completed 
as in the core economies, its socio-economic structure has not a dual character 
like most Third World countries.^ As Tsoucalas (1990: 19) remarks, the con­
temporary Greek economy and society has the major features of the ad­
vanced ones in terms of production and consumption levels, educational 
system, cultural and political institutions, etc. But on the other hand, these 
similarities do not imply that Greece has a "pure'’ capitalist character. As we 
will see later, employment in agriculture has remained high -despite the sec­
tor’s growing incorporation in modern capitalist relations and production 
methods. The percentage of self-employed remains high in relation to the 
core countries, multiple forms of employment and informal economic
 ^ The discussion of "dualism" in socio-economic development, was recently extended 
to include advanced capitalist countries like US which present a significant schism between 
zones of growth and wealth on the one hand, and zones of poverty and marginalisation on 
the other (see Albert 1993: 49-53; Wolff 1994).
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strategies are usual, and tax evasion has been a kind of "national sport" (see 
Tsoucalas 1986; Negrepondi-Delivani 1990; Tsiros 1991; Kanellopoulos 1992; Ka- 
rakousis 1992; Lytras 1993).
These characteristics -which Greece shares with other South European 
countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal (FMS 1986)- reflect the unique path 
Greek society followed in the process of its capitalist transformation. 
However, the relative lack of interest of conventional theories for the semi­
periphery, has led Greek writers and researches to adopt explanatory models 
addressed to either advanced capitalist societies^ in which monopoly capital 
relations and analogous forms of state intervention predominate (see e.g. Mal- 
lios 1979; Samaras 1982; Dovas 1980; Pavlidis 1987% or, inversely, to Third 
World societies characterised by dual forms of production organization (see 
e.g. Vergopoulos 1975; Mouzelis 1978; Fotopoulos 1985; Lambos 1988). Both 
theoretical perspectives agree that the contemporary Greek social formation 
is long before dominated by capitalist relations (Lytras 1993: 151 ff). The 
points of disagreement, however, refer to the type and character of capital­
ism’s penetration in Greece.
The first group of approaches asserted that state-monopoly capital 
relations have fully grown within the Greek production system, but in a dis­
torted manner stemming from the country’s dependence upon imperialist 
centres and especially upon USA. According to their views, Greek capitalism 
is a distorted and dependent state monopoly capitalism with an average level 
of development of its productive forces. These views can be questioned on 
three particular grounds: First, they presuppose the predominance of indus­
trial monopolies in the contemporary Greek economy. However, as will see 
more analytically in chap. 3, sect 3.1, it is rather the SMEs that predominate 
-by most respects- within the Greek industrial system. Second, they presup­
pose the existence of a perfectly organized state apparatus able to express 
with the most efficient way the collective interests of the industrial class by 
means of long-term planning policies and procedures. However, as we will see
 ^ On the conceptual and methodological problems that arise when societies like 
Greece are approached by means of explanatory schemes that stem from the theory and ex­
perience of advanced capitalism, see Tsoucalas i981a: 15-9.
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later on in this chapter, the Greek state machinery and its planning capacities 
are far away from such an efficiency. Third, by attributing to foreign de­
pendency a predominate role these views have underestimated the internal 
socio-economic transformations which have played an important role to the 
development of post-war Greece, as we will see more analytically in chap. 3.
The second group of approaches, asserted that post-war Greece shares 
some common characteristics with dual societies of the "Third World" pe­
riphery, as for instance (a) the coexistence of modern capitalist relations and 
precapitalist forms of production and social organization, especially in agri­
culture and industry, (b) the decisive role of petty producers in the develop­
ment of Greek economy, (c) the problematical articulation between the 
primary and the secondary sectors, (d) the dependence of industry upon 
foreign capital, (e) the political dependence of the native bourgeoisie upon 
foreign decision centres, etc. These views had strong reflections on early 
PASOK Socialists* (1970s-mid 1980s) politico-ideological rhetoric (Elefantis 
199k chap. 3). However these views faded away as it was gradually revealed 
during Socialists* service to office in the 1980s that they rather functioned as 
ideological elements of a populist political rhetoric, than as elements of real 
policy. At the scientific level, they have been also criticised (Milios 1988: 
318-24) on two particular grounds: (a) Firstly, despite their relevant contribu­
tion in analysing particular aspects of the post-war Greek economy and so­
ciety, they also tended to overemphasise the role of external forces and 
determinations (economic and political dependency), at the expense of inter­
nal transformative processes -just like the "state-monopoly capital" ap­
proaches. In the lights of this criticism, we assert that these transformations 
should be understood in systemic and dialectical terms: Modern Greek society, 
in its post-war drive to economic growth and industrialization (chap. 3, sect
3.1) has internally incorporated various traditional (precapitalist) and modern 
capitalist features, external and internal forces and determinations, and has 
re-synthesized them into a unique capitalist structure having its own particu­
lar logic of development and reproduction differing from both the advanced 
and peripheral capitalism, (b) Secondly, these approaches tend to identify the 
existence of petty ownership and petty production in the industrial sector
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with patterns of simple commodity production and further with precapitalist 
remnants (Lytras 1993: 154-58). However, as Marx (1978a edn., VoL 1: chap. 12) 
has shown, the development of small manufacturing units is functional to in­
dustrial capitalism and hence their existence does not contradict the very "na­
ture" of capitalist relations. Furthermore, in an era of flexible specialization, 
SMEs have been regarded as a viable alternative to the crisis of mass produc­
tion (Piore and Sabel 1984; Storey, ed. 1985; Scott 1988). As stated in an report 
prepared for the Commission of the European Communities (CEC 1991: 53, 
57), the growth of SMEs over the last years in the developing "Mediterranean 
arc" of Europe, has brought about the emergence of a new economic dyna­
mism that tends to reduce the traditional socio-economic disparities between 
the industrially developed core regions and the less developed agrarian ones. 
The cases of "Third Italy" (Scott 1988: 43-59; Bagnasso 1992; Garofoli 1992) and 
of some Spanish areas (Vasquez-Barquero 1983; 1991) are good examples of 
such a SMEs-led new industrial dynamism. There is growing evidence that 
such production structures have started to emerge in certain areas of contem­
porary Greece (Hadjimichalis and Vaiou 1987; 1990) and in certain manufac­
turing branches like e.g. plastics (Lyberaki 1991; 1991a), garments (Lyberaki
1992) and chicken meet processing manufactures (Labrianidis 1992). In that 
context, it seems that the view according which the domination of the capi­
talist mode of production within a developing economy implies inevitably the 
growth of big capitalist units and an associated disappearance of the small 
ones, is rather simplistic -at least for the Greek case. As we will see later on 
(chap. 3, sect. 3.1), SMEs played a much important role during the period of 
the country’s rapid capitalist expansion and industrial growth (1960s -  mid 
1970s). They not only showed a remarkable degree of resistance to change 
during this big company-led industrialization period, but, also, they were not 
seriously affected by deindustrialization and crisis in the post 1973/74 era, by 
contrast to big companies which were seriously hu rt For the most part of 
post 1973/74 crisis period, not only SMEs were adding new manufacturing jobs 
in the labour m arket but they were also absorbing redundancies created by 
the crisis of big enterprises. SMEs, thus, functioned as a kind of "safety valve" 
within the Greek industrial system which prevented deindustrialization and 
unemployment from attaining explosive social dimensions as it happened in
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some advanced industrial economies like for instance US, UK, or Germany 
(see Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1994 for the US case; 
Martin and Rowthorn, eds. 1986; Allen and Massey eds. 1988 for the UK case; 
Frobel et al 1981 for the Germany case).
2.2. The Social-Urban interrelationships
In discussing the "nature" of the spatiality of social life, Edward Soja (1985) 
made two very important points: The first is that "the production of space jn 
not simply a mechanical extrusion of a frozen matrix which acts passively to 
contain society" and that "spatiality and temporality, human geography and 
human history, intersect in a complex social process which creates a constant­
ly evolving historical sequence of spatialities, a spatio-temporal structuration 
of social life which gives form not only to the grand movements of societal 
development but also to the recursive practices of day-to-day activity." (Soja 
1985: 94). The second point is that "as a social product, spatiality is simulta­
neously the medium and outcome, presupposition and embodiment, of social 
action and relationship." (ibid.: 98).
The above points can form the context for the examination of the way 
post-war Greek society and urban space interacted in multiple combinations 
to "produce" a unique socio-urban dynamic, within which the development 
and location of the Athenian manufacturing industry, as well as the associated 
socio-political actions and cultural attitudes, can be more easily addressed.
The fundamental elements that constitute the post-war Greek social- 
urban interrelationships are briefly the following:
(a) The rural exodus to the urban centres and especially to Athens dur­
ing the first post-war decades (tables 2.1, 22), was the driving force of the 
country’s socio-economic transformation, industrialization and incorporation 
into the world capitalist market (see Wassenhoven 1980 and 1984; Stathakis 
1983; Andrikopoulou and Kafkalas 1985: chap.5). Indicative of this is that the 
growth of urban population all over the post-war period, coincided with the
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growth of industrial and manufacturing production -although in a much 
slower rate (table 2.3).
Table 2.1 Greek population by urban, semi-urban and rural areas, 1951-81
Census year Total % Urban % Semi-
urban
% Rural %
1951 7,632,801 100 2,879,994 37.7 1,130,188 14.8 3,622,616 47.5
1961 8,388,553 100 3,628,105 43.3 1,085,856 12.9 3,674,592 43.8
1971 8,768,641 100 4,667,489 53.2 1,019,421 1L6 3,081,731 35.1
1981 9,740,417 100 5,659,528 58.1 1,125,547 11.6 2,955,342 30.3
% Change 1951-61 
% Change 1961-71 
% Change 1971-81
9.9
4.5
11.1
26
28.6
2L3
-3.9
- 6.1
10.4
1.4
-16.1
-4.1
SOURCE: Adapted from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1986,
Athens 1987: table IL5 (own calculation of percentages).
Table 2.2 Population o f some main Greek urban centres, 1951-1991 (*)
Urban cenres 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Greater Athens 1,378,586 1,852,709 2,540,241 3,027,331 3,072,922
Thessaloniki 297,164 380,648 557,360 706,180 749,048
Patras 93,037 103,985 120,847 154,596 170,452
Irakleio 58,285 69,983 84,710 110,958 132,117
Volos 65,090 81,383 88,295 107,407 116,031
Larissa 41,016 55,391 72,336 102,048 113,090
(*) Only centres with 100,000+ of population (1991) are included 
SOURCE: NSSG, Greece in Figures 1994, Athens 1994: table Lb.
Table 2.3 Indices o f urban population, industrial and manufacturing 
production 1951-199L
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Urban population (a) 100 126 162 197
Industrial production (b) 100 243 614 894 1,005
Manufacturing production (b) 100 214 588 949 965
SOURCE* Own calculations (a) from table 21 (b) from table A.1 (appendix I).
(b) However, post-war economic growth and industrialization was 
never completed to such a degree as to break down the historical links with 
former traditional forms of economic activity, like petty agrarian production.
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small handicraft and artisanal activities, or petty commerce. Despite employ­
ment growth in non primary activities, agricultural employment has still re­
mained high in comparison to other OECD countries (table 2.4). The peasants
Table 2.4 Employment by sector in Greece and OECD as a percentage o f 
civilian employment 1951-1988.
Sectors 1951 1961
(1960)
1971
(1974)
1981 1988
Agriculture -Greece 59.3 55.7 41.4 28.1 26.6
-OECD M . . . 2L6 1L8 9.4 7.9
Industry -Greece 17.3 19.8 27.0 30.1 27.2
-OECD »###» 35.3 36.0 33.2 30.0
Manufacture -Greece 14.2 13.9 17.5 19.2 19.3
-OECD *#### 26.0 26.5 23.8 2L1
Services -Greece 23.4 24.4 3L6 41.8 46.2
-OECD •  ••M 43.1 52.5 57.3 62.1
SOURCE: For 1951-81 Greek data, own calculations from table A.3
(appendix I). For 1988 Greek data: OECD Historical Statistics 
1960-1988, Paris 1990: 40-1 For OECD data (aU years): OECD 
(ibid.).
which moved to the big cities -and especially to Athens- searching for jobs, 
were not alienated from their properties as in Europe during the period of 
primitive accumulation -which Marx analysed in his Das Kapital(}A^.r\ 1978a 
edn., VoLl: 738-88). This, allowed them to occupy more than one "positions" in 
the "map" of the division of labour and in the class structure of society 
(Tsoucalas 1986). There seems to exist a kind of social and geographical 
"continuum" between city and country allowing for income transfers between 
these two poles (Tsoucalas 1990: 59-60; Androulakis 1991; Lytras 1993:169). For 
instance, people employed normally in the urban economy, may simultaneous­
ly have supplementary earnings from agricultural or/and tourist activities in 
the countryside. According to an estimation (Tsiros 1991) two thirds of those 
having multiple employment live in rural areas. This is due to the fact that 
seasonal work in agriculture allows local people to engage in other forms of 
economic activity and income earning, in sectors like tourism (Tsartas 1991), or 
even to work as part-time employees in manufacturing SMEs that have 
started to flourish at certain rural areas near peripheral urban centres
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(Hadjimichalis and Vaiou 1987 and 1990). It also seems that the ongoing 
emergence of manufacturing subcontracting in such peripheral areas 
(Labrianidis 1992) allows the local populations for more "freedom" in choosing 
multiple forms of employment The structure of the family facilitates such 
practices in that the younger prefer to move to the urban centres (while 
keeping regular contacts with their rural birthplaces), the elderly stay in the 
countryside to take care of the property, while the whole family operates as a 
single entrepreneurial and income distribution unit among its members. A big 
metropolitan economy -like the Greater Athens’ one- seems to offer ample 
chances of multiple forms of employment People employed normally in the 
industrial or service sector of the urban economy may own and run on the 
same time (usually with the assistance of their families) a small shop or a 
small artisanal firm and work there on the afternoons as self-employed inde­
pendent merchants or craftsmen. Public servants (especially engineers, techni­
cians of various kinds, or Hospital doctors), may own their private service 
offices. Relevant evidence revealed that almost 50% of employed in the 
public sector, have a second (and usually not declared) job (Karakousis 1992). 
The reasons for multiple employment and informality have definitely to do 
with the post-war dramatic increase of the living costs, combined with the in­
ability of the formal economy to provide working people with satisfactory in­
comes -due to its structural weakness and its long-lasting crisis (see chap. 3, 
sect 3.1). In that respect, multiple employment and informality can be seen as 
a form of "resistance" of working people against the worsening of their living 
standards and against the suffocating presence of the state in the economic 
sphere. But on the other hand, this phenomenon is definitely associated with 
the widespread "culture" of consumptionism and with the strive of Greeks 
for social ascent and social success.
(c) Of crucial importance to the formation and reproduction of the 
contemporary Greek social and urban structure, has been the role of landed 
property. Broad pre-war agricultural reforms initiated by Eleftherios Venize- 
los, favoured the landless refugees of the Minor Asia disaster (1922) and the 
land workers: It is estimated that public lands were shared among 250,000 
families reaching a total population of 840,000 persons (Lytras 1993:158). The
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maintenance of their properties (along with their savings) allowed those who 
emigrated to North European industrial centres in the 1950s and 1960s for 
work, to come back and re-enter the economy not as industrial workers as in 
the receiving countries, but as self-employed in their own small commercial, 
manufacturing or artisanal firm in the cities -Le. it allowed them to upgrade 
their class position in the capitalist division of labour (Tsoucalas 1990: 24-6).
More specifically, the ownership of plots of land in Athens by working 
people, allowed them to live in private houses, constructed mainly through 
self-finance practices (Economou 1993: 336-7) or through the practice of 
"antiparohi" (FMS 1993: chap. 7). That is, a form of exchange "in kind" be­
tween the landowner and the developer, in which
the developer makes a legal pact with the landowner, whereby the 
former can develop the land and pay off the landowner with a percen­
tage of the newly-built floorspace. In this way, the landowner becomes 
a joint owner of this condominium property ... along with subsequent 
purchasers of shops or apartments in the new building (Wassenhoven 
1984a: 19).
In that context, as empirical research has revealed (Maloutas 1990a; 
1990b), a considerable part of working people in Athens live in private houses 
-a situation allowing them to feel "secure" in periods of economic recession 
and instability. As a matter of fact, the ownership of urban land and/or apart­
ments brings income (in the form of rent or sale price) that allows them not 
to enter the labour market as dependent (wage) labourers, but, instead, to 
carry on their own jobs as independent (self-employed) individuals. According 
to available 1983 data, wage earners represented 73% of the economically ac­
tive in Greater Athens, while employers and self-employed jointly repre­
sented the relatively high percentage of 24.7% (table 2.5). In a comparative 
viewpoint, the percentage of dependent labour in Greater Athens is much 
more lower than in other European metropolises (Tsoucalas 1986: 241). This is 
broadly reflected on the percentage of salaries and wages in the GDP: Com­
parative data show that this percentage in Greece is much lower from other 
European countries (table 2.6). It is very likely that incomes stemming from
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Table 2,5 Employers/self-employed and wage earners in Athens 1983.
Type of employment No Percent
Independent (employers/self-employed) 238,123 24.7
Dependent (wage earners) 704,233 73.0
Not-paid members of family businesses 22,363 2.3
Total 964,719 100.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Padazidis and Kasimati 1984: table IIL9 (own cal­
culation of percentages).
Table 2,6 Salaries and wages as percent o f GDP in Greece and in 
several other European countries 1977,1982
European countries 1977 1982
Greece 36.0 39.0
Spain 57.0 52.0
Germany 56.0 56.0
Branch 55.0 56.0
Italy 57.0 56.0
Portugal 58.0 54.0
United Kingdom 6L0 57.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Tsoucalas 1993: table 4.
private ownership of land and/or apartments, along with multiple forms of 
employment, might be the keys in explaining the "resistance" of the Athenian 
people to dependency from industrial capital and proletarization.
The relatively high percentage of self-employed in the active popula­
tion, has been perceived by analysts (Fotopoulos 1985; Vergopoulos 1986) as an 
indicator of the country’s "dependent development". Dependency, in fact, was 
evident during the first post-war decade when the decision centres of the 
country were shifted from parliament and government to the US embassy and 
the Greek economy was heavily based upon the American aid (and especially 
upon the Marshall Project -see Tsoucalas 1981). However, nowadays, one can 
hardly agree with such "dependency" schemes (Hletsos 1990:153). By contrast, 
the answer should be searched to the specific mode of the country’s capitalist 
transformation and to the role of the state in sustaining broad self-employed 
social strata in order to ensure and broaden its legitimation basis (Tsoucalas 
1986; Lytras 1993).
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(d) The rural exodus during the first post-war decades, initiated a 
strong housing demand which triggered the growth of building industry 
-mainly in Athens. The share of gross fixed capital investment in dwellings 
during the 1950s and 1960s was much higher than that in manufacturing 
-something that kept on in the following decades (table 2.7). The growth of
T able 2.7 % share o f gross fixed  capital formation by sector, 1950-1991.
Sectors 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1991
Agriculture 11.2 8.0 17.4 123 10.6 10.5 6.7 9.2 5.1
Mining/Quarrying 1.1 0.9 0.5 1.2 21 24 5.9 4.5 L9
Manufacturing 227 122 9.9 143 14.2 17.6 16.1 13.4 17.9 -
Energy 3.4 10.2 8.0 9.7 7.2 8.2 7.2 129 7.6
Transport/Commun/tion 17.1 9.3 18.8 17.1 20.8 19.0 21.0 220 21.9
Dwellings 29.7 44.2 29.2 3L6 27.9 27.4 29.4 20.8 222
Public administration 6.3 24 L4 0.4 L2 0.8 0.5 12 L4
Other service industries 8.4 129 14.7 13.4 16.0 14.1 13.2 16.0 220
Total ICO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.11 (appendix I).
building industry, in turn, stimulated (through various linkages) the growth of 
other manufacturing branches, like e.g. metal products, cement, non metallic 
minerals and wood products (Economou 1993: 346), facilitating therefore, the 
processes of industrialization, urbanization and economic growth as a whole in 
a cumulative causation manner (see Papagiannakis 1981; Antonopoulou 1987).
(e) Post-war industrialization was mostly capital intensive (chap. 3, sect
3.1), hence offering little opportunities for job creation on a massive scale. In­
dicative of this is that the percent increase of gross manufacturing product 
over the 1958-1988 period was much higher than that of manufacturing em­
ployment over the same period (table 28). This is why in spite of the 
industrial growth which took place during the 1960s - mid 1970s, migration to 
the industrial centres of Northern Europe -and especially to those of West 
Germany- took on massive dimensions (Andrikopoulou and Kafkalas 1985: 
143). However, unemployment continued to form a potential threat to the ef-
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Table 2.8 Gross manufacturingproduct (*) and employment 1958-1988.
1958 1969 1978 1988 % 1958-88
Gross manufacturing product (a) 
Manufacturing employment (b)
16,554 42,637 84,341 91,116 
441,092 501,521 671,496 706,307
450.4
60.1
(*) Million Drs at constant 1970 prices.
SOURCE: (a) Table A.4 (appendix I); (b) For 1958 table B.4 (appendix I); for
1969-88 table 3.22 (chapter 3).
forts undertaken by the post-war governments to stabilize the capitalist social 
order which was seriously questioned by the forces of the Left during the 
civil war (1946-49). Employment offered in the wider public sector -through- 
out extended patronage networks (Mouzelis 1978a; 1992a; Kazakos 1991)- re­
laxed the social pressures for jobs provision on the one hand, and consolidated 
the ideological basis of the post-war Greek capitalist order (legitimation) on 
the other. On the same time, it increased centralization since the major gov­
ernmental and public organizations were located in the Greek capital, and de­
prived the productive sectors of the economy from a major portion of the 
Greek labour force. For instance, between 1974 and 1991 public employment 
was increasing by 5.7% per annum (table 29), whereas manufacturing employ­
ment was increasing (1978-1988) by only 0.5% p.a. (calculated from table B.4 
-appendix I).
Table 2,9 Employment in the wider public sector 1974,1991.
1974 1991 Average annual public
employment growth
Central government (a) 179,889 311,272 + 4.3 %
Public Organizations (b) 142,500 322,000 4- 7.4 %
Local Authorities 21,600 42,000 + 5.6 %
Total Public employment 343,989 675,272 + 5.7 %
(a) Including mainly Ministries. In the numbers are also included: (i) the staff working at the 
various levels of public education and the priests (Ministry of Education and Religion) (ii) 
the hospital doctors (Ministry of Public Health), (iii) the corpse of Judges (Ministry of Jus­
tice) and (iv) the staff of the security forces (army, police, etc.).
(b) Various agencies and Organizations directly or indirectly controlled by the public sector.
The above categories do not include special public employment groups (like eg. medical 
staff of the Social Insurance Institution (IKAX extra staff for covering seasonal needs in 
public organizations, etc.
SOURCE: Adapted from Anti, No 503: 34. (Own calculation of the percents).
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This process, which was initiated and maintained by clientelistic practices and 
not by any prospects of creating a strong social state (as in Sweden for in­
stance), contributed to the creation of an excessively inflexible and inefficient 
urban-public sector, whose "servants" were more interested in maintaining 
their special privileges,^ rather, than in contributing to the efforts for rational 
regulation of the country’s problems.
*  *  *
Urban space and its socio-economic structure, has been functional to the 
post-war capitalist transformation of Greece. Let us analyse the fundamental 
urban realities in modern Athens.
Even a simple observation of the urban structure of Greater Athens, 
can convince that the Greek capital shares many common characteristics with 
every typical western metropolis. Several such indicative characteristics are, 
for instance, the following:
- The concentration in the CBD of luxury office buildings sheltering 
big national and international financial institutions (banks, insurance com­
panies, headquarters of native and multinational enterprises, etc.), interna­
tional hotels, luxury shopping centres, buildings of public administration and 
of other tertiary institutions.
-  The decentralization of residential areas to the suburbs and their 
horizontal differentiation according to the socio-economic status of their in­
habitants (TEE 1980:12; Maloutas 1990a: chap. 3; 1990b: 135; 1992: 75-134). For 
instance, in the western and north-western municipalities of the Athenian ag­
glomeration where traditionally working strata live, the residential apartment 
blocks are built in close proximity to each other, in poor condition, with strik­
ing lack of open spaces and social overhead facilities. On the contrary, in most 
areas of the northern, eastern and southern suburbs where wealthier (middle
* Such privileges, are for instance the job permanency of all public servants, extra 
allowances, lack of pressures for work productivity etc.
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and upper strata) live, the  apartm en t blocks are usually built in the  m idst of 
organized green spaces, w ith private  car parking and o ther facilities (shopping 
centres, private schools and hospitals, a th letic  and recreation  fields etc.). C er­
tain dow ngraded inner-c ity  areas, as fo r instance around O m onoia and Vathis, 
K ato Patissia, etc., o ffe r  residence to various ethnic m inorities (im m igrants 
from  Pakistan, Polland, Turkey, and from  other underdeveloped countries), 
involved in tem porary, low -paid and often  black jobs provided in the ui/er- 
ground economy (for an analysis of those m inorities’ w orking  practices see 
P etrin io ti 1993a). The social segregation o f residence, follows, in rough lines, 
the land value gradient as shown in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Spatial distribution o f land values (*) in Greater Athens, 1991. (In 
Drs per sq.m.)
300-420.000 
240-291 
i m  190-230.000 
155-185.000 
l i l i l i l  127-153.000
97-126.000 
58- 96.000
(*) As estim ated by the M inistry o f  National Econom y. 
SOURCE: M aloutas 1992: 124.
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- The linear expansion of tertiary office, commercial and directorial 
activities from the CBD outwards along big avenues -e.g. Kifissias avenue, Pi­
raeus avenue, etc. (Agelidis 1985 and 1989a).
- There are also historical central-city residential areas (e.g. Plaka) with 
old buildings of a remarkable cultural and aesthetic value, where upper- 
middle and bourgeois strata live after the displacement of former artisanal, 
commercial and entertainment activities through the implementation of a re­
newal programme and the operation of inexorable gentrification processes 
(Sarigiannis 1986).
- Clusters of manufacturing work and local linkages have remained in 
their traditional inner-city locations as for instance Eleonas (chap. 8), whereas 
new industrial localities have developed in specific suburban areas along 
major transport arteries (chap. 4).
From the above -descriptive- points of view, the aggregate socio-eco­
nomic and geographical structure of contemporary Athens is in general lines 
similar to any typical western urban area.
However, things differ considerably if viewed more closely. The most 
striking difference between Athens and advanced capitalist cities is the el­
ement of mixture in the land-use fabric. By contrast to the strict socio-eco­
nomic zoning of North European and American cities, Athens (like other
cities of the Mediterranean South) manifests a remarkable heterogeneity and 
multiplicity in the organization of urban space and in its social structure. For 
instance, at almost every block of the city (with the exception of some upper- 
class suburbs), there is a variety of shopping and retail activities sheltered in 
the groundlevel of the apartment buildings; the upper floors shelter residen­
tial apartments and/or service offices (lawyers, dentists, doctors, engineers, 
etc.), while in many basements (especially at central city areas) there are 
warehouses or small manufacturing and handicraft firms serving the basic 
needs of the population. Although the suburbanization trend has pushed 
manufacturing to the outskirts since the 1970s (chap. 4), there still exist
69
numerous small manufacturing units in their traditional "niches" at central- 
city areas that present a remarkable degree of "resistance to change" -as fo­
cused research (Wassenhoven et al 1989) has revealed. In some traditional 
central-city industrial areas, as for instance Eleonas, next to manufacturing 
plants there are residential buildings, schools, kindergartens, shops and ware­
houses, governmental and University buildings, bus and truck-transport sta­
tions, vacant land used for waste disposal, army camps and numerous other 
activities situated in an obviously chaotic manner (chap. 8). As a matter of 
fact, by contrast to the strict zoning principles characterizing for long the in­
ternal structure and growth of North European or American cities, every plot 
of urban space in Athens serves multiple economic purposes and is used sim­
ultaneously by a wide variety of social strata: Thus, the whole city resembles 
a "puzzle" of socio-economic activity at both the horizontal and vertical di­
mensions. As Leontidou writes.
Southern European working-class communities are somewhat mixed 
socially ... This contrasts with Anglo-American social geography, where 
working-class areas tend to be the most segregated and socially homo­
geneous. This mixture of middle and working classes is due, among 
other factors, to alternatives to community segregation, which are not 
met in the North. The most widespread is vertical differentiation ..- 
With the exception of some slum areas and modern housing districts, 
the middle and working classes live together in vertically stratified ^  
apartment blocks, the working class and service labourers in lower 
floors, the wealthier on top floors and in penthouses (Leontidou 1990:
12).
This mixed land-use pattern had in the past led to views stating that 
Athens is a parasitic city -a city resembling Third World ones (Burgel 1976). 
Such views have their origins to the studies of urbanization in Third World 
countries, as it was mentioned earlier. The conceptual transfer of such ex­
planatory schemes to the case of Athens, is based upon a profound ideological 
bias driving analyses away from reality -as other writers (Leontidou 1979: 
40-7; 1981a: chap. 5; 1986; Tsoucalas 1990: 54) have also remarked. Although 
during the inter-war period living and working conditions in Athens had cer­
tain similarities to Third World ones (see Pizanias 1993), post-war industrializ­
ation changed considerably the economic and social structure of the Greek 
capital (chap. 4).
\
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Other views, by contrast, (see e.g. Friedmann 1992), regard the element 
of mixture in the socio-urban fabric as positive in that it contributes to the
creation of a feeling of vitality, warmth, and variety in the everyday life of
citizens -a feeling hard to find in the cold, impersonal and disciplined cities 
of advanced capitalism. Although one can possibly agree with the idea of im­
plementing a kind of planned "land-use mixture" in the strict-zoning cities,^ 
ifs quite hard to agree with viewpoints, which, by overemphasizing the "psy­
chological" aspects of everyday life in unplanned mixed-up cities, tend to un­
derestimate the immense social and economic problems stemming from the 
inadequacies of planning controls and regulations, the spontaneous urban 
sprawl and the associated environmental problems, the lack of adequate infra­
structure, the lack of elementary internal organization and hierarchy of urban 
functions and the associated negative externalities that tend to paralyze the 
economic efficiency of such cities and the social well-being of their inhabit­
ants. This is especially true in the case of the Athenian industrial space where 
unplanned land-use development and change, contradictory social attitudes 
and prospects, inconsistent urban-industrial policies and legislative frame­
works, etc., predominate over any sense of economic rationality, organization 
and efficiency: As we will see later on in ^^rt^esis , the locational patterns of 
Athenian manufacturing are not simply identifiable in terms of the firms* 
sense of economic rationality in their locational or relocational decisions, 
alone, nor in terms of the state*s rational policies (land-use zoning and plan­
ning controls) as in the cities of advanced capitalism. The socio-economic 
structure of urban space in Athens follows a much more complicated and 
unique logic. A logic in which individual units’ rational choices coexist and in­
terrelate with public political attitudes and behaviours, social pressures and 
alliances, ideological and cultural priorities, local politics and contradictions, 
and so forth.
’ Recently, the strict zoning principles of the advanced capitalist cities was questioned 
by a committee of the Council of Europe (Hourdakis 1993: 110). According to the newly 
drafted "European Chart of City Planning" which was presented at Strasbourg on March 
1993 (ibid) the planned mixture of land uses in the urban fabric is expected to revitalise the 
European cities and to raise the quality and diversity of their citizens* lives.
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Population concentration in Athens, had also contributed in the past to 
the emergence of views about "overurbanisation", "pathological development", 
"cancerous growth", "monstrous size", "hydrocephalic form" of Athens, etc. 
Such views, by tending to overemphasize absolute numbers, neglected dy­
namic tendencies which show clearly that the Athenian population growth 
rate is continuously decreasing over the years (table 2.10). However, most rel­
evant studies in the 1970s (and even in the 1980s) contributed to the same 
ideological current in which the major debates were revolving around the 
issue of whether or not the Athens* size was the optimum one (for a critical 
presentation see Wassenhoven 1980: 191-5). It is not our concern here to com­
ment on the optimum city-size debate (on that issue see Gore 1984: 55-67). We 
can simply quote Wassenhoven’s statement that "the critical issue is not how 
large Athens is, but rather how Athens functions in the broader context of 
the national economy" (1980: 191). This is why the population concentration in 
capital, alone, cannot be regarded as an adequate indicator of convergence to 
Third World urbanization patterns, nor as a justification of the past "hysteri­
cal warnings" of an oncoming disaster of Athens.
Table 2.10 Population o f Greater Athens and Greece 1961-199L
Census year Greater
Athens
(G.A.)
Greece
(total)
as
G.A. po­
pulation 
% of the 
total
1961 1,852,709 8,388,553 22.1
1971 2,540,241 8,768,641 28.9
1981 3,027,331 9,740,417 3L1
1991 3,072,922 10,200,000 30.1
Average annual growth rate 1961-71 3.71 0.45
Average annual growth rate 1971-81 L92 111
Average annual growth rate 1981-91 0.15 0.47
SOURCE: For 1961-1981: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1986
Athens 1987: 15, 25. For 1991: NSSG, Greece in Figures 1994. 
Athens 1994: 2 (Own calculation of the percentages).
The previously analyzed characteristics, are not just precapitalist rem­
nants that sooner or later are destined to converge to western patterns in a 
Rostowian "stages of development" logic (for a brief presentation of Rostow’s
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theory see Keeble 1971: 249-53). Instead, they are functional to the country’s 
unique capitalist structure, to the specific manner through which Greek so­
ciety produces and reproduces the fundamental conditions of its existence. 
This is why, as we will see more analytically in this thesis, urban-industrial 
processes in Athens do not abide exclusively by the economic rationality 
norms of conventional theory, but, on the contrary, they should be studied 
and analysed in their own specific terms.
The above issues, pose the crucial question about the role of urban po­
licies and spatial planning to the location of economic activity in Greater 
Athens. Since industrial location planning policy is part of the broader state’s 
instrumentalities, the specific question cannot be separated from a more gen­
eral discussion about the role of the modern Greek state and of its relations 
to social structure.
2.3. State and Spatial Planning in Contemporary Greece
2.3.1. Some Diverging Views
Free discussions on the state issue and the role of intervention policies in 
Greece flourished mainly after the collapse of the military dictatorship and 
the restoration of democratic institutions (post 1974 period). Apart from pol­
itical and normative discussions on how the Greek state ought to function,^ a 
common point made by writers and researches of various ideological persua­
sions, is that the Greek state is generally ineffective, lacking internal coher­
ence and continuity in decision-making, and hence unable to stimulate a 
healthy economic development process (Nikolinakos 1987 and 1990; Giannitsis 
1989; Floros 1990; Tabakopoulos 1990; Loverdos 1991; Mouzelis 1990; Petmezi- 
dou and Tsoulouvis 1990; Nikolaou 1991).
 ^ Such views are periodically expressed by politicians and writers of all the political
spectrum. Conservative writers tend to emphasise the need for ''less state" as a precondition 
of stimulating entrepreneurial initiatives and economic development (see e.g. Andrianopou- 
los 1987; 1992). Left-wing writers answer that "less state" stands for "more state" in the ser­
vice of big capital and the ruling elite (see Bitsakis 1992; Fotopoulos 1991; Kotzias 1993). Left 
and socialist politicians and writers favour the strengthening of the social state’s functions 
(see e.g. Dragasakis 1985; Papachristos 1989) and the need for decentralized decision-making 
through democratic social dialogue and consensus (Simitis 1992).
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Discussions on the role of the state’s spatial policies, in particular, are 
relatively few in Greece. The main reflections are roughly shared between 
those adopting a conventional view of the "political", and those adopting vari­
ous Marxist and/or neo-Marxist perspectives.
In the context of the first group, spatial policies are interpreted in 
Keyensian terms as instrumentalities of a welfare state apparatus aiming at 
the decrease of socio-spatial disparities which are created by the free oper­
ation of the market forces (see e.g. Kottis 1980; Konsolas 1983). Such an out­
look of planning policy transfers analogous foreign practices and 
organisational experiences in the case of Greece. However, these practices and 
experiences,
were enacted and implemented in countries with a far better organized 
administration and a more widespread acceptance, among wide social 
strata, of the need to support an efficient government, operating for 
what is more or less recognised as the common good « (They) rest on 
assumptions of rational organization, rational thinking and rational 
decision-making. Decisions are thus legitimised with reference on one 
hand to values shared by a broad spectrum of social groupings and on 
the other to a belief that organized society, validly and democratically 
represented by government and the state machine under the govern­
ment’s control, is capable of making rational decisions, worthy of a 
scientific and technological tradition, which was the maker of that so­
ciety’s affluence and wealth (Wassenhoven 1993: 94-5).
For Marxist Greek spatial analysts and planners, there exists a certain 
hnk between the state’s spatial policies and the capitalist class interests across 
geographical space. Within this stream of thought, however, there are diverg­
ing views on the rigidity of that link - Le. on the degrees of freedom it allows 
for spatial regulations that contrast with the strategic aims of the capitalist 
class and particularly of its more powerful fractions. These views are roughly 
shared between those adopting the "state-monopoly capital" theorems on the 
one hand, and those adopting Structural -Marxism or other Neo-Marxist per­
spectives on the other.
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T h e j^ fi^  approach views spatiaLplanning_a&_an_insirument in the hands 
of capital (especially the monopoly fraction of it) in order to facilitate its ef­
fective location across space and to regulate spatial order in such a way as to 
maximize its profit rates (Sarigiannis 1984; 1988). Such views, have indeed an 
empirical supportive base relating to particular cases -like the case of the 
location of a petrochemical industrial complex in Galatas, Etoloakarnania 
Prefecture (Sarigiannis 1982). Such specific cases, however, are not evidently 
generalizable as to form a cohesive theoretical body, and the reason for this is 
that the "cornerstone" of the Greek industrial system is not made up of large 
enterprises, but, inversely, of small and medium ones (chap. 3, sect 3.1). More­
over, there is convincing research evidence (Lytras 1993: chap. 6; Moshonas 
1986) that industrial capitalists are n(^ t h e leading^r^^tion (or the hard core) 
of the Greek bourgeoisie, so as to be able to use spatial policies as mere "in­
struments" for the effective location of their production units.
The second group of approaches rejects the "state-monopoly capital" 
/instrumental thesis as oversimplified and views spatial planning as a com­
plex institution aiming at establishing and maintaining a relative balance be­
tween two contrasting sets of forces: (a) Forces leading to the creation of 
spatial conditions for the smooth functioning of capital accumulation; (b) 
forces leading to the creation of spatial requisites for the legitimation of the 
system and the maintenance of social harmony (Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984: 
65; Getimis 1989: 17; Pshychopedis and Getimis 1989: 31). Such approaches, 
however, which have been based upon O'Connor’s (1973) "accumulation -vs- 
legitimation" theory of the state, reflect the nature of planning in advanced 
capitalism (see e.g. Roweis 1981; Harvey 1985b: 175). That is to say, in societies 
in which the relations between the public and the private spheres are relative­
ly more stable and coherent than those in societies like Greece in which these 
relations are at a permanent "motion" according to the prevailing social atti­
tudes and political balances.
Although the previous approaches do have supportive empirical bases, 
we keep some reservations as to the extend they can form conceptual frame­
works going beyond the narrow logic of particular cases. The assumption that
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Greek state’s spatial policies share the characteristics of typical advanced 
states, is questioned (Hadjimichalis 1988: 136-7; Petmezidou and Tsoulouvis 
1990; Kourliouros 1992b) on the basis that this assumption presupposes the 
existence of relations of "externality" between state and society -which, as we 
will see in the next pages, simply do not exist to any considerable extend in 
Greece. Our basic reservation is that these approaches presuppose the exist­
ence of a rationality teleology, according which there is a reflective relation­
ship (of a feedforward - feedback kind) between society and state -a 
relationship operating in a deterministic and relatively stable manner without 
internal tensions, distortions and deviations (fig. 2.2). It actually makes little 
difference if one accepts that this rationality teleology refers to a "common 
good" principle of spatial organization -as pluralist planning theories accept 
(e.g. Dahl 1961; Pahl 1975), or, inversely, to the "rationale" of capitalist accu­
mulation and social reproduction across space as a whole, as Marxist spatial
F igure 2,2 Rational conception o f the society-state relationship in 
capitalism
socio-spatial needs
r
SOCIETY STATE
ài
political responce-planning
SOURCE: Kourliouros 1992b: 220.
analysts claim (e.g. Castells 1977; 1985; Preteceille 1981; Saunders 1984; 
McKeown 1987; Roweis 1981; Scott 1980; Lojkine 1976; 1977; Harvey 1985b). 
Both options, despite their eventual differences, seem to converge to a com­
mon point: To the existence o f relations of externality between society and 
state driving to a rationality teleology principle which operates as a general
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metric rule, or gnomon, regulating automatically the society-state 
relationships.
In the following lines we will try to show that things in the Greek 
context are usually much more perplexed and contradictory.
2.3.2. The Construction o f the Greek Political Sphere and the "Double State"
As historical and political research has revealed (Kontogiorgis, ed, (n.d.); Tsou- 
calas (n.d.): 73-112; Mouzelis 1978a; 1987; Haralabis 1989; Kazakos 199k 53-69; 
RG 1991), the historical construction of the political sphere in Greece, did not 
take place through the developmental dynamism of socio-economic and in­
stitutional modernization -as it did in the advanced western world (see Rosen­
berg and Birdzell 1987)- but through unique historical circumstances in which 
patronage and clientelism relations were playing a decisive role in the politi­
cal decision-making process. It has been argued in various writings (for a de­
tailed presentation see Wassenhoven 1980: 280-5) that the imposition of a 
foreign -Bavarian- political administration after the independence of Greece 
from Ottoman rule, led to the creation of a widespread "mistrust" between the 
citizens and the state. Confronted with a state machine which was not felt as 
"their" state and with laws which were not felt as "theirs", the Greeks were 
reacting by finding ways to get around the laws throughout their incorpor­
ation in extended patronage networks. However, this was not the result of 
historical reasons, alone. Economic and social change played a much important 
role: Towards the end of 19th century, the contradictions between a decentra­
lized agrarian economy based on the traditional landed interests and a cen­
tralized urban economy based on industrialization and modern institutions and 
supported by an emerging urban bourgeoisie, had reached a peak (Svoronos 
1992:100 ff.). Western-oriented politicians and political parties -as representa­
tives of this emerging bourgeoisie- were feeding the patronage model in 
order to increase their political influence upon the state machine "from the 
inside" (Mouzelis 1990). Thus, the state, as Wassenhoven (1980: 286) wrote, 
"was turned into an arena of conflict not of social classes fighting for their 
class interests but of individuals fighting for personal benefits."
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Historical conditions have pf course changed, and the modern Greek 
state is typically Greeks’ state, but it seems that the citizens* mistrust for 
"their" state and "their" laws has remained -although in a different context 
For almost three decades after the end of world war II, the Greek political 
arena was permanently experiencing successive periods of turbulence: Civil 
war during the second half of the 1940s, direct American involvement in pol­
itical matters during the 1950s, exile of communists and official separation of 
Greeks according to their political beliefs into "lawfully thinking" 
(nomimofrones) and "unlawfully thinking" (which was synonymous to "trai­
tors"), terrorism excersised by police and para-state organizations upon the 
Left, interference of the Palace in elected governments, extended political 
corruption, military coup d’ etat imposed in 1967 -were just a few deviations 
from what Greeks could have felt as "their state" if things had developed in 
an ordinary democratic way.
The collapse of the military government in 1974 and the restoration of 
the typical democratic institutions in the period that followed, brought about 
a considerable improvement in the state-citizen relationships. Some major 
modernization developments took place. The parliamentary institutions were 
fully restored, the official discriminations between Greeks according to their 
political beliefs were removed, the Communist Party was legalized and the 
1975 Constitution secured the equity of all Greeks. Under those conditions, 
the forces of socio-economic and political modernization increased their in­
fluence (Spanou 1993) and Greece became a full EC member in 198L However, 
in spite of these changes, the state machine continued to keep most of its au­
thoritarian/ despotic characteristics inherited from the past (Mouzelis 1990). 
Since the weak industrial economy was unable to absorb labour surpluses, 
public employment kept to be the major aim of the clientelistic practices. In 
that context, the major Greek governmental parties operated as "vehicles" for 
the realisation of such practices, rather, than as makers of development policy 
and ideology (Nikolinakos 1990; Floros 1990; Androulakis 1991; Loverdos 1991; 
Tsatsos 1991).
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The final result of the historical formulation of the political sphere, as 
described above, is a contradictory "scenery" characterised by the coexistence 
of multiple mechanisms of political function and control, which seem to 
create and reproduce a scheme of "double state" within the formal state 
itself:
The state as a technocratic and modernization mechanism It refers to 
that part of the state apparatus which is influenced by technocrats, modern 
political reformers, and by the fraction of the entrepreneurial class that aims 
at economic rationalism/efficiency, technology-led industrial development 
and at establishing and diffusing major institutional and cultural reforms 
within the socio-economic structure of the country. This "part" of the state 
and its relations to society are dominated by formal social behaviours and 
political attitudes operating within more or less commonly accepted 
parliamentary institutions. Within this "environment" the prevailing type of 
social action is the one based on the logic of "class interest" and "class 
conflict".
The state as a patron/employer. It refers to that part of the state in­
fluenced by populist politicians of all major parties, which, through the state 
apparatus provide public employment opportunities and other special econ­
omic privileges to their political clients (individuals and/or organized interest 
groups). Within this "type" of state and of its relations to society, social action 
is based upon informal practices, and the corresponding political culture tends 
to favour individual gains instead of collective goals.
These two "types" of state function and control, are not isolated but 
operate in mutual relationship to each other, whereas the relative balance be­
tween them is not stable, but depending on the changing political 
circumstances.
It has been stated (Milios 1993: 60) that analytical emphasis on clientel­
ism in approaching the Greek political sphere, tends to remain at the "surface 
movement of the world", and to disguise the real social processes which
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continue to base themselves on the logic of class struggle. Probably this view 
stems from a reductionist interpretation of Marxism -an interpretation that 
tends to view social and historical processes, with all their peculiarities and 
complexities, in a monocausal manner as the "history of class struggle" alone. 
Definitely, class relations and class conflict do play an important role within 
the Greek socio-political arena, but not in isolation: Class-based social action 
and political attitudes interrelate in numerous combinations with informal 
practices, clientelistic strategies etc., posed by both separate individuals and 
organized social groupings. As a matter of fact, what normally results, is a 
complex "mosaic" which is hardly identifiable in terms of "pure" class 
relations, alone. It has also been argued (Kotzias 1993: 75-8) that patron - cli­
ent relations are not only idiomorphic features of the semiperiphery, but 
characterise to a certain extend the advanced capitalist world as well Accord­
ing to him (Kotzias 1993: 77), many social scientists from Max Weber to Tal- 
cott Parsons have referred extensively in their works to the role of 
clientelism in the advanced capitalist societies. What, however, seems to dis­
tinguish clientelism in the advanced industrial world from clientelism in the 
Greek semiperipheral society, is the extend to which this type of social prac­
tice has been diffused within the social tissue. While in the advanced world 
clientelism has been mainly associated with the establishment of "favourable" 
relations between separate big capital interests and state mechanisms (see 
Baran and Sweezy 1973 for the USA case) in Greece, instead, it has corroded 
much more extended "areas" of the social tissue, creating, thus, a mass culture 
and mentality based on the logic of "individual benefit" and not on the logic 
of collective values and goals.
Those basic features of the Greek political reality are inextricably 
bound together with the incomplete and insecure presence of a modernization 
culture in the structure of contemporary Greek society. Mouzelis (1992a) 
identifies two contrasting types of political culture which have been histori­
cally developed in contemporary Greece. As he asserts:
Like most societies which in relation to the West entered lately in the 
process of development, Greece experiences a permanent and diffused 
dichotomy between two contrasting types of political culture. The first
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one is a more traditionally oriented type, autochthonous, internally 
oriented and hostile to the ideas of Enlightenment and Western institu­
tions. The other type is a modem externally-viewing orientation, which 
is striving to "reach" West by adopting western institutions and values 
(Mouzelis 1992a: AlO).
These two contrasting political cultures, which are reflected on -and 
operating into- the state apparatus, are constituted in such a way that the do­
mination of the one over the other is not permanent, but depending on the 
changing political circumstances and balances (Demertzis 1990).
The major problem which reproduces the traditional scheme of politi­
cal function and control and hinders the development and diffusion of the 
modernization culture in Greek society, is associated with the way the various 
socio-economic interests in post-war Greece were constituted, and with their 
relations to the state (Kazakos 199k 53-69; Kioukias 1994). The operation of 
the patronage system over the years and the lack of democratic traditions in 
government and citizens* participation institutions, gave rise to a guild-type 
organization of the various socio-economic interests into separate antagonistic 
groupings and sub-groupings struggling for their partial state-provided privi­
leges, without exhibiting any concerns or sensitivities for collective objectives. 
The state, on the other hand, especially under the Socialists* administration in 
the 1980s, promoted some forms of organized interests’ representation to the 
decision-making bodies, which were giving the impression of typical corpo- 
ratist processes. In practice, however, these forms operated rather as decor­
ative elements within the political scenery -leading, therefore, to what 
Kazakos (1991: 61-2) identified as "pseudo-corporatism" and Christophilopoulos 
(1990: 113) as "pseudo-participation". The participatory forms were simply con­
fined to accepting or rejecting the already made decisions and not to the 
actual procedures of their formulation. In that context, they rather formed el­
ements of the "public relations" image of the governing party, than elements 
for the making and implementation of consensual long-term policy objectives 
(Kazakos 1991: 61).
Some other inherent characteristics of the contemporaray Greek econ­
omy and society have contributed to this "horizontally" diversified and
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contradictory nexus of guild-type interests and to the type of relations they 
developed with the state. Multiple forms of employment and income earning 
-as we saw earlier in this chapter- have hindered the organization of socio­
economic interests across class-based lines and collective bargaining strategies; 
instead, they have encouraged occasional alliances and fragmentary practices 
striving not to attain collective objectives but short-term individual gains. 
Underground economy and informality have also contributed to this process 
(for an analysis of the role of informal economy -or paraeconomy- in Greece, 
see Negrepondi-Delivani 1990; Kanellopoulos 1992).’ Informal economic prac­
tices -no matter whether they are attributed to separate individuals or to 
broader socio-professional groupings- do not usually commit themselves to 
class-based strategies or to institutionalized procedures. Instead, they tend to 
pursue political support and legitimacy throughout "exo-institutional" (e.g 
clientelistic) accesses to the centres of political power. Last but not least, 
there seems to be a direct relationship between the continuing economic re­
cession and deindustrialization and the intensification of guild-type practices 
(Kazakos 1991: 66-7) -a relationship which has led to an increased inability of 
the state machine to promote co-ordinated planning objectives on a long-term 
basis.
The above make evident that in the contemporary Greek socio-politi­
cal scenery: (a) the clear-cut logic of class interest/class struggle as a means of 
attaining collective objectives, is to a lesser or greater extend subordinate to 
the "opaque" logic of occasional guild-type claims and clientelistic practices, 
and (b) the logic of individual gains -Le. what Tsoucalas (1993) calls "free rid­
er" attitudes- tends to predominate over the logic of social benefit and of the 
associated collective values.
 ^ The fluid and unstable balances between formality and informality characterize -to
a certain extend- all Southern European countries; for instance, the informal economy in 
Italy is estimated to reach about 20% of the GDP, in Portugal 22% and in Spain 15-25% 
while one third of the employed in this country are working illegally (Kanellopoulos 1992: 
39). Informality reflects the unique path of those countries’ capitalist transformation in their 
drive to reach the growth levels of core economies. It is estimated that by 1988 informal 
activities in Greece, reached 31% of the GDP (ibid: 39).
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The above points can form the wider socio-political framework within 
which the characteristics and the role of urban planning policies in Greece 
can be addressed.
2.3.3. Spatial Organization and Social Attitudes: Some Empirical Examples
Let us start our approach to the "nature" and role of spatial planning, by pro­
viding a set of characteristic empirical examples of how spatial organization 
and social attitudes tend to interrelate in contemporary Greece.
-In March 1989, industrial workers prevented highly polluting plants 
from relocating outside Athenian residential areas; in doing so, they came in 
confrontation with police and local population resulting in lots of injured and 
arrested people ( Ta Nea, 17 March 1989; Proti, 17 March 1989).
-It is a common practice that industrialists reject to locate their plants 
in ETVA’s (Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development) regional industrial es­
tates in order to avoid environmental and other labouring and production con­
trols (Vliamos et aL 199k 78), creating, thus, a chaotic industrial landscape 
which brings about more problems than benefits in regional economies. On 
the other hand, lot of money from  the state budget has been spent for the 
construction of industrial estates in peripheral areas that had no the slightest 
comparative advantage for attracting and sustaining manufacturing, just be­
cause local pressures and politics imposed their will upon the governmental 
decision-makers (Vliamos et aL 1991: 77; Vliamos 1988:134).
-University Faculties and Departments (without the necessary staff and 
equipment) have been scattered throughout the countryside without any rel­
evant developmental goal -except, perhaps, the clientelistic satisfaction of 
local pressures by the state (Labrianidis 1993; see also Ta Nea, 18 February
1993).
-Local population in Nea Kallikrateia, Chalkidiki, -a coastal tourist 
area in Central Macedonia- along with construction workers, possessed the
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local police station because the chief officer tried to hinder the construction /  
of illegal tourist buildings ("rooms to let") in that area {Enimerotiko Deltio 
TEE No 1755: 3).
-Forest fires set at combined successions in woodlands around major 
urban centres (and especially around the Athenian agglomerartion) have been 
a usual means for public land grabbing, subdivision into plots and illegal de­
velopment The lack of a national cadastral survey system makes possible 
such practices covered typically by forged "property titles" which usually 
emerge as originating "legally" from the period of Ottoman rule. The inad­
equacies of the state's emergency machinery and local social alliances feed 
such practices, and any resistance raised eventually against them is met with 
open hostility (at the best). Two characteristic examples of such attitudes are 
the following events:
-In February 1992, public land occupiers in Agios Stefanos, a northern 
high land-price suburb of Athens, injured the vice-president of a local 
ecological organization -by shooting him (sic)- in order to suppress any 
likely resistance against public land grabbing and illegal housing devel­
opment in that area (7b Vima, 28 February 1992). The government re­
acted by sending bulldozers to demolish illegal housing. Local 
population came in confrontation with the police force which was sent 
to supervise the operation. Finally, only a few improvised cottages 
were demolished, despite the official claims that all illegal construc­
tions in Attica would be bulldozed. Ironically, the illegal housing 
"clearance" operation ended a few days later, and the Under-secretary 
of the Ministry of Environment promised that illegally built-up areas 
in Attica (extending over 7,000 Ha or so) would be soon incorporated 
into the statutory city-plan {KatbimeriDi, 11 April 1993). Once more, 
Greek society as a whole, was forced to finance (through the state 
budget) the construction of urban infrastructure in those illegally 
built-up areas, in order land owners-grabbers to sell plots of privately 
appropriated public land in a much higher price than they did before.
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Once more, local pressures and vote-catching political calculations pre­
dominated over the need for a rational organization of space.
-In December 1994, local population in Penteli, another northern high 
land-price suburb of Athens, prevented volunteer ecological organiz­
ations from reforesting a former public wooded area which was burnt 
some years ago, and which had been characterised by the Ministry of 
Agriculture as "land under reforesting". Local people asserted that the 
area was privately owned by them, and hence they had every legal 
right to subdivide and sell it as plots. In trying to "prove" their state­
ments to the police officers which arrived at the area, they presented 
"property titles" provided in 1824! (sic). Due to timely police interven­
tion, fights between local people and volunteer ecological organizations 
were finally avoided and the case took the normal way to the courts.
The Secretariat of the Ministry of Agriculture, admitted that the lack 
of a national real estate registration system allows for private appro- ^
priation of public land for speculative purposes ("Sky 100.4" Radio 
news broadcast, December 6th, 1994).
-In June 1994, civil engineers, construction workers and local people in 
Santorini -a tourist Cyclades island- possessed the building of the prefectural 
authority and threatened that they would also take over the island’s port and 
airport, because the Ministry of Environment decided to send specialists to 
check out whether some construction works in the island abided by environ­
mental protection criteria or not (TV news on June 28th 1994).
-In November 1994, local population in Glyka Nera (a northern Athe­
nian suburb), came in confrontation with police forces because they hindered 
the Public Electricity Enterprise from building energy transmission towers in 
their area, (which, supposedly, would downgrade the area) -although the pro­
ject was considered to be of crucial importance for Athens’ power supply 
needs (TV news on 21st of November 1994).
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2.3.4. On the "Dichotomous "  Nature of Greek Spatial Planning
There are numerous similar examples of such "social" (guild-type) attitudes 
relating with spatial organization, and there is no need to present them here 
in any further detail However, if one sets forth an examination of the mod­
ern Greek spatial planning machinery on the basis of the published official 
documents and studies, the numerous planning statutes, the hierarchies of 
plans and programs ranging from the nation-wide scale of the 5-year social 
and economic development programs to the regional, metropolitan and local 
scales, the organization of governmental planning agencies, the planning pro­
fessionals etc, he/she will not probably find considerable differences from the 
way spatial planning is practiced in most advanced capitalist countries, except, 
perhaps, the limited planning responsibilities appointed to local authorities 
and a considerable lag in efficient planning education (on that issue see Geor- 
goulis and Kourliouros 1987).
Until the 1970s, urban planning was officially conducted under the 
provisions of the first Town Planning Act issued in 1923 for areas included 
"within the statutory city-plans", while areas "outside the plan" were governed 
by more general legislation covering the whole Greek territory. Settlements 
with a population less than 2,000 were governed by special statutes. The first 
General Building Regulation (GBR) which was ratified in 1929, addressed the 
various technical details and standards for building developments within the 
statutory city-plans, the making of topographic and other technical maps, and 
included provisions as to the maximum height of buildings by city-sector and 
other related land development issues. In that context, "city-plans" were notl^  
ing more or less than street lay-out plans making the distinction between pri­
vate property and public space and providing specific regulations for building 
development (e.g. distances of the buildings’ facades from the edge of streets, 
ratio of covered by total plot’s area (syntelestis kalypsis -SK), floorspace/plot 
ratio (syntelestis domisis -SD), maximum number of storeys allowed to be er­
ected by city-sector, etc.). In those physical city-plans there was no specific 
reference to, or connection with, such issues like land-use development prio­
rities and strategies, zoning regulations, location of industrial and other
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economic activities in the cities, transportation planning and social infrastruc­
ture provision, environmental planning etc, -which have been common in 
western city- planning theory and practice (see Chapin 1965).
It should be noted however, that this simplistic physical "planning mo­
del" was in accord with the way building practices in urban space were taking 
place (see sect 2.2): That is, "exchanges in kind" between landowners and de­
velopers or self-financing practices and predominance of small independent 
developers in the building business. Since building industry for most part of 
the post-war period has been considered as a "safety valve" for re-warming 
the Greek economy (by means of its multiplier effects in other linked manu­
facturing branches and services), the land development procedures should be 
as fast and relatively simple as possible.
However, this "urban planning model" started to be questioned during 
the 1970s when the international economic crisis magnified the accumulated 
deficiencies and problems of the post-war Greek development process (chap. 
3, sect 3.1). Prior social pressures for official increases in the degree of urban 
land appropriation, resulted in L.395/68 which allowed for increases of the 
floorspace/plot ratios (FMS 1993: 123). Big cities -and especially Greater 
Athens- became more congested with less free space, poor infrastructure, in­
adequate social amenities, chaotic intra-urban industrial location patterns and 
growing negative externalities hindering their economic efficiency within the 
national economy. The need for planning reforms based on a new "philoso­
phy" and new institutional tools was becoming increasingly urgent
Several major attempts for modernization of the urban planning 
framework were undertaken during the early 1970s. The 1975 Constitution 
included for first time a set of provisions associated with spatial (urban and 
regional) planning. According to article 24, the country’s spatial reorganiz­
ation, the development of the settlement system, the internal organization and 
expansion of cities and towns, the acquisition of land for social facilities, the 
provision of housing for low-income groups and the management of natural 
environment are subjected to the responsibility of the state in order the
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functionality of settlements to be efficiently served and better living condi­
tions for all Greek people to be secured (Christophilopoulos 1990: 124). The 
LD 1262/72 offered official covering of the urban planning studies carried out 
since the late 1960s, and three distinctive hierarchical categories of plans were 
introduced -i.e. regional plans (at the prefectural scale), structure plans (at 
urban agglomeration scale) and general urban plans (GPSs) (at single munici­
pality scale). Moreover, land-use zoning concepts and controls were intro­
duced and a Special Fund (ETERPS) for financing the implementation of 
urban plans on the ground and the associated works was created (FMS 1993: 
124). In 1976, a special organization -"Public Enterprise for City Planning, 
Settlement and Housing" (DEPOS)- was created for the purpose of enacting 
direct public involvement in organized land development and social housing 
provision initiatives within and/or around urban areas. In 1978 the Ministry of 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works (YCHOP later YPECHODE) 
as the responsible governmental agency for the production and implementa­
tion of spatial plans and regulations was established, and a new planning law 
(L.947/1979) -drawing mainly from French and German experiences- intro­
duced some major innovative tools in the way urban planning was conducted 
till then.
Two were probably the most important tools the new planning law in­
troduced: The first one was the obligatory participation of land ownership (by 
40% of each private plot’s size and an additional amount of money) in the 
formation of the public spaces and in financing infrastructure works at urban 
development areas. The second was the introduction of the "Operational 
Urban Planning Zones" (ZEP) principle* in the planning system. Private land 
and money contribution for public benefit purposes in the cities was already 
in accord with the 1975 Constitution, and had to be a kind of "property tax" 
the urban landowners should have to contribute once and for all to the costs 
of development, "in exchange" for the higher value their remaining landed 
properties should acquire after the planned development On the other hand, 
the tool of the "Operational Urban Planning Zones" (ZEP) introduced the
* The first version of this tool was introduced in 1971 (LD 1003/71) by the military 
government in an attempt to stimulate the involvement of big companies in organized land 
development programs.
88
possibility of public-private partnerships in undertaking organized develop­
ment or re-development projects in urban sub-areas so defined as ZEP. These 
projects should abide by a comprehensive land-use plan for the development 
of the ZEP according to the more general strategic directions set by the 
Structure Plan of the wider urban area, or by other official programmes. This 
land-use plan was further concretized into more detailed plans ranging from 
buildings’ lay-out plans, transport and infrastructural construction plans, land­
scape and architectural plans, etc.
Both of these innovatory tools were kept in the new planning law 
L.1313/1983 {O fficial Gazette 33A/14-3- 1983) which followed 4 years later 
under the Socialists’ administration as a more elaborate and "socially just" 
version of the previous L.947/1979.’ The most important contribution was the 
disconnection of the concept of planning from its past restricted physical di­
mensions and its association with socio-economic priorities for the orderly 
functioning and development of urban areas on a comprehensive basis. Em­
phasis was therefore shifted from the strictly "material" (built) context of 
cities to issues such as urban land-use organization and development, planning 
the location of CBDs, public spaces and social facilities provision, transporta­
tion planning and environmental protection, definition of land development 
standards (e.g. densities and average floorspace/plot ratios) by city sub-areas 
and neighbourhoods ("planning units"), planning the location of production 
(industrial and handicraft) activities and of other special uses within and 
around cities in "zones of urban control" (ZOE) so defined for these purposes, 
etc. It was also made possible the reservation of land for future social needs, 
the undertaking of renewal and organized housing construction programs in 
downgraded residential areas, etc. All those objectives and priorities should be 
included in the so called "General Urban Plans" (GPS) covering single cities or 
city-municipalities within metropolitan areas like Greater Athens and Thessa­
loniki which were covered by broader Structure Plans. The local authorities 
were given enhanced responsibilities to initiate the state’s planning procedures 
as to acquire GPSs for their administrative areas ratified by Presidential
 ^ L947/1979 was accused as unpopular because the percentage of private land con­
tribution to the formation of public spaces in cities was the same for both small and big 
landowners (Christophilopoulos 1990:148).
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Decrees, to express opinion on the proposed planning regulations in open 
meetings and to propose reforms of the plans. Before the final approval of 
plans, relating maps and diagrams were sent to the municipalities* buildings 
and were exposed at public view for a certain period of time, so that the citi­
zens could be informed about the proposed regulations in their areas and they 
could express written objections in case of disagreement However, the par­
ticipation of local authorities and citizens was not given a substantial role in 
the planning process. It remained mostly advisory, and the final responsibility 
for the approval or not of GPSs remained within the control of central gov­
ernment (Christophilopoulos 1990. 109). The ratified GPSs were then concret­
ized in more detailed plans at a lower (local) level which were also ratified by 
PDs. The local plans, finally, were followed up by more detailed plans for im­
plementing the proposed regulations "on the ground". The contribution of pri­
vate property to the formation of public spaces and infrastructure took on 
two forms: (a) land contribution (at percentages varying according to the plot 
size) and (b) money contribution to the cost of infrastructure works. Just as in 
the previous L.947, both forms were regarded as a kind of "property tax" the 
landowners would have to pay once and for all "in exchange" for the higher 
market value their remaining properties would acquire after the planned 
development
The tool of "Operational Urban Planning Zones" (ZEP) -inherited from 
L.947/1979- was kept but in a different setting: Whereas L.947/1979 gave prio­
rities in private initiatives for undertaking organized urban development or 
re-development ventures under the ZEP planning scheme, L.1313/1983 shifted 
priorities in private-public partnerships (including local authorities and the 
DEPOS) in which, however, the participating public organizations would have 
the best part of control
Although lots of plans and programs ranging from the wider metro­
politan to the lower local scales have been "produced" under the legislature of 
L.1383/1983, none of them has been implemented in practice. The reasons vary 
in each concrete case, and the explanations provided by writers and re­
searchers tend to put the blame on the inadequacies of the planning machine.
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Thus, it has been argued (FMS 1993: 128) that the lack of planning co-ordina­
tion between the urban and the wider regional and national geographical
scales (as well as the different state agencies involved in each level) is the
(— ~ ■
major reason for planning failures in contemporary Greece. It was also stated
,  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^  . 1 -  - . r ^ T  I I - ■ I I I . -  - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — - - - - - -   - — - - - - - -
(ibid.: 129) that the encouragement of public ventures under the ZEP mechan­
ism of organized urban development at the expense of private capital partici­
pation, has hindered the involvement of serious companies in the field. The 
excessive subdivision of land into very small plots in densely built areas 
around the cities makes difficult the acquisition of land for transport infra­
structure and for covering elementary social needs in those areas (ibicL* 130). 
For others (see e g. Christophilopoulos 1990) the inadequacies of urban plan­
ning are mainly associated with the fact that citizens’ participation in the 
planning process as introduced by the new legislation was not substantial, but, 
contrarily, it was just a kind of "pseudo-participation" operating as a legitima­
tion mechanism of the governmental planning decisions (ibicL 113). Others 
blame the big urban landed interests for blocking out legislation’s provisions 
on land acquisition for public benefit (Tzatzanis 1987). One could add, here, 
many other problems and inadequacies correlated with bureaucratic pro­
cedures and delays in the formulation and approval of plans, the lack of 
proper co-ordination between the various departments of the state’s planning 
machine, the shortage of qualified personnel in the planning departments of 
the Ministry of Environment and Planning (much of its staff are architects 
and engineers without any prior expertise in planning), the frequent shifts in 
priorities at the top of Ministries’ hierarchies due to frequent replacement of 
high-ranking officials according to the ever-changing correlations between 
the various "centres of power" within the state apparatus, and so forth.
The aforementioned inadequacies of the planning system and the re­
lated explanations are of course true, but they tend to deal with partial or 
surface aspects of the whole problem, whereas its substantial dimensions lie 
much deeper and are associated with what we call as "dichotomous" nature of 
planning in Greece -a nature linked up with the way Greek society and the 
state machine interrelate on the arena of spatial organization and change.
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The point is that the prevailing socio-spatial and political relations in 
contemporary Greece, have led to serious contradictions and shortcomings in 
the real process of planning and consequently to a situation characterised by a 
persisting dichotomy between:
(a) formal planning procedures moving at the "surface" of things 
(according to relevant legislation and official planning structures) on 
the one hand, and
(b) "hidden" -or informal- practices and processes, taking place beneath 
that phenomenal "surface" on the other.
These informal practices and processes consist of transactions of a 
political "give-and-take" type, alliances/conflicts and unstable balances be­
tween individuals, social groupings, political parties, local authorities, various 
professional organizations etc., and state planning agencies (see also Gianna- 
kourou 1992). The new planning statutes introduced during the post-dictatorial 
period (1974 onwards) brought about new institutions and mechanisms which 
attempted to impose upon urban communities what could be called as a "viol­
ent modernization" movement. We call it a "movement" in the sense that it 
fed lots of ambitious prospects for a considerable improvement of living and 
working conditions in the Greek cities (see Tritsis 1983). It was modernization 
-led in that it introduced a quite different mentality in the way urban space 
and its organization was perceived in accordance with analogous European 
experiences. But on the other hand, it was a "violent" modernization in that 
the Greek urban community, without having any prior experiences of demo­
cratic government and developed participatory institutions, was forced to "ad­
just" to a new urban culture and mentality in a very short period of time. This 
"up-to-bottom" planning modernization effort was therefore met with suspi­
cions and resistance by the broader urban masses that had been accustomed to 
the traditional "physical" practice of planning. Although during the 1980s all 
Greek major urban centres acquired official plans under the provisions of 
L.1313/1983 (Enterprise of Urban Reconstruction -EPA), in only a very few 
cases the produced plans were implemented "on the ground" and only a few
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aspects of them (see Conference Organizing Committee 1993a: 19-22; Moutza- 
lia 1993: 23-6). In most cases, local pressures and political calculations reduced 
the new innovative urban planning philosophy to what was prevailing before, 
i.e. to the making of physical plans aimed at setting on the ground the "bor­
ders" between private landed property and public space. This reduction repro­
duced the past popular mentality according which planning was not conceived 
as a spatial development mechanism, but as a chance to integrate private 
landed properties into a "government-sanctioned plan as to acquire a higher 
value because of the newly given possibility to "exploit" it by building on it a 
multi-storey block of flats with favourable building regulations and a com­
mercially profitable plot ratio." (Wassenhoven 1993: 96). If planning, by con­
trast, gets conducted as to bring about major innovations to the way urban 
space is treated in the direction of solving complex development and envi­
ronmental problems, it usually causes major misunderstanding and confusion 
among those strata that their economic interests prevent them from accepting 
change and from facing positively new challenges, development priorities and 
modernization in the structure of the urban economy. Governments and pol­
itical parties, on the other hand, are usually reluctant to discourage the tradi­
tional mentalities and practices and to implement innovative planning 
objectives, since this would inevitably lead to considerable political costs for 
the party at office. As Wassenhoven points out
The governments capacity to plan and then implement change has re­
mained in doubt, even in recent years, in spite of the ever-growing ar­
senal of statutory and institutional instruments that the state 
machinery has at its disposal The disregard for government institutions 
within Greek society at large is the key to understanding this weak­
ness, and the continued operation of the patronage system, even though 
less overt than in the previous century, in many ways characterizes the 
state-citizen relationship in Greece. The absence of a ‘civic spirit’ and 
of any readiness to face issues collectively, and the preference for per­
sonal, linear relations with friends and protectors near the centres of 
power, deprives the community of the moral and social prerequisites 
for collective action towards social and economic change. Under such 
circumstances town planning is but one more governmental function 
which is undermined through the network of family, extended kinship 
and political ties, and generally exploited for personal and political 
gains." (Wassenhoven 1984a: 7).
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Thus, a "conservative" (i.e. anti-innovatory) model of planning is being 
maintained and socially reproduced, although a vast arsenal of modern plan­
ning tools and statutes has been at the state’s disposal This model is "by na­
ture" unable to tackle with the new development challenges the Greek city 
faces (see e.g. the case of the Patras Science Park),“ or to deal effectively 
with specific issues such as the organized location/relocation of production, 
economic restructuring, technological change and social inequality in urban 
space, transport reorganization and energy saving, economic and environ­
mental regeneration of downgraded urban areas, etc.
The implementation of long-term urban-industrial planning policies, in 
particular, is confronted with enlarged difficulties stemming from the very 
nature of the Greek socio-urban dynamic The multiplicity/heterogeneity of 
the nexus of socio-economic interests in the city, as we saw earlier, combined 
with the weak industrial base of the Greek production system (chap. 3, sect 
3.1), leads the logic of accumulation and reproduction of industrial capital 
across space in a disadvantageous position in relation to the position held by 
the numerous other urban-economic interests, and affects the social and pol­
itical "balances" arising eventually between them. What predominates, there­
fore, is a complex and blurred "mosaic" lacking internal consistency -a 
"mosaic" in which the "borders" between social classes and interests are highly 
porous, hence difficult to get clearly identified (Tsoucalas 1990: 33). This 
contradictory nexus of heterogeneous socio-economic interests across urban 
space, is not necessarily associated with the industrial sector and the urgent 
need of its technological modernization and rational location, but with other 
urban activities and especially with those affiliated to a growing service econ­
omy.
“ See Kourliouros 1993a; 1993b.The project for the creation of a Science Park in a high 
land-value suburb of Patras -Rion- was met by local population with contradictory feelings 
and reactions instead of enthusiasm. There were irresponsible rumours that the S.P. would 
heavily pollute the area even with biological and nuclear wastes. Due to lack of proper tim­
ing and efficiency in information, the SPs administration was unable to show local people 
what a S.P. is, which is its role and what the neighbouring communities should expect from 
its operation. For the vast majority of local population, the S f. would contribute to the 
gradual transformation of the area from a high status residential and tourist one into indus­
trial, hence the land values would inevitably fa ll (From personal contacts with local people 
since Patras is my birthplace).
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2.4 . Conclusion
The preceding analysis reveals that t l^  ineffectiveness of planning in contem- 
porary Greece is not just a matter of "technical" inadequacies or "improper" 
organization and operation of the planning machinery, but a much broader 
issue which is associated with what Greek society as a whole can accept as 
"planning objectives" and with the way these "objectives" are conceived by 
the majority of the urban population. Even with the best of intentions, the 
Greek urban society is still unable to accept major change in the way 
planning policies are carried out, because suc h^ change tendsLjiQtentially to 
challenge the long established and perplexed nexus of privat^interests across 
urban space and the associated mentalities. Thus, as far as the contemporary 
Greek society retains its basic structural characteristics, there is little chance 
for long-term rational planning policies to meet the necessary social consensus 
in order to get implemented.
This chapter a n a lj^ d  some key characteristics of the contemporary 
Greek society and of its relations with urban space and state planning, provid­
ing, therefore, the basic lines of argument which will be put at concrete em­
pirical work in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
A REVIEW OF POST-WAR GREEK INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND SPATIAL CHANGE: PAST PROCESSES AND RECENT TRENDS
Post-war Greece has experienced two broad phases of industrial and geo­
graphical change: (i) A phase of economic growth and industrialization which 
took place mainly in the decade of 1960s and lasted till the world economic 
recession of 1973/74. (ii) A phase of deindustrialization and negative restruc- 
turing which started in the mid 1970s, was intensified after 1981 (year of
Greece’s accession to EC as a full member) and is still in progress. These two 
broad phases have also characterized post-war industrial change in other 
Southern European countries as for instance Spain (Vasquez-Barquero 1986). 
However, the concrete forms these changes took on in Greece, were shaped 
by several particular economic processes and policy priorities which are 
unique to the internal structure of the Greek social formation and which will 
be examined in the following section.
3.1. Greek Manufacturing at a Cross-Roads: From Incomplete 
Industrialization to Crisis and Negative Restructuring
The first phase followed a decade (1950s) of reconstruction of the Greek 
economy from the damages caused by the German occupation and the civil 
war.* In this decade the Greek economy was predominantly a "public works 
economy" (Wassenhoven 1980: 125), aiming on the one hand at stabilizing the 
social formation from the previous war period, and on the other at creating 
the material base for capital accumulation which would follow in the next 
period of economic growth and export-led industrialization (Andrikopoulou 
and Kafkalas 1985: 118-24; Skayiannis 1994: 115-32). As shown in table 3.1, the
’ According to Svoronos (1992:145) 7-8% of the total Greek population was killed dur­
ing the German occupation and the civil war, agricultural production was decreased by more 
than 70% and more than 1,000 villages were completely destroyed
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best part of public investment in the first post-war period was directed to 
transport/communications, energy and agriculture (land improvement works).
Table 3.1 Public gross fixed captai formatioD (GFCF) by sector, 1955-1986 
(million drs at constant 1970 prices)
Sectors 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
Agriculture 1,309 371 2,312 2,006 3,468 2,828 2,057 2,103
Mining/quarrying 2 18 15 105 404 560 1,268 1,852
Manufacturing ---- 107 494 109 28 128 679 2,616
Energy 100 1,340 1,969 4,579 4,994 5,899 6,710 6,954
Transport and 
communication
1,911 795 3,731 5,594 8,147 7,916 8,240 7,156
Dwellings 1,734 979 247 205 297 294 361 655
Public admin/on 1,024 348 417 181 828 579 482 740
Other service 
industries
483 347 672 1,152 1,760 2,850 2,443 4,124
Total GFCF 6,563 4,335 9,857 13,931 19,926 21,054 22,240 26,200
SOURCE: For 1950, 1955: National Accounts o f Greece 1958-75 (No 23),
Athens 1976: 206-7. For 1960-75, ibid: 156-8. For 1980 and 1986 
The Greek Economy in Figures, Electra Press, Athens 1987: 
140-1.
Despite some official attempts for liberalization, opening-up of the 
Greek economy to the external economic environment and export oriented in­
dustrialization through the attraction of foreign direct investments^ -attempts 
which were accompanied by contrasting views on the "proper" economic 
policy that should be followed (Zolotas 1948; Varvaressos 1952; see also Kara- 
gianni and Nikolaou 1994: 96-101)- the basic orientation of economy and in­
dustry in the 1950s was similar to the pre-war pattern. That is, high 
percentage of agriculture in the GDP and orientation of manufacturing to the 
traditional consumer branches of light industry. In the mid 1950s the share of 
agriculture in the GDP was much higher than that of manufacturing (fig. 3.1% 
while the consumer branches accounted for more than 70% of the gross 
manufacturing product (fig. 3.2), employed more than 65% of total manufac­
turing employment (fig. 3.3) and came to concentrate almost 1/2 of the total
 ^ 1953 Constitution and LD 2687/1953. The devaluation of the national currency by
50% in April 9, 1953 (Bank of Greece 1978; 371), was one more pull factor since it reduced 
by half the costs of labour, of raw materials and of other domestic resources for foreign in­
vestments in Greece.
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fixed capital investment in manufacture (table 3.2). The industrial backward­
ness of Greece during this decade, was also manifested by the value of ex­
ports (table 3.3) in which agricultural products were predominating. Most of 
the foreign aid fundings were directed to non-productive activities 
(Andrikopoulou and Kafkalas 1985: 120) such as military ones which absorbed 
54% of the total foreign funding (Svoronos 1992: 145). The share of funding 
(21%) which was directed to productive activities was scattered mostly among 
light industry consumer units.
Figure 3.1 Share o f GDP by sector, 1951-1991
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A: Agriculture
M-Q: Mining-Quarrying
E  Energy-W ater
M: M anufacturing 
C: Constructions 
S: Services
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.l (appendix I).
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Figure 3.2 Share o f manufacturing product by branch group, 1951-1991
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A=Non-Durable Consumer Goods 
B=In termediate Goods 
C=Capital Goods and Durables
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
Figure 3.3 Share o f manufacturing employment by branch group, 1958-1988
A: Non-Durable Consumer goods 
B: Intermediate goods 
C: Capital goods and durables
SOURCE: For 1958, 1969, 1978 and 1988, own calculations from table B.4
(appendix I). For 1973 own calculations from NSSG, Statistical 
Yearbook o f Greece 1978, Athens 1979: table X.l. For 1984 own 
calculations from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1986, 
Athens 1987: table X.l.
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T able 3.2 % share o f fixed capital investment in manufacturing by branch 
1958-1989
Code Branch groups* 1958 1973 1983 1989
Non durable consumer goods 47.9 35.7 29.8 48.5
20. Foods 13.9 9.6 7.7 15.8
21. Drinks 7.3 3.7 4.8 6.3
22. Tobacco 19 10 1.6 1.8
23. Textiles 19.8 13.1 7.9 13.8
24. Clothing/Footwear 0.1 0.7 1.4 2.6
25. Wood/Cork 0.1 15 10 13
26. Furniture 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.9
27. Paper 2.8 4.2 3.5 3.6
28. Printing/Publishing 0.6 10 1.0 17
29. Leather/Fur 0.9 03 0.2 0.3
39. Miscellaneous 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4
Intermediate goods 34.1 34.8 28.1 22.4
30. Rubber/Plastic 0.3 2.8 14 29
31. Cheniicals 2L2 13.8 3.9 5.5
32. Petroleum and coal products 0.5 6.4 5.8 8.0
33. Non metallic minerals 12.1 118 17.0 6.0
Capital goods and durables 18.0 293 42.3 29.2
34. Basic metals 4.4 15.3 18.7 6.2
35. Metal products 7.9 4.8 6.5 4.1
36. Non electric machinery 10 10 0.7 0.7
37. Electric equipment 1.6 3.0 11 4.4
38. Transport equipment 3.1 5.4 15.3 13.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
In the classification of branches in the 3 branch-groups, we followed Vaitsos and 
Giannitsis (1987: 39) grouping. This is approximate; a more accurate one would require a 3 
or 4 digit classification of branches, which goes beyond the scope of this study.
SOURCE: For 1958, 1973 Hassid 1980: table 40. For 1983 own calculations
from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1986, Athens 1987: 
table X.11. For 1989 own calculations from NSSG, Statistical 
Yearbook o f Greece 1990-91, Athens 1994: table X.10.
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Table 3.3 Value o f exports 1953-1985(million drs).
Exported products 1953 1965 1976 1985
A. Agricultural products(l)
B. Raw materials(2)
C  Manufactured products(3) 
Total
2,467 6,526 29,784 175,833
604 1,947 14,909 122,446
325 1,360 49,088 330,806
3,397 9,833 93,811 629,085
L foods/drinks/tobacco, oils, fats -SITC 0,1, 4.
2. inedible crude materials/mineral fuels, lubricants etc. -SITC 2, 3.
3. chemicals/manufactured goods classified chiefly by raw material/ machinery and trans­
port equipment/miscellaneous products -SITC 5, 6, 7, 8.
SOURCE: For 1953 own calculations from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f
Greece 1955, Athens: 317-9. For 1965 own calculations from 
NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1967, Athens: 277-80. For 
1976 own calculations from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f 
Greece 1978, Athens: 317-24. For 1985 NSSG, Statistical Yearbook 
o f Greece 1986, Athens: 310.
However, this situation could not last for long. By the early 1960s, de­
velopments in the international division of labour facilitated the transfer of 
parts of the industrial production process from core to peripheral regions. As 
Palloix (1978) and Frobel et al (1981) have shown, in the first post-war dec­
ades, western firms had already started considering the advantages of relocat­
ing part of their production process in less developed countries which could 
operate as export platforms for their products (see Dokopoulou 1986 for the 
case of Greece). Abundant and cheap working hands (Milios 1988: 316), lack of 
strict labour and environmental protection legislation, restriction of free trade 
unionism, lack of social policy tradition and totalitarian forms of government 
in the less developed world (Hirsch 1993: 37), were strong pull factors for di­
rect foreign capital investments. By the early 1960s, basic transport and en­
ergy infrastructure in Greece had been constructed, or was in the stage of 
completion, the legislative framework for the protection of foreign invest­
ments had been ratified by the 1953 Constitution and the LD 2687/1953, and 
the social formation had been relatively stabilized from the consequences of 
the civil war.
" 7
During thè 1960-mid 1970s \e r io d , Greece experienced a rapid indus- 
trial growth and restructuring which transformed the character of the 
country from an agrarian to a newly industrializing one. In 1962 the gross
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product of industry exceeded for/first time that of agriculture (table 3.4). 
During this period, the share of agricultural employment in the economically 
active fell considerably, whereas the share of industrial employment raised
Table 3.4 % share o f GDP by sector, 1952-1991
Sector 1952 1962 1972 1982 1991
Agriculture 27.4 22.7 17.0 14.5 123
Industry 18.7 25.9 33.5 31.0 29.8
-Mining-Quarring 0.9 1.2 1.5 L6 1.8
-Energy-Water 0.6 1.2 2.4 3.5 4.9
-Manufacturing 1L4 14.5 19.4 20.7 18.0
-Construction 5.9 9.1 10.3 5.3 5.1
Services 53.8 5L3 49.5 54.5 57.9
GDP, Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.1 (appendix I).
accordingly (table 3.5). The GDP, the gross product of industry and that of 
manufacturing were increasing with high annual growth rates (table 3.6), 
while manufacturing investments increased impressively as well (table 3.7).
Table 3.5 % share o f active population by sector, 1951-1991
Sectors 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Agriculture 59.3 55.7 414 28.1 22.2
Industry 17.3 19.8 27.0 30.1 27.5
-Mining-Quarring 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5
-Manufacturing 14.2 13.9 17.5 19.2 19.2
-Energy-Water 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 10
-Construction 24 4.8 8.1 9.4 6.8
Services 23.4 24.4 31.6 41.8 50.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.3 (appendix I)
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Table 3.6 A verage annual growth rates o f GDP by sector, 1960-1973
Sectors Average annual growth rate 1960-73
Agriculture +4.7%
Industry (total) +9.9%
Manufacturing +10.7%
Services +7.3%
Total GDP +7.5%
SOURCE: Table A.1 (appendix I).
Table 3.7 % increase o f gross fixed capital investment in
manufacturing 1960-1973.
change 1960-1973
Manufacturing +403.2%
Total gross fixed capital investment +243.7%
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.11 (appendix I).
As a result, the position of Greece amongst other OECD countries in 
terms of annual growth rates of real GDP, real GDP per capita, value-added 
and productivity in industry and manufacture, raised at the top -after Japan- 
exceeding even the growth rates of advanced industrial economies like US or 
W.Germany (see table A.2 -appendix I). The "engine" of this impressive up­
swing was industry and especially manufacturing industry, as figure 3.4 shows. 
As it can also be remarked (table 3.8), manufacturing establishments, employ­
ment and installed horsepower were continuously increasing all over the post­
war period. Income per capita raised to a considerable extend, reaching, by 
1970, the "threshold" of development set at the time at US $ 1,000 GNP per 
capita (Leontidou 1983: 81). Over the 1961-77 period, private consumption per 
capita increased by a rate exceeding even that of some advanced industrial 
economies like for instance France, Italy, W.Germany and USA (Tsoucalas 
1986: 312). Shifts in the value composition of exports in favour of manufac­
tured goods were also impressive: In just a decade’s period (1965-76) they 
were increased by 36 times (calculated from previous table 3.3).
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Figure 3.4 Index o f GDP by sector, 1951-1991 (1951=100).
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SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.1 -appendix I.
Table 3.8 Number o f manufacturing establishments, average annual
employment and installed HP, 1958-1988
1958 1969 1978 1988
No of establishments (a) 
Average annual employment (b) 
Installed horsepower (c)
109,236 124,651 128,988 144,717
441,092 501,521 671,496 706,308
775,760 2,014,417 4,519,618 6,880,057
SOURCE: (a) Table B.3 (appendix I), (b) Table B.4 (appendix I), (c) Table
B.5 (appendix 1). For 1988 horsepower data NSSG, Statistical 
Yearbook o f Greece 1990-91."Kdnens 1994: table X:1
The changes post-war Greek economy underwent, were reflected on 
the composition of active population. In 1951-1991 agricultural employment 
decreased by 1,079,900 jobs (-57.2%), while industrial employment increased 
by 450,400 jobs (4-81.9%) and service employment by 1,079,700 jobs (4-144.8%) 
(calculated from table A.3 -appendix I). However, manufacturing employ­
ment increased with a much slower rate than that of the gross manufacturing 
product (table 3.9). As we will see, industrialization was mainly based on mod­
ern capital intensive activities which had little effects upon the creation of 
new jobs. This is why despite industrial growth of that period, migration of
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Table 3.9 % changes o f manufacturing employment and product, 1961-1971
% change 1961-71
Manufacturing employment (a) 4-13.5
Manufacturing product (b) -H74.5
SOURCE: (a) Table A.3 (appendix I); (b) Own calculations from table A.4
(appendix I)
Greek labour force to the industrial centres of Europe (and especially to those 
of W.Germany) took on endemic dimensions. Just to give a measure of this la­
bour power drain, between 1960-1973 1,010,859 persons emigrated from Greece 
(own calculations from (a) NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1971, Athens: 
41 for the 1960-70 period; (b) NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1978, 
Athens: 51, 68 for the 1971-73 period). Even if we take into account that 
134,195 persons repatriated till 1973 (ibid.), there was a net loss of 876,664 per­
sons -a number excessively large if we compare it with the country’s active 
population in 1971 (about 3.2 million people) (see table A 3 -appendix I).
The causes of growth have been the liberalization of the Greek econ­
omy (1962 association to the EC and gradual removal of import tariffs, taxes 
etc. for manufactured goods) (Giannitsis 1988: 79) and the flow of direct 
foreign investments in modern intermediate and capital branches, -especially 
chemical industry (including petroleum and coal products, plastic and rubber), 
basic metallurgy and transport equipment (mainly ship-building) (Hassid 1980: 
313-14). In 1963-73 these three branches, alone, concentrated more than 3/4 of 
the total foreign industrial investments which had been "imported" since 1954 
due to LD 2687/1953 (ibicL 313). Along with the inflow of foreign investments 
a wave of merger of domestic companies with foreign capital took place in an 
effort of Greek industrialists to avoid the increased pressures of external 
competition and to secure their position under the "protection" of foreign 
capital (Antonopoulou 1987: 88-90).
Branch analysis of manufacturing, shows that although traditional con­
sumer goods (food/drinks/tobacco, textiles, clothing/footwear, wood/furniture, 
paper/printing and miscellaneous) were dominating all over the post-war 
period in terms of their share in the total manufacturing GDP (table 3.10), a
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considerable restructuring towards the growth of modern intermediate and 
capital branches took place in 1960-73 (tables 3.10 and 3.11). Most growth dy­
namism was exhibited by basic metallurgy, chemicals/allied and transport 
equipment (table 3.12).
Table 3.10 % share o f gross manufacturing product by branch, 1951-1991
Branch 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Non durable consumer goods 77.5 63.3 56.0 55.7 54.8
-Foods,drinks,tobacco 26.8 2L7 18.9 19.1 22.9
-Textiles 19.2 15.0 14.9 18.0 14.9
-Clothing & Footwear 19.2 125 9.2 8.6 6.4
-Wood & Furniture 5.3 6.1 6.1 3.7 28
-Paper & Printing 4.0 5.0 4.2 4.1 5.1
-Miscellaneous 3.0 3.1 27 22 2.6
Intermediate goods 9.0 13.7 18.6 21.8 23.6
-Chemicals & allied 3.9 7.3 1L2 13.2 16.1
-Non-metallic minerals 5.1 6.4 7.4 8.6 7.5
Capital goods & durables 13.5 23.0 25.4 225 21.6
-Basic metals 0.5 L5 5.9 5.2 6.1
-Metal manufactures. 10.7 15.4 13.6 124 9.9
machinery & electrical
equipment
-Transport equipment 2.3 6.0 5.9 4.8 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
Table 3.11 A verage annual growth rates o f branch groups, 1960-1991
Branch group 1960-73 1973-81 1981-91
Non durable consumer goods 9.3 3.3 0.0
Intermediate goods 13.2 5.0 LI
Capital goods & durables 129 L6 -0.2
Total 10.7 3.2 0.2
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
106
Table 3.12 Index o f gross manufacturing product by branch, 1951-1991 
(1951=100)
Branch 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Non durable consumer goods 100 175 425 682 683
-Foods,drinks,tobacco 100 174 415 678 827
-Textiles 100 167 456 890 750
-Clothing & Footwear 100 139 283 424 322
-Wood & Furniture 100 247 679 664 516
-Paper & Printing 100 265 609 962 1,222
-Miscellaneous 100 225 530 704 842
Intermediate goods 100 326 1,211 2,289 2,523
-Chemicals & allied 100 397 1,670 3,176 3,930
-Non-metallic minerals 100 271 855 1,601 1,431
Capital goods & durables 100 365 1,109 1,582 1,544
-Basic metals 100 680 7,216 10,216 12,060
-Metal manufactures, 
machinery & electrical 
equipment
100 308 745 UOO 895
-Transport equipment 100 567 1,521 2,013 2,363
Total 100 214 588 949 965
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
Capital intensity^ and productivity of labour** were also higher in the 
intermediate and capital branches than in the consumer ones (table 3.13). The 
composition of capital investments prevailing in the 1950s, was drastically 
reversed during the industrialization period: Whereas in 1958 the consumer
Table 3.13 Capital intensity and labour productivity in manufacturing 
by branch group, 1978.
Non durable Intermediate Capital goods
consumer goods goods and durables
Capital intensity (a) 4.90 13.72 7.33
Labour productivity (1977) (b) 149.1 266.2 184.4
SOURCE: (a) Own calculations from tables A.7 and A.9 (appendix I); (b)
Vaitsos and Giannitsis 1987: 40.
 ^ Measured as installed horsepower per worker. According to Giannitsis (1985: 187-8)
this index manifests the Capital/Labour ratio and expresses the extend to which capital 
equipment is used intensively in the production process.
 ^ Measured as value-added per worker.
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branches concentrated almost 48% of the total manufacturing investment, by 
1973 their share had fallen to 35.7% in favour of the capital ones (see previous 
table 3.2). This tendency was strengthened further in the early 1980s: By 1983, 
for instance, capital and intermediate branches, together, concentrated the 
vast majority (over 70%) of the gross fixed capital investment in manufactur­
ing. However, as we will see later on, deindustrialization and negative restruc­
turing re-oriented manufacturing activity to the traditional pattern of 
accumulation prevailing in the 1950s, that is, to the predominance of con­
sumer branches: By 1989, the share of investment in those branches had ex­
ceeded even the 1958 level (see previous table 3.2).
In terms of growth rates the leading branches of the 1960-1973 growth 
period were: (a) basic metallurgy, (b) chemicals and allied and (c) transport 
equipment (table 3.14). These three branches, alone, absorbed 43,7% of the
Table 3.14 Hierarchical classification o f manufacturing branches according 
to their average annual growth rates, 1960-1973
Branches Average annual 
growth rate (%)
Basic metallurgy 27.8
Chemicals and allied 15.0
Transport equipment 12.2
Non-metallic minerals 10.8
Metal manufactures, machinery & electrical equipment 10.8
Textiles 10.7
Wood and furniture 10.7
Miscellaneous industries 9.5
Paper and printing 9.4
Food, drinks and tobacco 8.9
Clothing and footwear 7.8
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
gross manufacturing investments in 1973 (calculated from previous table 3.2) 
and reached very high levels of labour productivity (1970) (Vaitsos and Gian­
nitsis 1987: 40). These branches, also, concentrated in 1966 the vast majority 
(83.2%) of total foreign investment in manufacturing (calculated from Hassid
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1980: table 75). Some other modem at that time branches of heavy industry 
were also growing with relatively high average annual growth rates as table 
3.14 shows.
According to Hassid (1980: 317-19), the main reasons for the attraction 
of foreign direct investments were: (a) the low cost of raw materials 
(abundant mineral resources); (b) the relatively low cost of labour; (c) the 
growing domestic demand for certain manufactured goods (e.g. fertilisers, 
packing materials, building materials and electrical cables), and (d) the fa­
vourable conditions created either by the LD 2687/1953 addressed to the 
protection of foreign investments, or by special deals between the Greek gov­
ernments and foreign investors.^ One has to add to these reasons the compara­
tive advantages of Greece as an export platform for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) since its 1962 association to EC (Dokopoulou 1986). Such companies, 
would be able to establish subsidiaries and produce in Greece with a much 
lower production cost than in the mother-countries, import raw materials, 
equipment and other intermediate inputs without import restrictions and tar­
iffs, export their products in the EC market or in the markets of Middle East 
and Northern Africa just like the Greek industries, that is, without export tar­
iffs (ETVA 1967: 63), and on the same time benefit from generous incentives 
and other facilities provided by the LD 2687/1953. The military dictatorship 
imposed in April 21st 1967, restricted drastically labour’s claims and free 
trade- unionism, creating, therefore, favourable conditions for smooth capital 
accumulation. By 1968, the share of foreign investments to the total fixed 
capital of Greek manufacturing had reached 36,3% at the average (Giannitsis 
1985: table 62). The share was much greater in certain branches like e.g. mis­
cellaneous industries, petroleum and coal products, transport equipment, elec­
trical equipment, rubber/plastic, metallurgy and metal products, while light 
industry consumer branches were left to the domestic capital (ibid.).
’ For instance, the 1960 deal between the Greek government and the French Pechiney 
(aluminium production company) provided that the public sector would contribute with 
50% in the total investment and would participate with only a 12% in revenues. This deal 
was characterised as one of a colonial character (for more details on the arguments relating 
to such issues see Antonopoulou 1987: sect II.2).
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Much of the industrial growth of the period, was led by big manufac­
turing companies which, by the Greek standards, are those employing 504- 
persons and having a net turnover of 1004- million Drs (KEPE 1989: 30). Those 
companies’ share in the total manufacturing horsepower was higher than the 
share of SMEs (table 3.15). Capital intensity (HP per worker) was also much
Table 3.15 Installed manufacturing horsepower by plants* size 1978,1984
Plants’ size 1978 % 1984 % 1978-84
SMEs (up to 49 employees) 1,663,021 36.8 2,463,037 40.1 -H48.1%
Large firms (4-50 employees) 2,856,880 63.2 3,680,931 59.9 4-28.8%
Total 4,519,901 100.0 6,143,968 100.0 +35.9%
SOURCE: Tables A.9 and A.IO (appendix I).
greater in larger companies than in SMEs (table 3.16). The participation of 
larger companies in the formation of the total value-added in manufacturing
Table 3.16 A verage capital intensity in manufacturing by plants* size 
1978,1984
Plants’ size 1978 1984 change 1978-84
SMEs (up to 49 employees) 4.12 5.66 +37.4%
Large companies (50+ employees) 10.65 14.77 +38.6%
Total 6.73 8.98 +33.4%
SOURCE: Own calculations from tables A.7, A.8, A.9 and A.10 (appendix I).
industry was greater than that of SMEs (table 3.17). However, the role of 
SMEs should not be underestimated, especially in forming the total number of 
manufacturing establishments and in employment creation (table 3.18). By 
1978, SMEs accounted for 98.8% of total manufacturing establishments and for 
60.1% of total manufacturing employment These percentages were further in­
creased in 1984 and 1988. SMEs* employment was greater in the consumer 
goods group than in the intermediate and capital ones (table 3.19).
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Table 3.17 Participation o f large companies and SMEs in value-added 
___________ o f manufacturing, /P75-/9^5 (value-added in million Drs).
1975 % 1980 % 1986 %
Large companies (50+ 
employees)
SMEs (up to 49 
employees)
Total
69,965,458 59.67 199,934,900 62.33 584,957 75.61
47,293,712 4033 120,835,139 37.67 188,655 24.39
117,259,170 100 320,770,039 100 773,612 100
SOURCE: For 1975: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1978, Athens
1979: table X:4. For 1980: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 
1986, Athens 1987: table X.*6. For 1986: NSSG, Statistical Year­
book o f Greece 1990-91, Athens 1994: table X:4.
Table 3.18 Number o f establishments and employment in SMEs, 1978-1988
1978 % 1984 % 1988 % 1978-1988
Number of SMEs (up to 
49 employees)
127460 98.8 143044 99.0 143407 99.1 +12.51%
Number of larger com­
panies (50+ employees)
1528 1.2 1419 1.0 1310 0.9 -14.27%
Employment in SMEs 403312 60.1 434926 63.6 480327 68.0 19.10%
Employment in larger 
companies
268182 39.9 249212 36.4 225981 310 -15.74%
SOURCE: For 1978 and 1984, tables A3, A.6, A.7 and A.8 (appendix L) For
1988 own calculations form NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f 
Greece 1990-91. Athens, 1994: tables X:2 and X:4.
The oil-related world economic recession of 1973/74 marked a drastic 
reversal of the previous growth tendencies and Greek industry entered a long 
lasting state of deindustrialization and negative restructuring whose effects 
were intensified after 1981 (year of Greece’s accession to EC) due, mainly, to 
the inability of Greek industry to adapt effectively to the increased external 
competition (KEPE 1990: 205). The growth rates of the past were drastically 
decreased (table 3.20). According to available OECD data (table 3.21), value- 
added and productivity of labour in Greek industry and manufacturing fell 
dramatically since 1973.
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Table 3.19 Manufacturing employment by plants* size and branch group 
1978,1984
Plants’ size 1978 % 1984 % % 1978-84
A. Consumer goods 401,833 59.9 409,093 59.8 18
-Large companies 144,324 215 138,080 20.2 -4.3
-SMEs 257,559 38.4 271013 39.6 5.2
B. Intermediate goods 89,753 13.3 93,610 13.6 4.3
-Large companies 47,213 7.0 46,171 6.7 -22
-SMEs 42,540 6.3 47,439 6.9 115
C  Capital goods 179,858 26.8 181440 26.5 0.9
-Large companies 76,645 114 64,968 9.5 -15.2
-SMEs 103,213 15.4 116,474 17.0 128
Total 671494 100.0 684,143 100.0 19
SOURCE: Tables A.7 and A.8 (appendix I). (Own calculation of percentages).
Table 3.20 A verage annual rates o f GDP, gross product o f industry and 
gross product o f manufacturing during the deindustrialization 
___________ period________________________________________________
1973-1981 1981-1991
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Gross product of industry 
Gross product of manufacturing
3.0%
11%
3.2%
18%
12%
0.2%
SOURCE: Table A.1 (appendix I).
Table 3.21 Deindustrialization in Greece, (percentages)
1968-73 1973-79 1979-88
Average annual change of value-added 
in industry
118 33 0.3
Average annual change of value-added 
in manufacturing
13.2 43 0.3
Average annual change of productivity 
in industry
7.4 12 0.3
Average annual change of productivity 
in manufacturing
7.8 27 -0.8
SOURCE: Adapted from OECD, Historical Statistics 1960-1988. Paris 1990:
49, 50 and 51
After 1978, although total manufacturing employment continued in­
creasing, about half of the 20 2-digit Order branches started to present job 
losses (table 3.22). From the consumer branches the most seriously affected
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during 1978-88 were leather/fur and textiles. Wood and furniture were also 
affected but to a less extend. From the intermediate goods non-metallic min­
erals and rubber/plastic experienced job loss, whereas from the capital goods 
metal products and electric equipment presented job loss as well
Table 3.22 Manufacturing employment by branch, 1969-1988.
Code Branch 1969 1978 1988 % change 
1969-78
% change 
1978-88
Non durable consumer goods 321,119 401,825 436,018 25.13 8.51
20.Foods 81,517 94,324 104,307 15.71 10.58
21 Drinks 10,923 12,722 13,530 16.47 6.35
22 Tobacco 13,191 9,711 12,896 -26.38 328
23 Textiles 54,961 78,377 66,403 42.6 -15.28
24 Clothing/Footwear 62,232 87,284 116,924 40.26 33.96
25 Wood/Cork 30,274 33,009 30,949 9.03 -6.24
26 Furniture 26,507 31,263 30,467 17.94 -255
27 Paper 7,784 11,023 12,010 41.61 8.95
28 Printing/Publishing 14,123 17,285 22,621 22.39 30.87
29 Leather/Fur 10,312 15,548 12,018 50.78 -227
39 Miscellaneous 9,295 11,279 13,893 2L34 23.18
Intermediate goods 60,875 89,751 92,396 47.43 295
30 Rubber/Plastic 10,845 19,480 19,296 79.62 -0.94
31 Chemicals 16,250 26,009 27,769 60.06 6.77
32 Petroleum/Coal 
products
2,921 4,745 7,483 62.44 57.7
33 Non metallic minerals 30,859 39,517 37,848 28.06 -4.22
Capital goods and durables 119,527 179,861 177,893 50.48 -L09
34 Basic metallurgy 5,709 9,816 10,418 71.94 6.13
35 Metal products 43,266 54,317 47,081 25.54 -13.32
36 Non electric machinery 17,214 22,323 22,320 29.68 -0.01
37 Electric equipment 18,282 30,401 28,424 66.29 -6.5
38 Transport equipment 35,056 63,004 69,650 79.72 10.55
Total 501,521 671,496 706,307 33.89 5.18
SOURCE: Table B.4 (appendix I). (Own calculation of percentages).
The large companies -irrespective of branch group- were especially hit 
in terms of job loss; however, the greater loss (-15.2% in 1978-84) was re­
marked in large capital goods companies (see previous table 3.19). The number
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of such companies was also decreased over the same period in all branch 
groups and especially in the capital goods one (table 3.23).
Table 3.23 Number o f manufacturing establishments by size and branch 
group 1978,1984
Plants’ size 1978 % 1984 % % 1978-84
A. Consumer goods 82,434 63.9 86,405 59.8 4.8
-Large companies 935 0.7 907 0.6 -3 .0
-SMEs 81,489 63.2 85,498 59.2 4.9
B. Intermediate goods 8,682 6.7 10,547 7.3 21.5
-Large companies 247 0.2 243 0.2 -16
-SMEs 8,435 6.5 10,304 7.1 222
C. Capital goods 37,882 29.4 47,511 329 25.4
-Large companies 346 0.3 269 0.2 -223
-SMEs 37,536 29.1 47,242 327 25.9
Total 128,998 100.0 144,463 100.0 120
SOURCE: Tables A.5 and A.6 (appendix I). (Own calculation of percentages).
By contrast to large companies, SMEs showed a remarkable degree of 
resistance to crisis. Not only they managed to increase their number of estab­
lishments over the 1978-88 crisis period, but they also increased their employ­
ment (see previous table 3.18). However, their positive role was unable to 
totally counteract the wider effects of deindustriualization and negative re­
structuring. Total manufacturing investments experienced a serious decline in 
the post 1973/74 era. Whereas they represented 20% of the total gross fixed 
capital formation in 1974, they fell to 13.4% in 1985; they presented an increase 
in 1991, which, however, did not reach the 1974 percentage (calculated from 
table A.11 -appendix I). Their average annual growth rate fell from 13.8% in 
1960-73 to -0.2% in 1973-81 and raised slightly to 19% in 1981-91 (ibid.).
Branch analysis shows that the capital goods group, which displayed a 
remarkable dynamism in the industrialization period, experienced a decline in 
the post-1978 era (fig. 3.5). Ironically, despite the decline in output, the share 
of investments in the capital branch group increased in 1973-1983 (see previ­
ous table 3.2) and this is probably due to the entrance of new capital good
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firms in business (from 37,882 in 1978 to 47,511 in 1984 -see tables A.5 and A.6 
-appendix I)). On the other hand, a reorientation of the industrial system to
F ig u re  3.5 Index o f gross manufacturing product by branch group, 
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SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
the consumer branches which characterized the accumulation pattern of the 
first post-war decade can be remarked (table 3.24 and fig, 3.6) The leading 
branches (1973-81) in terms of average annual growth rates, were non-metallic 
minerals, textiles, foodstuffs, etc; after 1981, the growth rates were further de­
creased and in a number of branches (non metallic minerals, textiles, metal 
products/machinery/electrical equipment, wood/furniture and clothing/foot­
wear) were negative.
Another important feature of Greek deindustrialization is the further 
weakening of the already weak vertical integration trends. This point can be 
deduced from data relating: (a) to the degree of value-added in the various
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branches, and (b) to the volume of manufactured imports. In most branches, 
especially intermediate and capital ones, value-added as a percentage of the
T able  3.24 Classification o f manufacturing branches according to their av­
erage annual growth rates in the period o f deindustrialization 
(1973-1991)
1973-1981 % 1981-1991 %
Non-metalic minerals 7.2 Paper & printing 16
Textiles 5.2 Miscellaneous 14
Foods,drinks,tobacco 4.0 Chemicals & allied 13
Chemicals & allied 3.9 Food,drinks,tobacco 11
Paper & printing 3.1 Basic metallurgy L8
Transport equipment 3.0 Transport equipment L8
Clothing & footwear 2.7 Non-metallic minerals -10
Metal products, machinery 
& electric equipment
2.0 Textiles -L6
Miscellaneous 1.5 Metal products, machinery 
& electrc. equipment
-19
Basic metallurgy 0.7 Wood & furniture -10
Wood & furniture -2.5 Clothing & footwear -16
SOURCE: Own calculations from table A.4 (appendix I).
gross manufacturing product marked negative changes in 1973-80 (vertical 
disintegration) as we can see in table 3.25. The branches which were the 
hardest hit by disintegration were most of the strategic branches that led 
economic growth and industrialization in the 1960s-mid 1970s. It seems that 
domestic manufacturers, instead of pursuing vertical integration strategies, 
preferred to pursue the much cheaper "solution" (due to cut out of tariffs) of 
imported inputs (raw materials, intermediate manufactured goods). This is
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F ig u re  3.6 A verage annual growth rates o f manufacturing branches dur­
ing the periods o f industrialization (1960-1973) and deindustri­
alisation (1973-1981 and 1981-1991)
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SOURCE: Tables 3.14 and 3.24.
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T able 3.25 Value-added as percentage o f the gross manufacturing product, 
1973,1980.
Code Branch 1973 1980 % 1973-80
Non durable consumer goods
20. Foods 25.7 23.8 -7.4
21. Drinks 33.2 36.3 9.3
22 Tobacco 25.1 24.8 -12
23. Textiles 40.0 38.1 -4.7
24. Clothing-Footwear 39.3 427 8.7
25. Wood-Cork 4L2 36.4 -11.6
26. Furniture 45.9 47.1 26
27. Paper 39.2 27.1 -30.3
28. Printing-Publishing 51.2 54.4 6.3
29. Leather-Fur 29.1 327 124
39. Miscellaneous 46.9 48.3 3.0
Intermediate goods
30. Rubber-Plastic 49.2 39.7 -19.3
31 Chemicals 46.3 327 -29.4
32 Petroleum-Carbon Products 26.2 6.5 -75.5
33. Non metallic minerals 52.2 416 -20.3
Capital goods and durables
34. Basic metallurgy 415 25.9 -37.6
35. Metal manufactures 40.5 34.7 -14.3
36. Non electric machinery 427 43.3 14
37. Electric equipment 37.5 34.7 -6.7
38. Transport equipment 55.5 56.9 25
SOURCE: Adapted from Vaitsos and Giannitsis 1987: 42
why, despite the increasing value of manufacturing exports all over the post­
war period, the Greek economy remained dependent on increasing imports of 
raw materials and manufactured goods (table 3.26), which was continuously 
worsening its external trade deficit This deficit raised from 187 million US 
dollars in 1955 to 5,111.5 million by 1985, that is, it presented a huge increase of 
2,633.4% in just three decades (calculated from Vaitsos and Giannitsis 1987: 
table 14).
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T able 3.26 % composition o f the external trade o f Greece, 1953-1985
Year Exports Imports
A B C A B C
1953 726 17.8 9.6 23.2 29.7 47.1
1960 64.8 25.2 10.0 10.8 16.8 724
1965 66.4 19.8 13.8 15.2 18.5 66.3
1970 41.1 17.9 41.0 10.5 15.3 74.2
1975 32.3 19.8 47.9 9.4 30.0 60.6
1980 25.7 23.4 50.9 8.4 30.1 6L5
1985 28.0 19.4 52.6 123 35.2 525
A: Agricultural products (SITC 0,1, 4)
B: Raw materials (including oil, lubricants, etc.) (SITC 2, 3)
C  Manufactured products (SITC 5, 6, 7, 8).
SOURCE: /  O
1953: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece /R%A^hens: 312 
1960: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1^ 952, Athens: 249 
1965: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greeçd1966, Athens: 255 
1970: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Gréece 1971, Athens: 256 
1975: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f ùreece 1977, Athens: 298 
1980: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yearboo)tof Greece 198Z Athens: 306 
1985: Calculated from NSSG, Statistical Yeajpdok o f Greece 198Z Athens: 310
The aggregate result of all these changes was the worsening of the 
comparative position of Greek economy among OECD countries, especially 
after 1979 (see table A.2 -appendix I). The loss of the previous leading role of 
industry in economic growth was countered, in the post 1973/74 period, by the 
increasing importance of the service economy (tertiarization), which kept on 
growing (see table A.1 -appendix I).
The preceding analysis reveals that Greek deindustrialization is a quite 
^niqye phenomenon differing in a number of respects from deindustrializ­
ation and restructuring in the advanced industrial economies:
(a) While in the advanced economies (e.g. USA, UK, Germany, etc.) dein­
dustrialization and capital restructuring since late 1960s/early 1970s was 
associated with absolute declines_in-m anufacturing output and 
employment (see e.g. Rowthorn 1986; Massey 1988; Mouzelis 1990a for 
the UK case; for the US case see Bluestone and Harisson 1982; Harrison
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and Bluestone 1994; for the case of Germany see Frobel et al 1981), in 
Greece, by contrast, not only there was no job loss in manufacturing as 
a whole, but a continuing employment increase during all the post-war 
period (until 1988) took place. Job losses were branch-specific and 
emerged particularly in large companies after the mid 1970s. However, 
job losses in those branches and companies were countered by new jobs 
created mainly by SMEs which -by contrast to larger ones- exhibited a 
remarkable degree of resistance to job reduction.
(b) While in the advanced capitalist world deindustrialization and restruc­
turing brought about the exodus of a vast number of companies from 
business, in Greece, contrarily, new manufacturing firms entered the 
market during crisis period. SMEs, again, played an important role in 
this. The increase of both number of manufacturing establishments and 
employment during crisis period, is the net output of two combined 
tendencies; (a) closures of larger companies and (b) entrance of new 
smaller firms in business.
(c) While in advanced world deindustrialization took on the form of a 
serious decline of traditional branches and the simultaneous restructur­
ing of production through the adoption of technological improvements 
and rationalization strategies aiming at the development of high-tech 
branches and knowledge based firms, in Greece, on the contrary, re­
structuring took on a negative form by reorienting the production sys­
tem to the traditional manufacturing activities which were prevailing 
during the first post-war decade. According to Giannitsis (1986: 245), 
the crisis of Greek industry "is identified by a dialectical relationship 
between stability and transformation, between surpassing of past 
frameworks and search of a new balance." In that "search", however, all 
evidence shows that the "past frameworks" continue to predominate 
over the creation of new production structures.
There are diverging views on the causes of Greek deindustrialization.
State monopoly capital theorists (e.g. Samaras 1982) assert that the country’s
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economic and political dependence upon foreign decision centres hindered the 
development of a self-sufficient industrial base able to adjust effectively in 
the changing international circumstances. For underdevelopment theorists (e.g. 
Fotopoulos 1985), post-war foreign capital-led and export-oriented industrial­
ization took on the typical form of an "enclave" within the whole economic 
system which remained technologically backward and underdeveloped, hence 
vulnerable to increased external pressures. These views are mostly stressing 
the impacts of external factors and determinations upon the country’s indus­
trial system. However, a series of internal, structural characteristics of the 
post-war Greek industrialization and economic growth process, as well as the 
role of policy priorities, should be given special attention in addressing the 
major causes of Greek deindustrialization and negative restructuring:
(1). As we saw in the previous chapter, the class structure of modern 
Greek society is not characterized by a strict polarization between capital and 
labour, but by the coexistence of a multiplicity of petty socio-economic in­
terests creating an "opaque" social mosaic and making the "borders" between 
classes extremely fluid and porous. In this fluid social structure, the interests 
of industrial capital had not been dominant and compact -a t least to the ex­
tend orthodox Marxists believed (see e.g. Papadopoulos 1987)- as to form a 
leading power for the country’s industrialization and development along typi­
cal western patterns.
(2). In that context, post-war manufacturing investments represented 
only a small proportion of the total fixed capital investment in the economy 
by contrast to the construction of dwellings which absorbed much greater 
proportions of investment all over the post-war period (see table 2.7 -chap. 2). 
Although it is recognized that the growth of building industry stimulated the 
growth of other linked industries, it absorbed disproportionately large 
amounts of investments which otherwise could have been directed in the de­
velopment of a more dynamic, modern and stable manufacturing base.
(3). Much less were the private investments in industrial R+D activities 
as Vaitsos and Giannitsis (1987: chap. 2) have shown. Only 21% of the Greek
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industrial companies have R+D departments, whereas even less have ever col­
laborated with an academic research institute and/or University in technologi­
cal R+D projects (Kakavelakis and Dimopoulos 1993). Even large companies 
having some research activity, tend to orient this activity to improving their 
existing products than to developing new ones. A UNIDO report (quoted in 
Hassid and Katsos 1992: 66) revealed that by 1984 only 57 capital goods (in a 
sample of 140) were produced in Greece; moreover, the production of 35 of 
them had started before 1970 and they did not present high degree of techni­
cal complexity. Greek manufactures were preferring to import technology 
and "know-how" than investing to produce it in the country. Thus, the compe­
titiveness of Greek industry was increasingly relied upon factors which were 
beyond its own range of control (Giannitsis 1986: 252). Wassenhoven (1984) 
places the major problems of Greek industrialization in the small size of es­
tablishments, family-type ownership and low productivity, small degree of 
vertical integration, external sources of financing, dependence upon imported 
technology and equipment and consumption oriented production. A more re­
cent article (7b Vima, 23 October 1994) places the "three big problems" of 
Greek manufacturing (a) in the small size of establishments which restricts 
the creation of economies of scale and poses problems in firms* financing, (b) 
in the low productivity which restricts modernization and adaptation of firms 
to the increased external competition, and (c) in the small degree of integra­
tion between agriculture-industry and industry-services. In the light of the 
presented evidence, however, it seems that the small size of firms was not by 
itself a major problem. On the contrary, it could potentially operate as a 
stimulus of a new industrial growth based on flexibility as in the case of 
"Third Italy" (see Scott 1988: chap. 5; Bagnasco 1992; Garofoli 1992). What 
seems to be more important, is the burgeoning reorientation of the Greek 
manufacturing system in the traditional labour intensive and low-tech con­
sumer branches. This reorientation presents a serious threat for the future of 
Greek industry and economy in general These branches are world-wide de­
clining in terms of demand (KEPE 1990: 207-8), and the country’s specializ­
ation in them has to face an increasing competition from the NICs which 
have the comparative advantage of much lower labour costs. As Nijkamp et 
ai. remark:
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The focus on traditional production methods has a number of negative 
consequences for the Greek economy: (1) The share of low-tech indus­
trial production to total industrial production is world-wide declining; 
stated otherwise: the Greek manufacturing sector is selling its products 
in markets with a growth rate below world average. (2) Low-tech pro­
duction is characterized by price competition. The comparative advan­
tage of the Greek industry has been low wage. For two reasons Greece 
is losing this advantage. Firstly, new industrial countries with lower 
wage rates have emerged. Secondly, since 1972 the monetary authorities 
have periodically devaluated the Drachma to improve the terms of 
trade, but EC regulations have restricted this policy option since June 
30 1991. (3) Profit margins of low-tech production sectors are generally 
low (Nijkamp et al. 1992:101).
It becomes obvious that the Greek economy today, pays the penalty of 
its twofold backwardness: On the one hand it cannot manage to maintain its 
competitiveness in branches in which NICs are currently specializing with 
much lower labour costs, and on the other it is unable to adopt modernization 
strategies and technological improvements in order to enter the paths fol­
lowed by the more advanced economies (Giannitsis 1986; Giannitsis and Mavri 
1993). Although some initiatives towards such paths have recently emerged,® 
they are still far from reversing considerably the grim "picture" of the Greek 
production system.
(4). The inability of Greek industry to restructure by adopting techno­
logical modernization and rationalization strategies, is the basic reason that 
the post-war industrialization process remained incomplete and insecure, 
hence vulnerable to pressures generated by negative economic circumstances 
(oil-related world economic crises of 1973/74 and 1978, increasing antagonism 
from low cost countries, etc.). The origins of this inability can be traced back 
to both the priorities of industrial capital and state policy during all these 
decades of lost chances. The primary role foreign capital played in the
* We refer to possibilities and initiatives of development of new high-tech knowledge 
based firms that will enable Greece to exploit its new competitive advantage -cheap brain 
power (Nijkamp, et aL 1992: 102)- and a considerable amount of commercially exploitable 
research products which have been developing in the Greek Universities and Research 
Centres during the last decade (see Kourliouros and Laskaris 1992; 1992a). New knowledge- 
based firms have already developed especially in software production and informatics tech­
nology (some of which export their products), telecommunications, etc.; three science parks 
have been already constructed and others are in the phase of completion.
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country’s industrial growth, was not only the result of wider relocation strat­
egies in the context of an emerging new international division of labour as 
some Greek writers assert (e.g. Antonopoulou 1987), but, also, the result of the 
inability of both domestic capital and state policy to promote modernization 
and transformation of the industrial structures on the basis of endogenous 
strategic choices. Greek industrial capital -or at least a major fraction of it- 
instead of pursuing the conditions of its accumulation and profit in the im­
personal forces of the market (as in advanced capitalism), was systematically 
searching for these conditions in state’s protectionism policies and in building 
various clientelistic accesses to the decision-making bodies for gaining special 
privileges (e.g. various grants and loans, tax concessions, special incentives, 
etc.) (Giannitsis 1986: 261-62). At least till the mid 1970s the Greek production 
system was still "a society of protection" (Giannitsis 1988: 82). In this context, 
the "ideal type" of entrepreneur which was created, was the one that did not 
strive to improve productivity by undertaking the risks of technological 
modernization, but, inversely, to maintain the already state-provided privi­
leges and to enjoy the "security" of a small but officially protected domestic 
m arket Thus, the structures of Greek industry were found quite unready to 
benefit to any considerable extend from technological change and other de­
velopments initiated by the foreign direct investments in the modern inter­
mediate and capital manufacturing branches. Greek industrialization, 
followed, thus, a process of horizontal -or surface- diversification and 
growth, under traditional, sluggish, and unplanned structures. Neither the 
complementarity between agriculture and industry, nor the complementarity 
between the various manufacturing branches was achieved to any consider­
able extend (Mouzelis 1990; 1993).
(5). The state, on the other hand, by responding positively to various 
clientelistic mechanisms, secured the survival of numerous unproductive, un­
competitive and state-dependent manufacturing firms, through incentive 
policies providing various grants and low-interest loans (Giannitsis 1986: 253) 
without setting on the same time strict presuppositions for promoting techno­
logical change and increasing productivity of subsidised firms. Such policies 
were supposedly aimed at helping industries face financial difficulties due to
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international economic recession and increased external competition. How­
ever, what these policies achieved, factually, was the emergence (in the early 
1980s) of the so called "overdebted and problematical enterprises". That is, in­
dustrial firms which were unable to pay back their accumulated Bank loans, 
and which were kept artificially in business during the 1980s by the Socialist’s 
government for social and ideological reasons (for a detailed discussion see 
Sakellaropoulos 1992). The accumulated problems of Greek industry created a 
new "wave" of problematical and overdepted manufacturing companies in the 
early 1990s as it was recently revealed (7b Vima, 23 January 1994). Most of 
those firms were technologically innovative and dynamic, but they started to 
decline because Banks were reluctant -due to liquidity problems- to finance 
their immediate costs (e.g. payments of suppliers). According to a recent sur­
vey, 25% of 884 manufacturing firms whose revenues exceeded 1 billion Drs. 
each in 1992, were not able to pay back their short-term financial obligations 
due to lack of liquidity (ibid.).
(6). The various tools of industrial policy which were undertaken dur­
ing the post-war period were mostly of a traditional character. Le, they aimed 
mainly either at reducing the costs of private investments (e.g. provision of 
grants and loans, provision of cheap energy, etc.), or at increasing directly the 
profits of manufacturing companies (e.g. freezing of salaries and wages, tax 
concessions, etc.) (see Giannitsis 1993: 23). By contrast, policy elements which 
could have enhanced the competitive advantages of industry and increased its 
productivity and dynamism -e.g. policies aiming at raising the educational 
level, the skills and the specialization of labour, at improving the quality of 
products, at increasing the level of embodied technology in production, at 
supporting dynamic branches, etc.- never drew a special and consistent atten­
tion by the state apart from some sporadic efforts. In that context, the major 
common characteristic of the post-war industrial policies was the protection 
and maintenance of the existing traditional industrial structures, instead of 
the creation of an "environment" which could stimulate the internal dyna­
mism and development of the production system.
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The major point that has to be made, is that all over the post-war 
period the relations between state and domestic industrial enterprises formed 
a kind of economic patronage which hindered both the development of a 
healthy entrepreneurial mentality and the making of long-term development 
policies. Thus, while in most countries which just like Greece entered the 
stage of industrialization late (e.g. Finland, Norway, etc.) the national states 
managed to modernize the industrial sector and to support restructuring in­
itiatives based on technologically advanced production processes, in Greece, 
inversely, the state not only failed in helping domestic industry to modernize 
or to benefit from the presence of technologically developed branches during 
the growth period, but, on the contrary, it formed a "barrier* to development 
due to its planning inconsistencies and contradictions (see chap. 2). The state, 
thus, became the major cause of the country’s deindustrialization, crisis and 
negative restructuring. Even nowadays, when almost all Greek Technical Uni­
versities and the Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development (ETVA) have un­
dertaken co-ordinated action for the creation of a Greek "sunbelt" (a zone of 
Science Parks and Incubators) in order to help industry modernize and be­
come more antagonistic, the Greek state has not yet created an appropriate 
legislative framework and other supporting mechanisms for this purpose 
(Kourliouros 1993a; 1993b). As Mouzelis remarks, the Greek state resembles "a 
mentally defective giant, an unshaped monster which is unable to react with 
flexibility and effectiveness in a rapidly changing environment" (1990: A7).
(7). One more determinant element of the crisis of Greek industry, is 
associated with the impacts of several social changes upon the production sys­
tem -changes which took place after the collapse of the military dictatorship 
(post 1974 period) and the passing of Greece in a normal and stable represen­
tative democracy. These changes had to do with the restoration of trade 
union freedoms, the sensible increase of salaries and wages in industry 
(Vergopoulos 1986: 83 ff), the gradual removal of protectionism, etc. More 
sensible was the raise of wage rates in manufacturing. As comparative OECD 
data show, (table 3.27), manufacturing wages in Greece were increasing with 
much higher rates than in other EC and OECD countries (totals) since 1975. 
New conditions for the operation of industrial capital and its accumulation
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started therefore to emerge in the Greek economy. The post-dictatorial (post 
1974) improvement of the working conditions in the private and public sectors
Table 3.27 Hourly wage rates (year-to-year percentage change) in 
facturing in Greece, EC and OECD, 1975-1988.
1975 1978 1984 1988
Greece 24.6% 23.6% 26.3% 18.4%
Total of EC countries 15.2% 9.3% 6.9% 5.5%
Total of OECD countries 110% 8.1% 5.2% 4.4%
SOURCE: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960-1988. Paris 1990. 95.
of the economy, the real increase in wages and salaries, etc., were the outcom­
es of mass mobilisations and strikes in which lots of working people were 
participating. As shown in table 3.28, the number of strikes and strikers be­
tween 1975 and 1980 increased to a great extend. However, after the
Table 3.28 Number o f strikes and strikers, 1975-1985(^)
Year Number of strikes Number of strikers Working hours lost
1975 142 46,374 1,743,353
1976 829 241,142 5,187,783
1977 401 393,592 8,217,264
1978 405 349,969 6,477,117
1979 372 638,635 9,950,074
1980 472 1,317,917 20,494,944
1981 313 361,106 5,341,961
1982 447 246,543 7,892,094
1983 261 148,174 2,986,957
1984 268 107,957 2,690,789
1985 453 785,725 7,660,879
(*) Private sector, public organizations and banks.
SOURCE: Adapted from Petri nioti 1993:168.
coming of Socialists to office in the 1981 general elections, the strike move­
ment decreased abruptly -probably because working strata were expecting 
that the newly elected government would satisfy labouras claims. But in 1985 
(beginning of Socialists’ austerity policy), the strike movement started to rise
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again. However, apart from strictly economic claims (wage and salary in­
creases) during the post-1974 era, the labour movement managed to gain a 
bundle of qualitative improvements (e.g. restoration and further development 
of trade-union freedoms, expansion of social insurance to all kinds of work, 
welfare policies and re-skilling programs for unemployed, official regulation 
of labour-capital relations through collective bargaining, establishment of so­
cial wage, etc. (Petrinioti 1993), which were gradually legislated by post-1974 
governments, and which, finally, resulted at improving the relative position of 
labour in the nexus of capital-labour relationships (Katsanevas 1983: 156). 
However, these changes were not accepted unproblematically by industrial 
capital Having for decades been accustomed to different social and political 
conditions (protectionism, special privileges, suppression of wages, restrictions 
of free trade unionism etc.) the Greek industrial capital found itself quite un­
ready to adapt to the new socio-political circumstances, and continued to pur­
sue the maintenance of the past frameworks.
*  *  *
Industrial change, brought about spatial change. The changing spatial struc­
tures and the role of Athens metropolitan region in the country’s industrial 
geography will be examined in the next section of this chapter.
3.2. Transformations of the Industrial Space 
and the Role of Athens
3.2.1. Spatial Polarization and the Location o f industry
As Myrdal (1957), Hirschman (1958), and other advocates of the theory of un­
even spatial development have argued, economic growth and industrialization 
never starts up evenly in all areas of geographical space; for natural and/or 
historical reasons, some areas are "endowed" with more production factors 
than others (availability of capital and land, workforce, mineral and other 
natural resources, entrepreneurship, industrial and commercial tradition and 
mentality, infrastructure, etc.). Economic growth tends initially to occur in
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such areas to take advantage of those factors; once the developmental dy­
namic has been set up, it tends to accelerate in a "cumulative causation" 
manner that reinforces the initial inequalities ("backwash" or "polarization 
effects") (for a concise presentation of the theories of unbalanced spatial de­
velopment see Holland 1979: 36-60; Friedmann and Weaver 1979: 114-39; Cook 
1983:120-6).
Spatial polarization characterized the location of production during the 
period of economic growth and industrialization in Greece. Greater Athens 
(including Piraeus), was historically a major pole of industrial location (chap. 
4, sect 4.1); it was a pool of skilled labour, and the port of Piraeus was the 
major transit centre of the country. Moreover, Athens -as the capital city of 
Greece- was from 19th century endowed with administrative, commercial, fi­
nancial, social and cultural services (Karageorgas and Pakos 1986: 277), which, 
simply, did not exist to any considerable extend in other areas of the Greek 
territory. The inflow of refugees after the Minor Asia disaster in 1922, in­
creased the Athenian population -hence the supply of labour force for pro­
duction and the demand for manufactured goods. However, till the early 
1950s, regional inequalities remained at relatively low levels. The dominant 
position of the agricultural sector in the Greek economy kept local popula­
tions tightly bound to their rural provinces (ibid: 278).
By the end of the civil war, however, a first wave of rural exodus to 
urban areas and mainly to Greater Athens took place. This exodus had two in­
terrelated causes: (a) People who had joined the Democratic Army of Greece 
against the national forces during the civil war (which took place mainly in 
rural areas), moved to Athens hoping that the anonymity offered in a big city 
would help them avoid reprisals and other consequences after the final defeat 
of the Democratic Army in 1949 (e.g. terrorism exercised by police and right 
wing para-state organizations, extraordinary martial courts, etc.) (see Fischer 
et a] 1974; Svoronos 1992: 147 ff). (b) because regional economies and infra­
structure networks were completely destroyed during a decade of wars 
(Svoronos 1992 145), there were no chances of employment in the countryside. 
These masses were mostly employed in informal sectors of the Athens urban
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economy, which, during the 1950s shared many common characteristics with 
Third World metropolises -i.e. subsistence wages and urban poverty, domina­
tion of informality and marginality, etc. (Leontidou 1990: 90).
Rural exodus continued to take place during the 1960s, but to a much 
greater extend and in a different context Industrialization was in progress, 
the Athens urban economy was rapidly transforming into a productive indus­
trial economy (chap. 4, sect. 4.2) and the people moving to the capital supplied 
manufacturing sector with abundant and cheap workforce. Other major urban 
centres manifested considerable percentage increases of their population, even 
greater from those of Athens (table 3.29). However, due to their small initial 
population, these increases did not manage to alter the dominant position of 
Athens as the major pole of concentration of population and activities and the 
major reason (along with migration abroad) for depopulation and economic 
backwardness of most peripheral regions.
Table 3.29 Population changes o f the main Greek urban centres 1951-1991
Main urban centres % 1951-61 % 1961-71 % 1971-81 % 1981-91
Greater Athens 34.4 37.1 19.2 15
Thessaloniki 28.1 46.4 26.7 6.1
Patras 11.8 16.2 27.9 10.3
Irakleio 20.1 2L0 3L0 19.1
Volos 25.0 8.5 21.6 8.0
Larisa 35.0 30.6 4L4 10.8
Chania 41.4 4.4 16.9 16.3
loannina 8.3 14.7 117 518
Chalkida 4.0 46.7 23.6 40.1
Acharnae 33.4 70.1 46.2 49.9
Kavala 5.7 3.9 21.9 2.9
Serres 9.0 -0.4 16.1 8.8
SOURCE: Own calculations from NSSG, Greece in Figures 1994, Athens
1994: table I.b.
Industrialization and growth of the 1960s-mîâ 1970s period, accelerated 
the initial inequalities. Population concentrafion in Athens and regional 
socio-economic disparities, have been usually considered as the two sides of
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one^nd^the,5aijie coin (Wassenhoven 1984: 3). By 1974, the index of GDP per 
capita in Attica (Greece: 100) was 121 whereas in most peripheral regions was 
much below the national average, reaching even 63 in Thrace and 67 in Epirus 
and Eastern Aegian Islands (ibid.: 5). The index of electric energy consumption 
per capita in Attica reached 178 in 1975 (Greece: 100), whereas in peripheral 
regions it fluctuated between 32 (Thrace) and 77 (Central and Western Mace­
donia) (Kintis 1982:113). The index of number of inhabitants per doctor was 57 
in Attica (Greece: 100), whereas it fluctuated between 313 and 92 in peripheral 
regions.
The geographical distribution of manufacturing industry (1969, 1978 
and 1988) by planning region is shown in tables 3.30, 3.31 and in figure 3.7.
Table 3.30 Geographical distribution o f manufacturing establishments by 
planning region, 1969-1988.
Planning region 1969 % 1978 % 1988 %
Greece, total 124,651 100 128,988 100.0 144717 100.0
Attica 43,803 35.1 51,350 39.8 54,707 37.8
-Greater Athens 40,956 32.9 47,332 36.7 48,656 33.6
-Rest of Attica 2,847 2.3 4,008 3.1 5,552 3.8
Eastern Macedonia + 
Thrace
6,430 5.2 6350 4.9 6,613 4.6
Central Macedonia 20,840 16.7 21,420 16.6 27,999 19.3
Western Macedonia 4,340 3.5 5,362 4.2 6,504 4.5
Epirus 3,241 2.6 3,246 25 3,661 25
Thessaly 8,230 6.6 8,150 6.3 9,158 6.3
Sterea Hellas 6,473 5.2 5,685 4.4 6,403 4.4
Western Greece 6,762 5.4 6,584 5.1 7,190 5.0
Peloponnesos 7,570 6.1 6,518 5.1 7,127 4.9
Ionian Islands 2,754 2.2 2,332 L8 2,226 L5
Northern Aegian 3,770 3.0 2,781 22 2,655 L8
Southern Aegian 3,291 26 2,463 19 2,702 L9
Crete 7,147 5.7 6,757 5.2 8,253 5.7
SOURCE: Table B.1 (appendix I).
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Table 3.31 Geographical distribution o f manufacturing employment by 
planning region, 1969-1988.
Planning region 1969 % 1978 % 1988 %
Greece, total 501,522 100.0 671,496 100.0 706,308 100.0
Attica 251,711 50.2 327,779 48.8 292,509 4L4
-Greater Athens 233,779 46.6 281,821 42.0 246,880 35.0
-Rest of Attica 17,932 3.6 45,958 6.8 51,397 7.3
Eastern Macedonia 4- 
Thrace
17,747 3.5 25453 3.8 37,463 5.3
Central Macedonia 79,836 15.9 117,991 17.6 155,699 220
Western Macedonia 13,110 26 17,385 2.6 19,641 28
Epirus 7,700 L5 10,351 1.5 11,992 L7
Thessaly 25,626 5.1 37,571 5.6 41,246 5.8
Sterea Hellas 21,164 4.2 40,228 6.0 44,393 6.3
Western Greece 25,577 5.1 31,808 4.7 31,905 4.5
Peloponnesos 21,411 4.3 26,058 3.9 25,871 3.7
Ionian Islands 5,511 LI 5,248 0.8 5,267 0.7
Northern Aegian 7,928 L6 6,309 0.9 6,181 0.9
Southern Aegian 7,714 L5 7,414 LI 8,664 L2
Crete 16,484 33 17,900 27 19,739 28
SOURCE: Table B.2 -appendix I.
As it can be remarked, during the industrialization period, the location 
of manufacturing industry was highly polarized. By 1969 the region of Attica 
(including the Greater Athens agglomeration and the rest of Attica), concen­
trated more than 1/3 of the total number of manufacturing establishments and 
more than 1/2 of total manufacturing employment With the exception of 
Central Macedonia (which includes the second major urban-industrial pole, 
Thessaloniki), all other regions concentrated very low percentages of both 
number of establishments and employment Only two urban-industrial centres, 
alone, (Greater Athens and Thessaloniki), concentrated in 1969 43.1% of total 
manufacturing establishments and 58.4% of total manufacturing employment 
(see tables B.1 and B.2 -appendix I).
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Figure 3.7 Geographical distribution o f manufacturing establishments and 
employment by planning region, 1969, 1978, 1988.
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The reasons for the concentration of industry in Attica, can be grouped 
into two broad categories: (a) reasons associated w ith ^^  internal characteris­
tics of the country’s industrial system, and (b) reasons associated with the ex­
ternal "environment" in which this system was operating (see Koutsoumaris 
1963: 132-42; TEE 1978: 15 ff; Kottis 1980: 22; Kintis 1982: 119-20). More 
analytically:
Internal reasons
Despite the growth of intermediate and capital branches during the in­
dustrialization period, the industrial system continued to be dominated 
by consumer branches in terms of both their share in the manufactur­
ing output and in manufacturing employment -as we saw in the previ­
ous section. Because these branches are market-oriented, they found 
their ideal location in Athens which is the largest consumption centre 
of the country.
The lack of intercomplementarity between the industrial and the agri­
cultural sectors (see Mouzelis 1993) prevented manufacturing from lo­
cating to peripheral agricultural regions.
The dependence of Greek manufacturing upon imports (see sect 3.1), 
led plants to locate within the range of the major transit centre of the 
country.
External reasons
Existence of public and private services necessary for the operation of 
manufacturing firms (e.g. banks and other financial institutions, admin­
istrative, commercial, advertising, insurance, accounting and juridical 
services, technical services, etc.).
Existence of infrastructure (energy, transport and communication). 
Existence of social overhead facilities (education, health, recreation 
and cultural facilities, etc.) and generally better conditions of life and 
of social status for entrepreneurs and managerial staff.
Existence of abundant labour force.
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Lack of considerable differences in the wage levels between Athens 
and peripheral areas. (In formal activities wage levels are determined 
by national collective bargaining).
Nodal geographical position of Athens in the country’s national and in­
ternational transport connections.
Insufficient and inconsistent decentralization policies.
In a 1980 survey of 204 manufacturing enterprises located in Attica 
(Kottis 1980: chap. X), it was revealed that the most significant reasons for 
plants’ attraction were (a) proximity to labour and (b) proximity to the 
m arket Other reasons (e.g. existence of infrastructure, land ownership, prox­
imity to urban services, etc.) played their role but to a less extend. In a more 
recent study (Tsekouras et aL 1985: 32) it was revealed that the most 
important comparative advantage of Attica in attracting industries has still to 
do with the external economies of location (proximity to labour, suppliers and 
market), while the most important disadvantage (encouraging decentralization 
tendencies) has to do with shortages and high cost of available land.
Forces of historical continuity and inertia should be also added to the 
"puir dynamic: Qualitative factors, such as working tradition and discipline, 
labour specialization, etc, in Athens, although cannot be easily "measured" in 
statistical numbers, must have played an important role in attracting in­
dustries during the post-war growth period.
3.2.2. Towards a Reversal o f the Industrial Locatbn Pattern?
During the 1970s some changes in the structure of the Greek industrial space 
started to emerge along with the process of deindustrialization and negative 
restructuring. Some writers assert that these changes indicate a reversal of the 
past polarized industrial location pattern, a weakening of the dominant posi­
tion of Athens and the gradual emergence of a new pattern of "diffused in­
dustrialization" based on flexible production processes, SMEs-led peripheral 
industrialization, multiple forms of regional employment, local initiatives and 
informality (see e.g. Hadjimichalis and Vaiou 1987; 1990; Leontidou 1990:
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184-88). Such processes, are indeed currently in progress and have been ad­
dressed by both theoretical analysis (Getimis and Kafkalas 1990; Konminos 
1990a) and empirical research (Lyberaki 1991; 1991a; 1992; Labrianidis 1992). 
Others (see e.g. Papamichos and Tsoulouvis 1990), assert that the spatial-indus­
trial changes are rather marginal, and therefore they cannot outweigh the past 
polarized configurations which continue to remain dominant till nowadays. It 
is therefore important to identify in some more detail the extend of change.
Statistical evidence reveals that despite ongoing deindustrialization 
since 1973/74, industrial concentration in space was further intensified by 
1978 (table 3.32 and figures 3.8 and 3.9 -upper maps). In 1969-78 both manufa-
Table 3.32 Percent change o f manufacturing establishments and employ- 
ment by planning region, 1969-1978.
Planning region % change of 
the number of 
establishments
% change of 
employment
Greece, total 3.5 33.9
Attica 17.2 30.2
-Greater Athens 15.6 20.6
-Rest of Attica 40.8 156.3
Eastern Macedonia 4- Thrace -L2 43.4
Central Macedonia 2.8 47.8
Western Macedonia 23.5 316
Epirus 0.2 34.4
Thessaly -LO 46.6
Sterea Hellas -12.2 90.1
Western Greece -2.6 24.4
Peloponnesos -13.9 2L7
Ionian Islands -15.3 -4.8
Northern Aegian -26.2 -20.4
Southern Aegian -25.2 -3.9
Crete -5.5 8.6
SOURCE: Tables B.1 and B.2 (appendix I.).
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Figure 3.8 Change o f manufacturing establishments by planning region,
1969-1978, 1978-1988
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Figure 3.9 Change o f manufacturing employment by planning region,
1%9-1978, 1978-1988.
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SOURCE: Mapped from table B.2 (appendix I).
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cturing establishments and employment in Attica increased. A few regions 
(Western Macedonia, Central Macedonia and Epirus) increased their number 
of establishments, whereas the vast majority of Greek regions increased their 
manufacturing employment. This was partly due to new plants’ location in pe­
ripheral regions and partly to relocation of existing manufacturing activities 
away from Athens. Larger units (Limited Liability and S.A. Companies) fol­
lowed a process of "selective decentralization" of parts of their production 
processes during 1973-78 ; their concentration in Attica decreased from 52% in 
1973 to 42% in 1978 (Leontidou 1990: 178). However, this selective decentraliz­
ation was countered by the attraction of new manufacturing activity in 
Attica, which by 1978 had increased both its establishments and employment 
(table 3.32).
In 1969-78 most peripheral regions presented absolute decline in their 
number of manufacturing establishments and absolute employment increases; 
only three of them presented absolute declines in both establishments and 
employment (Ionian, northern Aegian and southern Aegian islands). This sim­
ply means that during crisis the dominant tendency was less and larger plants ^  —  ^        —■ -         _
to locate into peripheral regions.
Statistical evidence assigned to large geographical units (planning re­
gions) shows that from 1978 onwards the Greek industrial space is undergoing 
a notable depolarization trend (table 3.33 and figures 3.8, 3.9 -lower maps). In 
1978-88, although a slight increase (6.5%) of Attica’s manufacturing establish­
ments took place, employment was decreased by 10.8% (and by 124% in 
Greater Athens). Most peripheral regions increased both their number of es­
tablishments and employment. However, a more detailed examination of stat­
istical data at the scale of prefectures (tables B.1 and B.2 -appendix I), shows 
that what appears to be a depolarization trend, is actually an expansion of in­
dustrial activity along an S-shaped growth corridor stretching from Achaia 
and Korinthia Nomoi (prefectures) in Northern Peloponnesos, via Attica, to 
Viotia, Evia (around Chalkida), Magnisia, Larissa, Thessaloniki (with local 
deviations to Imathia, Pella and Serres) and ending in Kavala (fig. 3.10).
n
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Table 3.33 Percent change o f manufacturing establishments and 
employment by planning region, 1978-1988.
Planning region % change of the num­
ber of establishments
% change of 
employment
Greece, total 122 5.2
Attica 6.5 -10.8
-Greater Athens 28 -124
-Rest of Attica 38.5 11.8
Eastern Macedonia + Thrace 4.1 47.2
Central Macedonia 30.7 3L9
Western Macedonia 2L3 13.0
Epirus 128 15.9
Thessaly 124 9.8
Sterea Hellas 126 10.4
Western Greece 9.2 0.3
Peloponnesos 9.3 -0.7
Ionian Islands -4.5 0.4
Northern Aegian -4.5 -20
Southern Aegian 9.7 16.9
Crete 221 10.3
SOURCE: Tables B.1 and B.2 (appendix I).
This growth '^corridor", concentrated in 1978 65.8% of the total number of 
manufacturing establishments and 793% of the total manufacturing employ­
ment (calculated from tables B.1, B.2 -appendix I). In the early 1970s, intense 
industrial concentrations emerged next to the borders of Attica in the neigh­
bouring prefectures of Viotia (Oinofyta locality) and Korinthia (Agioi Theo- 
doroi locality) along the national highway Korinthos -  Athens - Lamia (see 
also Karka-Agelidi 1989; Yoti-Papadaki 1988). In 1969-1978 manufacturing em­
ployment in Viotia prefecture increased by 128.1% and in Korinthia by 38.7% 
(table R2 -appendix I). Incentive laws of early 1970s (L.1078/1971 and 
L.1312/1972 -see sect 3.2.3) defined those adjacent prefectures as B-type as­
sisted areas in which new manufacturing investments could receive enhanced 
incentives. Industrialists directed their investments to those areas for the pur­
pose of benefiting from incentives, and on the same time benefiting from the 
dense network of the Athenian agglomeration economies. Thus, what seems at 
a first glance to be a notable depolarization-spatial equalization trend, is in
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Figure 3.10 The S-shaped industrial growth "corridor" on 1978.
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reality a transformation of the past form of industrial inequality between 
Athens/Thessaloniki -vs- the rest of Greek territory into a new form of in­
equality between this S-shaped growth corridor and the rest of regional in­
dustrial space. As Wassenhoven remarks, "more prefectures are now 
participating in the process of industrial development, but at the same time 
the gap separating the growing areas from those which fail to take part in 
this process is widening." (1984:12; see also Economou 1983: 37).
By 1988 these trends had been consolidated, but a new element was 
added: For the first time in the post-war period manufacturing employment 
in Attica declined in both percentage and absolute terms. Its share in the 
country’s total fell from 48.8% (1978) to 414% (1988), while in absolute terms it 
decreased by 35,270 jobs (-10.8%) (calculated from previous table 3.31).
The previous evidence reveals that deindustrialization and negative re­
structuring of the Greek economy as a whole, affected exclusively the region 
of Athens, -Attica. Thus, apart from that region, which increased only the 
number of its establishments, all other regions of the country (with the ex­
ception of Peloponessos, and the island regions of Ionian and northern Ae­
gian) presented absolute increases in both manufacturing establishments and 
employment during 1978-88 (previous table 3.33). It seems that despite the en­
trance of new firms in business in Attica during 1978-88, the employment they 
offered was unable to outweigh the wider effects of its deindustrialization 
and job loss.
Job loss in Attica was mainly caused by plant closures (especially big 
ones) and by plants’ relocations to peripheral regions. In 1978-84, employment 
in the big plants (50+ employees) of Attica was decreased by a much greater 
rate than that of SMEs (table 3.34). Three other regions of the country (Ionian 
islands, Peloponnesos and Crete) presented absolute employment decline in 
big plants as well On the contrary, employment in SMEs was increased in all 
regions (with the exception of Attica). In terms of number of establishments, 
SMEs increased in all 13 regions, whereas larger plants decreased in 6 of them 
(including the Attica region) (table 3.35). It should be noted that in a period
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Table 3.34 Manufacturing employment change (%) by size o f plant and
planning region, 1978-1984
Planning region SMEs (1-49 
employees)
504-
employees
Total
Greece, total 7.84 -7.06 L89
Attica -0.45 -24.59 -10.76
Eastrn Macedonia + Thrace 3.98 72.90 27.89
Central Macedonia 24.70 8,17 18.24
Western Macedonia 15.77 10.50 15.16
Epirus 20.80 16.74 14.96
Thessaly 6.30 10.95 8.11
Sterea Hellas 18.95 15.53 16.76
Western Greece 5.36 9.54 7.01
Peloponnesos 9.87 -14.12 0.51
Ionian Islands 7.77 -31.80 3.33
Northern Aegian 4.38 9.83 5.06
Southern Aegian 25.79 18.22 23.66
Crete 7.29 -34.68 L30
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.7 (appendix I).
Table 3.35 Percent change o f the number o f manufacturing establishments 
____________by size o f plant and planning region, 1978-1984______________
Planning region SMEs (1-49 
employees)
504-
employees
Total
Greece, total 1123 -7.13 1100
Attica 6.92 -19.12 6.55
Eastern Macedonia 4- Thrace L07 47.69 1.54
Central Macedonia 27.10 6.69 26.80
Western Macedonia 19.64 -36.36 19.53
Epirus 18.07 13.33 18.05
Thessaly 13.61 10.00 13.57
Sterea Hellas 14.97 -4.96 14.55
Western Greece 13.81 -8.22 13.56
Peloponnesos 10.41 -24.29 10.03
Ionian Islands L80 -60.00 L67
Northern Aegian 149 1150 152
Southern Aegian 18.83 0.00 18.76
Crete 8.71 10.53 8.72
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.6 (appendix I).
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of economic recession, not only SMEs presented a remarkable degree of resis­
tance to crisis, but they also increased their presence in the industrial and re­
gional system in both number of establishments and employment creation 
-with the exception of Attica- as we mentioned earlier.
The decline of manufacturing employment in Attica was not associated 
-to  any considerable extend- with technological modernization/rationaliz­
ation strategies undertaken by whole branches and companies in order to re­
main antagonistic in a period of economic recession, instability and increased 
international competition, as in the advanced economies like for instance the 
UK economy (Massey and Meegan 1982; Allen and Massey eds., 1988). On the 
contrary, as we saw in the previous section, the major problem of Greek in­
dustry is its inability to modernize technologically: Job loss in Attica,
therefore, can be seen as the combined outcome of two parallel processes: (a) 
closures of big companies and (b) moderate decentralization of manufacturing 
to peripheral lower cost regions. As a survey revealed, the major problems 
facing Attica’s industries (which generate decentralization pressures) are asso­
ciated with shortages and high cost of both land and labour (Kottis 1980: 248). 
According to another study (Leontidou 1981b: 41- 2), the major decentraliza­
tion-stimulating forces are the following:
Decentralization policies, environmental controls and associated popu­
lar and political pressures.
Agglomeration diseconomies (congestion, rise of land prices, etc.). 
Shortages in labour supply due to young people’s preference to tertiary 
forms of employment
Decrease of building activity in Athens has led linked manufacturing 
branches to seek relocation elsewhere.
Accession to EC favoured regional industrial development 
Technological modernization of Athenian manufacturing leads to 
labour redundancies and indirectly to increase of tertiary employment 
The energy crisis affects negatively the growth of manufacturing in 
Attica.
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A focused survey undertaken during the mid 1980s (Tsekouras et aL 
1985: chap. VI), revealed that relocation of manufacturing away from Athens 
region took actually place on a very limited scale and was met by lots of 
problems. More precisely:
Most of the the relocated firms moved to adjacent regions. Thus, what 
seems to be an industrial decentralization tendency, is actually a geo­
graphical "extension" of the industrial space of Athens into its neigh­
bouring areas as we saw earlier.
Most of the relocated firms were of a very small size.
Investments in the receiving sites were very small, contributing thus 
very little to peripheral job creation.
The reasons for relocating, as the survey revealed, were recorded as 
follows (according to importance):
Need for expansion of the existing plants. (Lack of available space and 
its splitting into storeys or even into different buildings, entailed in­
creased production costs especially in the case of larger companies). 
Pressures stemming from environmental protection concerns (reactions 
of people and local authorities of Attica against polluting plants, nega­
tion of state authorities to renew plants’ operation permits, etc.). 
Regional incentives played a role in relocation -not by themselves but 
in parallel with other reasons.
Lower labour costs away from Attica (and especially in informal types 
of work).^
Efforts to gain new markets in parallel with maintaining the Athenian 
one by keeping warehouses and/or commercial exhibitions in the Greek 
capital
Disproportionately high prices of the existing plots in Attica in relation 
with their present (industrial) use.
 ^ E g seasonal and part time jobs, subcontracting and work-at-home, etc., since formal 
work is covered by collective bargainining and there are no regional divergences in wage le­
vels. According to recent evidence (Kopsini 1994) part-time jobs are steadily increasing es­
pecially in informal economic activities.
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Strictly personal reasons.
According to the survey, the relocation experiences that were recorded 
were not so encouraging (Tsekouras et aL 1985: 277-81). The surveyed firms 
had to tackle with a lot of problems associated with bureaucratic procedures 
and delays in getting relocation permits and incentives, inadequate infrastruc­
ture and services at the receiving areas, lack of working discipline by the pe­
ripheral workforce, etc.
For a number of reasons, income inequalities between the core region 
of Attica and the peripheral ones have started to diminish since the mid 1970s 
(table 3.36). The moderate decentralization of manufacturing, along with
Table 3.36 Indices o f gross regional income per capita, 1974,1981.
Regions 1974 1981
Eastern Sterea (including Attica) and Cyclades islands 114.1 109.8
Central and Western Macedonia 88.3 93.2
Peloponessos and Western Sterea 83.3 95.5
Thessaly 85.3 94.4
Eastern Macedonia 84.4 89.7
Crete 84.0 90.9
Epirus 73.8 814
Thrace 83.6 95.2
Eastern Aegian islands 84.8 87.6
Greece, total 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Athanasiou 1991: 88.
modernization of the agricultural sector and tourist growth in certain 
peripheral areas, are some major regional convergence reasons. Multiple forms 
of employment (e.g. seasonal work in agriculture combined with employment 
in SMEs and involvement in tourist activities during summers) which are very 
customary work practices in certain peripheral areas, have played an import­
ant role to a considerable increase of regional incomes (Hadjimichalis and 
Vaiou 1987; 1990; Tsartas 1991). However, this convergence trend was not ac­
companied by a considerable shift of the industrial location pattern: Whereas
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in the advanced countries deindustrialization and capital restructuring pro­
cesses were associated with a wave of productive decentralization (see Martin 
and Rowthorn, eds^ 1988; Massey 1988 for the UK case), in Greece, by contrast, 
empirical evidence presented previously revealed that decentralization trends 
were rather weak if not marginal: Despite some impacts on the development 
of regional industrial spaces, decentralization was unable to question the 
dominant position of the Athenian region in the country’s industrial geogra­
phy: By 1988, Attica continued to concentrate 37.8% of total manufacturing es­
tablishments and 41.4% of manufacturing employment (see previous tables 
330 and 3.31). It seems that industrial restructuring in Greece took place 
rather as a process of internal transformation of the production system in its 
drive to maintain the "benefits" of the traditional pattern of accumulation, as 
we saw in the previous section, than as a consistent effort of industrial capital 
to create new spaces for new accumulation. The inefficiency of 
decentralization policies -as we will see in the last section- played a major 
role to the maintenance of the past geographical configuartion of industry.
3.2.3. Industrial Decentralization Policies: Regional Incentives 
and ETVA's Industrial Estates
The prevailing economic arguments in the first post-war decade on the model 
of development the country should follow, were mostly focused upon issues 
of economic growth and efficiency, hence offering little room for geographi­
cal equality considerations. The neo-classical doctrine that the free operation 
of the market would secure the balanced spatial distribution of economic ac­
tivity was explicitly or implicitly assumed by governments at least until the 
mid 1960s (Andikopoulou and Kafkalas 1985: 132-3). Within this broader con­
text, the legislation concerned with the decentralization of industry was quite 
limited and ineffective; every industrialist was quite aware that rapid econ­
omic growth and export oriented industrialization could not take place effi­
ciently away from Athens (and to a lesser degree from Thessaloniki). The 
limited and geographically undifferentiated incentives offered by legislation 
in the 1950s and 1960s were quite unable to outweigh the favourable external 
economies of plants’ location in Athens.
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The most important measures for encouraging industry to locate in the 
provinces during the 1950s, were introduced by Law 2176/1952, LD 2901/1954, 
Law 3213/ 1955 and LD 3765/ 1957. These statutes did not make any further 
geographical differentiation of incentive-areas apart from Attica-vs-rest of 
Greece, and provided incentives of accelerated amortisation for the provincial 
industries, decreases of their turnover taxes, other tax concessions, subsidy of 
interest rates on bank loans, facilitated land acquisition for the establishment 
or expansion of industries in the provinces, etc. However, even the limited 
benefits provided to peripheral industries were later diminished, as soon as 
Laws 3949/1959, 4002/1959 and 4171/1961 extended most of them to include 
Athenian industries (Kottis 1980: 177-8). Legislation of the 1960s followed the 
same directions (with the exemption of Law 4458/1965 about the establish­
ment of peripheral industrial estates which will be discussed later on). The 
first tangible effort to introduce spatially differentiated incentives was un­
dertaken by LD 1078/1971, which made the distinction between 3 types of in­
centive-assisted areas (fig. 3.11). The incentives offered were of the same type 
as the earlier ones (tax concessions, subsidies of bank loans, etc.) and were en­
hanced in C type areas. Just one year later another Law (1312/1972) subdivided 
C areas into one more type (D) including western Greece, southern Pelopones- 
sos, northern border areas and islands (fig. 3.12) and receiving enhanced 
incentives. Grants on investments for the construction of manufacturing 
building (25% of the cost) were also provided in D type areas. Four years later. 
Law 289/1976 subdivided D areas into one more type (E) which included 
Thrace and eastern border islands (fig. 3.13). Enhanced incentives were pro­
vided in E areas and included not only manufacturing, but agricultural, mi­
ning-quarrying and tourist investments as well A further subdivision into El 
and E2 areas was introduced by Law 849/1978 to offer enhanced assistance to 
a narrow geographical "strip" along the country’s northern border (fig. 3.14) 
and a new type of incentives was introduced (subsidies and loans for decreas­
ing industrial pollution and energy savings, for establishing R+D departments, 
for plants’ relocation from A and B areas to more backward ones, etc.).
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Figure 3.11 Incentive-areas o f LD 1078/1971
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SOURCE: Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984:161.
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Figure 3.12 Incentive-areas o f LD 1312/1972
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Figure 3.13 Incentive-areas o f Law 289/1976
SOURCE: Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984: 165.
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Figure 3.14 Incentive-areas o f Law 849/1978
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In a report prepared by the Centre of Planning and Economic Re­
searches (quoted in Wassenhoven 1984: 14), the system of incentives was criti­
cised on the basis that it was subsidising non-viable industries without "clearly 
defined objectives and priorities". It proposed the creation of various 
"packages" of incentives depending on the area, the industry involved and the 
investment agent It also highlighted the need to introduce some other types 
of incentives, as for instance incentives for the creation of new jobs in pe­
ripheral areas, grants to encourage relocation of existing manufacturing in 
less developed areas, state’s participation in industrial ventures through share 
capital, subsidies of transport costs in the backward regions, underwriting of 
loans for industrial investments, grants to industries undertaking workforce 
training programmes, etc. It also suggested that more attention should be paid 
in drawing the assisted areas’ boundaries in order to fit more accurately to the 
real assistance needs and regional industrial development priorities.
A further differentiation of areas and incentives was introduced by an 
Act of the Council of Ministers (40/14-3-1979) (fig. 3.15). On the one hand, in­
dustries were classified into three assistance categories (of high, medium and 
low assistance priorities), and on the other C, D and E areas were divided in 
various sub-areas associated with the above assistance priorities. It was there­
fore the first official effort to link selectively the developmental prospects of 
certain areas to the development of certain manufacturing branches on the 
basis of a number of criteria associated with future growth prospects, with 
problems stemming from foreign competition, and with the level of each in­
dustry’s technological development (Wassenhoven 1984: 14-5). However, this 
branch-selective incentive policy was not met unproblematically: In 1980, a 
report prepared by the Ministry of Co-ordination (later Ministry of National 
Economy) stated that this branch-selectivity could be problematical in that:
(a) it might prove difficult and time-consuming for the administration to 
make the proper choices; (b) it might entail subjective criteria in deciding 
which branches should be additionally assisted and which should not; (c) it 
might drive the country’s industrial development in wrong directions at the 
long-run; and (d) it might create confusion and uncertainty to potential 
investors (KEPE 1980:188). Alternatively, it suggested a set of other criteria
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Figure 3.15 Incentive-areas o f Act o f the Council o f Ministers 
40/13-3-1979
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SOURCE: Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984:169.
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manufacturing firms should fulfil for receiving enhanced incentive assistance 
such as: (a) creation of over 100 jobs in a period of three years; (b) utilization 
of domestic raw materials and contribution to vertical integration or special­
ization of production; (c) export orientation (over 40% of total production) (d) 
orientation towards dynamic high-tech products; and (e) high percentage of 
skilled workforce.
However, the arrangements of the previous legislation proved to be ex­
tremely perplexed and led to bureaucratic procedures which were posing seri­
ous problems to the applying investors. In another report of the Centre of 
Planning and Economic Researches (quoted in Wassenhoven 1984: 15), it was 
suggested that the system had to be simplified and that greater use of 
investment grants -used in other EC countries- should be adopted.
Thus, some corrective measures were taken in the early 1980s (Laws 
1616/1981 and 1262/1982) the most important of which was the introduction of 
investment grants. Free grants on productive investments were usual in all EC 
countries (see Lemonias 1991: chap. 6), were much more simple, transparent 
and effective, and encouraged the birth of new manufacturing activities, since 
they did not presuppose the existence of initial profits like the various tax- 
based incentives. Law 1616/1981 decreased incentive-areas in only 3 (A, B and 
C -fig. 3.16), while an Act of the Council of Ministers (45/ 4-3-1981) subdi­
vided B and C types into various sub-areas (fig. 3.17). In the most backward C 
areas, investment grants reached 50% of the total investment for high assist­
ance industries, 45% for medium and 40% for low assistance ones. Subsidies of 
interest rates on bank loans in the same areas were respectively graded (50%, 
45% and 40%). Other incentives (accelerated amortisation, tax concessions etc.) 
were also offered.
One year later, the Socialists* administration set forth Law 1262/1982 
which revised again the incentive-areas division into four (fig. 3.18).The acti­
vities which could be subsidised ("productive investments") apart from usual 
activities such as construction, expansion, or modernization of industrial 
plants, included activities such as introduction of high-tech electronic and
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Figure 3.16 Incentive-areas o f Law 1116/1981
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Figure 3.17 Incentive-areas o f Act o f the Council o f Ministers 
45/4-3-1981
SOURCE: Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984: 189.
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Figure 3.18 Incentive-areas o f Law 1262/1982
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SOURCE: Andrikopoulou-Kafkala 1984: 196.
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data processing equipment, relocation of plants in backward areas or in indus­
trial estates within them, erection of warehouse facilities, purchase of trans­
port means, building of workers’ housing, purchase of industrial floorspace in 
ETVA’s industrial estates, etc. (ETVA 1988: 3-5). Moreover, if the investment 
did not exceed an upper limit, the investment grants were offered free. If this 
limit was exceeded, part of the grand offered had the form of public sectors’ 
participation in the share capital of the subsidised firm. This regulation was 
obviously reflecting the politico-ideological priorities of the Socialist admin­
istration aimed at imposing an increased social control on the productive 
forces (especially big investments), at strengthening the antimonopoly 
directions of the new economic policy and at encouraging private-public 
partnerships in the process of industrial development (see Lemonias 1991: 92). 
The amount of grants offered in each incentive-area was relatively flexible 
and depended on criteria such as: (a) the potential linkages of the investment 
with key-sectors of the economy (and especially its potentiality in creating 
multiplier effects in employment), (b) the level of technology and productiv­
ity of the investment, (c) export prospects and import substitution, energy 
saving, utilization of domestic raw materials and mechanical equipment, (d) 
job creation, level of pollution and quality of life, and (e) the "nature" of the 
investment agent (e.g. productive investments of co-operatives, local author­
ities, and repatriated Greek entrepreneurs were favoured) (ETVA 1988: 20-1). 
Moreover, investments in areas B, C and D were offered enhanced grants (up 
to 15%) for activities such as (a) environmental protection and relocation of 
polluting plants from residential areas into industrial estates, (b) replacement 
of traditional energy sources with environmentally friendly ones, (c) estab­
lishment of R+D departments in industrial, energy and metallurgical sectors, 
(d) production of especially high-tech products, (e) opening of companies 
owned by local authorities and/or co-operatives, and (f) investments especially 
designed for offering employment to persons needing special care (ibid: 24-5). 
Apart from investment grants, other, more "traditional" kinds of incentives 
(subsidy of interest rates on bank loans, tax concessions and accelerated 
amortizations) were also provided to the decentralizing industries.
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In the early 1990s the conservative administration of ND replaced Law 
1262/1982 with Law 1892/1990 (ETVA 1991), which, however, followed the 
basic directions of the previous one. The only differences were: (a) The new 
Law put more emphasis upon tax concessions instead of investment grants, (b) 
The enhanced incentives offered by the previous Law to enterprises owned by 
social agencies (co-operatives, local authorities) were equalized to those of­
fered to private investors, (c) Enhanced incentives were offered to highly pol­
luting industries for relocating away from Athens and Thessaloniki The types 
of incentive-assisted areas remained four (A-D) as in Law 1262/1982, but some 
prefectures -mainly those in mountainous central Greece and those in agrar­
ian western Peloponnesos- were raised from C to D-type, receiving, thus, 
greater assistance (fig. 3.19). The productive investments which could be subsi­
dised -apart from traditional ones- included investments in technological 
modernization (e.g. purchase of new mechanical equipment, introduction of 
informatics and computing technologies in production and administration of 
firms, education of staff), R+D activities, construction of pilot plants, etc. 
(ETVA 1991: 5-6). Investments in A areas (Greater Athens and Thessaloniki) 
were also offered grants (up to 40% of the total investment) in special acti­
vities related with: (a) environmental protection; (b) energy saving and re­
placement of traditional energy resources by new ones; (c) establishment or 
expansion of industrial, energy or mining research labs; (d) production of es­
pecially high-tech goods and services; and (e) investments undertaken by vari­
ous social organizations offering employment to persons needing special care.
According to Kintis (1982: 123-7), the efficiency of incentives policy (at 
least till the 1980s) could not be regarded as satisfactory for a number of rea­
sons, most important of which were the following:
The state’s unwillingness or incompetence to implement an integrated 
and consistent industrial decentralization and regional development 
policy.
The lack of appropriate urban-industrial infrastructure in all provinces 
with the exception of Athens and Thessaloniki ones.
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Figure 3.19 Incentive-areas of Law 1892/1990
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The extremely centralized public/administrative system.
The inadequacy of the incentives system.
The restricted utilization of the country’s natural resources. 
Considerable delays in the development of the country’s economic rela­
tions with the neighbouring Balkan countries.
Decentralization policy was not combined with measures for discourag­
ing industrial concentration in Athens.
Some other major problems which have been recorded (Andrikopoulou 
- Kafkala 1984: 168-71), are related with: (a) The complexity of the incentives 
system and the frequent changes of assisted areas’ and sub-areas’ boundaries. 
It is remarkable that in a period of just 10 years (1971-1982), there were 8 
changes of those boundaries (and associated changes of the incentives corre­
sponding to each one of them). This presupposes a good organizational struc­
ture and special knowledge and capability on the part of firms -preconditions 
that tend to favour the existing (mature) big companies and to discourage 
small, new, or foreign ones, (b) The base of the system -at least till the 1980s- 
was formed by various tax concessions and subsidies of interest on bank loans, 
which operate long after the initial investment, and presuppose the existence 
of profits -a fact that also tends to favour mature industries and to discour­
age new ones (Kintis 1982: 123; Kalogirou et aL 1989: 48; Lemonias 1991: 19). It 
was only during the 1980s (Laws 1116/1981 and 1262/1982) that free investment 
grants started to be provided to the decentralizing firms, (c) The evaluation of 
the investment projects has in practice been appointed to the banks which 
tend to finance only the big mature companies (minimisation of banks’ risks). 
It also results in considerable bureaucratic procedures and delays which dis­
courage many firms from undertaking decentralization initiatives, (d) The in­
centives are oriented in financing the cost of capital, hence favouring capital 
intensive investments which have no considerable effects upon job creation to 
the assisted areas, (e) Subsidies of interest rates on bank loans were not so im­
portant as to influence decisively the inflow of considerable industrial invest­
ments in the less developed areas.
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According to Kalogirou et ai. (1989: 48-54), the failure of the incentive 
system in promoting a substantial wave of productive decentralization, can be 
attributed to the following reasons:
The bmited nature of incentives (the basis of the system till recently 
was formed by various tax concessions as previously mentioned).
The diversification of assisted areas was not accompanied by clearly 
defined development priorities and objectives in each one of tbenL 
The relocation incentives were inadequate (they subsidised a very small 
portion of the total relocation cost) and were not combined with tech­
nological modernization incentives.
The selective differentiation of incentives-by-brancb and area was 
delayed, not clearly defined and the related decisions were left to the 
subjective opinion of the Minister of National Economy. In that con­
text, the comparative advantages of certain areas for the development 
of certain branches were not properly evaluated and the growth of 
modern manufacturing activities was in most cases problematical 
The complexity of the incentive system and of the areal differenti­
ations caused bureaucratic delays in evaluating and implementing in­
vestment projects.
The monitoring of the system was inadequate, causing, thus, a 
considerable flow of grants and other subsidies in activities other than 
those for which they had been initially appointed.
Lack of co-ordination between the banking system (which provides 
subsidies under risk-minimization criteria) and the incentive system 
(which is supposedly based upon developmental criteria).
Labrianidis (1989a) identified the major problems of the incentive sys­
tem as follows:
Incentives for encouraging industrial decentralization were not com­
bined with "negative incentives" (or dis-incentives) discouraging cen­
tralization of production in Athens.
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Relocation incentives were not differentiated from the other -general- 
incentives, and covered a very small proportion of the total relocation 
costs. They were not also combined with modernization incentives so as 
to encourage combined decentralization/rationalization initiatives.
The regional differentiation of the incentive system emerged late 
(early 1970s) when industrial growth had already reached its peak.
The differentiation of incentives-by-branch, emerged, also, very late 
(1978), and in an unsystematic way. There were no connections be­
tween specific areas and particular industry groups on a "comparative 
advantage" basis.
The incentives legislation was loosely implemented, leaving, thus, lots 
of "open windows" for priviledged treatment of particular industrial 
interests (especially for investments in Attica).
The official controls of the incentive-assisted companies were not sys­
tematic. After the initial controls for getting the investment permitts, 
most of the assisted firms could direct part or the whole of subsidies to 
purposes other than the officially agreed ones.
In an empirical study which analyzed the investment projects sub­
mitted for approval under Law 1262/1982 (Georgakellos et aL 1990), it was re­
vealed that only 33.3% of them have been materialized in practice. It was 
argued that no matter how elaborate and complete an incentive system might 
be, industrial decentralization would remain restricted and ineffective if other 
complementary packages of measures were not undertaken. Such measures 
were considered to be the improvement of the quality of regional transport - 
communication - information infrastructures* and urban services, the 
vocational- technical improvement of industrial workforce and of the mana­
gerial staff, the simplification of the procedures for applying, approving and 
implementing investment projects, etc.
Another important tool, as it was hoped, for promoting the combined 
objectives of regional industrialization and decentralization of Athenian 
manufacturing, was legislated in the mid 1960s (Law 4458/1965). Under this
 ^ The importance of infrastructure networks in regional industrial development was
revealed in another study (see Petrakos et aL 1993).
164
Law, the Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development (ETVA) was given re­
sponsibilities to establish, organize and manage industrial estates near big pe­
ripheral urban centres for the purpose of (a) accelerating the industrialization 
of the country as a whole, (b) supporting regional economic development, and 
(c) encouraging decentralization of economic activity from Greater Athens 
(Vliamos 1988: 61). In another special study (Konsolas et aL 1985), the basic ob­
jectives of the industrial estates policy were listed as follows:
(1). Strengthening o f the country*s Industrial infrastructure The urban 
centres which were first selected for the location of industrial estates 
were relatively big cities having all the necessary facilities and compa­
rative advantages for the attraction of manufacturing activity (urban- 
industrial growth poles) and for promoting industrialization of the 
country as a whole.
(2). Encouragement o f decentralization o f manufacturing from Athens. As 
it was hoped, the provision of appropriate infrastructure in the periph­
eral industrial estates, combined with incentives, would act as a pull 
factor for regional industrial growth and as a push factor for the Athe­
nian industry.
(3). Attraction o f foreign investments It was remarked that foreign in­
vestors had to face various bureaucratic procedures and other "adapta­
tion problems" with which they had not been familiar in their 
countries. The provision of land and infrastructure in industrial estates 
under relatively simple procedures, was hoped to facilitate the attrac­
tion of foreign capital investments in industry.
(4). Improvement o f productivity in industry. The quality criteria adopted 
by ETVA for allowing industries to locate in industrial estates were 
expected to contribute to productivity increasing technological 
initiatives.
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(5). Modernization o f SMEs. It was expected that the accomodation of 
SMEs in properly organized buildings within the industrial estates, the 
organizational support they could receive from the estates’ administra­
tion, the economic linkages they could develop with bigger estate firms 
and their participation in joint modernization projects, would help 
them in surpassing most of their problems.
(6). Protection o f environment It was expected that the clustering of in­
dustrial plants in the estates, would release the neighbouring urban 
centres from pollution, and on the other hand it would make possible 
the construction of common liquid waste treatment systems.
In the context of Law 4458/1965, 10 industrial estates were legislated 
till 1977 near major peripheral urban centres, but only three of them (in Thes­
saloniki, Volos and Irakleion) were actually completed and operated 
(Magana-Kakaounaki I99I: 39). However, Law 742/1977 added 20 new indus­
trial estates in the existing configuration, while a 1986 Presidential Decree 
(PD 136/28-3- 1986) proposed the establishment of an industrial estate in every 
prefecture of the country. However, by 1993 only 21 industrial estates were 
actually in operation (fig. 3.20).
The tangible experiences from the implementation of the industrial es­
tates program, cannot be considered by far as encouraging. Statistical evidence 
presented in the previous section, showed that the decentralization of Athe­
nian manufacturing industry was not accomplished to any considerable ex­
tend. The relative development of industry in the peripheral regions cannot be 
attributed to the presence of industrial estates in them: Employment in 16 sur­
veyed industrial estates by 1984 was only 14,096 persons out of a total of 
222,122 manufacturing jobs to the prefectures in which those estates are lo­
cated -that is, a 6.34% participation of estates in regional manufacturing em­
ployment (Magana-Kakaounaki 1991: table 31). The number of estate firms by 
1988 was only 471 (Vliamos 1988: table 3.3) in a total of about 90,000 manufac­
turing establishments in the country’s regions (calculated from table B.1 -ap­
pendix I) -that is, only a 0.52% participation. It is evident that while a certain
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Figure 3.20 Industrial estates in Greece, 1992
%A
i
•  INDUSTRIAL ESTATE IN OPERATION 
■  INDUSTRIAL ESTATE WÎTH BOUNDARIES FIXED 
▲ INDUSTRIAL ESTATE ESTABUSHED by  l a m s  uemn a n d  743m 
MARITIME INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
O INDUSTRIAL ESTATE ESTABUSHED u n o e b  P R Q oeK T U L  d e c r e e  13b«b
SOURCE: ETVA 1993: 12.
167
growth of peripheral industry took place -as we saw previously- the industrial 
estates failed to participate to any considerable extend in that growth. As Pa- 
pamichos and Tsoulouvis (1990: 101) have remarked, the existence of ETVA’s 
estates in certain peripheral areas did not bring about major differentiations 
of those areas’ industrial structure from the more general trends in the whole 
country. With the exception of a few industrial estates (those of Volos, Irak­
leion and Thessaloniki) whose land has been occupied by plants to a satisfac­
tory extend (86.7%, 62,8% and 54,1% respectively), the other estates are in fact 
under-operating (Magana-Kakaounaki 199k 128). Since the majority of estate 
firms tend to specialize in traditional consumer goods with low to average 
technological specialization and weak linkages to other more dynamic 
branches, the industrial estates failed to form regional "growth poles" as it 
was initially envisaged (see Petrakos et aL 1993: 84- 5).
The inadequacies of the industrial estates policy, have been addressed 
in a number of studies. In a detailed survey of industries which relocated into 
ETVA’s estates (Tsekouras et ai 1985: sect 63), it was revealed that the major 
criteria the firms took into consideration in choosing the receiving estate 
were firstly its geographical distance from a big urban centre (Athens and/or 
Thessaloniki), and secondly its proximity to existing markets. The problems, 
however, those firms had to face in the new location were equally pressing:
Some firms regarded that the incentives they received for relocation 
into the estate were not adequate.
The wider transport infrastructure was judged in certain cases as prob­
lematical (e.g. lack of proper loading-unloading platforms and installa­
tions in certain peripheral ports, problems with the rail network that 
increase the individual units’ transport costs, bad connections of indus­
trial estates with the local and wider road network, etc.).
Problems related with the industrial estates’ infrastructure -e.g. lack or 
inappropriate construction and operation of liquid-waste treatment in­
stallations, problems with water and energy supply, telecommunication 
problems, bad road network within certain industrial estates, lack of
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collectively used spaces, bad condition and high rent of provided indus­
trial floorspace, etc.
Problems related with the quality of the local workforce -e.g. low pro­
ductivity in comparison with the Athenian workforce, lack of working 
discipline and mentality, multiple forms of employment resulting in 
frequent absences from the factories, problems in attracting skilled 
managerial/scientific/clerical staff, etc.).
Problems related with the quality and efficiency of public services and 
of the broader urban facilities.
According to Vliamos (1988:130-4), the major problems associated with 
the policy of industrial estates are the following: (a) Their legislation was not 
accompanied by concrete measures which would facilitate the fast acquisition 
of land and the construction of infrastructure, (b) The incentives offered to 
industries in order to locate into the estates were not so attractive as to dis­
courage industries from locating outside of them, (c) The economic benefits 
of location in the estates (agglomeration economies and economies of scale) 
were not given adequate publicity as to become widely known both to the in­
terested investors and to the local public opinion. There were cases local or­
ganizations and people prevented the construction of industrial estates in 
economically feasible sites for reasons of environmental protection, hence the 
construction of those estates had to take place in cost-increasing sites. Con­
sensus and co-operation between the estates’ administration, the social organ­
izations and the local population has not been achieved to any considerable 
extend, (d) The estates failed to form regional "growth poles" because: (dl) the 
industries located into them belonged mostly to the traditional manufacturing 
activities, with low technological specialization, lack of growth dynamism and 
weak linkages with the local economic environment; (d2) many of the cities 
selected to accommodate industrial estates had neither the appropriate infra­
structure nor the specialized services for supporting a dynamic local industrial 
growth. Many of them were selected under persistent social pressures and 
vote-catching political calculations and not under economic efficiency cri­
teria. The cost of infrastructures was increased since the estates’
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administration had to finance the construction of networks which normally 
should be provided by the local authorities.
Konsolas et ai (1985:159-65), regard that the major problems associated 
with the industrial estates policy have to do with: (a) Bureaucratic procedures, 
reactions and lack of co-ordination between the various social and public or­
ganizations involved in the processes of establishment, construction and oper­
ation of the estates, (b) Lack of co-ordination between the policy of industrial 
estates and other regional development programs (see also Petrakos et al 1993: 
86). (c) Inappropriate urban infrastructure in the estates’ wider areas, (d) De­
lays in estates’ site selection and/or disadvantageous (economically) sites due 
to local reactions and pressures, (e) Delays in the completion of estates be­
cause of poor co-ordination between public organizations, lack of construction 
studies’ standardization, perplexed public works legislation, lack of specialized 
construction workers in the estates’ areas, etc. (f) Inadequate programme for 
the construction of standardized industrial buildings, (g) High participation of 
the cost of land in the total estate’s cost because of land-use conflicts and up­
swinging land prices around urban areas, (h) Centralization of the estates’ 
decision-making procedures.
3.3. Conclusion
The shift of Greek industry from growth to crisis and negative restructuring 
did not bring about major transformations of the country’s polarized indus­
trial geography. By the late 1970s, during crisis, the industrial polarization 
tendency was further intensified. By the late 1980s, deindustrialization and job 
loss in the region of Athens -Attica- was accompanied by a relative growth of 
peripheral industry. However, the moderate decentralization trends did not 
question the predominant role of Attica within the country’s industrial ge­
ography; the changes, therefore, were rather marginal Industrial decentraliz­
ation policies (mainly regional incentives and industrial estates) were 
generally ineffective in reversing the polarized geography of production. The 
most basic problem, however, is the quite different development priorities 
posed by the state on the one hand, and by the private investors on the other
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While the drafting of the incentive-assisted areas and the location of indus­
trial estates followed a long-term pattern of supporting industrially backward 
regions, the pattern of private investments was mostly directed to the already 
dynamic areas along the S-shaped development corridor, as we saw in the 
previous section. The laissez-faire spatial development philosophy of the post­
war Greek governments, on the one hand was offering incentives and organ­
ized industrial spaces in which private investors could potentially locate, but 
on the other was quite reluctant in defining spaces in which they could not be 
allowed to locate. It would be quite simple, for instance, if the legislation had 
included the definition that grants and subsidies would be offered only to 
those industries locating or relocating within the industrial estates. It would 
be quite simple as well if there has been a branch specialization and vertical 
integration policy for each industrial estate and each area, according to that 
area’s comparative advantages/disadvantages, its local economic and employ­
ment structure, its infrastructure and service provision network, its level of 
technology and labour skills, its natural resources, its import/export needs, the 
wider regional development priorities and strategic objectives, etc. As Lemo­
nias (1991: 166-7) points out, a major problem is that the Greek state paid 
more attention to individual incentives and less to other complementary 
measures such as the construction of appropriate infrastructure in the less de­
veloped areas, the rational organization of the administrative system, the 
fostering of a healthy entrepreneurial climate, etc, which would have rein­
forced the effectiveness of the incentive system. As they stood, without any 
real connections with broader spatial development priorities and programs, 
both incentive and industrial estates policies operated rather at reinforcing 
the already existing moderate decentralization tendencies than initiating or 
altering them. The existing from the previous growth period spatial divisions 
of labour, did not allow for major territorial change to take place during the 
period of deindustrialization and negative restructuring. However, this point is 
reversed if we shift our analytical scope into the intra-metropoUtan industrial 
geography of Athens, where, crisis and negative restructuring was accompa­
nied by a drastic change of the industrial location pattern; that is, a wave of 
suburbanization of production combined with a serious decline of inner-city 
manufacturing as we will see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SPACE 
OF GREATER ATHENS
4.1 The Historical Heritage
The historical origins of Greek industrialization are rooted in 19th century 
(Agriantoni 1986; Hadjiiosif 1993). Manufacturing industries like textiles 
(mainly cotton), metallurgy (mainly iron), metal products, ship-building etc., 
were developing in Greece during the best part of 19th century after the 
country’s liberation from Ottoman rule. Other consumer industries like ty­
ping/printing, silk textiles, leather and drinks (mainly wine), were developing 
as well, whereas some of them -silk, leather and wine- were exported abroad 
(Leontidou 1989: 98). These industries were domestically owned, numbered 
only a few plants and functioned rather as "enclaves" within the Greek econ­
omy which was largely dominated by agricultural activities at the countryside 
and by comprador ones at the urban centres. Foreign direct investments were 
directed at mining and quarrying, with best example the French lead-ore min­
ing and processing company at Lavrion, near Athens (see Manthos 1990; Kor- 
dellas 1993; Kourliouros and Laskaris 1992). The gradual incorporation of 
various Greek areas into the national territory -and hence the expansion of 
the domestic market- was the key-factor for initiating early industrialization. 
However, this process took place without the distinctive landmark of an in­
dustrial revolution and with considerable shortages of both capital and labour. 
As Wassenhoven wrote.
for the best part of the century the national economy was generally 
stagnant, and following the War of Independence with the Turks in the 
1820s, the emerging urban bourgeoisie and a nascent industrial sector 
suferred severe setbacks. Rather, it was the rural landed classes that 
tended to prosper, and their grip on local politics hampered the rise of
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the entrepreneurial urban classes and the growth of industry and
manufacturing (1984a: 5).
The native bourgeoisie had no any prior industrial tradition and most 
part of it had a comprador mentality which was hostile to production acti­
vities since it was believed that the development of industry would restrict 
the freedom of Greeks which were traditionally inclined to commerce 
(Leontidou 1989: 99). A prosperous bourgeoisie (Greek diaspora), consisted 
mainly of merchants and businessmen, was living abroad -mainly in Egypt, 
Asia Minor and around the Black Sea (Svoronos 1992: 89 ff.)- hence having no 
direct interests in undertaking industrial development initiatives at the 
country.
Despite those historical setbacks, the emergence of the steam engine in 
the 1860s, gave a generous push to Greek manufacturing. During the 1870s 
economic modernization initiatives advanced by Charilaos Trikoupis* adminis­
tration (see Svoronos 1992: 100 ff.), triggered the emergence of an ideological 
current favouring industrialization, whereas the political influence of the 
traditional rural classes was loosing ground in favour of an emerging urban 
bourgeoisie. Major infrastructural works (roads, railways, ports, etc.) were 
constructed during Trikoupis’ administration (on railways construction see Pa- 
pagiannakis 1982). However, despite the widening of national territory and the 
accompanying expansion of the transport network, Greek industry did not 
manage to take off. It was only in the early 20th century -and especially after 
the arrival of the Minor Asia refugees in 1922- that a more comprehensive 
endeavour for the development of Greek manufacturing was undertaken 
(Hadjiiosif 1993: 279 ff).
Piraeus, along with other city-ports (Patras, Ermoupolis, Kalamata, 
Thessaloniki and Volos) attracted considerable manufacturing activity since 
the very beginnings of Greek industrialization (Leondidou 1989: 100 ff). By 
contrast to West European experiences in which industrialization emerged at 
the countryside and then expanded gradually to the urban centres, in Greece, 
city-ports were the major poles of early industrial development (Weberian 
type locations). By the end of 19th century, Piraeus, in particular, concentrated
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considerable manufacturing activities (mainly of consumer orientation) such 
as corn-mills, oil-press factories, tobacco industries, clothing (Retsinas’ plant), 
etc. (Burgel 1970: 197). In 1909, the first chemical factory of the country 
(fertilisers) was established in Drapetsona, at the south-western edge of Pi­
raeus’ port, while, a year later, the same firm established another plant 
(ceramics) to the fringe of Piraeus next to the Piraeus-Athens transport axis. 
This example was followed by other industrialists. By the early 1900s, the po­
larization of manufacturing along the Piraeus - Athens urban zone was al­
ready observable. By 1920 an industrial axis connecting Piraeus and central 
Athens was formed; it concentrated relatively big plants in branches like 
foods, tobacco, textiles, clothing, chemicals, energy, paper, wood, leather, 
machine-works and building materials (fig. 4.1). As Leontidou writes, "the big 
manufacturing plants tended to concentrate in Athens and Piraeus and the do­
mination of capital over the new Greek industrial geography became abso­
lute" (1989: 103). Just to give a measure of this, by 1920 the neighbouring
prefectures of Attica and Viotia concentrated more than 16% of the total
manufacturing plants and more than 27% of the total industrial employment 
(ibid: 104).
The reasons for this early polarization of manufacturing had definitely 
to do with the existence of infrastructure (energy, communication and trans­
port), the existence of abundant and cheap working hands in Athens, especial­
ly after the arrival of the Minor Asia refugees, the existence of 
administrative, commercial and financial services, as well as with the exist­
ence of the major consumption market for manufactured goods.
By the early 20th century the location of manufacturing in Greater 
Athens (including Piraeus) followed Hoyt’s sectoral model across the major 
road and rail axes leading to the Piraeus port (Leontidou 1989:135). The exist­
ence of cheap and big plots of land encouraged the early attraction of in­
dustries in this zone (Burgel quoted in Leontidou 1983: 96). Around the
industrial axis major working class communities were gradually formed 
(Keratsini, Drapetsona, Tavros, etc.), whereas the wealthier social strata tended 
to reside in some central Athens areas (Kolonaki, Syntagma, Plaka, etc.) or in
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suburban "garden-city" areas (Psychiko, Filothei, Kifissia, Ekali). However, 
deviations in the social segregation of space were remarked: Working class 
communities were also formed as "niches" amidst wealthier middle-class areas 
in a pattern that Leontidou (1989: 137) has called "dotted social segregation".
Figure 4.1. Tbe industrial axis between Piraeus and Athens by 1920.
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The production activities of the industrial axis were expanded north­
wards, especially after the arrival of Minor Asia refugees in 1922. Industrial
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localities specializing in textiles were created at the northern fringe of Athens 
(Nea Ionia, Nea Philadelphia and Nea Chalkidona), where the Minor Asia ref­
ugees continued to exercise the skills (weaving) they had acquired in their 
former lands (Burgel 1970:199).
These developments had important impacts upon the Athenian urban 
economy which was gradually transforming from a parasitic to a productive 
one -a process which was intensified only in the post-war period (sect 4.2). 
Over the 1840-1920 period, the percentage of economically active raised; in­
dustrial employment raised considerably, while service activities (mostly of a 
comprador character) declined (table 4.1).
The major part of Athenian industries during the inter-war years was 
oriented to the production of consumer goods. By 1930 light industry con­
sumer branches (food, drinks, tobacco, textiles, clothing/footwear, wood, 
furniture, paper/printing, leather and miscellaneous) represented 76.43% of the
T able 4.1 Composition o f employment by sector in Athens, 1840-1920
Sector 1840 1879 1920
Agriculture 8.69 7.43 13.88
Industry 1148 34.01 32.87
Services 7L06 43.83 28.90
Economically active 39.86 39.55 47.07
SOURCE: Adapted from Leontidou 1989:107.
total manufacturing establishments in Athens and 78.43% of manufacturing 
employment, whereas the percentages for Piraeus industry were 76.13% and 
70.17% respectively (Leontidou 1989: table 20). However, in comparison with 
other urban areas Greater Athens presented a remarkable specialization in 
heavy industry branches such as metallurgy and metal products, machinery, 
rubber and chemicals (ibid.).
The above processes indicate that although the inter-war urban econ­
omy of Greater Athens had not yet reached the status of a fully productive 
economy -phenomena of mass urban poverty, subsistence wages,
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marginalization etc. were still present (see Pizanias 1993)- a noticeable shift 
from precapitalist to modern capitalist industrial structures was gradually set 
in motion. This process was further intensified during the post-war period as 
we will see more analytically in the following section.
4.2. Industrial and Spatial Change In Greater Athens
4.2.1. Industrial Structures
In spite of the post-war changes Greek economy underwent in its drive to 
economic growth and industrialization, and in spite of relevant transform­
ations of the Athenian economy, some views (by drawing abstractly from un­
derdevelopment theories) continued to regard post-war Athens as an 
unproductive and parasitic capital of an underdeveloped Third World type 
(see e.g. Burgel 1976). However, concrete statistical evidence (table 4.2) shows 
that the great majority of the economically active population of Athens is 
employed in activities which by no way could be regarded as precapitalist, 
parasitic or marginal More precisely:
Employment in the secondary sector and manufacturing increased ab- 
solutely over the 1961-1983 period, but decreased as/percentage of the 
economically active population due to faster e m ^ y m en t growth in 
the tertiary sector. Despite the tertiarization trend, the share of manu­
facturing employment was still high in comparison to other southern 
European metropolises. For instance, in 1970/71, manufacturing employ­
ment in Athens represented 3298% of active population, while in 
Rome, Naples, Lisbon and Madrid the percentages were 18.47%, 30.30%, 
25.48% and 29.64% respectively (Leontidou 1990: table 3.7).
Over the examined period, the share of employed in productive sectors 
such as primary sector, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, energy, 
construction industry, transport and communications, was relatively 
high -reaching almost 1/2 of Athens’ active population.
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Table 4,2 Employment in A thens by sector o f economic activity, 1961,1983
Sector 1961 (%) 1983 (%)
Primary sector (agriculture, etc.) 10,133 14 2,116 0.2
Secondary sector 273,256 38.7 340,927 35.3
-Mining and Quarrying 2,769 0.4 1,891 0.2
67Z)-Manufacturing industry 203,391 28.8 260,687
-Electricity, Gas and Water 6,951 10 12,640 13
-Constructions industry 60,145 8.5 65,709 6.8
Tertiary sector 
-Commerce, Hotels, etc.
374,673
126,961
53.0
18.0
612,053
179,688
r
-Wholesale 25,852 3.7 45,002 4.7
-Retail 75,291 10.7 103,436 10.7
-Restaurants and Hotels 25,818 3.6 31250 3.2
-Transport, Warehouses and 62,216 8.8 113,202 11.7
Communications
-Transport & Warehouses 56,049 7.9 97,579 10.1
-Communications 6,167 0.9 15,623 16
-Banks, Insurances and allied 29,393 4.2 66,425 6.9
-Banks and Insurances 12,445 18 32,381 3.4
-Allied 16,948 2.4 34,044 3.5
-Services 156,103 22.1 252,738 26.2
-Governmental services 53,402 7.6 97,005
-Social services 46,760 6.6 109,263 113
-Personal services 47,233 6.7 12,229 13
-Other* 8,708 12 34,271 3.5
Not Declared Activities 48,272 6.8 9,623 10
Total of economically active 706,334 100.0 964,719 100.0
______ 1961 data includes those employed in health, recreation and cultural services.______
SOURCE: For 1961 Leontidou 1982: 396. For 1983 Padazidis and Kasimati
1984: 76-7. (Own calculation of the percentages).
Employment in the tertiary sector expanded from 53% of the active 
population in 1961, to 63.4% in 1983. The growth of this sector should 
not be regarded as indicating a pattern of Third World parasitism, but, 
instead, as indicating a process of convergence of the Athenian urban 
economy to North-European patterns of post-industrialism and service 
economies: As shown in table 4.2, the growth of this sector is mainly
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due to the development of modern service activities such as commerce, 
transport and communications, banking, insurances and other financial 
activities, administrative services etc.
The activities which could be regarded as parasitic or marginal, are: (i) 
a fraction of the retail activities (the part consisting of various wan­
dering salesmen and kiosk keepers), (ii) a part of the various "personal 
services", and (iii) the not declared activities. But even if we make the 
rough assumption that 1/2 of employed in retail are kiosk keepers and 
street salesmen (an assumption that can be easily rejected even by a 
mere observation in the city), all the respective percentages added to­
gether, which represented 18.85% of the active population in 1961, have 
fallen to only 7.65% in 1983.
By 1983, therefore, almost 89% of the Athenian active population was 
employed in typical -and to a good extend modern- capitalist activities. The 
existence oTlTrelatively high percentage of self-employed in comparison to 
other western metropolises (Tsoucalas 1986: 241; Tsoucalas 1993: table 4), does 
not contradict the typical capitalist character of the Athenian urban econ- 
omy. On the contrary, it reflects the(unique .path Greece followed -jqst like J  
other southern European countiies--in its capitalist transformation, as we saw 
more analytically in chapter 2 of this thesis.
The views about "parasitism" were also built upon the statement that 
post-war Athens concentrated mainly light industry consumer branches 
(Burgel 1976). This is true if viewed from a static perspective, but things 
differ if viewed from a dynamic one: From a static perspective we can re­
mark that these branches were predominating all over the post-war period in 
terms of number of establishments (table 4.3) employment (table 4.4) and in­
stalled horsepower (table 4.5). But from a dynamic perspective the same data 
shows that their importance within the Athens manufacturing system was 
continuously decreasing over the time whereas the importance of intermedi­
ate and capital branches was continuously increasing. This importance be­
comes even more obvious if we examine the branches in which Greater
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Athens was specializing all over the post-war period in comparison to the 
whole country. Location Quotient values over 10 are rather observed in the 
capital and intermediate branches (taken in aggregate), than in the consumer 
ones (table 4.6).
Table 4.3 % share o f manufacturing establishments in Greater Athens by
branch, 1958-1988
Code Branch 1958 1969 1978 1988
Non durable consumer goods 72.2 65.9 615 59.8
20 Foods "7 T ” 7.0"“ 73
—
21 Beverages 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3
22 Tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
23 Textiles 5.7 5.5 4.8 3.8
24 Clothing-Footwear 33.4 24.2 20.1 20.6
25 Wood-Cork 5.0 6.2 7.1 5.9
26 Furniture 9.8 112 10.5 8.8
27 Paper 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
28 Printing-Publishing 3.4 3.7 4.1 4.9
29 Leather-Fur 16 16 16 13
39 Miscellaneous 4.2 5.1 5.0 5 ^
Intermediate goods 5.6 7.7 ^ 7.9
30 Rubber-Plastic 0.6 21 25 3.3
31 Chemicals 14 12 12 11
32 Petroleum-Coal products 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
33 Non metallic minerals 3.5 4.2 3.9 3.4
Capital goods and durables __26.4 _30J -3 3 .2
34 Basic metallurgy 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
35 Metal products 10.2 10.7 9.5 7.7
36 Non electric machinery 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.1
37 Electric equipment 4.2 5.2 6.0 6.1
38 Transport equipment 5.3 7.5 118 16.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Table B.3 (appendix I).
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Table 4.4 % share o f manufacturing employment in Greater A thens
_________ by branch, 1958-1988.______________________________
Code Branch 1958 1969 1978 1988
Non durable consumer goods 64.6 59.2 56.2 59.0 —
20 Foods 9.5 9.2 8.0 10.0
21 Beverages 0.9 18 17 15
22 Tobacco 3.2 18 10 0.9
23 Textiles 16.1 13.1 117 8.8
24 Clothing-Footwear 15.7 13.2 14.7 17.3 4-
25 Wood-Cork 3.2 3.9 3.2 26
26 Furniture 6.5 5.7 5.2 4.9
27 Paper L6 18 21 21
28 Printing-Publishing 4.1 4.8 4.9 6.4
29 Leather-Fur 13 13 12 12
39 Miscellaneous 26 26 26 3.4
Intermediate goods 124 13.1 13.5 127
30 Rubber-Plastic 17 3.6 4.1 3.1
31 Chemicals 5.8 45 53 5.8
32 Petroleum-Coal products 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7
33 Non metallic minerals 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.1
Capital goods and durables 23.0 27.7 30.3 28.3 H-
34 Basic metallurgy 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4
35 Metal products 8.9 9.1 8.3 6.8
36 Non electric machinery 25 3.7 3.2 29
37 Electric equipment 3.8 5.7 6.0 5.4
38 Transport equipment 6.9 8.6 123 128
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Table B.4 (appendix I)
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T able 4.5 % share o f installed manufacturing horsepower in Greater
Athens by branchy 1958-1984
Code Branch 1958 1969 1978 1984
Non durable consumer goods 50.2 45.6 43.6 46.3
20 Foods 15.0 10.5 8.4 10.8
21 Beverages 14 19 1.5 13
22 Tobacco 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7
23 Textiles 16-5 13.4 13.9 10.4
24 Clothing-Footwear 10 20 29 3.6
25 Wood-Cork 4.2 4.8 3.5 3.8
26 Furniture 24 4.2 3.9 4.5
27 Paper 3.4 3.2 4.2 5.6
28 Printing-Publishing 24 25 27 3.4
29 Leather-Fur 16 14 0.9 10
39 Miscellaneous 16 0.8 0.8 12
Intermediate goods 25.4 25.1 221 24.0
30 Rubber-Plastic 12 5.5 6.7 7.5
31 Chemicals 132 6.6 6.5 8.2
32 Petroleum-Coal products 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
33 Non metallic minerals 10.5 125 8.5 7.8
Capital goods and durables 24.4 29.2 34.3 29.6
34 Basic metallurgy 4.0 26 15 0.7
35 Metal products 9.9 10.7 9.7 8.7
36 Non electric machinery 3.6 4.9 3.7 4.9
37 Electric equipment 16 3.2 3.4 27
38 Transport equipment 5.3 7.8 16.0 13.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Table B.5 (appendix I).
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Table 4.6 Location quotients o f manufacturing employment in Greater
A thens, 1958-1988 (*).
Code Branch 1958 1969 1978 1988
Non durable consumer goods 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.96
20.Foods 0.69 0.57 057 0.67
21.Drinks 0.50 0.84 0.87 0.78
22Tobacco 0.97 0.68 0.67 0.47
23.Textiles L25 119 100 0.94
24.Clothing-Footwear 0.92 106 113 105
25. Wood-Cork 0.57 0.64 0.66 0.59
26.Furniture L21 109 113 113
27.Paper 143 116 125 122
28.Printing-Publishing 180 169 189 199
29.Leather-Fur 0.88 0.64 0.53 0.71
39.Miscellaneous 165 141 152 175
Intermediate goods 0.79 108 101 0.97
30.Rubber-Plastic 180 165 141 113
31.Chemicals 0.61 138 137 147
32Petroleum-Coal products 115 0.83 0.41 0.66
33.Non-Metallic minerals 0.95 0.74 0.65 0.59
Capital goods and durables 126 116 113 112
34.Basic metallurgy 140 0.46 0.28 0.27
35.Metal products 115 106 103 102
36.Non-Electric machinery 115 108 0.96 0.92
37.Electric equipment 167 157 134 1.35
38.Transport equipment 128 124 131 129
Manufacturing employment in branch i in Greater Athens
(♦) LQ =
Manufacturing employment in all SIC branches in Greater Athens
Manufacturing employment in branch i in Greece
Manufacturing employment in all SIC branches in Greece 
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.4 (appendix I).
More specifically, most of the consumer branches in which Greater 
Athens specialized in the 1950s (textiles, furniture and paper), presented de­
clining L.Q. values throughout the post-war period. Only clothing/footwear,
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printing/publishing and miscellaneous industries presented an increasing de­
gree of specialization in 1958-88.
It is evident, however, that the combined outcomes of negative restruc­
turing and moderate decentralization (chap. 3), affected most of the inter­
mediate and capital branches in which Greater Athens was specializing during 
the growth period. Branches as rubber/plastics, petroleum/coal products, basic 
metallurgy, metal products and electrical equipment, presented decreasing 
LQs over 1958-88. Despite these tendencies, however. Greater Athens by 1988 
continued to specialize in most of those branches (rubber/plastics, chemical 
products, metal products, electric equipment and transport equipment). But it 
is evident that the past dynamism has been lost Much of this decline is due to 
the internal contradictions and inconsistencies of state policies undertaken 
during the 1980s, as well as to a widespread anti-industrial culture within the 
public opinion of Athens, the major political parties and the social organiz­
ations, as we will see more analytically in subsequent chapters.
However, manufacturing played a crucial role in the post-war trans­
formation of the Athenian urban economy. In 1969 Greater Athens concen­
trated 32.9% of the total manufacturing establishments and 46.6% of total 
manufacturing employment (table 4.7). This concentration trend was not 
reversed till the mid 1970’s: In 1969-1978 manufacturing establishments in­
creased by 15.6% and employment by 20.6%. But since 1978 these growth ten­
dencies experienced a drastic downswing: In 1978-88 the growth rate of 
manufacturing establishments fell to 2.8%, while employment declined abso­
lutely by -124%.
4.2.2. The Uneven Geography of Production (!): Greater Athens-vs-
Rest of Attica
The post-war industrial growth of the Athenian region, was unevenly distrib­
uted across the two basic sub-regional units -that is, the Greater Athens ag­
glomeration on the one hand, and the peripheral areas (rest of Attica) on the 
other. The latter, exhibited a much greater growth dynamism: Over the
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1969-1978 period the number of manufacturing establishments and employ­
ment increased by much greater rates in the rest of Attica than in Greater 
Athens (table 4.7). New industrial spaces developed along Attica’s major trans­
port arteris in a pattern resembling the sectoral industrial location model (fig. 
4.2). Such spaces developed westwards along the Athens-Korinthos national 
highway (Elefsina, Megara, Ag. Theodori, Korinthos), eastwards (Mesogea 
valley -Pallini, Koropi, Lavrion) and northwards along the Athens-Lamia- 
Thessaloniki national highway (Oinofyta and Halkida). As we can remark in 
table 4.8, during 1963-73 manufacturing jobs increased much more to the rest 
of Attica than to Greater Athens in most branches and especially in rubber/ 
plastics, paper and printing, metal products, electrical equipment, transport 
equipment, furniture, non electric machinery and miscellaneous industries.
Table 4.7 Manufacturing establishments and employment in Greater 
Athens and in the rest o f Attica^ 1969-1988.
1969 % 1978 % 1988 %
No of establishments
-Greater Athens 40,956 329 47,332 36.7 48,656 33.6
-Rest of Attica 2,847 23 4,008 3.1 5,552 3.8
Employment 
-Greater Athens 233,779 46.6 281,821 420 246,880 35.0
-Rest of Attica 17,932 3.6 45,958 6.8 51,397 7.3
% change of the nu­
mber of establish­
ments
1%9-1978 1978-1988
-Greater Athens 15.6 28
-Rest of Attica 40.8 38.5
% change of manu­
facturing employ­
ment
-Greater Athens 20.6 -124
-Rest of Attica 156.3 11.8
SOURCE: Tables B.1 and B.2 (appendix I).
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Figure 4,2. The sectoral pattern o f industrial location in Attica in tbe 1970s.
VIOTIA
ATTICA
1 KORINTHOS
2. AGIO! THEODOROI
3. PAN! MEGARON (NEO MEL!)
4. ELEFSINA
5. ASPROPYRGOS
6. SKARAMANGAS-PERAMA
7. SALAMINA
8. PIRAEUS
9. ELEONAS
10. NEA PHILADELPHIA-NEA lONIA-IRAKLElO
11. METAMORPHOSIS
12. AG.STEFANOS-KRYONERI
13. OINOFYTA
14. THEBES
15. HALKIDA
16. PALLINI
17. PEANIA-KOROPI
18. LAVRION
19. MARKOPOULO-KALYVIA 
20 SPATA
21. YPATO
22. VATHI
SOURCE: Combined information drawn from: (a) SCET (1974: 98-98.3); (b)
Doxiadis & Associates (1976: IL29-IL35); TEE (1978: 15-23); 
Leontidou (1990: 193); unpublished maps of the Ministry of 
Environment.
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Finally, 59,152 new manufacturing jobs were added in Greater Athens and 
17,431 in the rest of Attica (table 4.9). It was the capital goods group that ac­
counted the most for job increases at both sub-regional scales.
T able 4.8 Manufacturing employment change (%) in Greater A thens, rest 
____________o f Attica and Attica (region total) by branch, 1963-1973._______
Code Branch 1963-1973
Greater Athens Rest of Attica Attica (total)
Consumer goods 18.1 50.5 19.7
20.Foods 14.7 35.0 16.7
21.Drinks -88.3 60.5
22.Tobacco -4L3 0.0 -413
23.Textiles 10.3 67.8 14.3
24.Clothing-Footwear -10.3 15.4
25. Wood-Cork 2L7 110.8 26.5
26.Furniture 34.7 286.5 39.1
27.Paper 31.5 8615 35.2
28.Printing-Publishing 30.2 438.9 30.9
29.Leather-Fur -14 6.5
39.Miscellaneous 517 334.3 55.2
Intermediate goods 33.1 1110 418
30.Rubber-Plastic 66.7 2,444.8 77.8
31.Chemicals 34.2 919 410
32.Petroleum-Coal products 132.7 143.8 138.3
33.Non-Metallic minerals 8.1 812 19.4
Capital goods and durables 43.1 ^ 2 n _ 55.3
34.Basic metallurgy 718 618 65.1
35.Metal products 4.9 458.7 19.0
36.Non-Electric machinery 54.1 217.4 612
37.Electric equipment 916 238.5 96.4
38.Transport equipment 50.0 304.5 66.3
Total 26.8 117.1 315
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.8 (appendix I).
Even in the first years of recession (1973-78) manufacturing employ­
ment at the aggregate was still increasing in both Greater Athens and rest of 
Attica (table 4.10). However, most branches in Greater Athens (tobacco, tex­
tiles, wood/cork, furniture, leather/fur, petroleum/coal products, non metallic
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Table 4.9 Absolute change o f manufacturing employment in Greater 
Athens and in the rest o f Attica by branch group, 1963-1973. 
Branch group Greater Athens Rest of Attica
Non durable consumer goods 24,132 3,345
Intermediate goods 9,076 4,330
Capital goods & durables 25,944 9,756
Total___________________________________________ 59,152_________17,431
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.8 (appendix I).
Table 4.10 Manufacturing employment change (%) in Greater Athens, 
rest o f Attica and Attica (region total) by branch, 1973-1978 
Code Branch 1973-1978
Greater Athens Rest of Attica Attica (total)
Consumer goods 0.7 42.8 3.2
20.Foods 3.2 17.2 4.8
2LDrinks 4.7 936.4 16.1
22.Tobacco -14.4 0.0 -14.4
23.Textiles -4.7 19.8 -22
24.Clothing-Footwear 9.1 6L8 10.3
25. Wood-Cork -10.7 69.3 -3.6
26.Furniture -5.6 127.0 0.9
27.Paper 23.9 190.3 29.2
28.Printing-Publishing 5.2 17.5 5.2
29.Leather-Fur -3.4 35.7 -26
39.Miscellaneous -10.5 -220 -10.9
Intermediate goods 4.4 53.5 13.4
30.Rubber-Plastic 11.6 149.1 20.8
3LChemicals 15.5 70.5 24.1
32Petroleum-Coal products -38.2 96.1 3L1
33.Non-Metallic minerals -9.1 6.5 -5.4
Capital goods and durables -0.9 35.2 4.2
34.Basic metallurgy 18.8 7.1 10.1
35.Metal products 9.2 48.1 14.8
36.Non-Electric machinery -29.4 75.0 -20.5
37.Electric equipment -18.7 54.0 -15.4
38.Transport equipment 15.9 28.9 17.9
Total 0.7 422 5.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.8 (appendix I).
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minerals, non electric machinery, electric equipment and miscellaneous in­
dustries) presented absolute employment decline ranging between -38.2% at 
maximum (petroleum/coal products) and -3.4% at minimum (leather/fur). By 
contrast, employment in all branches at the rest of Attica (with the exception 
of miscellaneous industries) kept increasing, with best example of this drinks 
(which increased by 936.4%), paper (190.3%), rubber/plastic (149.1%) and furni­
ture (127.0%). Deindustrialization hit foremost Greater Athens and especially 
its inner city areas as we will see later on in this chapter. It should be also re­
marked that during the growth period Attica was attracting mostly big -for 
the Greek standards- companies. By 1978 Athens concentrated 73.42% of 
employed in companies with 100+ employees, 81% of the headquarters of the 
100 bigger industrial companies in the country and 69.8% of all S.A. industrial 
companies (Hadjisocratis 1983: 2). Limited liability and S.A. Athenian com­
panies, which in 958 accounted for only 42% of total fixed capital in manu­
facture, came to control 90% of it by 1973 (Leontidou 1990: 175). As table 4.11 
shows, by 1978 the average plants’ size in Greater Athens exceeded the Greek 
average in all manufacturing branches with the exception of textiles, paper, 
petroleum/coal products, non metallic minerals and basic metallurgy. How­
ever, since there were shortages of available land within the urban agglomer­
ation, the larger plants tended to locate outside Greater Athens -in the rest of 
Attica- as we can remark from the average plants size in the two sub-areas of 
Attica (table 4.12).
The economic recession of the 1970s, marked a drastic reversal of the 
previous trends. In 1978-1988 the number of manufacturing establishments in 
Greater Athens increased slightly (see previous table 4.7) but employment de­
clined by 34,941 jobs (table 4.13). All manufacturing branches, with only a few 
exceptions (foods, clothing/footwear, printing/publishing, petroleum/coal 
products and miscellaneous industrie^ experienced job losses. Intermediate and 
capital branches were especially hit: Taken in aggregate, they accounted for 
22,214 out of 34,941 total job losses in Greater Athens. Job loss hit especially 
the larger companies (50+ employees) as table 4.14 shows.
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Table 4.11 A verage plants*size in Greater Athens by branch, 1978.
Code Branch Greater Athens Greece
Non durable consumer goods 5.4 4.9
20.Foods 6.5 4.9
21.Drinks 28.5 6.7
22.Tobacco 135.9 74.1
23.Tex tiles 14.7 15.5
24.Clothing-Footwear 4.4 4.0
25. Wood-Cork 27 27
26.Furniture 3.0 29
27.Paper 18.1 24.8
28.Printing-Publishing 7.1 6.1
29.Leather-Fur 4.7 4.1
39.Miscellaneous 3.1 29
Intermediate goods 10.4 10.3
30.Rubber-Plastic 9.7 8.9
3LChemicals 26.1 23.8
32.Petroleum-Coal products 15.3 38.6
33,Non-MetalIic minerals 5.9 15
Capital goods and durables 5.9 4.7
34.Basic metallurgy 4L9 166.4
35.Metal products 5.2 3.7
36.Non-Electric machinery 5.6 5.0
37.Electric equipment 6.0 5.7
38.Transport equipment 6.2 4.7
Total 6.0 5.2
SOURCE: Own calculations from tables B.3 and B.4 (appendix I).
Table 4,12 A verage plants* size (*) in A ttica*s sub-areas, 1969,1984.
1969 1984
Greece, total 4.00 4.73
Region of Attica 5.75 535
-Greater Athens 5.71 4.92
-Rest of Attica 6.21 9.53
(*) Number of employed / number of establishments.
SOURCE: Own calculations from tables B.1 and B.2 (appendix I).
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Table 4.13 Manufacturing employment change in Greater A thens by
branch, 1978-1988.
Code Branch Number 1978-88 % 1978-88
Non durable consumer goods -12,726 -8.0
20.Foods 2,152 9.6
21.Drinks -971 -20.9
22.Tobacco -577 -2L2
23.Textiles -11,232 -34.0
24.Cloth ing-Footwear 1,259 3.0
25. Wood-Cork -2,743 -30.2
26.Furniture -2,797 -18.9
27.Paper -672 -1L6
28.Printing-Publishing 2,009 14.6
29.Leather-Fur -475 -13.8
39.Miscellaneous 1,321 18.4
Intermediate goods -6,798 -17.8
30.Rubber-Plastic -3,872 -33.7
31.Chemicals -742 -4.9
32.Petroleum-Coal products 909 112.4
33.Non-Metallic minerals -3,093 -28.5
Capital goods and durables -15,416 -18.1
34.Basic metallurgy -181 -15.4
35.Metal products -6,647 -28.3
36.Non-Electric machinery -1,839 -20.4
37.Electric equipment -3,636 -21.3
38.Transport equipment -3,113 -9.0
Total -34,941 -124
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.4 (appendix I).
Table 4,14 Large firms* (50+ employees) decline in Greater Athens,1975-88.
1975 1988 % 1975-1988
Number of establishments 
Number of employed
578 417 
102,112 73,566
-27.85
-27.96
SOURCE: For 1975: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 1978 Athens
1979: table X:4. For 1988: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f Greece 
1990-9L Athens 1994: table X:4. (Own calculation of the 
percentages).
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By contrast to Greater Athens and Attica (as a whole), manufacturing 
employment continued to increase at the rest of Attica in most branches and 
particularly in consumer and intermediate ones over 1978-84 (table 4.15).
Table 4.15 Manufacturing employment change in tbe rest o f Attica and 
Attica (region total) by branch, 1978-1984.
Code Branch Rest of Attica Attica (total)
Absolute
change
1978-84
% change 
1978-84
Absolute % change 
change 1978-84 
1978-84
Non durable consumer 
goods
2,194 15.4 -15,173 -8.8
20.Foods 872 27.3 871 3.4
21.Drinks 302 53.0 -371 -7.1
22.Tobacco 0 0.0 -236 -8.7
23.Textiles -787 -16.7 -11,333 -30.0
24.Clothing-Footwear 174 12.9 -133 -0.3
25. Wood-Cork 101 6.0 -1,092 -10.1
26.Furniture 482 26.4 -1,698 -10.2
27.Paper 425 95.1 -657 -105
28.Printing-Publishing 438 384.2 -342 -25
29.Leather-Fur 31 32.6 -325 -9.2
39.Miscellaneous 156 68.7 143 L9
Intermediate goods 777 6.2 -4,959 -9.8
30.Rubber-Plastic 388 211 -2,043 -153
31.Chemicals 420 10.2 -252 -13
32.Petroleum-Coal
products
-109 -4.0 -168 -4.7
33.Non-Metallic
minerals
78 10 -2,496 -17.0
Capital goods & durables -570 -3.0 -15,137 -145
34.Basic metallurgy -311 -10.4 -851 -205
35.Metal products -46 ^0.8 -5,106 -17.7
36.Non-Electric machi­ 721 34.7 -263 24
nery
37.Electric equipment 131 8.5 -3,084 -16.6
38.Transport equipment -1,065 -15.0 -6,359 -153
Total 2,401 5.2 -35,269 -10.8
SOURCE: Own calculations from table B.8 (appendix I).
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Most employment dynamism was exhibited by printing/publishing, paper, mis­
cellaneous industries, drinks and foods, non electric machinery, leather/fur, 
furniture and rubber/plastics.
The above evidence shows that deindustrialization and job loss in Atti­
ca affected unevenly its sub-areas and its branch structure. The Greater 
Athens agglomeration and the intermediate and capital branch groups were 
the hardest hit; in just a decade (1978-88), the Greater Athens agglomeration 
had lost 34,941 manufacturing jobs (see previous table 4.13) while, by contrast, 
outer (rest of Attica) industry was not seriously affected.
4.2.3. The Uneven Geography of Production (if): Inner City-vs-Suburbs
The shift of Greek industry from growth to decline and ^gatjye,^^tructur- 
ing. brought about major geographical change not only at the sub-regional 
scale (Le. Greater Athens -vs- the rest of Attica), but at the intra-urban scale 
of Greater Athens as well (inner city -vs- suburban industrial spaces). In a 
more general perspective, the contemporary locational pattern of manufactur­
ing in Greater Athens can be seen as the combined outcome of two contrast­
ing tendencies: On the one hand, previous spatial divisions of labour and the 
inertia of historical heritage tend to maintain the past industrial "landscape" 
of Athens, which was characterized by the clustering of production along the 
traditional (inner-city) industrial axis (see fig. 4.3).* On the other hand, econ­
omic change and new spatial divisions generate forces tending to transform 
this industrial "landscape" by imposing a wave of suburbanization of produc­
tion. On the same time^policy and cultural forces interrelate with the spa- 
tio-economic processes and affect the whole industrial settings in Greater 
Athens to a considerable extend (see chap. 6 to 8). As we will see, since the 
mid 1970s the relative balance between these two contrasting tendencies has 
started to shift in favour of suburban industrial development, accompanied by 
a serious employment decline of inner city manufacturing.
' This axis includes the municipalities of Athens, Piraeus, Agios loannis Rendis, Ker­
atsini, Drapetsona, Tavros, Moschato, Nea Ionia, Nea Chalkidona, Nea Philadelphia and Irak- 
leio (see Leontidou 1990:196).
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Evidence on manufacturing employment change by Greater Athens* 
municipalities over the 1969-88 period^Js^esented in table 4.16 and figures 
4.4 and 4.5. As it can be remarked, the period 1969-1973 was one of remark­
able manufacturing employment growth in almost all municipalities of 
Greater Athens with the exception of a few western ones (fig. 4.4) which 
manifested slight employment declines. Inner city areas along the traditional 
industrial axis, as well as most western, northern and southern suburbs con­
centrated much of that growth. By 1973, industrial axis concentrated 160,028 
jobs -that is, 57.19% of the total Greater Athens manufacturing employment 
(table 4.17). Most of those Jobs belonged mainly to the consumer branch group 
(which represented 60.3% of total inner city employment -calculated from 
table 4.17) with best example of this textiles, clothing/footwear, foods, prin­
ting/publishing and furniture, and secondly to the capital group (representing 
27.9%) with best example transport equipment, metal products, electric and 
non electric machinery.
The oil-related world economic recession of 1973/74 marked a turning 
point in the process of manufacturing employment growth in Greater Athens. 
A totaH ob decline of 3Z943 took place over the 1973-1988 period (see table 
4.16). Most of Greater Athens’ municipalities were affected. The most serious­
ly affected were those included in the traditional inner city industrial axis as 
we can remark in fig. 4.5. Job loss in the major municipalities of Athens and 
Piraeus, alone, represented more than 86% of the total Greater Athens job de­
crease (calculated from table 4.16). The aggregate decrease along the industrial 
axis reached 25,646 manufacturing jobs, and by 1988 its percentage had fallen 
to 54.4% of the total Greater Athens manufacturing employment (table 4.17). 
However, the uneven geography of production in Greater Athens was ex­
pressed by a continuing employment growth in most suburban municipalities 
over the 1973-1988 deindustrialization period, as we can see in table 4.16 and 
figure 4.5. The suburban municipalities of Perama, Korydallos, Peristeri, Pe- 
troupoli, Nea Liossia, Kamatero, Metamorphosis, Lykovrysi, Neo Psychiko, Fi­
lothei, Nea Erythrea, Melissia, Vrylissia, Agia Paraskevi, Zografos, Byron, 
Ymittos, Nea Smyrni, Kallithea, Paleo Phaliro, Agios Dimitrios, llioupolis, 
Argyroupolis, Alimos-Elliniko, Glyfada, Voula and Vouliagmeni, presented
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Figure 4.3. Greater A thens’ municipalities included in its traditional inner 
city industrial axis.
SARONIKOS GULF
N
GREATER ATHENS MUNICIPALITIES
1.ATHENS
2. PIRAEUS
3. DRAPETSONA
4.KERATSINI
5.PERAMA
6.NIKEA
-  7.KORYDALLOS
8.HAIDARI
9.AGIA VARVARA
10.EGALEO 
_11.PERISTERI
12.PETR0UP0U
13. NEA LIOSIA
-14. KAMATERO
15.AG10I ANARGYROI
16.NEA HALKIDONA
17.NEA PHILADELPHIA
18. NEA IONIA
19.GALATSI 
20.IRAKLEIO
21.METAM0RPH0SIS
-22.LYK0VRYSI
23.PEFKI
24.PSYCHIKO
25.NEO PSYCHIKO
26.FILOTHEI
27.HALANDRI
28.MAROUSI
29.KIFISSIA
30.NEA ERYTHREA
31.EKALI
32.MELISSIA
33. NEA PENTELI
34.PENTELI
35.VRILISSIA
36.AGIA PARASKEVI
37. HOLARGOS-PAPAGOS
38. ZOGRAFOS
39.KESARIANI
40.VYRON
41.YMITT0S
42.DAFNI
43.NEA SMYRNI
44.KALLITHEA
45.TAVROS
46.MOSCHATO
47.AGIOS lOANNIS RENTIS
48.PALEO FALIRO
49.AGIOS DIMITRIOS 
50.ILIOUPOLIS
51.ARGYROUPOLIS
52.ALIMOS-ELLINIKO
53.GLYFADA
54.VOULA
55.VOULIAGMENI
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Table 4,16. Manufacturing employment in Greater A tbens* municipalities
1969-1988
Municipalities 1969 1973 1978 1988 Change Change 
1969-73 1973-88
1. Athens 82,705 90,887 89,696 70,364 8,182 -20,523
2. Piraeus 28,676 29,113 25,841 21,291 437 -7,822
3. Drapetsona 3,780 5,288 3,199 2,565 1,508 -2,723
4. Keratsini 2,832 3,193 3,188 3,072 361 -121
5. Perama 1,337 2,604 2,569 3,119 1,267 515
6. Nikea 3,892 3,505 3,512 3,213 -387 -292
7. Korydallos 1,341 1,218 1,568 1,812 -123 594
8. Haidari 6,041 8,130 6,981 5,511 2,089 -2,619
9. Agia Varvara 1,283 1,399 1,343 969 116 -430
lO.Egaleo 8,822 10,839 12,300 9,875 2,017 -964
ILPeristeri 12,226 15,363 18,738 16,980 3,137 1,617
IZPetroupoli 426 485 460 753 59 268
13.Nea Liosia 1,838 2,789 3,211 4,219 951 1,430
14.Kamatero 167 332 1,053 1,265 165 933
15.Agioi Anargyroi 898 2,343 2,776 1,967 1,445 -376
16.Nea Halkidona 1,423 1,233 1,645 1,168 -190 -65
17.Nea Philadelphia 2,090 2,179 1,965 1,667 89 -512
18.Nea Ionia 7,541 8,089 7,089 6,853 548 -1,236
19.Galatsi 609 850 1,171 2,059 241 1,209
20.1rakleio 2,775 3,323 3,455 2,895 548 -428
2LMetamorphosis 2,150 4,427 6,007 6,857 2,277 2,430
22.Lykovrysi 676 1,513 1,971 1,814 837 301
23.Pefki 639 668 466 533 29 -135
24.Psychiko 23 21 17 16 -2 -5
25.Neo Psychiko 351 408 483 465 57 57
26.Filothei 12 2 3 9 -10 7
27.Halandri 1,981 2,753 2,475 2,674 772 -79
28.Marousi 3,004 5,141 4,456 4,115 2,137 -1,026
29.Kifissia 2,102 3,823 4,196 3,783 1,721 -40
30.Nea Erythrea 184 606 860 761 422 155
3LEkali 1 3 191 0 2 -3
32.Melissia 73 182 177 282 109 100
33.Nea Penteli 47 34 56 12 -13 -22
34.Penteli 6 15 9 12 9 -3
35. Vrylissia 89 90 124 260 1 170
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Municipalities 1969 1973 1978 1988 Change Change 
1969-73 1973-88
36.Agia Paraskevi 626 654 644 898 28 244
37.Holargos-Papagos 650 697 570 460 47 -237
38.Zografos 1,192 1,690 1,654 1,850 498 160
39.Kesariani 1,073 1,143 1,014 1,068 70 -75
40.Byron 1,606 1,996 2,063 2,246 390 250
4L Ymittos 863 1,913 3,293 2,647 1,050 734
42Dafni 1,676 2,260 2,010 1,585 584 -675
43.Nea Smyrni 879 1,007 1,192 1,381 128 374
44.Kallithea 6,336 7,525 7,850 7,910 1,189 385
45.Tavros 9,077 8,997 8,714 6,266 -80 -2,731
46.Moschato 7,952 11,252 11,825 7,701 3,300 -3,551
47Agios loannis Rentis 10,174 13,271 12,336 10,543 3,097 -2,728
48.Paleo Phaliro 1,097 1,390 1,339 1,535 293 145
49.Agios Dimitrios 3,197 4,215 4,761 5,097 1,018 882
SO.Ilioupolis 1,571 1,909 1,937 2,565 338 656
SLArgyroupolis 672 1,193 1,232 1,563 521 370
52Alimos-Elliniko 2,542 4,488 4,730 6,692 1,946 2,204
53.Glyfada 484 1,285 1,307 1,479 801 194
54. Voula 65 86 90 160 21 74
55. Vouliagmeni 7 3 24 23 -4 20
Greater Athens, total 233,779 279,822 281,836 246,879 46,043 -32,943
SOURCE: For 1969, published data from NSSG, census o f industrial eta es­
tablishments, Athens 1969. For 1973, 1978 and 1988, unpublished 
(computer printouts) NSSG data of the 1973, 1978 and 1988 cen­
suses of industrial etc. establishments. (Own calculation of the 
changes).
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Figure 4.4. Manufacturing employment change in Greater Athens*
municipalities, 1969-1973
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SOURCE: Mapped from table 4.16.
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Figure 4.5. Manufacturing employment change in Greater Athens*
municipalities, 1973-1988
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SOURCE: Mapped from table 4.16.
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Table 4,17 Inner city manufacturing employment by branch, 1973-1988.
Code Branch 1973 1988 1973-88 1973-88 (%)
Non durable consumer goods 96,471 82,004 -14,467 -15.00
20.Foods 12,572 13,428 856 6.81
21.Drinks 1,528 748 -780 -51.05
22.Tobacco 3,176 2,072 -1,104 -34.76
23.Textiles 20,539 12,311 -8,228 -40.06
24.Clothing-Footwear 26,464 23,263 -3,201 -12.10
25. Wood-Cork 3,562 2,185 -1,377 -38.66
26.Furniture 7,918 5,353 -2,565 -32.39
27.Paper 3,616 3,831 215 5.95
28.Printing-Publishing 9,145 10,709 1,564 17.10
29.Leather-Fur 2,609 2,153 -456 -17.48
39.Miscellaneous 5,342 5,951 609 11.40
Intermediate goods 18,874 17,045 -1,829 -9.69
30.Rubber-Plastic 4,196 4,373 177 4.22
31.Chemicals 8,089 8,267 178 220
32.Petroleum-Coal products 717 906 189 26.36
33.Non-Metallic minerals 5,872 3,499 -2,373 -40.41
Capital goods and durables 44,683 35,333 -9,350 -20.93
34.Basic metallurgy 412 770 358 86.89
35.Metal products 10,320 8,014 -2,306 -22.34
36.Non-Electric machinery 9,535 4,715 -4,820 -50.55
37.Electric equipment 9,803 7,450 -2,353 -24.00
38.Transport equipment 14,613 14,384 -229 -157
Inner-city total 160,028 134,382 -25,646 -16.03
Greater Athens total 279,824 246,879 -32,945 -11.77
Inner-city (%) 57.19 54.43
SOURCE: For 1973, Leontidou 1983: table 4. For 1988, unpublished NSSG
data (computer printouts) from the 1988 census of industrial etc. 
establishments. (Own calculation of absolute and percent 
changes).
absolute employment increases. Aggregately, these municipalities offered 
16,478 new manufacturing jobs in the Greater Athens’ economy (calculated 
from table 4.16). However, the job loss of central industry could not be out­
weighed by the suburban employment growth; a total of 32,943 jobs were lost
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in the Greater Athens agglomeration over the 1973-88 deindustrialization 
period.
The inner city job decline was not branch-specific, since the majority 
of br^ches_w.ej^,^aflfèCtedJto^-aL.le (see table 4.17). The
most affected was textile industry which presented a loss of 8,228 jobs; other 
traditional consumer branches (cloths/footwear and furniture) experienced 
serious job losses as well (-3,201 and -2,565 jobs respectively). These three 
branches, aggregately, accounted for 54.6% of the total inner city job loss dur­
ing 1973-1988 (calculated from table 4.17). But it was not only the traditional 
consumer branches which were affected: Modern capital and intermediate 
ones experienced marked job losses as well, with best example non electric 
and electric machinery (-4,820 and -2,353 jobs respectively), metal products 
(-2,306 jobs) and non metallic minerals (-2,373 jobs).
Inner city employment decline, has been associated with three interre­
lated sets of forces:
(a) The more general deindustrialization processes which are at work since 
the mid 1970s, have caused closures of manufacturing companies 
(especially big ones) in traditional branches such as e.g. textiles, furni­
ture, clothing/footwear, etc.
(b) Locational problems and other negative externalities at inner city areas 
have forced companies to seek relocation elsewhere. In a 1973 survey 
(referred in Leontidou 1983: 960), it was revealed that although inner 
city decline had not fully started yet, 75% of the surveyed firms as­
serted that the need for plants* expansion was the major thrust for re­
location prospects.
(c) Industrial policy inconsistencies and restrictions (chap. 6), a widespread 
anti-industrial culture (chap. 7) and major problems of consensus be­
tween public planning bodies and social groupings in tackling with the
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problems of inner city manufacturing (chap. 8), have contributed to the 
further intensification of the decline process.
By 1988 the uneven geography of production in Greater Athens had 
created a diversified pattern of areal specialization (table 4.18 and figure 4.6). 
More precisely:
Specialization in food industry (Code Order 20) is(r^marked at most 
suburban municipalities and especially at the southern and eastern ones, 
whereas specialization in beverages (Order 21) k ^ ^ ^ a r ^ d  at a few 
areas in which big plants are located (Coca-Cola in Nea Kifissia along 
the Athens-Lamia national highway, and Amstel beer in Egaleo along 
Kifissou avenue).
Specialization in tobacco industry (Order 22) is s till /r^ a rk e d  at its 
traditional Piraeus areas.
Specialization in textiles (Order 23) isg^r^arked along the industrial 
axis and especially at the northern traditional textile-areas of N.Ionia, 
Nea Philadelphia, Irakleio, etc.
Specialization in clothing-footwear (Order 24) is^ r^arked  at inner city 
areas (Athens municipality) with extensions towards north-west and 
south-west municipalities.
Specialization in wood industry (Order 25) is (^œpnarked mainly along 
two discrete zones including most western and eastern-southern sub­
urbs, whereas specialization in furniture (Order 26) follows a similar 
spatial pattern probably because the branch is heavily dependent on 
the previous one.
Specialization in paper industries (Order 27) and in the linked print­
ing-publishing activities (Order 28) follows a central-city (market 
oriented) pattern with some extensions to the suburbs.
TABLE 4.18
LOCATION QUOTIENTS OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN GREATER ATHENS’ 
MUNICIPALITIES. 1088
municipalities
Of GREATER ATHENS
FOOOS DRINKS TOBACCO TEXTILES CLOTHING-
FOOTWEAR
WOOD-
CORK
FURNITURE PAPER PRINTING-
PUBLISHING
LEATHER
FUR
RUBBER.
PLASTIC
CHEMKAIS PETROLEUM- 
COAL PRODUCTS
NON METALLIC 
MINERALS
BASIC
METALS
METAL NON ELECTRIC 
PRODUCTS MACHINERY
ELECTRIC
EQUIPMENT
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
OTHER
1 ATHENS 044 020 047 044 1 31 053 0 74 205 143 149 043 102 142 043 1 57 052 090 090 0.78 197
a PIRAEUS 120 035 0 43 125 0 31 0 71 047 084 0 37 043 043 0 73 O il 0 40 035 104 248 1 24 183 040
3 0RAPETSONA 030 010 000 002 015 042 021 000 O il 010 025 7 70 240 1010 000 024 127 017 038 003
4 KERATSINt 140 015 000 100 044 1 95 104 002 O il 000 034 0 07 009 207 000 049 124 081 239 040
SPERAMA 023 000 000 001 009 104 0.13 000 001 000 O il 004 1305 045 000 044 144 0 25 588 0 03
•  NIKEA 124 004 000 053 154 141 1 71 014 021 028 114 004 000 139 594 097 122 088 098 143
T KORVOALLOS 174 022 000 057 1.54 240 134 010 014 040 1 14 O il 000 244 000 044 0 23 045 048 1.44
•  HAIDARI 0 25 004 000 013 0 44 094 034 O il 004 0 33 042 0 03 0 21 0 32 000 039 047 029 585 0 77
•  AQA VARVARA 1 13 040 000 050 0 70 4 43 094 050 010 024 040 4 71 000 234 000 044 044 025 049 0 78
10 EGALEO 054 540 000 212 0 74 104 1 22 104 030 049 252 019 012 239 1 99 127 048 040 0 89 0 28
11 PERISTERI 0 02 O il 000 141 1 15 170 135 042 045 029 1 59 0 55 0 22 0 45 0 03 1 33 1 48 0 89 088 0 43
12PETROUPOU 204 000 000 040 135 344 ISO 051 004 121 039 000 000 045 000 1 79 014 054 0 35 127
19NEALIOSIA 004 004 000 044 1.55 341 144 047 102 035 039 0 53 055 044 000 1 34 088 084 0 87 058
14 KAMATERO 240 000 000 030 1 11 254 184 041 042 000 159 1 34 000 044 000 0 93 1 55 0 32 0 43 009
ISAGKXANARQYROt 100 007 000 1 19 1 37 2 24 140 041 034 110 034 059 0 73 1 15 000 1 17 0.59 0 78 084. 125
10 NEAHALKIOONA 044 000 000 592 0 72 057 033 000 042 000 042 014 000 030 000 0 57 0 21 1 09 0 70 0 72
17NEAPM1LA0ELPHIA 005 034 000 145 144 0 40 062 154 020 120 101 0 33 009 0 42 0 75 0 24 043 050 048 3 39
11 NEA IONIA 047 010 000 395 140 044 045 0 72 1 It 054 050 015 000 045 OOO 055 042 0 51 035 050
10GALATSI 113 0 00 000 0 47 199 1 85 127 0 23 0 21 045 0 33 021 000 0 97 000 0 79 0 23 080 108 125
aO IRAKLEIO 050 005 000 244 1 54 124 063 034 042 014 242 137 000 104 000 073 049 031 034 049
a i METAMORPHOSIS 141 0 31 000 209 054 1 37 1 34 039 0 40 029 112 1 47 0 73 0 43 000 074 054 238 0 32 0 59
aa LYKOVRYSI 020 000 305 200 0.32 0.52 014 104 039 055 193 014 000 717 000 0 71 021 438 013 0 77
aaPEFKi 080 000 000 444 037 051 429 0 27 009 000 030 042 000 000 000 034 000 017 0 25 018
24 PSYCHIKO 042 000 000 000 000 000 120 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
as NEO PSYCHIKO 404 00 0 000 045 045 034 0 40 000 024 054 0 43 000 2 47 212 000 024 0 37 210 0 41 031
as FN.OTHEI 000 00 0 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 18 40 000 000
27 HALANORI 120 003 000 021 051 0 55 043 004 444 022 014 104 000 209 1 21 054 003 042 107 0 82
as MAROOSI 004 744 017 044 0 24 054 044 014 217 004 032 2 74 043 554 2 74 023 041 129 050 032
a* KIFISSIA 054 2155 000 042 041 044 032 090 039 000 123 3 74 000 0 35 000 054 0 75 127 017 021
WNEAERYTHREA 
31 EKAU
1.34 044 000 344 004 1.54 035 000 004 000 004 404 000 043 000 054 000 027 044 004
32MEUSSIA 111 000 000 000 010 0.55 044 000 000 000 0 23 984 000 189 000 010 0 24 0 72 084 185
33NEAPENTEU 410 000 000 000 000 14 23 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 245 000 000 000 000
34 PENTEU 335 000 000 000 044 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 14 54 000 000 000 000 000 000
35 VRIUSSIA 174 141 000 039 204 150 004 203 034 000 012 000 000 355 000 034 0.13 1 13 044 049
3SAGUPARASKEVI 174 000 000 O il 0 52 254 122 000 0 79 000 090 140 000 0 82 000 1.34 044 0 72 1.74 100
37 HOLARGOSfAPAGOS 240 0 00 000 037 044 034 170 000 007 000 042 000 000 254 000 147 334 180 0 58 044
3SZ0GRAF0S 153 000 000 042 171 1 14 149 300 042 0 72 049 0 23 000 042 000 0 33 007 1 11 088 143
3SKESARIANI 100 043 000 034 2 31 144 154 014 0 31 350 033 023 000 042 000 0 43 0 32 044 0 40 141
40VYRON 000 027 000 054 200 1 70 154 002 044 4 07 050 012 000 095 000 041 023 092 088 159
41 YMITTOS 014 000 000 007 O il 012 033 009 049 009 004 000 000 004 000 12 91 009 0 04 012 0.02
42 OAFM 001 000 000 024 221 150 245 0 21 1 73 143 014 050 000 044 000 044 030 0 83 044 1 10
43NEASMYRNI 145 015 000 041 137 107 1 54 0 24 020 120 024 014 000 104 000 0 72 097 2 23 077 188
44KALL1THEA 001 120 001 071 1.13 041 095 044 042 145 043 1 17 723 041 000 044 039 242 109 073
4STAVROS 300 202 000 054 055 0 41 049 0 37 110 300 214 045 000 0 70 941 1 11 117 094 018 049
44 MOSCHATO 113 002 000 130 092 045 0 47 0 74 0 59 1 29 4.79 127 017 043 000 0 91 089 1.77 0 31 042
47 AGIOS lOANNIS RENT» 003 0 73 0 49 034 0 27 044 1 74 064 094 2 75 219 144 049 0 87 1 39 3 31 1 70 1 74 0 37 020
44 PALEO FAURO 243 0 57 000 027 144 1 22 . 154 003 034 222 142 010 009 044 000 0 77 054 0 77 0 77 0 63
40 AGIOS OIUTRIOS 042 024 000 042 127 2.70 313 030 104 031 094 050 000 0 55 000 1 31 0 52 109 0 71 077
MUOUPOUS 1 17 005 000 039 127 322 241 052 0 81 145 053 039 000 122 000 1.11 0 52 048 0 72 1 18
51 ARGYROUPOUS 122 000 000 095 159 204 147 0 74 014 O il 0 31 0 47 000 200 000 050 084 108 0 82 1 19
52 AUMOS-ELLMIKO 130 0 21 000 034 094 034 045 0 70 040 000 034 1 85 000 0 19 000 039 035 0 31 295 0 43
53GLYFAOA 201 1 77 000 036 1 54 147 1 11 000 013 054 018 0 33 000 1 14 000 0 70 0 28 182 1 12 0 55
54VOULA 4 15 000 000 014 034 0 97 024 000 0 74 000 101 000 000 2 79 000 014 000 048 211 000
55 VOULIAGMEM 1005 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
g
SOURCE; Own calculations from table 8.9 (appendix I).
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Figure 4.6. Branch specialization o f Greater Athens* municipalities, 1988.
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Specialization in leather-fur (Order 29) follows a similar central-city 
pattern extending southwards to the traditional tannery-sites of Eleo- 
nas (Tavros, Agios loannis Rentis, Moschato, etc.) as well as to some 
eastern suburbs.
Specialization in rubber-plastic (Order 30) is rather remarked at west­
ern and northern municipalities, whereas chemical industry (Order 31) 
includes both central-city and northern suburban areas.
Specialization in petroleum and coal products (Order 32) can be re­
marked at a south-west municipality (Perama) in which large oil in­
stallations are located as well as at inner-city areas (many small 
gasoline stations).
Specialization in non metallic minerals (Order 33) can be remarked 
mainly at northern and southern suburbs which are adjacent to Penteli 
and Ymittos mountains (providing raw material for marble-cutting and 
processing industry).
Specialization in basic metals (Order 34) follows a linear pattern ex­
tending from the traditional areas of Eleonas towards some northern 
municipalities vis-a-vis central-city sites. On the other hand, the areas 
that specialize in the linked branch of metal products (Order 35) are 
adjacent to this linear zone.
The areas specializing in non electric machinery (Order 36), include 
mainly the Piraeus port zone in which machine-works were concen­
trated since 19th century, while specialization in electrical equipment 
(Order 37) presents a more decentralized pattern including most south­
ern, eastern and northern municipalities.
The areas specializing in transport equipment (Order 38) include the 
Piraeus port zone extending westwards (and containing mainly heavy 
ship-building and repairing acti\ities), the southern zone (containing
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mainly light boat-building activities) and some northern municipalities 
(with car repair activities).
Finally, specialization in miscellaneous industries (Order 39), follows a 
rather market-oriented central-city pattern with some extensions to 
the suburbs.
4.3. Conclusion
The spatial configuration of manufacturing industry in Athens inherited from 
the growth period was drastically reversed in the period of recession (mid 
1970s onwards). Whereas outer industry (rest of Attica) kept growing -es­
pecially in capital branches- Greater Athens' industry experienced severe job 
losses in intermediate and capital industries, while some consumer ones kept 
on offering jobs. The larger companies were the hardest hit, whereas SMEs 
resisted more successfully to the impacts of crisis. Inner-city industry 
(including almost all branches) experienced the greater job decline. However, 
within this general negative climate, some suburban localities manifested a 
remarkable industrial dynamism. In the following chapter, a detailed survey 
of such a suburban industrial locality will be advanced, in order to highlight 
its production structure and the unique characteristics that contributed to 
such a dynamism
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CHAPTER 5
A FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY 
OF GREATER ATHENS: A SUBURBAN INDUSTRIAL LOCALITY
5.1. General characteristics
The surveyed locality extends over an area of 478 Hectares (4,780,000 sq. m 
or about 1,195 Acres) and is situated at the start of the national highway 
(Athens-Lamia-Thessaloniki) to the northern fringe of Greater Athens (fig. 
5.1) between the municipalities of Aharnes (or Menidi), Nea Kifissia, Lykovry- 
si and Metamorphosis. Although the area is in close proximity to Metamor­
phosis, it belongs in the administrative boundaries and responsibilities of the 
Aharnes municipality. The area is crossed -along a length of about 3.5 km- by 
the Athens-Lamia-Thessaloniki national highway (fig. 5.2), which creates 
problems of transport connection between the two separate slices of the area. 
The survey was based upon statistical processing and elaboration of primary 
data collected by means of questionnaires and complementary interviews. The 
questionnaires were filled in by 188 manufacturing companies (95.4% of the 
total) which were operating in the area during the survey period (1987). Only 
9 companies (4.6%) denied to collaborate.
The ground of the land slice which is adjacent to the municipality of 
Metamorphosis is quite flat, whereas the other has some slight slopes that do 
not present serious problems for the construction of industrial buildings or for 
the normal transport flow. There are some natural torrents which accept 
liquid industrial waste from neighbouring plants. There are no sub-areas of 
special natural beauty, or of archaeological findings or other historical monu­
ments. The landscape is a typical industrial one (fig  5.3), with some remaining 
small olive groves and vegetable gardens (mainly at the northern part of the 
area) "waiting'' to be sold as industrial plots to newcomer manufacturing 
companies.
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Figure 5.1 The location o f the Metamorphosis industrial area in Greater
A thens
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SOURCE: Mapped from  the Structure Plan of Athens {Official Gazette
ISA/ 18-2-1985).
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Figure 5.2 General layout o f the Metamorphosis industrial area
2
SOURCE: Sketched from  map provided by the M inistry of E nvironm ent
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Figure 5.3 The typical landscape of the Metamorphosis industrial area
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5.2. The Development of the Area and 
Location/Relocation Reasons
Till the early 1960s the area was vacant; there  w ere only a few  cottages and 
agricultural cultivations. From  early 1960s onwards, it s ta rted  to a ttrac t m anu­
facturing plants (both first-tim e locations and relocations). The first p lan t was 
established on 1962 and it was the "Levadeaki" cotton-processing  unit (see 
table C.2 -appendix I). However, in the decade of 1960s only 14 plants (7.4%) 
w ere in operation (fig. 5.4). As we saw in the previous chap ter, it was the
Figure 5.4. Temporal evolution o f Metamorphosis industrial area
49.5% of plants 
(93 plants)
7.4% of plants 
(14 plants)
3.1% of plants 
(81 plants)
1960-69
1970-79
0 1980-87
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
inner city which attracted  th e  best part of G rea te r A thens’ industrial g row th  
in the 1960s. In the period o f deindustrialization and negative restructuring , 
however, inner city decline was combined w ith  suburban  m anufactu ring  
growth and therefore during the 1970s and 1980s th e  survey area developed 
the m ajority of its industrial arsenal By the end o f th e  survey period (1987), 
there were 216 firm s operating in the area, am ong w hich 19 were non-in ­
dustrial ones (mainly com m ercial -tab le C l  appendix I) and 188 m anufacturing  
ones em ploying 5,233 w orking people (table C.2 -append ix  I). A considerable 
share of the areas’ plants (44.1%) cam e from  relocations (fig. 5.5). The w ave o f  
both first-tim e locations and relocations, took  m ainly place during  th e  
post-1970 period (fig. 5.6). The previous locations o f th e  relocated  plants w ere
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scattered across various parts of the  A then ian  agglom eration, and m ostly 
across its central areas (fig. 5.7). P lants’ relocation into the  area was not 
branch-specific but included alm ost all branches (fig. 5.8).
Figure 5.5 Type o f plants* move to the Metamorphosis industrial area
55 .9% -^  
(105 plants)
First location
Relocation^ # ^ 4 4 . 1 %  
(83 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
Figure 5.6 Type o f plants* move, 1962-1987
Number of plants
Upper bars: 
Relocations
Lower bars: 
First locations
1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
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Figure 5.7 Previous locations o f plants relocated into the Metamorphosis 
industrial area
CENTRAL ATHENS 
AREAS 67.5%  
(56 plants)
PIRAEUS 3.6% (3 plants
OTHER AREAS 
OF GREECE 
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SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
Figure 5.8 Type o f plants* move into the Metamorphosis industrial area
by manufacturing branch.
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SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
The factors w hich w ere taken into account by com panies fo r m oving 
into the area, d iffe r  betw een firs t-tim e locating com panies and relocating
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ones. In the first case (table 5.1), the factors can be grouped in three broad
categories according to importance:
(a) land-cost related factors (low cost of land/low cost of rent/pre-existing 
private plot or building in the area)
(b) identification of the area as institutionalized industrial . zone
(legitimacy reasons)
(c) transport accessibility to the market and administrative centre of
Athens
Table 5.1 Reasons for plants* location to the Metamorphosis industrial 
area
Reasons Number of preferences
Land-cost related reasons 45
Existence of institutionalized industrial zone 42
Transport accessibility to market and administrative 
centre of Athens
28
Accessibility to raw materials 5
Proximity to labour market 4
Linkages with other industries in the area 3
Purely personal reasons 3
Organizational reasons (merger, change of firm’s 
ownership, etc.).
1
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
The first and second sets of factors are interrelated, since the charac­
terization of the area as an industrial zone has kept the land price down 
(around 3,000 drs/sq.nL at the average by the time of the fieldwork).* This 
price could be regarded as extremely low if one takes into account that the 
area is in very close proximity to Kifissia, an upper-class suburb, at which the 
price of land in 1987 was ten times as high (around 30,000 drs/sq.m.) (see Ta 
Nea, 12 February 1990). The low cost of land in the survey area, has also defi­
nitely to do with that it was outside the boundaries of the statutory city-plan, 
and that its infrastructure was in an awkward condition -as we will see later
* Information provided and cross-checked in interviews with area's industrialists. The 
price may vary in relation with the specific plot Plots along the national highway have 
usually higher prices than "interior^ plots.
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in this chapter. Other locational factors (accessibility to raw materials, prox­
imity to labour, linkages with other industries in the area, etc.) do not seem to 
have played a much important role in attracting first-time locations to the 
survey area.
With regard to the relocation reasons (table 5.2), apart from the need 
of available space for plants’ expansions, the second most important reason is 
associated with the prospect of industrialists that relocation into this suburban 
area would release them from social pressures related with environmental 
pollution in their former inner city sites. In other words, the relocational at­
tractiveness of the area was partly connected with the industrialists’ expecta­
tions that in the new location their plants would pollute the environment 
without serious resistance from the local population. Other important
Table 5.2 Reasons for plants* relocation into the Metamorphosis area
Reasons Number of preferences
Need of space for plants’ expansions 43
Avoidance of social pressures associated with 
environmental pollution in the former inner city 
sites
38
Transport accessibility to market and administra­
tive centre of Athens
21
Land-cost related factors (low cost of land/and 
rent/pre-existence of plot or building
19
Existence of institutionalized industrial zone 16
Proximity to labour 3
Organizational reasons (merger, change of firm’s 
ownership, etc.)
3
Accessibility to raw materials 2
Linkages with other industries in the area 1
Purely personal reasons 0
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
relocation reasons were: accessibility to the Athenian market and CBD, land- 
cost related factors, and existence of institutionalised industrial zone (like 
first-time locations). Other reasons, like proximity to raw materials and
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labour, linkages, etc^ do not seem to have played a major role in attracting re­
locating plants to the area.
The above evidence shows that not only typical reasons of economic 
rationality, but also that other non-typical reasons, played an equally import­
ant role -although indirectly- to the industrial growth of the surveyed 
locality. These reasons are associated with wider political inconsistencies and 
problems: The inability of the state machine to impose planning controls on 
the spatial development process (chap. 2, sect 23), "created" areas -just like 
the surveyed one- in which industries could locate or relocate spontaneously, 
without having to abide by environmental protection criteria or land-use zon­
ing regulations which would have existed if the area had developed along a 
comprehensive plan. The growing industrial character of the area helped in 
keeping land demand for other -tertiary- uses of a higher economic profile 
(commercial centres, office buildings etc.) at relatively low levels, which, as 
an effect, kept the price of land down. The low cost of land, in turn, 
stimulated the further attraction of industries in a cumulative manner.
5.3. Production, Labour and Other Related Characteristics
The major land-use prevailing in the survey area is manufacturing industry 
which occupies 20% of the total area, includes 188 establishments and employs 
5,233 persons, whereas commercial uses share much lower percentages (table 
5.3). The best part of the area’s land was by the time of the survey unbuilt 
The commercial uses have been mainly developed along the national highway. 
There are also some dispersed dwellings and cafes.
Table 5.3 Major land-uses in Metamorphosis industrial area
Land use Area
(sq.m)
% No of 
establishments
% Employed %
Industrial 956,644 20.0 188 90.8 5,233 94.8
Commercial 68,350 1.4 19 9.2 288 5.2
Undeveloped land 3,755,006 78.6
Total 4,780,000 100.0 207 100.0 5,521 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
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By 1988, compared with the whole Greater Athens, the area specialized 
in food, drinks and furniture from the consumer branch group, in rubber/plas­
tic and chemicals from the intermediate group and in basic metals, non elec­
tric machinery and electrical equipment from the capital group (table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Location quotients o f manufacturing employment in the Meta- 
morpbosis industrial area, 1988.
Code Branch L.Q.
Non durable consumer goods 0.9
20. Foods 1.0
2L Drinks 14.0
23. Textiles 0,3
24. Cloths and footwear 0,9
25. Wood 0,2
26. Furniture L4
27. Paper 0.6
28. Typing and printing 0.2
29. Leather 0.4
39. Miscellaneous industries 0,3
Intermediate goods 23
30. Rubber and plastic 21
3L Chemicals and allied 3.5
33. Non metallic minerals 0.9
Capital goods and durables 0.6
34. Basic metallurgy 3.3
35. Metal manufactures 0.5
36. Non electric machinery 1.0
37. Electrical equipment L5
38. Transport equipment 0.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from table 5.5 and table B.4 (appendix I).
In terms of their share in the area’s total number of plants (table 5.5), 
the dominant branches (ordered according to importance) are: (1) Cloths/ 
footwear, (2) metal products, (3) chemicals and (4) rubber/plastic, which con­
centrate more than 1/2 of the area’s plants. The other branches share lower 
percentages. Taken in aggregate, the consumer branch group predominates.
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Table 5.5 Aggregate characteristics o f manufacturing industry by branch 
in the Metamorphosis industrial area.
Branch No of 
plants
% No of 
Emp­
loyed
% HP % Plot
area
(sq.m)
% Floor-
space
(sq.m)
%
Consumer 84 44.7 2,846 54.4 20,166 52.8 542,179 56.7 223,888 59.9
goods
20.Foods 11 5.9 503 9.6 4,938 12.9 94,800 9.9 25,180 6.7
21.Drinks 4 2.1 756 14.4 4,025 10.5 117,588 123 44,372 1L9
23.Textiles 14 7.4 179 3.4 1,474 3.9 45,600 4.8 23,780 6.4
24.Cloths/ 31 16.5 843 16.1 6,792 17.8 136,338 14.3 80,667 2L6
footwear
25. Wood 2 1.1 24 0.5 155 0.4 6,880 0.7 1,790 0.5
26.Furniture 12 6.4 355 6.8 1,941 5.1 81,219 8.5 30,820 8.2
27.Paper 3 1.6 63 1.2 472 1.2 33,900 3.5 7,110 L9
28.Typing/ 3 1.6 50 1.0 216 0.6 14,550 L5 4,380 L2
Printing
29.Leather 1 0.5 23 0.4 28 0.1 2,180 0.2 1,650 0.4
39.0ther 3 1.6 50 LO 125 0.3 9,124 LO 4,139 LI
Intermediate 52 27.7 1560 29.8 12,094 31.6 235,185 24.6 95,897 25.7
goods
30.Rubber/ 21 11.2 347 6.6 3,343 8.7 64,572 6.7 20,750 5.6
Plastic
31.Chemicals 22 11.7 1,070 20.4 4,735 124 121,403 127 68,449 18.3
33.Non met­ 9 4.8 143 2.7 4,016 10.5 49,210 5.1 6,698 L8
allic minerals
Capital 52 27.7 827 15.8 5,968 15.6 179,280 18.7 54,068 14.5
goods
34.Basic 3 1.6 69 1.3 938 2.5 7,300 0.8 3,530 0.9
metals
35.Metal 25 13.3 183 3.5 2,065 5.4 71,800 7.5 15,650 4.2
products
36.Non elec­ 12 6.4 151 2.9 1,283 3.4 42380 4.4 9,600 26
tric machi­
nery
37.Electrical 11 5.9 419 8.0 1,585 4.1 54,300 5.7 24,888 6.7
equipment
38.Transport 1 0.5 5 0.1 97 0.3 3,500 0.4 400 0.1
equipment
Total 188 100 5,233 100 38,228 100 956,644 100 373,853 100
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
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whereas the intermediate and capital groups share equal percentages.
In terms of their share in the area’s manufacturing employment, the 
dominant branches are: (1) Chemicals, (2) clothing/footwear and (3) drinks 
which concentrate more than 1/2 of the area’s manufacturing employment 
The other branches share lower percentages. Taken aggregately, it is the con­
sumer goods group, again, which predominates in employment terms.
The consumer industry group is also dominant in terms of total in­
stalled HP, total plot area and total industrial floorspace. Only two consumer 
branches, alone, (drinks and clothing/footwear) employ 30.5% of the total 
manufacturing workforce, cover 28.6% of the total plot area and 33.5% of the 
total industrial floorspace.
Three other indices were used for sketching-out the aggregate 
"morphology" of industry groups in the survey area -Le. capital intensity, land 
intensity^ and industrial floorspace per worker^ (table 5.6). With reference to 
capital intensity, only a few branches (foods, rubber/plastic, non metallic min­
erals, transport equipment, basic metals and metal products) have capital in­
tensities exceeding the national average (9 HP/worker in 1984 -own 
calculation from tables B.4 and B.5 appendix I). It is evident that the 
"morphology" of production in the survey area is mostly characterized by la­
bour intensive processes. With reference to land intensity, the great majority 
of branches does not make intensive use of land for production purposes. 
Only basic metals (with 7.8 sq.m. of industrial plot per IHP) and non metallic 
minerals (with 122 sq.m./lHP) make intensive use of their industrial plots. 
This can either indicate a trend of the area’s industrialists to buy large plots 
of (relatively cheap) land for reasons of future expansion -although their 
scale of operations at the survey time did not justify such large plots- or, 
otherwise, they tend to use land for other anchillary reasons (e.g. car-parking
 ^ Industrial plot size per 1 HP. This index expresses the degree at which industrial land 
is used intensively for production purposes.
 ^ This index is a rough estimation of working conditions with reference to space 
available to each worker. Of course, working conditions are determined by many other para­
métrés -both quantitative and qualitative- and not only by this index.
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and landscaping, open-air warehousing, free space for trucks’ loading/unload­
ing manoeuvres, etc.). On the other hand, this spare of valuable land can be 
seen as the result of the unplanned way the area developed. Every industrial­
ist wishing to locate or relocate into the area, could buy a tract of land not 
according to a comprehensive lay-out plan with predetermined plot sizes (as it 
is the case in organized industrial parks), but according to his/her own estima­
tion of how much space would be needed for the specific activity, and to 
his/her ability to afford the requested land price. With reference to the avail­
able industrial floorspace per worker, it varies considerably among the dif-
Table 5.6 Various production indices in the Metamorphosis industrial area 
___________ by branch._________________________  ______________
Branch Capital
intensity
(HP/worker)
Land intensity 
(Plot size/ 
IH P)
Industrial 
floorspace per 
worker
Consumer goods 7.1 26.9 78.7
20.Foods 9.8 193 50.1
21.Diinks 53 29.2 58.7
23.Textiles 83 30.9 1318
24.Cloths/f ootwear 8.1 20.1 95.7
25. Wood 63 44.4 74.6
26.Fumiture 53 413 86.8
27.Paper 73 7L8 1119
28.Typing/Printing 43 67.4 87.6
29.Leather 13 77.9 7L7
39.0ther 23 73.0 82.8
Intermediate goods 73 19.4 6L5
30.Rubber/Plastic 9.6 19.3 59.8
3LChemicals 4.4 25.6 64.0
33.Non metallic minerals 28.1 112 46.8
Capital goods 73 30.0 65.4
34.Basic metals 13.6 7.8 51.2
35.Metal products 113 34.8 85.5
36.Non electric machinery 83 33.0 63.6
37.Electrical equipment 33 34.3 59.4
38.Transport equipment 19.4 36.1 80.0
Total 73 25.0 714
SOURCE: Own calculations from table 5.5.
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ferent manufacturing branches. Lower working densities (more floorspace per 
worker) are manifested in the consumer branch group, and more specifically 
in textiles and paper industries. This, also, cannot be regarded as an indicator 
of "comfortable" working conditions in those industries, but rather, as the re­
sult of the unplanned way the area developed.
The previous analysis makes evident that the production "profile" of 
the survey area is characterized by a marked degree of heterogeneity. Figure 
5.9, shows schematically the ordering of branches according to the previous 
criteria -e.g. their share in the total number of plants, total employment, total 
installed HP, total plot area, total industrial floorspace, and their ordering in 
terms of capital intensity, land intensity and floorspace/worker. As it can be 
remarked, there is a variety of combinations between those orderings: Eg. 
branches having high participation in number of plants, employment, HP, plot 
area and industrial floorspace (for instance cloths/footwear and chemicals), 
have average to low capital intensity and land intensity. By contrast, branches 
sharing low percentages in number of plants, employment, HP, plot area and 
industrial floorspace (e.g. transport equipment), present high capital intensity, 
etc., etc.
With regard to the size of manufacturing establishments, SMEs pre­
dominate in terms of number of plants, installed HP, plot size and industrial 
floorspace (table 5.7). It is only in terms of employment that large companies 
predominate (table 5.8) and this is to a certain extend natural: Among the 
area’s firms there are some manufacturing "giants" for the Greek standards, as 
for instance PAGE milk products with 330 employees, METAXAS alcoholic 
drinks with 470, LEVENTAKIS clothing company with 220, ALMA shoes 
company with 220, and ELCO-VAGIONIS Electrical equipment company 
with 240 just to name the most important of them (see table C4 -appendix I). 
There are also multinational companies, e.g. COCA-COLA, SANDOZ pharma­
ceutical industry and BENCKISER detergents production company just to 
name the most known.
221
Figure 5.9 A schematic ordering o f branches in the Metamorphosis indus­
trial area according to their participation in various production 
magnitudes.
NO OF 
PLANTS
EMPLOY- INSTALLED PLOT
w e n t  W* AREA
INDUST.
FLOOR­
SPACE
CAPITAL LA W
INTENSITY INTENSITY
20. foods
21. drinks
23. textiles
24. cloths/footwear
25. wood
26. furniture
27. paper
28. typing/printing
29. leather
31. chemicals
33. non metallic minerals
34. basic metals
35. metal products
36. non electric machinery
37. electrical equipment
38. transport equipment
39. miscellaneous industries
FLOOR­
SPACE/
WORKER
21.33 20
0 37
27,28
29,38
SOURCE: Based on tables 5.5 and 5.6.
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Table 5.7 Various production characteristics o f the Metamorphosis indu- 
striai area by plants* size.
Size No of 
plants
% Installed
HP
% Plot 
size 
(sq.m.)
% Indust
floor­
space
(sq.nL)
%
SMEs (1-49 
employees)
171 91.0 19,360 50.6 604,001 63.1 220,902 59.1
Large (4-50 
employees)
17 9.0 18,868 49.4 352,643 36.9 152,951 40.9
Total 188 100.0 38,228 100.0 956,644 100.0 373,853 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
Table 5.8 Employment in the Metamorphosis industrial area by plants size
Size Employment %
SMEs (1-49 employees) 2,171 415
Large companies (4-50 employees) 3,062 58.5
Total 5,233 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
It is important to underline that there is a marked concentration of employ­
ment in the area: Only 12 out of the 188 firms (6.4%) account for 48.4% of the 
total manufacturing employment in the area (calculated from table C.4 -ap­
pendix I).
In terms of number of establishments, SMEs predominate in all three 
branch groups (fig. 5.10), with consumer group having the biggest share and 
large companies sharing much lower numbers. However, just like employment, 
installed horsepower is concentrated in a few large plants (table 5.9). Only 13 
plants (6.9% of the total) concentrate the majority of the total HP in the area.
Industrial plot sizes, in general, vary from 500 sq.m. to 55,000 sq.m. (see 
table C.9 -appendix I). The majority of the areas plants have been built on 
plots of an average size (1,000 -5,000 sq.m.) (fig. 5.11). As to the size of the in­
dustrial floorspace, it varies accordingly from 60 sq.m. (in one level) to 35,000 
sq.m. (in four levels) (table C.9 -appendix I). The majority of plants have
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floorspaces not exceeding 1,000 sq.m. whereas only a few  exceed 5,000 sq.m  
(fig. 5.12).
Figure 5.10 Plants size by branch-group in the Metamorphosis industrial 
area
No of plants
8 0
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
SMEs LARGE COMPANIES
g  CONSUMER GOODS 
g  INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
^  CAPITAL GOODS
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires
Table 5.9 Plants* installed HP in the Metamorphosis industrial area
N um ber % HP %
Plants w ith <500 HP 175 93.1 18,565 48.6
Plants w ith 500-1,000 HP 7 3.7 5,311 13.9
Plants w ith +1,000 HP 6 3.2 14,352 37.5
Total 188 100.0 38,228 100.0
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
Figure 5.11. Share o f plants in the Metamorphosis area by plots* size.
1,001-5,000 sq.m. 
62.8% (118 plants) 5,001-10,000 sq.m. 
11.7% (22 plants)
+10,000 sq.m. 
13.8% (26 plants)
500-1,000 sq.m. 
11.7% (22 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
224
Figure 5.12 Share o f plants in the Metamorphosis industrial area by size o f 
industrial floorspace.
1,001-5,000 sq.m. 
30.9% (58 plants)
Up to 500 sq.m. 
29.2% (55 plants)
+5,000 sq.m. 
9% (17 plants)
501-1,000 sq.m. 
30.9% (58 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
The rapid and unplanned way the area developed, has led to an increas­
ing land demand for plants’ expansion purposes. Thus, a notable part of them 
need to expand (fig. 5.13) but are restricted in doing so due to prohibitions 
imposed by the existing legislation (see chap. 6).
Figure 5.13 Plants* expansion needs in Metamorphosis industrial area
PLANTS THAT DO 
NOT NEED EXPAN­
SION
62.8% (118 plants)
PLANTS NEEDING 
EXPANSION 
37.2% (70 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
As the survey revealed, the great majority of the area’s production 
units are independent single-plant companies whereas branch-plant units 
share a very small percentage (fig. 5.14). The intra-firm spatial division of la­
bour does not seem to have developed to any considerable extend; it is rather 
the traditional scheme (production-administration-stocking-distribution under
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a single-plant’s roof) that predom inates. Thus, very  sm all portions o f the  
area’s firm s have th e ir  adm inistrative headquarters, th e ir d istribu tion  acti­
vities and th e ir stocking facilities in o th e r A thenian  areas (fig. 5.15, 5.16 and 
5.17 respectively).
The division o f labour by sex in the  survey area, favours the  m ale 
w orkforce in both production and adm inistrative jobs (table 5.10). A fem ales’ 
share of 32.4% in the  survey area seems to  be a little  b e tte r  than  the  national 
share which in 1987 was 28.4% of the to ta l m anufactu ring  (both blue and 
w hite colar) w orkforce ( calculated from  NSSG, Statistical Yearbook o f 
Greece 1990-91 A thens 1994: table 111.10).^
Figure 5.14 Single-plant and branch-plant firms in the Metamorphosis 
industrial area
SINGLE-PLANT FIRMS 
94.1% (177 plants)
BRANCH-PLANT FIRMS 
5,9% (11 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
* This is o f f ic ia l data responding to typ ica l -o r  fo rm a l-  w o rk . In fo rm a l w o rk  practices  
(e.g. seasonal and p a rt-tim e  w ork, w o rk -a t-h o m e, etc.) in w h ich  fem a le  labour is usuaL are  
not included in this data, and therefore the actual share o f  fe m a le  labour must be m uch  
higher than the one presented in the o ff ic ia l statistics.
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Figure 5.15 Spatial segregation of firms* administrative activities
FIRMS WITH ADMINISTRATION 
HEADQUARTERS IN THE
PLANT
88.3% (166 plants)
FIRMS WITH ADMINISTRATION 
HEADQUARTERS IN OTHER 
AREAS
11.7% (22 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
Figure 5.16 Spatial segregation o f firms*product distribution facilities
FIRMS WITH DISTRIBUTION 
FACILITIES IN THE PLANT
91.5% (172 plants)
FIRMS WITH DISTRIBUTION 
FACILITIES IN OTHER AREAS 
8.5% (16 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
Figure 5.17 Spatial distribution o f firms* stocking facilities
FIRMS WITH STOCKING FACI­
LITIES IN THE PLANT 
94.7% (178 plants)-
FIRMS WITH STOCKING 
FACILITIES IN OTHER AREAS 
5.3% (10 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from  questionnaires.
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Table 5.10 Division o f labour by sex and position in the Metamorphosis 
industrial area
Position Male % Female % Totals
Production workers 2,595 67.5 1,248 32.5 3,843
Adninistration staff 940 67.6 450 314 1,390
Total 3,535 67.6 1,698 32.4 5,233
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
Only a small percentage of the area’s workforce resides to the adjacent 
municipalities -in a radius up to 5 Km (table 5.11). The great majority of 
working people live in relatively distant areas (5-20 Km) and a small percen­
tage in very distant ones (over 20 Km).
Table 5.11 Spatial segregation between work and residence.
Work-residence distances Number of workers Percent
Distance up to 1 Km 152 2.8
Distance 1-5 Km 802 14.9
Distance 5.1-10 Km 1,995 37.0
Distance 10.1-20 Km 1,762 317
Distance 20.1-30 Km 643 119
Distance over 30 Kul 40 0.7
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
Thus, the area’s contribution to the local labour market in terms of 
jobs offered, does not seem to be so important Since most plants have relo­
cated into the area, their managers have preferred to keep on employing the 
previous workforce rather (even by affording the cost of transporting them 
to and from work), than to undertake the extra costs and risks recruitment of 
new staff in the new location usually implies (e.g. costs of new staff training, 
costs stemming from production delays during new workforce "adaptation", 
risks stemming from likely lower working discipline of new staff, etc.).* Thus, 
the majority of the area’s working people are transported to and from work 
by means (usually buses) owned or hired by the companies (fig. 5.18). A con­
siderable portion of them use private transport means and only a small per­
centage use public transport
Information provided in interviews with area's industrialists.
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Figure 5.18 Labourers* mean of transport to and from work.
FIRMS' TRANSPORT 
MEANS
52.2% of workers
PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
2.1% of workers
PRIVATE MEANS 
45.7% of workers
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
The survey area has not developed important linkages with the local 
economy. Apart from its low contribution to the local labour market in terms 
of jobs -as we saw previously- market and supplies linkages are also very 
loose. Thus, only a small portion of the area’s plants distribute their products 
to the local market (fig. 5.19), while even less make use of local raw materials 
and supplies (fig. 5.20).
Figure 5.19 Plants* market areas
Plants sharing parts 
of the local market 
41.7% (22 plants)
Plants with wider 
market areas 
88.3% (166 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
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Figure 5.20 Sources o f raw materials and supplies
Wider areas (Greater 
Athens, other areas 
of Greece, abroad)
94.1% (177 plants)--*
Local area 
5.9% (11 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
The majority of the area’s manufacturing establishments are accommo­
dated in single-storey plants, whereas muli-storey ones represent a consider­
able part (fig. 5.21). The conditions of the individual factory-buildings are -in 
general lines- good (fig. 5.22). However, the area’s infrastructure is in bad
Figure 5.21 Single and multistorey plants in the Metamorphosis area
Single-storey plants 
51.6% (97 plants)
Multi-storey plants 
•48.4% (91 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
condition as a result of the unplanned way the area developed since the 1960s. 
Most of the area’s plants reported serious problems with the water and sewer­
age system, the transport and communications network and the electrical 
power supply (table 5.12).
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Figure 5.22 Plantas building conditions
Good condition 
72.3% (136 plants)
Bad condition 
4.3%  (8 plants)
Average condition 
.23.4% (44 plants)
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
Table 5.12 Infrastructure problems in the Metamorphosis industrial area
Number of plants % of total
Plants facing problems with the water and 
sewerage system
132 70.2
Plants facing problems with the transport 
network
87 46.3
Plants facing problems with telecommu­
nications
66 35.1
Plants facing problems with the electric 
power supply network
54 28.7
SOURCE: Own calculations from questionnaires.
5.4. Conclusion
Although generalizations cannot be drawn from only a single case, the sur­
veyed industrial locality does provide a characteristic example of how the
growth of suburban industry in Athens during the crisis period took place and 
which its basic features and related problems were.
The survey revealed that there are very little similarities between sub­
urbanization of production in the advanced western cities and what actually 
took place in Athens during the last years. As literature reveals (see chap. 2), 
the suburbanization of manufacturing in the advanced cities was associated
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with the historical passing of industrial capitalism from labour-intensive acti­
vities -for which city-centres presented marked comparative advantages in 
the past- to capital and technology-intensive ones (fordist mass-production 
processes) for which suburbs were much more suited. During this passing, the 
declining role of local linkages at inner-city sites and the internalization of 
external economies of scale by the growing firms, the widening of firms’ 
market areas beyond the single-city market, the assembly-line that called for 
abundant industrial land in order to be accommodated, the expansion of trans­
port, energy and telecommunications infrastructure to the suburbs, the nega­
tive externalities and planning controls at inner-city locations, etc, have been 
decisive forces pushing industry to migrate to the suburbs. In our case, how­
ever, it was revealed that fordist large-scale processes are rather rare. Instead, 
what predominate, are small-scale traditionally oriented production processes 
leaded by SMEs which accounted the most (with the exception of employ­
ment) to the area’s production magnitutes. Traditional labour-intensive con­
sumer branches also predominate in the production profile of the surveyed 
locality and the old-fashioned intra-firm  organization of production predomi­
nates by any respect The presence of a few modern large companies in the 
area does not change its overal production morphology. The industrial land is 
not used intensively for production purposes (spare of valuable suburban 
land), and this has led to emergence of plants’ expansion needs. The great ma­
jority of the area’s units are single-plant independent companies whose link­
ages with the local economy -in terms of jobs, market area and supplies- are 
quite unimportant Male workforce predominates in both blue and white col­
lar jobs. Most of the factory-buildings are in a good condition, but the situ­
ation of infrastructure poses serious problems to the orderly operation of 
plants.
By contrast to what happened to the advanced cities in which the sub­
urbanization of industry was initiated by combined firms’ "economic ra­
tionality" concerns and public planning policies, the development of the 
survey area took place in a spontaneous \yay. The lack of planning concerns 
(apart from the official characterization of the area as an "industrial zone") 
and the associated bad infrastructure conditions, have kept land prices at
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comparatively low levels, presenting, therefore, favourable conditions for the 
attraction of manufacturing units (both first-time locations and relocations). 
The favourable geographical location of the area in relation with the adminis­
trative and business centre of Athens, reinforced these processes. Environ­
mental pressures at previous inner-city sites have pushed a good number of 
companies to relocate into the area, hoping that this would release them from 
the economic and social costs of pollution.
Similar problems can be identified -even by a simple observation- at 
many other suburban industrial localities around the Athenian agglomeration, 
and it is a matter of further research to explore in detail their particular 
characteristics and development dynamic. What is most important, however, is 
that such problems of unplanned industrial growth in Athens were recognized 
by the governmental machinery during the 1980s, and policy proposals aiming 
at a planned re-organization of industry were set forth as we will see in the 
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE LOCATION 
OF INDUSTRY IN ATHENS DURING THE 1980s, 
AND COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES
6.1. Introduction
Although legislation concerned with the location of industry at the national 
geographical scale (incentive-assisted areas and regional industrial estates) 
emerged much earlier (see chap. 3, sect 3.2.3), it was only in the late 1970s- 
early 1980s that the location of industry within the region of Greater Athens 
-Attica- attracted public policy concern. This chapter’s aim is to examine the 
basic policy guidelines and the concrete legislative measures which were is­
sued (especially during the 1980s) for the purpose of contributing to the 
planned development and location of manufacturing industry in Greater 
Athens. The experience of some European cities which responded successfully 
to economic recession and deindustrialization during the 1980s will then be 
examined so that comparative conclusions to be drawn.
6.2. Prior Attempts
The first basic guidelines and measures were set forth in a number of Minis­
tries’ decisions and circulars issued in the 1970s. Those measures were the 
following:
A 1971 decision of the Ministry of National Economy (No. 85319/Y570/ 
17/29-12-1971) {Official Gazette, 1038B/29-12-1971) restricted the expan­
sion of the installed horsepower of manufacturing plants located in
  « I I I » . -   LI !..<■>.    "1 'k'L I A ,  - I.- .. AJ A
Attica above the limit of 1,000 HP. Plants exceeding this limit were not 
allowed to expand further -except if relocated elsewhere.
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A decision of the Ministry of Industry (No. 5070/275/75)^estricted the 
provision of ex permits inxase4he expansion was judged as dis­
proportionately large in comparison with the existing plant’s mechan­
ical equipment or productivity. Moreover, the same decision restricted 
the provision of permits for the establishment of new industries in 
Attica, with the exception of those that would be regarded as absolute­
ly necessary for serving the locality’s needs and their installed horse­
power would not exceed the limit of 30 HP.
Circular 16986/1542/17-3-1978 prohibited the expansion of highly pol­
luting plants in Attica’s residential areas.
Circular 16762/970/16-3-1^79 issued one year later, prohibited the es­
tablishment, expansion, or relocation of manufacturing plants into    —* - • '  ...
inner city^areas.
Circular 28800/15-5-1979 issued two months later, prohibited every new 
manufacturing activity in Attica, with the exception of those serving 
the basic needs of the population.
It has to be mentioned, however, that although all those measures were 
aiming at restricting industrial activity in Greater Athens, they left a lot of 
unclarified and ambiguous questions, as, for instance, which manufacturing 
branches and products could be regarded as serving the basic needs of the city 
population and which could not As a result, the implementation of those 
measures was selectively depending on the subjective judgements of the Min­
istries’ bureaucracies and on patron/client type practices. Moreover, the re­
strictions imposed by those measures were countered by other statutes (e.g. 
incentives Law 849/1978) which encouraged industrial investments in Attica 
(loans and tax concessions) under the "coverage" of technological moderniz­
ation and environmental protection initiatives (Hadjisocratis 1983:16).
By 1979 a more restrictive legislative framework started to emerge. A 
decision of the ESCHP (National Council of Regional Planning and
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Environment) (No.HP/ GHP/2094/ 6-9-1979) prohibited the establishment of 
new industries in Attica. As in the previous measures, there were only a few 
exceptions of branches serving the basic needs of the population. Moreover, 
this decision imposed severe restrictions upon employment increase of the ex­
isting industries. The decision was followed up by a presidential decree (PD 
707D/13-12-1979) in which, for the first time, specific zones for the location 
of industries and non-industrial zones were concretely mapped and defined on 
Attica’s ground. However, those restrictions were also countered by the incen­
tives Law 1116/1981 which, just as the previous one, continued to offer grants 
and tax concessions to industrial investments in Attica aiming at technological 
modernization, energy saving and environmental protection. Needless to say 
that this measure could be in the right direction if the provided grants and 
loans were used for the above purposes. But in most cases they were no t In­
stead, they were just used as a "mask" for simple plant expansions.*
6.3. Policy Priorities and Legislation of the 1980s
6.3.1. The Presidential Decree 791/1981and Other Related Measures
The preceding restrictive measures were followed up and concretised by PD 
791/1981 {Official Gazette, 207A/3-9-1981). In that PD, for first time the 
manufacturing branches which could be established in Attica were concretely 
defined and associated with specific sub-areas (drafted on maps) that could 
-or could not- "accept" them. Those sub-areas were classified according to the 
prevailing land-use as follows:
(K) Residential areas
-(KA) Areas of unmixed residence 
-(KG) Areas of general (mixed) residence 
(E) Industrial areas
-(EM) Areas of non-polluting industrial activities
' As Hadjisocratis (1983: 16) mentions, environmental studies which could justify the 
purposes of those investments were not requested by the official bodies in order to provide 
permits to the applying industrialists. According to an official of the Ministry of Industry, 
when industrialists talk about "modernization", they simply mean increase of their plants’ 
floorspace and horsepower (personal notes from an ^3-1994 meeting).
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(P )
( I)
(M)
“(EO) Areas of polluting industrial activities 
Urban centres 
Areas of special use
-(lA) Recreation, tourist and summer-time residential areas 
-(I) Other areas of special use (not defined)
Mixed-use areas 
-(MX) Villages
-(MD) Other areas of mixed use (not defined)
In KA and lA type areas (unmixed residence - recreation, tourist and 
summertime residential areas), new manufacturing activities were not allowed 
to open. In other areas, especially industrial ones (EM, EO) new manufactur­
ing plants could open, but under severe restrictions as to the maximum 
number of workers they could employ. The branches which were allowed to 
develop were restricted to those servings bask 
(including 110 product-groups only) as shown in table 6.L
Table 6.1 New manufacturing activities allowed to develop in A ttica 
according to PD 791/1981
L Slaughter and skinning of 
cattle.*
38. Saddle-making from 
wood
75. Other metallic frames
2. Processing and preserva­
tion of meet (except poultry)
39. Other wood products 76. Cutting and assembling of 
window screens
3. Preservation of poultry 40. Wooden furniture 77. Tinsmith’s products
4. Preserved milk, butter and 
yoghurt
4L Wickerwork furniture 78. Bronze products
5. Ice-creams 42. Upholsters 79. Metallization of small 
objects
6. Sweets (jams, stewed fruit) 43. Plastic-wire products 80. Other metallic goods
7. Preserved vegetables 44. Paperbags 8L Repair of internal combu­
stion engines
8. Olives 45. Cartons and cardboard 
products
82 Production of business 
machines
9. Bakeries 46. Other carton and card­
board products
83. Repair of business 
machines
10. Pastry-making 47. Printing and publishing of 
newspapers and periodicals
84. Other machine and repair 
works
IL Candies 48. Printing and publishing of 
books and leaflets
85. Illuminated signs
12 Turkish delights 49. Special printing works 86. Electric switchboards
13. Dried fruit 50. Other printing works 87. Electric scientific and te­
chnical instruments
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14. Processing of honey 51. Construction of typogra­
phic plates
88. Repair of electric equip­
ment
15. Sheet-cnist of sweets 52. Bookbinding 89. Car repair
16. Burning and grinding of 
coffee
53. Sheaths and cases from 
leather or other substitutes
90. Bikes and bicycles repair
17. Ice production 54. Items for horseriding 9L Surgeons’ tools and ortho- 
paedical instruments
18. Other food industries^ 55. Partial tyre-recondition­
ing
92. Precise measurement and 
control instruments
19. Wines-distilleries 56. Vulkanizers 93. Lens, eyeglasses and fra­
mes
20. Socks for shoes 57. Packing goods from pla­
stic
94. Photographic and optical 
instruments
2L Repair of shoes 58. Plastic toys 95. Repair of eyeglasses
22 Sewing of men’s cloths 59. Bottling of atmospheric 
air
96. Repair of photographic 
and optical instruments
23. Sewing of women’s and 
children’s cloths
60. Cosmetics and other rela­
ted goods
97. Jewellery
24. Sewing of waterproof, 
plastic and leather cloths
6L Ink 98. Jewellery made from 
cheap materials
25. Sewing of special cloths 62 Wax 99. Clockmaking and parts
26. Sewing of underwear 63. Processing of glass objects 100. Clock repair
27. Orthopaedic belts and 
bandages
64. Glass mirrors lOL Musical instruments
28. Hat-making 65, Pottery 102 Toys
29. Dressing accessories 66. Porcelain decorative obje­
cts
103. Dummies for fashion- 
and tailor’s shops
30. Mattress-making 67. Lime-pulp production 104. Artificial teeth
3L Quilt-making 68. Production of concrete 105. Buttons
32 Sewing of homework 
cloths
69. Marble cutting and pro­
cessing
106. Artificial flowers, plants 
etc.
33. Cloth embroideries 70. Products made from ma­
rble-cutting wastes
107. Stamps, signs, inscripti­
ons, etc.
34. Other cloth products 71. Plaster goods 108. Umbrellas and walking- 
sticks
35. Window frames 72 Odds and ends made from 
non-metallic minerals
109. Other odds and ends (not 
referred elsewhere)
36. Products made from reed 
(and from other similar ma­
terials).
73. Locks-keys 110. Decoration of small obje­
cts as vases, ashtrays, etc.
37. Products made from cu­
rved wood
74. Iron frames and related 
building equipment
 ^ Allowed only for enterprises owned by local authorities and after examination of the real needs.
 ^ With some exceptions.
SOURCE: PD 791/1981 (OZ/ïcia/Gazette 207A/3-8-1981).
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Expansions of existing plants were prohibited with the exception of 
those undertaken for modernization purposes but without changing their ex­
isting activities. Such modernization initiatives could entail:
increase of the total plant's horsepower;
increase of the machinery items installed in the plant;
increase of the volume of production, and
erection of new buildings, under the precondition that the new number 
of employed would not exceed the maximum of plant’s employment 
during the last five years (1/1/1976 - 31/12/1980) plus 20% of it, and that 
the activity would not cause additional environmental pollution.
If modernization initiatives entailed increase of plant’s horsepower, 
this increase would not exceed the plant’s legally approved HP by 20%, and 
the threshold of 400 HP or 300 kW.
Relocation of existing plants into the above areas could take place just 
like the newly establishing ones. If this option could not be adopted, existing 
plants could relocate under the following preconditions:
Relocation could take place only in industrial zones (EM, EO type 
areas).
The maximum number of employed in the relocated plant could not 
exceed the maximum employment in the former position during the 
last 5 years plus 20% of i t
Relocation should not entail additional environmental pollution.
Plants serving the basic needs of population (see previous table) and 
forced to relocate due to demolition of their buildings, expulsions, and 
other emergency reasons, could relocate within a radius of 500 metres 
from the initial site under certain employment restrictions.
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Merger plants were allowed to locate or relocate whole or part of their 
installations from one plant to the other, or to keep part of installations and 
production in the former sites, under certain restrictions as to the total 
amount of workforce employed in them.
Other related measures were the following:
(a). The PD 1180 {Official Gazette, 293A/6-10-1981), set forth the legis­
lative framework for environmental protection from industrial activity in the 
whole country (including of course its most polluted urban area. Greater 
Athens). It was the first time that industries should have to abide by strict 
environmental restrictions associated mainly with upper limits to the emission 
level of industrial pollutants. However, as it was asserted (Hadjisocratis 1983: 
19), this legislative framework was insufficient and ineffective since these li­
mits were arbitrarily set, and the official body which would be given re­
sponsibility to evaluate the environmental protection studies carried out by 
the manufacturing firms was not clearly defined.
(b). The incentives Law 1262/1982 encouraged manufacturing invest­
ments in Greater Athens undertaken by local authorities and/or by other so­
cial organizations and co-operatives. Generous grants -reaching 45% of the 
total investment for special activities and 35% for manufacturing ones- were 
provided Local authorities and co-operatives would be able to apply for 
grants (up to 35% of the total investment) for creating handicraft centres and 
multi-storey artisanal buildings in the industrial zones of Attica.
(c). A 1982 Act {Official Gazette, 73A/13-6-1982) -issued across the lines 
of PD 1180- imposed a bundle of further restrictions upon industrial activity 
in Athens for the purpose of more efficient environmental protection. By 
means of that Act, governmental bodies (Ministries of Environment and In­
dustry) were jointly given the powers to:
Force industries to decrease production volumes and fuel consumption
for certain time periods of increased environmental pollution.
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Impose temporal prohibition of operation upon certain polluting 
industries.
Impose fines upon polluting industries (ranging between 800,000 and 
10,000,000 Drs according to the degree of pollution).
Take away the plants’ operation permits in cases of serious environ­
mental pollution and negation of the firms to abide by environmental 
protection criteria.
Create special Ministry detachments (KEPPE) for checking out the 
quality of environment and for imposing fines upon polluting units.
(d). A Ministry Decision (No. C.12791/870/12-4-1982) issued on April 
1982 prohibited the provision of building permissions for the erection of 
manufacturing plants in Attica’s areas of heavy industrial concentration.
It is obvious that all above statutes were based upon an implicit "nega­
tive" philosophy for the development and location of manufacturing activity 
in Greater Athens. They remained piecemeal in character and they imposed a 
number of restrictions without on the other hand offering positive alterna­
tives to the developmental and locational problems of Athenian industry on a 
comprehensive basis. These inadequacies would be supposedly overwhelmed 
by comprehensive strategic priorities and initiatives set forth by the 5-year 
(1983-87) Development Plan and the Structure Plan of Athens, which will be 
examined in the following subsections.
6.3.2. Strategic Directions of the 5-Year Development Plan, 1983-1987
The basic aim of the Socialists’ administration when they came to office in 
1981, was the setting of a different policy framework for the country’s econ­
omic, social and territorial development "Democratic Planning" was intended 
to be the cornerstone of that framework (MNE 1985: 26) and the basic
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"vehicle" leading to economic, social and cultural change across the lines of 
national independence, social justice, popular participation in decision-making, 
social dialogue and broad social consensus. The basic economic policy prio­
rities of the 5-year Plan (MNE 1985: 216) were declared to be:
The undertaking of co-ordinated actions and economic development 
initiatives by the public sector.
The creation of a network of motive production units and infrastruc­
ture works which could play an important role in sustaining new dy­
namic economic activities.
The balanced co-ordination between big industrial enterprises and 
SMEs.
The activation of the public sector as a major agent of socio-economic 
and territorial development.
The support of new socialized (as opposed to nationalized) investment 
agencies as for instance municipal enterprises, co-operatives, etc.
The continuous monitoring of the changing national and international 
economic environment for the purpose of marking out new investment 
opportunities in the context of integrated complexes of activities.
With regard to the manufacturing sector, the Plan’s strategic goals 
were set as follows (MNE 1985: 274):
Upgrading of the country’s manufacturing base for the purpose of 
countering deindustrialization tendencies.
Reinforcement of restructuring initiatives by encouraging new 
technology-based investments, especially in agro-industrial activities
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organized on a co-operative and vertically integrated basis, in biotech­
nology, in micro-electronics/informatics, etc.
Encouragement of manufacturing initiatives undertaken by the public 
sector and by other socialized organizations like municipal enterprises, 
co-operatives, etc.
More balanced territorial arrangement of manufacturing activity. 
Encouragement of manufacturing SMEs.
These policy goals would be achieved by means of the following 
measures and actions:
Creation of a special agency (OAE) for helping problematical enter­
prises (whose accumulated debts to the banks could not be paid back) 
to regain economic viability by introducing new production technol­
ogies, better management and marketing schemes, etc. This agency 
would not be strictly controlled by the state. In its board of directors, 
representatives of workers, employers, local authorities, scientific and 
other social organizations would participate.
Establishment of collaborative links between the public sector and the 
private companies by means of the so called ''planning agreements". 
These agreements would entail mutual engagements, and would include 
possibilities of programming the scale and methods of production, the 
volume of exports, the transfer of appropriate technologies in produc­
tion, as well as preference of those firms in government purchases. 
Priorities would be given in pharmaceuticals and in exporting products 
with increased demand in the international markets.
Creation of a special department in the Ministry of National Economy 
(Law 1360/83) which would be given full responsibility for restructur­
ing and upgrading the whole system of government purchases.
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Creation of a number of special agencies assisting exporting industries 
in tasks like product standardization, secure against export risks, finan­
cial support of exports, provision of expert advice to the exporting 
firms, provision of special incentives to SMEs for the purpose of in­
creasing their participation in the volume of exports, co-ordination be­
tween various public export organizations, etc.
Priorities in attracting foreign investments were revised towards en­
couragement of partnership (Greek-foreigh) initiatives under certain 
criteria like (a) the improvement of the sub-sector’s composition, (b) 
the percentage of value-added in the country (c) the contribution of 
investments to the improvement of the balance of payments, (d) the 
kind of imported technology and the way of its utilization, and (e) the 
employment of Greek workforce and especially skilled (technical- 
engineering and scientific).
Revision of the industrial development legislation in the direction of 
less perplexed and contradictory regulations, decentralization of public 
services linked with the manufacturing sector, increased concerns 
about protection of natural and work environments, special care about 
better quality control, standardization and packing of manufactured 
products, etc. Moreover, measures for the training of chief executives 
of private companies in advanced manufacturing management tech­
niques were provided, at both continuing and post-graduate educational 
levels. The profession of business consultants would be promoted and 
expert advice would be provided free of charge to manufacturing 
SMEs.
Sectoral policies would be revised towards the following directions: (a) 
Reorientation of the incentive system for encouraging a broader spec­
trum of investment opportunities, the establishment of new relations 
between the public and private sectors based on the principle of demo­
cratic planning, the growth of new socialized investment agencies, the
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introduction of new technologies in production and the support of non 
traditional branches, the support of relocation initiatives into less de­
veloped areas, etc. (b) Special support would be provided to branches 
which were facing viability problems but which were considered as 
important in the country’s industrial structure -branches such as tex­
tiles, paper and pharmaceutical products. Special support would also be 
provided to branches having high potential for export, or for vertical 
integration, or important multiplier effects within the economic sys­
tem, or, finally to emerging high-tech branches (especially biotechno­
logy and micro-electronics/informatics). (c) The support of 
manufacturing SMEs could take the form of encouraging the birth of 
new ones, of providing technical and managerial assistance, of encour­
aging the creation of co-operative and merger SMEs, of promoting and 
securing their subcontracting work, etc.
However, all that rich bundle of policy goals and measures was curi­
ously diminished as soon as the 5-year Plan document shifted analysis and 
proposals to the concrete geographical scale of Attica (MNE 1985: 419-23). In­
dicative of this is that deindustrialization and job loss in Greater Athens was 
not explicitly considered as a major probleuL Instead, the capital’s major 
problems were regarded to be (MNE 1985: 420):
The environmental deterioration and the downgraded quality of life
The inadequacy of social facilities and infrastructure
The growing speculative pressures on urban land; and
The multiple, contradictory and unclassified roles of the Athenian 
space economy within the country’s economic geography.
With regard to the manufacturing sector, it was stated that Attica’s 
comparative advantages are associated with high-tech branches such as elec­
tronics industry, telematics, bioenergy and biotechnology -that is, with
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branches needing specialized R+D personnel, advanced technical infrastruc­
ture and related support services (MNE 1985: 421). According to the Plan’s 
priorities, the development of production activities in Attica would be en­
couraged only if those activities were of a national or international signifi­
cance, and only under the precondition that their development in Attica 
would not contradict regional industrial development priorities. Other manu­
facturing activities that could develop in Attica were those serving basic con­
sumption needs -especially for food (agro-industrial complexes), shelter and 
energy (MNE 1985: 423). It was also stated that the legislation of the Structure 
Plan of Athens would secure the reorganization of the Athenian industrial 
activities by proposing the creation of industrial and handicraft parks (VIPA- 
VIOPA) (MNE 1985: 422).
6.3.3. The YCHOP "Special Study" and the Structure Pian of Athens 
(Law 1515/85)
In the context of the preparation of the Structure Plan of Athens by the Min­
istry of Environment, a special study of manufacturing industry in Athens 
was carried out in the early 1980s (Hadjisocratis 1983). According to this study, 
the way post-war Greek economic and industrial development took place (i.e. 
primacy of private choices over decentralization and regional development 
policies) led to the excessive concentration of manufacturing activity in 
Athens. Other factors reinforcing this geographical clustering in the study’s 
view were (ibid.: 1-2):
The internal structure of manufacturing: In spite of the relative growth 
of intermediate and capital branches, Greek industry continues to be 
oriented to the production of consumer goods (proximity to the major 
urban markets).
Proximity to labour and to specialized managerial staff, proximity to 
urban services and markets, and accessibility to the main transport 
network.
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The centralization of governmental and financial services.
The nodal geographical position of Athens.
The lack of political will for the implementation of regional industrial 
development policies.
The study further asserted that the major locational trend was a grad­
ual shift of Athenian manufacturing from its traditional inner-city areas to 
the metropolitan periphery, and especially to sites along the major transport 
arteries. The unplanned way of the post-war Athenian industrialization, led to 
major urban problems such as (ibid: 10-3):
Excessive waste of valuable urban land in areas needing it to serve 
other basic social priorities.
Expansion of industrial activities into residential, recreation, tourist etc. 
areas in Attica. This expansion led to serious land-use conflicts which 
usually resulted (a) in the gradual disappearance of agricultural land 
(transformation into industrial plots of a higher market value), and (b) 
in generating problems to the development of other non-industrial 
activities.
The uneven distribution of manufacturing across the Athenian agglom­
eration, created serious traffic and other infrastructural problems in 
specific areas of heavy industrial concentration.
The unplanned spatial mix of factories regardless of branch, size, de­
gree of pollution, needed infrastructure and services, etc., created dis- 
functionalities and negative externalities which hampered the 
development of industry itself and deprived specific areas from their 
comparative advantages for the development of particular branches.
Serious environmental problems (air, water and soil pollution).
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However, as the study asserted (ibid: 23-6% during the last years a 
moderate decentralization trend has been at work. This trend was fed by the 
following processes:
Intensification of decentralization policies and increased environmental 
concerns in Athens.
Growing emergence of negative externalities in Athens (rapid upswing 
of land prices, lack of available land for plants* expansions, traffic con­
gestion, etc.).
"Post-industriar changes in the structure of the metropolitan labour 
market; the gradual shift of young people’s preferences to tertiary 
forms of employment has caused marked shortages in industrial labour 
supply.
The continuous decrease of building activity in Athens has pushed 
linked industrial and handicraft firms to seek relocation elsewhere.
The relocation of big polluting industrial plants away from Athens, as 
well as the closure of many problematical enterprises, were expected to 
intensify labour redundancies.
Accession of Greece to EC was expected to reinforce industrial decen­
tralization iitiatives.
According to the special study, the way industrial development and 
location in Greater Athens was taking place during the post-war period, re­
flected directly or indirectly the combined interests of industrialists and the 
state, while environmental concerns and criteria of quality of citizens* lives 
played quite minor roles in the related decision-making. The growing envi­
ronmental sensitivities and mobilizations of the Athenian citizenry -in the 
study’s view- necessitated a drastic shift of optic, in which industrial location
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could no more be treated under criteria of technical, economic or export effi­
ciency, only, but under qualitative ones associated with environmental protec­
tion and improvement of life in the city as well (ibid: 27).
It was also estimated that the implementation of the 5-year Plan’s stra­
tegic goals would impose a number of positive direct or indirect effects upon 
the Athenian industrial system (ibid: 30-1):
At least 1/3 of the predicted new manufacturing jobs in the whole 
country was expected to emerge in Attica.
State assistance to the problematical firms (60-70% of which were lo­
cated in Attica) was expected to contribute to the maintenance of ex­
isting manufacturing jobs.
Sectoral and sub-sectoral policies were expected to contribute to the 
upgrading of the Athenian industrial system especially in traditional 
branches like textiles, foodstuff and non-metallic minerals.
The special encouragement of agro-industrial activities (food-drinks 
industry) and other consumer oriented branches, was expected to in­
crease the industrial potential of the metropolitan area.
Emphasis on high-tech developments would benefit Greater Athens 
which has marked comparative advantages in comparison with other 
urban areas of the country.
Special programs and measures for sustaining manufacturing SMBs 
would benefit Athens which concentrated a major part of thenL
In the above context, the special study proposed the following strategic 
goals for a new model of industrial development and location in Athens (ibid: 
32):
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Decentralization o f production activities from Athens 
-Large vertically integrated manufacturing units should not be allowed 
to open in Attica, as well as new exporting industries with international 
significance. The location of firms with national significance should 
also be restricted.
-New manufacturing activities that do not aim at serving the basic 
needs of the Athenian population should not be allowed to open.
Maintenance o f manufacturing employment and countering tertiariz- 
ation tendencies.
-Encouragement of merger initiatives, stabilization of production and 
productivity increases by means of technological and organizational 
improvements, growth of new high-tech branches, etc.
-Establishment of industries serving the basic needs of the city*s life, in 
selected labour-intensive activities, or in high-tech branches, or in 
agro-industrial ones.
Environmental upgrading and internal reorganization o f the city. 
-Decrease of industrial pollution by means of imposing systematic anti­
pollution controls upon manufacturing units and by constructing the 
appropriate infrastructure in existing industrial clusters (e.g. common 
liquid waste treatment systems).
-Gradual relocation of polluting manufacturing units away from 
Greater Athens.
The above objectives should be followed up by a bundle of measures 
and directions for action such as (ibid.: 33-5):
Discouragement of industrial investments not only in Attica but in the 
neighbouring prefectures of Korinthia, Viotia and Evia as well 
(blockage of linear industrial expansion of Greater Athens). For this 
purpose the incentives-Law 1262/1982 should be reformed so as to in­
clude in A-type (non assisted) areas some localities with increased
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industrial concentrations (e.g. Shematari, Oinofyta, Tanagra, Agios Tho­
mas, Lavrion, and the urban centres of Halkida and Korinthos).
Undertaking of special programs and actions for assisting and upgrad­
ing particular declining industries such as textiles, clothing/footwear, 
etc.
Encouragement of private investments aiming a t  (a) environmental 
protection, (b) replacement of traditional energy resources (e.g. petro­
leum) with environmentally friendly ones, and (c) vertical organization 
of agro-industrial activities based on new technologies.
Intensification of the European Social Fund inputs for the purpose of 
funding special labour power policies (e.g. vocational programs for pre­
paring women and young unemployed people to enter the labour 
market, programs aiming at re-skilling of traditional workers in new 
activities, etc.).
Clear definition of the legislative framework for the development and 
location of manufacturing in Attica, so as the potential investors to 
have a precise prior understanding of the pros and cons of their en­
deavour on the one hand, and the urban land to be allocated to its 
proper uses on the other (avoidance of expansion of industrial and pol­
luting activities into non-industrial areas).
Encouragement of relocation of existing industries, and even creation 
of new ones, in Attica’s areas for which population increase could be 
judged as desirable.
Definition of particular industrial zones within and around the Athe­
nian agglomeration which would be equipped with the proper infra­
structure and into which scattered manufacturing units of low to 
medium pollution level would be allowed to relocate in an organized 
and controlled manner. %
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Organization and clearance of existing industrial clusters for the pur­
pose of removing polluting industries from them, constructing the ap­
propriate infrastructure networks, upgrading their natural and built 
environments and allocating part of their land to public uses and green. 
Moreover, special technical-economic studies of polluting problemati­
cal industries should be carried out so as the possibilities of their re­
location to be clearly defined in cost-benefit terms.
Organization of industrial and handicraft parks (VIPA-VIOPA) as well 
as construction of multi-storey artisanal buildings in them.
Establishment of an effective administrative and legislative mechanism 
for controlling environmental pollution caused by industrial activity.
Reform of the existing PD 791/1981 by reference to: (a) the need to 
counter deindustrialization and unemployment tendencies in Athens,
(b) the need for more efficient industrial pollution controls, (c) the 
need for better quality controls of existing industrial buildings, (d) the 
need for more careful location of industrial zones in Attica, and (e) the 
need for drafting special building regulations for handicraft manufac­
turing units that should remain within the urban tissue.
In the above context, the following 4 different categories of organized 
industrial spaces were proposed to develop in Attica (see fig. 6.1): (a) Industrial 
Zones (ZOVI), (b) Industrial Parks (VIPA), (c) Handicraft Parks (VIOPA) and 
(d) new Industrial Estates (VIPE) managed by the Hellenic Bank of Industrial 
Development (ETVA) just like the regional industrial estates. Such spaces 
were proposed to develop in the following localities:
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Figure 6.1. Organized industrial spaces in Attica as proposed by the
YHOP "Special Study" (1983) in the context o f the preparation 
o f the Structure Plan o f Athens
EVIA
VIOTIA
ATTICA
SALAMIS
S A R O N I K O S  G U L F
#  INDUSTRIAL ZONES -ZOVI (a1 - a6)
O  INDUSTRIAL PARKS -VIRA (b1 - b12)
□  HANDICRAFT PARKS-VIOPA (c1-c8)
A  ETVA's INDUSTRIAL ESTATES -VIPE (d1 -d4) 
(For the names of localities see text)
SOURCE: Adapted from Hadjisocratis 1983: chart 2
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(a). Industrial Zones (ZOVI)
a.L Pahi Megaron (Neo Meli) 
a.2. West of Elefsina 
a.3. East of Elefsina
a.4. South-East of Aspropyrgos -oil refinery area 
a.5. Skaramangas ship-yard
a.6. Ship-building/repairing zone of Salamina
In ZOVI, heavy and polluting industrial units were already located; 
those plants, for various economic or technical reasons, were unable to relo­
cate elsewhere. Within ZOVI especially strict pollution control measures 
should be undertaken.
(b). Industrial Parks (VIPA)
b.L Eleonas
b.2. Ship-building/repairing zone of Perama 
b.3. Nea Ionia
b.4. Metamorphosis-Kifissia-Aharnes
b.5. Agios Stefanos-Kryoneri
b.6. South-East of Mandra
b.7. North-East of Aspropyrgos
b.8. Tzaverdella
b.9. Peania-Koropi
b.lO. Koropi-Vari
b.lL Markopoulo-Kalyvia
b.12. South of Lavrion.
In these areas low to medium pollution manufacturing plants were al­
ready located, but much of their space was still unbuilt Thick protective 
green belts and collectively used parcels of land would be left in them, the 
land allocated for development would be subdivided into industrial plots ac­
cording to a comprehensive lay-out plan, the proper infrastructure networks 
would be constructed, and supporting services would be provided to the locat­
ing and/or relocating firms. The organization and administration of VIPA
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would be appointed to a representative body in which the Hellenic Bank of 
Industrial Development (ETVA)" the areas* local authorities and the industria­
lists’ organizations would participate (Hadjisocratis 1983: 38).
(c). Handicraft Parks (VIOPA)
C.L Peristeri
C.2. Nea Chalkidona
C.3. Nea Philadelphia
C.4. Nea Ionia
C.5. Neo Irakleio
C.6. Soros Maroussiou
C.7. Patima Halandriou
C.8. Trahones
In VIOPA small non polluting manufacturing firms would be able to 
locate and/or relocate from scattered sites of the urban tissue. Multi-storey 
artisanal buildings would be also erected for offering common accommoda­
tion, infrastructure (central heating, water, electricity, telecommunication, 
etc.) and supporting services to the tenant firms.
(d). ETVA *s Industrial Estates (VIPE)
d.1. Imeros Topos Thriassiou Pediou (for the development of agro­
industrial activities as proposed by the 5-year Plan) 
d.2. North-East of Megara (for the above purpose) 
d.3. Avlona (for the above purpose).^
d.4. Shistos (for receiving relocations of scattered machine-works in 
the ship-building/repairing zone of Piraeus-Keratsini- Skarama- 
ngas).^
 ^ or alternatively the Greek Organization of SMEs (EOMMECH)
 ^ Later on, this place was proposed to "receive" tanneries relocating from inner city
areas like Eleonas. After lot of discussion between the Ministry of Environment, the area’s 
local authorities and industrialists, the proposal was rejected (information provided in per­
sonal contact with Mrs. Theano Yaliri, town-planner, official of the Ministry of 
Environment).
* Later on, this place was proposed to "receive" metal-melting works relocating from
inner city areas. The Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development (ETVA) entrusted the Devel­
opment League of Piraeus (ANDHP) with the task of carrying out a study for the organiz­
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The total area of all above industrial spaces in Attica was estimated to 
reach 3,557 Ha (35,570,000 sq.m.) whereas the area proposed by the previous 
PD 791/1981 was much larger (4,255 Ha) (Hadjisocratis 1983: 46). In other 
words, the Special Study of the Ministry of Environment proposed a 16.4% de­
crease of the total Athenian industrial space. The total number of employed 
in those areas was estimated to reach 182,305 by 2001.
Whereas the PD 791/1981 imposed employment restrictions on newly 
established, expanding and relocating industries in Attica (see 6.3.1), the 
YCHOP special study proposed limits to the maximum amount of plants’ in­
stalled horsepower. More precisely, existing plants up to 15 HP could be al­
lowed to increase it by 100% within a 5 years period, while plants with 15+ HP 
could increase it by 50%. (ibid.: 36). It is therefore evident, that while PD 
791/1981 discouraged labour intensive activities, the special study, contrarily, 
encouraged such activities for the purpose of countering job loss.
Many of the special study’s proposals were embedded in the text of the 
Structure Plan of Athens -SPA- (L.1515/1985) {Official Gazette, 18A/18-2-1985). 
The more general objectives of SPA were declared to be (article 3):
(a) The enhancement of the Greek capital’s historical physiognomy and 
the upgrading of its inner areas
(b) The improvement of the quality of life and the protection of 
environment
(c) The diminishing of social inequalities between the various intra-urban 
areas.
(d) The widening of the choices for residence, work and recreation.
ation of the area. The study concluded that not only metal-melting works but other related 
industries should be relocated in that area as well. However, the project was not implem­
ented because of local reactions (information provided in personal contact with Mrs. Theano 
Yaliri, town-planner, official of the Ministry of Environment).
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(e) The qualitative upgrading of neighbourhoods and the protection of
residential areas from polluting activities.
With regard to the location of economic activity, a basic objective for 
improving the environment and the quality of citizens’ lives was the spatial 
rearrangement of urban functions and activities, as well as the control of land 
uses by means of measures aiming at the removal of polluting industrial in­
stallations from residential areas and their relocation in industrial and handi­
craft parks (VIPA-VIOPA). Measures for constructing the necessary 
infrastructure and forming collectively used green spaces in them were also 
proposed. The parks’ geographical location according to the SPA, is presented 
in figure 6.2. As we can remark, this configuration is in general lines similar 
to that proposed by the Ministry’s special study (see previous figure 6.1). 
Another basic objective of the Structure Plan aiming at the economic revital­
ization of Greater Athens was the modernization of manufacturing and the 
support of SMEs under environmental protection criteria.
In the broader context of SPA’s objectives, joint Ministries’ decisions 
would determine: (a) the limits to the emission of industrial pollutants, (b) the 
manufacturing branches which cause pollution, and (c) their obligations in un­
dertaking protective measures (article 11). Such measures could include the in­
troduction of new (environmentally friendly) technologies in production, 
changes in the type of fuel and raw materials used, installation of special 
pollution measurement equipment, etc. Environmental impacts assessment 
studies should be carried out and approved officially if any production work 
or activity that might affect the environment were about to take place in 
Greater Athens. Moreover, special environmental quality control detachments 
of the Ministry of Environment (KEPPE) would check out whether industrial 
firms abide by the above regulations or not, and would impose fines and other 
penalties on the polluting industries.
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Figure 6.2 Organized industrial spaces in Attica as proposed by the 
Structure Plan o f Athens (Law 1515/1985).
SOURCE; Law 1515/1985 (Official Gazette, 18A/18-2-1985).
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The measures aiming at the spatial rearrangement of manufacturing 
activity in Athens were the following (article 15):
1. The creation of handicraft parks (VIOPA) and multi-storey artisanal 
buildings in appropriate sites across the whole urban tissue, in order to 
offer common accommodation and support services to locating or relo­
cating plants of light non polluting industries, so that manufacturing 
jobs to be evenly distributed across urban space.
2. The existing industrial clusters should be renewed and organized into 
industrial parks (VIPA). These parks would provide the necessary com­
monly used spaces and services as well as extended green parcels of 
land.
3. The creation of new industrial and handicraft parks away from resi­
dential areas (at the periphery of the Athenian agglomeration) into 
which existing scattered polluting industries like tanneries, metal-melt­
ing and metallizing works, brick-tile making works, concrete and as­
phalt production works, etc., would be allowed to relocate.
4. Creation of special industrial zones for the location of light agro-in­
dustrial activities.
However, for reasons which will be analysed in the following chapters, 
the basic SPA objectives with regard to the spatial rearrangement of the 
Athenian industry were not implemented. What remained as a "practical" 
policy instrument was the Presidential Decree 84/84, whose basic points will 
be examined in the following sub-section.
6.3.4. The Presidential Decree 84/84 and Other Measures.
The basic principle underlying the PD 84/84 {Official Gazette, 33A/21-3-1984) 
-just like the previous one (PD 791/1981)- was thg^association of manufactur­
ing branches allowed to get established, modernized, relocated, etc. within the
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borders of Attica with specific types of space (space-branch specification). 
These types were:
Areas of unmixed residence (KA type)
Areas of general residence (KC type)
Areas of non polluting production installations (EM type)
Areas of polluting production installations (BO type)
Other areas
As it can be remarked in table 6.2, the industries allowed to develop 
were mainly consumer ones (foodstuff, clothing-shoes, paper-printing- 
publishing, furniture, etc.), and very few intermediate and capital industries 
(especially some high-tech ones like electronic equipment, medical instru­
ments, biotechnology and informatics products, etc.). As it was clearly stated 
in the PD’s text, (article 2, paragraph 2), the manufacturing units which were 
allowed to develop in Attica were those "serving the immediate needs of the 
urban population", as well as those belonging to "selected high-tech branches" 
and employing "intensive specialized labour^, or "agro-industrial units of 
vertical processing of Attica’s primary raw materials."
Table 6.2 New manufacturing activities allowed to get established 
and to locate in Attica according to the PD 84/84
L Bakeries 31. Printing-publishing of 
newspapers and periodicals
6L Illuminated signs
2. Pastry-making 32. Printing-publishing of 
books and leaflets
62. Electric switchboards
3. Dried fruits and seeds 33. Special printing works 63. Electric scientific and te­
chnical instruments
4. Processing of honey 34. Other printing works 64.Repair of electric equip­
ment
5. Sheet-crust of sweets 35. Construction of typogra­
phic plates
65. Car repair
6. Burning and grinding of 
coffee
36. Bookbinding (normal and 
in gold)
66. Repair of bikes and 
bicycles
7. Other food industries^ 37. Sheaths and cases from 
leather or other substitutes
67. Surgeons* tools and ortho- 
paedical instruments
8. Shoe-making^ 38.Vulkanizers 68. Precise measurement and 
control instruments
9. Repair of shoes 39. Cosmetics and other re­
lated stuff
69. Photographic and optical 
instruments
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10. Sewing of men’s cloths 40. Production of asphalt 70. Repair of eye-glasses
11. Sewing of women’s and 
children’s cloths
41. Processing of glass objects 71. Repair of photographic 
and optical instruments
12. Sewing of waterproof, 
plastic and leather cloths
42. Glass mirrors 72 Jewellery and related 
objects
13. Sewing of special cloths 43. Pottery 73. Jewellery made from 
cheap materials
14. Sewing of underwear 44. Porcelain decorative obje­
cts
74. Clockmaking and parts
15. Orthopaedic belts and 
bandages
45. Lime-pulp production 75. Clock repair
16. Hat-making 46. Production of concrete 76. Musical instruments
17. Dressing accessories 47. Marble cutting and pro­
cessing
77. Toys
18. Sewing of homework 
cloths
48. Products made from rub­
bing of marble
78. Artificial teeth
19. Cloth embroideries 49. Plaster goods 79. Stamps, signs, inscriptions, 
etc.
20. Other cloth products 50. Odds and ends made from 
non-metallic minerals
80. Umbrellas
21. Window frames 51. Iron frames and related 
building equipment made 
from iron
81 Other odds and ends (not 
referred elsewhere)
22 Products made from reed 
and from other similar 
materials
52. Other metallic frames 82 Decoration of small ob­
jects (e g. vases, ashtrays, 
etc.).
23. Products made from 
curved wood
53. Cutting-assembly of win­
dow screens
83. Laundries
24. Advertisement signs and 
other wood products
54. Popular art bronze 
products
84. Cleaning, coloring and 
ironing of cloths
25. Wooden furniture 55. Metallization of small 
objects
85. Movie, TV, radio and 
sound studios. Development 
and processing of movie and 
TV films
26. Wickerwork furniture 56. Other metallic objects 
(only popular art)
86. Mixing and assembly of 
various materials^
27. Upholsters 57. Repair of internal com­
bustion engines
87. Environmental protection 
installations (selection and 
processing of solid waste, 
liquid waste treatment 
systems
28. Paperbags 58. Business machimes and 
electronic computers
88. Gas of Athens
29. Carton boxes and card­
board products
59. Repair of business 
machines
89. Production of particularly 
high-tech products 
(biotechnology, informatics, 
microelectronics, etc.).
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30. Other carton and card­
board products^
60. Other machine and repair 
works
90. Agro-industrial units:
(a) slaughtering and skinning 
of cattle
(b) processing and preserva­
tion of meat (except poultry)
(c) preservation of poultry
(d) wine production and 
distilleries
I with some exceptions
2 except rubber and plastic shoes
3 flamable, explosive, toxic and other polluting materials are not included
4 with some exceptions
SOURCE: PD 84/84 {Official Gazette, 33A/2I-3-1984).
By contrast to the previous PD 791/1981 which posed limits to the 
maximum amount of plants’ employees, the new PD posed limits to the maxi- 
mum amount of plants’ horsepower by area type (for the purpose of counter­
ing deindustrialization and job loss without burdening the environment with 
further industrial activity). Thus, in KA type areas (unmixed residence) any 
production activity was strictly prohibited, whereas in KC areas (general resi­
dence) the maximum amount allowed was 15 HP of motive power and 50 KW 
of thermal power (that is to say only small artisanal activities were allowed to 
develop in such areas). In EM and EO type areas (industrial) the maximum 
amount was 50 HP for the majority of industries, 3(X) HP for concrete pro­
duction works, whereas there was no power limit fo r  (a) high-tech industries 
(electronic and scientific equipment, medical and optical equipment, etc.), (b) 
liquid waste processing installations, and (c) agro-industrial activities run by 
local authorities or co-operatives.
In order a newly established, modernized, or relocating plant to get 
connected with the public electric power supply network, its administration 
would have to submit at the Public Enterprise of Electricity (DEH) the plant’s 
operation permission provided officially by the Ministry of National Econ­
omy. Otherwise, DEH would have the legal authority to interrupt the plant’s 
electric powèr supply (article 3, paragraphs 3.a and 3.b). Any other infringe­
ment could also lead to supply interruption. In other words -although it was 
not explicitly stated but it was implicitly meant- the numerous small, illegally
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built and operating polluting manufacturing units at inner-city areas like 
Eleonas (see chap. 8), were neither allowed to modernize, nor to relocate.
According to article 4, expansions of existing plants were strictly pro­
hibited no matter whether such expansions could potentially be combined 
with introduction of new technologies that might decrease the plants* envi­
ronmental pollution levels.
Modernization of existing plants (article 5, paragraph 1) could take 
place without change of their existing activities and under the precondition 
that modernization would not cause additional pollution. Modernization initi­
atives could entail (paragraph 2):
a. production increase
b. increase of the plant’s horsepower within a 3 years period as follows: 
-for plants up to 120 HP, 30 HP maximum increase
-for plants with 121-1200 HP, 25% maximum increase 
-for plants with 1,200+ HP, 300 HP maximum increase
c. limitless power increase for environmental protection purposes only
d. erection of new factory buildings
According to article 6, paragraph 1, the preconditions for the relocation 
of existing production units were similar to those for the establishment of 
new ones. This simply means that the numerous existing (and polluting) plants 
in branches which were not included in the previous list (as for instance metal 
melting and metallizing works, tanneries, brick and tile making works) and 
which are currently scattered in central-city sites (as for instance in Eleonas 
-see chap. 8), were not allowed to relocate into more appropriate, distant sites 
on the metropolitan periphery. In other words, the PD 84/84 contributed to 
the maintenance of the existing inner-city locational pattern of those heavily 
polluting branches.
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The legally operating industries included in the previous list, could re­
locate only if relocation did not entail additional environmental pollution and 
only under the following preconditions (article 6, paragraph 2):
(a) Highly polluting plants with installed horsepower not exceeding 120 
HP, or manufacturing and handicraft plants of a medium pollution 
level, could relocate only into EO-type zones (zones of polluting pro­
duction activities).
(b) Manufacturing and handicraft plants of medium to low pollution level 
could relocate into EM-type zones (zones of not particularly polluting 
production activities).
(c) Manufacturing and handicraft activities of low pollution level could 
relocate into areas outside the statutory city-plan in existing buildings 
which were erased legally for industrial use in the past (before the 
publication of the PD 791/1981), and in which manufacturing activities 
were legally operating at the time of PD’s 84/84 publication.
When relocation was necessitated for emergency reasons (as for in­
stance demolition of building, obligatory expropriation, damages caused by 
fire or earthquake, etc.), the plant could relocate into another site within the 
borders of the municipality in which it was previously located. In any case, 
however, an official confirmation would be needed in order the relocation 
permission to be provided.
Low pollution handicraft units could relocate into multi-storey artisa­
nal buildings legally constructed at general residence (KC type) areas (article 
9, paragraph 2).
According to a circular (OIK. 15683/2787/File 15/31-8-93) issued by the 
Ministry of Industry for the purpose of clarifying some points of PD 84/84, 
as legally operating units being allowed to relocate were considered only
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those which: (a) At the time of PD’s publication (21-3-1984) the unit had oper­
ation permission, or (b) was legally released from the obligation to have such 
a permission; (c) The plant’s operation permission had expired before the 
above date and was later updated, while the plant was continuously operating, 
or was in a state of bankruptcy.
Mergers were allowed within the borders of Attica (article 7, para­
graph 1) as well as the associated relocation of parts or wholes of their former 
equipment into one of the merger plants. Mergers taking place on a co- oper­
ative basis (paragraph 2% were especially encouraged: They were allowed to 
increase their plants’ horsepower (the sum total of merger plants’ HP) by 100% 
within a 3 years period.
According to article 9 (paragraph 1), the Minister of National Economy 
was given authority to allow the establishment of new manufacturing in­
dustries only for the purpose of serving needs of the local authorities. In the 
CBD every new establishment, expansion, modernization, relocation, etc. was 
strictly prohibited (paragraph 3).
Some other restrictive measures and regulations were issued by the 
Environmental Law 1650/1986 {Official Gazette, 160A/16-10-1986). The Law 
did nor refer to particular areas, but it was obvious that its provisions aimed 
mainly at protecting the environment of the country’s most polluted area -the 
Greater Athens agglomeration. The most important measures were the 
following:
According to article 3, every work and/or activity carried out by public 
or private agencies should be classified in one of three categories ac­
cording to the degree of danger it could entail for the environment 
The classification criteria were associated with (a) the type and extend 
of activity, (b) the type and quantity of emissions, (c) the possibilities 
to reduce emissions in the production process and (d) the danger of a 
serious accident caused by this activity or work. Activities included in 
the high-danger category, should abide not only by the general
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environmental restrictions, but by additional measures issued by joint 
Ministry decisions especially for that purpose.
According to article 4 (paragraphs 1, 2a and 2b), a basic precondition 
for the realisation of any investment, activity or work (including es­
tablishment of new industries, expansions, modernization, and/or re­
location of existing ones) was the submission and official approval of 
environmental impacts assessment studies.
According to article 8 (paragraph 2), the measures by which new or ex­
isting industrial activities would have to abide (and which should be 
satisfactorily justified in the environmental impacts assessment 
studies), were associated with: (a) appropriate security distances be­
tween the site of activity and other areas; (b) introduction of 
anti-pollution technologies in production; (c) utilization of particular 
raw materials, intermediate products and fuel; (d) limits to the emission 
of gases; (e) keeping of particular working-hours; (f) installation of 
measurement equipment for checking out the quantity and quality of 
emissions, etc.
6.4. Strategic Responses to Economic Recession and Deindustria­
lization: Comparative European Urban Experiences
Economic recession and deindustrialization of the 1970s affected the major 
European industrial centres and especially their inner-city areas. However,
many of them reacted successfully by undertaking combined and integrated 
policies aimed at regenerating their economic, social, cultural and physical 
environments as a whole, for the purpose of attracting new investments and 
countering urban poverty, social exclusion and degradation. Local authorities, 
played a decisive role in the industrial regeneration efforts. In Britain, as 
Lawless mentions (quoted in Chapman and Walker 1987: 241), some partner­
ships between central government and local authorities were established 
under the "Inner Urban Areas Act", and local governments "were provided 
with funds for a wide range of actions related to land purchase.
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environmental and building improvements, and grants and loans to small 
businesses".
In some cases, however, the restricted funding, the lack of appropriate 
co-ordination and diverging political views on the relationships between the 
public and private spheres in urban economic redevelopment, has restricted 
the effectiveness of industrial regeneration policies and programs (Chapman 
and Walker 1987: 241). The rise of Conservatives to office in 1979, deprived 
local authorities from adequate funds and responsibilities, leading, therefore, 
to what has been dramatically identified as "destruction of local government 
autongmyjLXsee Duncan and Goodwin 1988, especially chap. 5). The idea of 
"enterprise zones" -which was developed by Peter Hall- was better suited to 
the Conservatives’ ideology in that it allowed for private investors to avoid 
bureaucratic and planning controls in the location of economic activity, mak­
ing, thus, "their life easier" (Chapman and Walker 1987: 241-2). Nevertheless, 
as it was stated, enterprise zones tended to "encourage a rather static view of 
the urban economy than one that adapts to change" (Jones and Manson as 
quoted in Chapman and Walker 1987: 242).
In spite of those difficulties, however, a new "urban industrial regener­
ation" culture was gradually formulated within both the public and the pri­
vate spheres; it was based upon combined and integrated initiatives aiming at 
attaining a multiplicity of objectives like:
increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing sector,
preserving capital investments from being wasted;
using the urban space wisely and to the maximum benefit of as many
people as possible;
providing a variety of jobs in each area of the urban tissue (Chapman 
and Walker 1987: 243).
In that context, actions and interventions undertaken by city-autho- 
rities included a variety of aspects of urban life, like for instance: (a) ap­
propriate infrastructural improvements (transport and parking facilities), (b)
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beatification and renewal of old declining inner-city industrial zones, (c) 
provision of appropriately equipped units of space (often in renewed older 
multi-storey factory buildings) for accommodating new manufacturing firms, 
especially knowledge-based SMEs, (d) encouragement of innovative firms, (e) 
effective marketing schemes for attracting potential investors, (f) creation of 
a friendly city environment by relaxing internal conflict between local auth­
orities and private businesses, and (g) creation of a feeling of continuity and 
certainty to potential manufacturing investors (Chapman and Walker 1987: 
243-6).
According to the conclusions of an international conference held at 
Dortmund, Germany, in 17-19th of September 1985 (CE/CDUP/CD 1985), 
economic regeneration initiatives in deindustrializing cities and urban regions 
in Europe should be effectively linked with spatial arrangements and policy 
programs aiming at the improvement of their human, built and natural envi­
ronments as a whole. More precisely, the following bundle of objectives and 
policy priorities was proposed:
A. Objectives and priorities associated with economic regeneration and 
improvement o f the natural and built urban environment
-It was realized that there exists a very strong relationship between 
urban-economic regeneration and environmental improvement
-It was also realized that such improvement programs affect equally 
the social and cultural facilities of cities, especially when they 
encourage citizens’ participation and co-operation which create a 
strong "community feeling" that increases mutual understanding and 
reliability and helps in attracting private investments.
-In cases of extended ecological damages, special emphasis should be 
placed upon the protection of the cities’ natural environment
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R Objectives and priorities aiming at reinforcing the links between con­
servation and development
-Special attention should be paid on the improvement of the existing 
building stock, since it increases citizens’ confidence for their cities’ 
future.
-Special priorities should be directed to the conservation of cities’ his­
torical sites and other cultural assets, since they help in keeping the 
feeling of "historical continuity" and increase the cities’ attractiveness 
to potential investors. Also, the maintenance and provision of free and 
recreation spaces reinforces economic attractiveness.
-The implementation of all above priorities presupposes labour- inten­
sive working activities which contribute to the decrease of urban 
unemployment
C  Objectives and priorities associated with the role and responsibilities o f
local authorities in economic regeneration attempts
-It was realized that local authorities have gained increased responsibi­
lities in every aspect of city-life (from economy and employment to 
culture and recreation), since their role in economic and industrial re­
generation programs should be enhanced.
-In managing the urban area and in proposing urban industrial policy 
guidelines, local authorities should pay more attention on re-using der­
elict or existing industrial land than wasting new one.
-Local authorities should be given adequate funding so as to be able to 
handle land transactions and development projects and more generally 
to keep enhanced control upon the urban land-use development 
dynamic.
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D. Objectives and priorities for encouraging collaboration and participa­
tion in industrial cities
-Local authorities should encourage local partnerships and mobilization 
of the cities’ resources in the direction of economic regeneration,
widening, therefore, the basis and extend of the decision-making
\ Imechanisms and promoting citizens participation and democracy at the 
local level
-It is very important for local authorities to encourage innovative in­
vestors not only in industrial development projects, but also in social, 
cultural or recreation activities, since such activities increase the cities’ 
attractiveness.
-More tight partnership links between public and private agencies 
should be built, especially in creating new projects’ financing and im­
plementation mechanisms.
-In the process of urban-industrial regeneration the collaboration be­
tween industry and Universities should be given special attention.
-Wider educational and training programs increase the urban popula­
tions’ environmental consciousness and affect positively the urban-eco­
nomic regeneration efforts.
-Public funding is used more effectively when directed in specific re­
generation projects than in general purpose grants and loans.
-Public funding should be more intensively directed at economic, social 
and ecological pilot-projects in the cities undertaking industrial regen­
eration attempts. The economic risks such pilot-projects entail,'Should 
be accepted by the financial agencies.
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-In making crucial decisions that may affect the future of industrial 
cities, central governments and local authorities should build more 
tight collaborative links.
Most of the above objectives and directions for action, were implem­
ented in several European cities which managed to respond successfully to the 
economic decline and deindustrialization of the 1970s-80s and to adapt effec­
tively to the new challenges, by developing innovative institutional arrange­
ments and economic strategies. As stated in a report prepared for the 
European Commission (European Institute of Urban Affairs 1992: chap. 5) new 
institutional frameworks and development programs varied according to the 
specific economic and social problems each city had to tackle with, but the 
underlying logic was common: The cities* public and private economic spheres 
were strengthened, public-private partnerships were encouraged, their human 
resources were improved, internal conflict was considerably relaxed, their 
environmental and locational advantages were enhanced, their cultural assets 
were improved and their leaders* ability to influence central policy makers 
was given special attention. The cases of Hamburg and Dortmund in Germany, 
and Rotterdam in Holland, as outlined in the aforementioned report, are char­
acteristic examples of such successful strategic responses to economic crisis 
and deindustrialization.
(1). (ftamb u ^  a major port, oil refining, and ship building urban centre 
of Northern Germany, experienced the impacts of deindustrialization and job 
loss during the post-1973 period of international recession. Bj(l9«5,The rate of
unemployment had climbed to 13%. In order to tackle with the problem, the 
city Major persuaded various social groupings (businessmen, labour, govern­
mental agencies, knowledge-based businesses, etc.) to collaborate in the 
formation of a new economic and industrial strategy giving priorities to the 
development of modern economic activities. Comprehensive physical urban 
renewal was undertaken to improve the city*s cultural and tourist assets, hous­
ing stock, retail facilities, recreation amenities and so on. In 1985, the Ham­
burg Business Development Corporation (HWF) was established for the above 
purpose. The corporation was a public-private partnership scheme initiated
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collaboratively by the city’s authority, the Chamber of Commerce and ten 
largest banks, and its aims included the development of modern, high value- 
added industries in sectors like electronics/informatics, medical and environ­
mental technologies, aviation, biotechnology, media, and port-services. The 
creation of a new Technical University in the area and of other technological 
research institutions, reinforced industrial modernization of the city’s produc­
tion base, attracted new investments (reaching a total of 3.7 billion DM) and 
initiated marked multiplier effects in the whole urban economy.
(II). portmuiid, a traditional urban-industrial centre of the Ruhr basin, 
whose economy was built upon coal, steel and brewing industries, experienced 
the effects of international economic recession and deindustrialization of the 
1970s and 1980s that raised the rate of unemployment to 18% by 1988. Job loss 
in the traditional sectors was not compensated by new innovative initiatives 
which were directed to the rapidly developing southern German areas. The 
Dortmund local authority and the powerful labour unions were reluctant to  ^
accept new technology-based initiatives and they pressed government.to keep 
on subsidizing the declining traditional sectors. However, these attitudes soon 
changed: Physical renewal projects altered the image of the city and a new 
service and high-tech economy replaced the old traditional one. The creation 
of a technology centre and a technology park, in collaboration with the local 
University, the Polytechnic School and the local Chamber of Commerce, at­
tracted transport technology, automation and robotics activities in the area, 
whereas the local banks and the city’s authorities advanced programs for at­
tracting new investors. Job creation programs were also launched and the in­
formal sector of the urban economy was given employment opportunities. EC 
funding was directed in providing free management consultancy services, fi­
nancial support and accommodation to small businesses in renovated formerly 
derelict industrial buildings. The architectural, aesthetic, social, cultural and 
environmental image of the city was also immensely improved through the 
creation of pedestrian streets, urban boulevards and attractive public places, 
programs of social housing provision, etc.
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(III). R o tte ^ fn , the world’s largest port, had based its economy upon 
port-related activities (ship-building and petro-chemical complexes). During 
the 1970s and 1980s, the decline of those activities rose urban unemployment 
to over 20%. However, by investing in port reorganization and development of 
new transport logistics, the municipal port authority managed to regenerate 
the city economy, whereas corporate investments in the petro-chemicals sec­
tor increased. Commercial investments, expansion of office spaces and new 
services (business services, hotels, catering services and entertainment ones) 
grew as side effects of the city’s economic revival The reasons for this suc­
cess could be found in the improved relations established between local auth­
orities and private investment agencies. The ROTOR -a public/private 
partnership development board initiated by the city’s local authority and the 
Chamber of Commerce, acted as a "think tank" in the city’s economic and in­
dustrial regeneration. Small businesses were supported to locate in renovated 
areas and private investments were directed in the port infrastructure. Real 
estate development programs -especially at the city centre- were undertaken 
by the local authority in collaboration with private development agencies, and 
the city’s housing stock was broadened with private and high income prop­
erty. Much of r o t o r ’s concern has been centred not only around economic 
and industrial growth objectives, but around social and welfare ones as well, 
like construction of family housing, improvement of health facilities, training 
of unemployed, improvement of public spaces, etc.
6.5. Conclusion
As we saw in the previous section, during the 1980s-early 1990s, in many 
European industrial cities and localities facing problems of deindustrialization 
and job loss, there were implemented integrated programs and policies which 
were aimed at naakingjtliose areas, more attractive to new investments, at 
stimulating job creation and at countering urban decay and environmental 
degradation. In the case of Athens, as we saw earlier, there were several im­
portant policy proposals and directions for action aiming at a more rational 
economic/spatial reorganization of manufacturing industry and at countering 
production decay, environmental degradation, spatial inequality in the location
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of production, etc. The most important of those policy guidelines was the in­
dustrial and handicrafL^parks.initiative in the context of the objectives posed 
by the "special study" of the Ministry of Environment and by the Structure 
Plan of Athens along the strategic directions of the 5-year Economic and So­
cial Development Plan 1983-87. It is a common sense, however, that policy 
guidelines alone are not enough if they are not followed up by concrete 
practical means and actions for their implementation on the ground. In the 
areas defined and mapped by the SPA as industrial and handicraft parks, in­
vestments for the creation of the appropriate infrastructure networks did not 
take place. The official body which would supposedly undertake the task of 
organizing and managing those parks was not created. The Hellenic Bank of 
Industrial Development (ETVA) which -as we saw in a previous chapter- had 
a long experience in organizing and managing such planned industrial spaces 
in peripheral regions, was left outside -although the "special study" of the 
Ministry of Environment proposed the participation of ET VA in the indus­
trial parks’ administration scheme (Hadjisocratis 1983: 38). It is very likely that 
some high-ranked government officials regarded that the organization and 
management of planned industrial spaces within urban areas was outside 
ETVA’s organizational capabilities or interests.^ Thus, apart from the environ­
mental measures and restrictions outlined previously, what remained as a 
"practical" policy tool for "guiding" industrial development and location in 
Greater Athens was P P ..84/84,. However, as the previous analysis revealed, its 
basic priorities were mostly of a "negative" orientation: They simply hindered 
the further expansion of Athenian industry without offering -on the same 
time- positive alternatives to its existing developmental and spatial problems. 
As we will see in the following chapter, this was one basic reason for the in­
creasing socio-political reactions against PD 84/84 -reactions which widened 
the "polarity" between reality and proposals -or otherwise, between "what is" 
and "what ought to be" on the arena of industrial location in Athens. The sim­
plistic negative orientation underlying PD 84/84, not only was proved ineffic­
ient in tackling with the accumulated problems of the Athenian industrial 
space, but, moreover, contributed to the creation of new ones, as for instance,
 ^ There seems to exist a kind of "hidden" hostility and mistrust between Ministry of
Environment officials and Ministry of Industry (in which ETVA belongs) ones. (Personal 
impressions from some joint meetings in the context of NTUA research projects -e.g. ERG 
1992a and 1992b).
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the posing of serious obstacles to dynamic industries and companies wishing 
to expand and develop their production capacity (and indirectly to add new 
manufacturing jobs in a stagnating Athenian labour market). Moreover, the 
PD*s lack of planning concerns, maintained the existing problems associated 
with the unplanned location of industry; i.e. lack of appropriate infrastructure 
and supporting services in areas of existing industrial concentration or in 
areas having high potential for the development of new industries. The PD’s 
encouragement of light industry consumer branches, left outside a consider­
able portion of the Athenian production system consisting of intermediate 
and capital ones (chap. 4), contributing therefore to the enhancement of the 
negative restructuring tendencies. The PD did not take into account that pro­
duction technologies change over time, and that manufacturing activities 
which might have caused environmental pollution in the past, may remain in 
urban areas (offering jobs and local economic linkages) and still be environ­
mentally friendly if they introduce new advanced technologies and produc­
tion methods. Finally, and probably most importantly, the PD 84/84 
contributed to the creation of a negative psychological climate to the poten­
tial investors.
Apart from the above inadequacies, the very "logic" of the PD 84/84 is 
characterized by internal contradictions and lack of coherence: Whereas the 
PD*s declared objective was to stimulate modernization and rational industrial 
location/relocation initiatives, in practice, these attempts were strictly pro­
hibited. Intermediate and capital branches having high potential for modern­
ization and development, were not included in the PD*s list of allowed 
production activities (with only a few exceptions). The branches and plants 
which are mostly responsible for the serious environmental degradation of 
inner city areas like Eleonas (chap. 8) and need urgent relocation into periph­
eral sites (e.g. metal melting and metallizing works, brick and tile making 
works, tanneries, etc.) were not included in the PD’s scope, and hence they 
could neither modernize nor relocate, even if they wished to do so. In other 
words, these branches and plants were indirectly "forced" by the PD 84/84 to 
continue their operation amidst central-city residential areas, contributing, 
thus, to the maintenance of existing problems (environmental pollution, urban
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degradation, land-use conflict, etc.). This is why the way the relocation prob­
lem was treated by PD 84/84, resulted in a failure to encourage relocations to 
any considerable extend, contributing, therefore, to the maintenance of the 
scattered intra-urban pattern of those polluting industries.
What is most important, is that the PD’s provisions were of a piece­
meal character There was not even the slightest connection of them with 
other urban policies and programs in an integrated manner (e.g. programs and 
policies for the renovation of degraded inner-city industrial zones, environ­
mental and urban landscape improvement, infrastructure re-organization and 
improvement, transport and energy saving planning, social housing provision, 
programs for workforce skills improvement, and other social infrastructure 
programs) as in the case of the European cities experiencing similar problems. 
That is, with integrated programs and policies which improve the whole func­
tioning and efficiency of the city and increase its attractiveness to potential 
investors in an era of high areal competition for the attraction of economic 
activity. In the case of Athens, however, such integrated policy actions were 
ultimately absent Thus, in spite of the official expectations, the PD 84/84 not 
only failed in solving the accumulated developmental and locational problems 
of manufacturing industry in Athens, but it also contributed to their further 
worsening.
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CHAPTER 7
THE FORMATION OF AN ANTI-INDUSTRIAL 
CULTURE IN MODERN ATHENS
7.1. Anti-Industrialism in Context
As we saw in the previous chapter, what was left from a whole decade of So­
cialist rhetoric on the issues of democratic planning and rational development 
and location of Athenian manufacturing industry, was the PD 84/84, which 
hindered the development of new industries and/or the expansion of existing 
ones in Greater Athens -with the exception of a very "thin" layer of manu­
facturing branches. On the same time -as we will see in this chapter- an asso­
ciated anti-industrial culture within the political parties, the   social
organizations and the public opinion was gradually formulated. The contribut­
ing factors have been related with real events of serious industrial pollution 
of Athens on the one hand, and ideological biases against Athenian industry 
on the other. These biases were based on the widespread belief that for all the 
serious environmental problems of Athens (and especially the everyday pres­
ence of smog) it is industry, alone, that should be blamed {Express  ^ 22 Febru­
ary 1989) -something which is not absolutely true as special environmental 
studies have revealed.* It is not therefore accidental that in an era of deindus­
trialization and negative restructuring, the Athenian manufacturing industry 
is forced to operate in the midst of a hostile legislative and social surround­
ing, which, in the name of environmental protection restricts industrial mod­
ernization and development initiatives.
* According to a 1989 study carried out by a group of 23 environmental engineers of 
PERPA (an environment research organization of the Ministry of Environment), the partici­
pation of cars in the formation of four out of six major air polutants of the Athenian envi­
ronment was found to be much more greater than the participation of industry (see 
Kyriakatikos Rizospastis, 24 September 1989).
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It should be stressed out from the outset that such a hostility is not a 
unique Athenian phenomenon, but it is increasingly expanding in many other 
areas of the country. Its causes are much deeper and have to do with the 
weak position of industrial capital in the structure of socio-economic interests 
across geographical space and with the social attitudes, political behaviours 
and cultural values this structure generates and reproduces. As we will see 
later on, political and ideological reasons have also played a decisive role in 
the formation and maintenance of anti-industrial mentalities and attitudes. 
Wassenhoven et al. (1991: 37-8) provide some examples of such attitudes:
The project for the establishment of a non-polluting gold producing 
manufacturing plant in a tourist area of Halkidiki was cancelled be­
cause of local reactions.
The project for the establishment of a "petro-chemical complex" in 
Galatas -Etoloakarnania prefecture- was also cancelled because of 
. various local politics, party antagonisms and wider political calcula­
tions. According to specialists’ views, this project was economically 
feasible, friendly to the environment, import-substituting, attracted the 
interest of private investors to finance it, and had the support of all 
scientific organizations.
A leather production plant was established in (K m ii^  (reaching a total 
investment of 1 billion Drs). According to the investment project, this 
plant would utilize local raw materials, would create high percentage 
of value-added and would generate new jobs in an area suffering high 
unemployment rates. The plant’s site had been indicated by the area’s 
local authorities and all necessary building permissions had been pro­
vided. However, when the plant’s construction was completed, the pre-
fectural authority denied to provide operation permit because, in its     —      •      ------
opinion, the local population was against the plant’s operation. The "ex­
planation" which was given, was that in spite of the plant’s high-tech 
sewage installations, the cost of their operation "would be" so high that 
the plant’s owners "would" find ways to get around the controls and
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canalize the plant’s liquid waste out without any prior treatm ent Thus, 
a hypothetical scenario formed arbitrarily in the local collective im­
agination, aquired a quite real political backing which, finally, ^ c e lle d  
the implementation of a very important local economic development 
initiative.
A modern plant intending to produce keys and locks was about to be 
erected in an industrial zone of north-western Attica. All official per­
missions had been provided and the firm was about to relocate from a 
congested central area of Athens into the new decentralized location. 
Due to local reactions, the new plant was not finally built and the firm 
was forced to expand its old installations in the congested inner-city 
area.
All above cases converge to the same point as it is stressed out by 
Valtis-Spanopoulos:
The political and social treatment of industry is a fundamental factor 
determining its role and the protection of environment It can be re­
marked that during the last 10-15 years the way industry is socially and 
politically treated has been particularly negative. There has been a 
strong tendency of political speculation on this issue and of misleading 
public opinion from the real dimensions of the problem (Valtis- Spano- 
poulos, quoted in Wassenhoven et al. 1991: 38).
Such anti-industrial attitudes are magnified if we shift analysis to the 
geographical scale of Greater Athens. As it will be shown, during the 
1980s-early 1990s, the major Greek political parties, powerfull social and pro­
fessional organizations and a major part of the press, were holding either a 
clearly hostile stance against Athenian industry, or, at the best, an ambiguous 
one. Both stances were having negative impacts upon the capitafs productive 
base, either because they discouraged potential investors, or because they 
tended to confuse them as to the real intentions of the governmental bodies 
and of the other collective organizations affecting the socio-political climate 
in the Greek capital And all of this was taking place in a period during which
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the process of deindustrialization in Athens had already started to manifest 
itself in plain statistical numbers as we saw in previous chapters.
7.2. The "Inertia" of the Decentralization Policy Tradition
The choices of the two major political parties (Conservatives and Socialists), 
were in accord with an already existing policy tradition which -since the early 
1970s- favoured the decentralization of Athenian manufacturing and the de­
velopment of regional industrial spaces (chap. 3, sect 3.2.3). This policy tradi­
tion, was followed by both parties during their post 1974 successive services 
to office. However, such a policy orientation in the 1970s could be justified to 
some extend, since Greater Athens was yet operating as a major pole of in­
dustrial concentration, which, in the process of unequal development, was 
leading most of the country’s peripheral regions to economic backwardness 
and depopulation. But during the 1980s the previous spatial inequalities started 
to get transformed into new ones: Not only a moderate -but still noticeable- 
decentralization of manufacturing took place, but, also, Athenian industry en­
tered a long lasting declining process. One should expect, therefore, that in­
dustrial policy of the 1980s would express some special concerns about the 
future of Athenian manufacturing, especially in front of the new economic 
challenges after Greece’s accession to EC on 198L Such concerns, however, 
were utterly absent The urban-industrial policy of the 1980s continued to 
pursue the strategic objective of productive decentralization and to discour­
age new manufacturing investments in Athens with the exception of a very 
thin layer of branches regarded as quite necessary for the city’s population 
needs (chap. 6).
The lack of real political sensitivity for the problems of the Athenian 
industrial space becomes evident even by a simple reading of the parliamen­
tary discussions in the context of the Structure Plan of Athens legislation (see 
Parliament Proceedings 1985). As we saw in the previous chapter, the SPA in­
troduced for first time the concept of "industrial park" in urban-industrial 
policy. It was therefore the first time the major parties were given the oppor­
tunity to discuss in a substantial and detailed way this new policy tool which
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supposedly would affect the developmental and locational prospects of the 
Athenian industrial base. However, as we can see in the Parliament Proceed­
ings, all discussions (with the exception of the criticisms of a Communist MP) 
revolved around the SPA’s more general objectives, with only some sporadic 
references to the problems of the Athenian industrial space lacking specific­
ity, comprehensiveness and strategic vision. It was as if all discussions avoided 
carefully to touch this "hot" issue. Thus, in the presentation of the SPA’s stra­
tegic directions by the governmental proposer (Parliament Proceedings 1985: 
3469-71) not even a reference was made about Athenian industry, while the 
criticisms of the opposition conservative party (ND) were confined to the 
point that the Socialists identified the existing industrial clusters of Athens as 
"industrial parks" without having prepared on the same time an appropriate 
legislative framework for that purpose (ibid.: 3473). The Communist (KKE) 
proposer, blamed government that the Structure Plan allowed for more in­
dustries to be located in Athens under the mask of "modernization" (ibicL 
3477). According to her opinion, the goal of establishing industrial parks as a 
means to "gather together" the existing scattered manufacturing units was not 
going to be attained, because those units (mostly SMEs) could not afford the 
relocation costs. Therefore, only big companies would be able to establish new 
plants or relocate existing ones in industrial parks, and this would inevitably 
entail additional environmental pollution and urban degradation problems. 
The Minister of Environment, by contrast, stated that industrial parks would 
set on the ground the "rules of the game" for the location of Athenian in­
dustry (ibicL 3481), but the long-term strategic goal still remained to be the 
decentralization of production (ibidj 3479). However, it was never explicitly 
explained which "the rules of the game" were, or by what means they would 
be attained. Finally, both the governmental majority (Socialists) and the op­
position (Conservatives) voted in favour of the SPA which was ratified by 
Law (L.1515/1985) and published in the Official Gazette on 18th of February 
1985.
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7.3. Socio-Political Attitudes and Reactions
With the exception of industrialists, various social and professional organiz­
ations, as well as some big press companies, contributed to the formation of 
the anti-industrial milieu, which naturally was posing severe obstacles to any 
serious manufacturer from investing in Athens, even though economic ra­
tionality criteria (favourable external economies of agglomeration) were en­
couraging such prospects.
Already in the mid 1980’s part of the Athenian newspapers was holding 
an ambiguous -if not directly hostile- stance against initiatives aimed at the 
rational organization and planning of manufacturing activity in Athens. 
When, for instance, the Ministry of Environment in the mid 1980s charged the 
National Technical University of Athens with the task to carry out a 
pilot-project on planning two major industrial parks in Attica (RG 1988), 
Eleutberos Typos -a mass circulation daily opposing the then Socialists* 
government- published an aggressive article which blamed government (and 
especially the then Minister of industry Mrs. Vaso Papandreou), for deciding 
to "industrialize" some areas of Attica (by "baptizing" them as industrial 
parks) without asking anyone (Kollias 1986). The article referred in particular 
to the areas of Metamorphosis, Koropi and Eleonas and stated that this "arbi­
trary" governmental action brought about confusion to the inhabitants of the 
neighbouring municipalities which were anxiously trying to get informed 
about the future of their areas. The article’s effort to foster a local negative 
climate against the establishment of industrial parks in Attica was evident 
The article "forgot" to mention that the defined areas were already burdened 
with manufacturing activities which were located there spontaneously with­
out the necessary infrastructure networks or support services (for both the 
cases of Metamorphosis and Eleonas industrial localities see chapters 5 and 8 
respectively). The article also concealed that it was exactly the lack of organ­
ization and planning which was causing major environmental and urban 
degradation problems to the localities at issue, and tried contrarily to present 
the planning endeavour as a potential source of future problems. An earlier 
article {Ta Nea, 10 November 1984) presented the identification of the
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Metamorphosis industrial locality as an industrial park, as a governmental ef­
fort to establish a "park of pollution" to the area.
The industrial parks policy was also met with lot of scepticism by left- 
wing writings. Spatial policies in general, were preceived by such writings as
measures aiming at capitalist déconcentration and modernization, in 
order to facilitate the overcoming of crisis and the country’s adapta­
tion to the new divisions of capitalist integration. They are drastically 
expressed at the level of a new organization of space in favour of capi­
tal (KOA 1990:10).
The industrial parks policy, in particular, was perceived as a means 
helping Athenian industries to get around the legislative restrictions imposed 
by PD 84/84, and therefore, to legitimize "on the ground" the already existing 
areas of heavy industrial concentration, urban degradation and pollution, by 
"presenting" them under the covering of a modern industrial location planning 
tool (KOA 1990: 24).
Other left writings (see e.g. ProvUmata Topikis Autodioikisis, No 17/18 
1987: 39-43) were less rigidly oriented towards the industrial parks policy and 
considered it as a means potentially able to bring about positive solutions to 
the problems of industrial development and location in Athens, across the fol­
lowing directions:
The avoidance of uncontrolled dispersal of manufacturing into the 
urban and suburban space,
the protection of environment and other urban uses from industrial 
activity,
the production improvement of the already located firms in the areas 
defined and mapped as industrial parks,
the increase of labour’s productivity by means of providing better 
environmental and working conditions in those areas, 
the activation of local authorities in tackling with the complex issues 
of production in their sphere of responsibility, and
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the reorientation of industrial policy to encompass criteria of produc­
tion modernization.
The crucial question, however, referred to the extend to which the So­
cialist's administration was actually looking forward to implement the indus­
trial parks project As the article stated.
The fact that three whole years after the official announcement of the 
industrial parks creation in Attica the government has not yet pro­
ceeded to the elaboration of a corresponding legislative framework, is 
disappointing. Moreover, one cannot neglect the fact that the indus­
trial parks initiative was not included either to the 5 year plan of econ­
omic and social development (1983-87) or to other governmental 
declarations on industrial policy issues ». Also, one cannot forget that a 
crucial factor for any urban land use policy -Le. the arrangement of 
land ownership problems through the drawing up of the national real 
estate registry- is still in pendency (ibidj 42).
Another article (Antahopoulos 1988), asserted that industrial parks 
should be used for combined relocation-modernization of existing Athenian 
industries or even for establishment of new ones only after the approval of a 
special committee which would be given powers to decide whether or not 
these industries were quite necessary for the wider Athens area. However, the 
article expressed reservations as to the practical prospects of the industrial 
parks instrument, due, mainly to the piecemeal nature of the governmental 
spatial policies and to its close relationships with the organized interests of 
industrial capital For other writers (Meladinis and Diamantopoulos 1990. 
47-56) the lack of clearly defined objectives and priorities for the develop­
ment of industrial parks, could easily turn this policy into a tool in the hands 
of industrialists helping them to get around the legislative restrictions im­
posed by PD 84/84.
The prospect of central plants' relocation into remote industrial parks 
for environmental protection reasons, was met with lot of scepticism as a 
likely means of weakening the industrial base of Athens and feeding ter- 
tiarization trends. As the president of the Technical Chamber of Greece has 
pointed out in a scientific meeting (6-7-1988)
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We meet with lot of scepticism proposals for an undifferentiated re­
location of manufacturing away from Athens. Such a prospect engend­
ers dangers for the balanced productive development of Athens and of 
the whole country. It objectively facilitates the prospect of an Athens 
-centre of services and commerce- in a Greece of waiters and tourists. 
TEE proposes the formation of (special scientific) committees which 
will study the structure and function of each of the polluting manufac­
turing plants and will propose ... the appropriate environmental protec­
tion measures which should be undertaken; they will also supervise the 
implementation of those measures in case that the relocation of those 
plants will not be decided. In these committees should participate 
-apart from TEE- representatives of the workers, of the Ministries of 
Environment and Industry, of the Association of Greek Industries, and 
of the local authorities {Enimerotiko Deltio TEE, No 1/90: 9).
Such scepticisms and reservations about the real intensions of the So­
cialises industrial parks policy were to a great extend justified since they 
were based on real political evidence. For instance, the government’s unwill­
ingness to set forth a concrete legislative framework for the development and 
operation of Attica’s industrial parks, apart from creating dilemmas as to the 
real official intentions, left a number of unclarified questions such as:
Which industries would be included in the industrial parks?
Which branches would be given priority for locating or relocating into 
them and why?
By what means the unproblematical coexistence of industrial parks and 
other neighbouring urban land uses would be secured?
How the parks’ administration would be conducted and which organiz­
ations would be called to participate in the administrative bodies?
Which would be the "links" between parks’ administration and other 
public and private organizations or local authorities?
By what means the environmental quality of park areas would be se­
cured and how environmental polluting activities would be prevented 
from developing into them?
Which strategy would be adopted in order the government to convince 
working people that the relocation of centrally located plants into in­
dustrial parks in the metropolitan periphery would not entail the loss
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of their jobs? As the president of the Technical Chamber of Greece
has asserted in a scientific meeting (3-12-1990),
we all know that the relocation of industries which are techni­
cally unable to adopt environmetally friendly technologies or to 
reduce the pollution they cause by any means, is a much diffi­
cult issue. Another factor which has emerged in the last years 
-and we have to talk about it- is the attitude of industrial 
workers. These workers, under the threat of becoming redun­
dant, are not willing to accept a concrete timetable for the re­
location of their plants away from Athens. Many times, 
moreover, this reasonable fear, this logical uneasiness of the 
workers, is used as a lever of pressure by all those having rea­
sons to hamper relocations {Enimerotiko Deltio TEE, No 1647: 
%
Apart from the industrial parks issue, it was also the need for legislat­
ive reforms in the direction of allowing industrial modernization and devel­
opment in Athens that drew numerous attacks by various newpaper articles 
and other political writings and public speeches. Common point of all those 
views was that it is mainly industry which is responsible for all the acute 
environmental problems of the Greek capital In that context, the dilemma: 
"industrial development- vs- environmental protection" gained in importance 
within the Athenian public opinion and formed a rigid ideological platform 
used against industrial modernization and rational location attempts. Any 
official prospect to reform PD 84/84, has been characterized as either indicat­
ing a governmental affiliation with organized industrialists* interests, or/and 
as indicating a governmental lack of environmental sensitivity.
In April 24,1987, the then Under-secretary of the Ministry of Industry 
Mr. Petsos, signed a draft PD which replaced some articles of the existing PD 
84/84 and allowed for the establishment of new industries in Attica. This 
decision was based on the need to attract new investments for the purposes of 
countering unemployment and deindustrialization. However, the initiative was 
presented as "a governmental retreat in front of the industrialists’ pressures" 
(Papastefanatou and Diamantopoulos 1987: 11-13). The need for environmental 
protection was treated as a barrier to new manufacturing investments in 
Athens. Similar views were held by another article (Antahopoulos 1988: 40-2)
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which stated that the reform initiative was actually aiming at allowing Athe­
nian industries to get around the legislation and expand their plants under the 
covering of production modernization.
With regard to the previous views, it should be pointed out that, in­
deed, the process of technological modernization of a manufacturing plant 
-e.g. installation of new technology machinery, reorganization of management 
schemes, introduction of computing (CAD/CAM/CAE) technologies, etc.- may 
take place without any expansion of the existing industrial building or of the 
plant's horsepower. However, this type of technological modernization is not 
generalizable but depending on the technical characteristics of the new ma­
chinery and equipment including the auxiliary installations. Some types of 
machinery may require larger floorspace to be installed, may have more 
horsepower than the old machinery and -what is more important- may be 
much more friendly to the environment than the old fashioned machinery; 
computing equipment and relating activities may need more office space, etc.
In another endeavour to reform the PD 84/84 undertaken by the Con­
servatives on 1991, the environment was again used as a "fortress" against this 
reform: As it was written in a mass circulation daily,
in spite of the acute environmental problems and the danger of smog, 
the government does not seem to reject the possibility of allowing the 
establishment of new industries in Attica, even in the form of plants' 
expansion (increase of their horsepower, etc.) {Ta Nea, 13 September
1991).
However, the decline of the Athenian manufacturing industry and the 
loss of thousands of jobs in just a few years (chap. 4), does not seem to have 
touched the newspapers' sensitivities. Characteristic of such an attitude, is a 
couple of articles published by the same newspaper {Ta Nea, 3 and 4 January 
1992) when the Ministry of Environment started to prepare a draft PD which 
allowed for the expansion of existing industries and the establishment of new 
ones in Athens. In the issue of January 3rd 1992, the daily took advantage of 
the existence of some antitheses between governmental bodies in order to dis­
pute the need for the PD's 84/84 revision. More particularly, the article
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asserted that while the Ministry of Environment regarded the draft PD as "a 
significantly positive initiative for the Athenian environment", the Ministry 
of Industry announced that it was not informed about the existence of such a 
draft, and that any likely reform of the existing legislation should take place 
in collaboration with the local authorities of Greater Athens. It is worth not­
ing that the newspaper’s negative attitude against the draft PD took place 
without an even elementary presentation of, and comment on, its articles as to 
let the public opinion form its own independent understanding of the draft’s 
proposals.
The Socialists’ Prefectural Organization of Western Attica reacted by 
announcing that
the New Democracy government seems to be continuously trying to 
reaffirm that "the murderer always returns to the murder place". Thus, 
those whose concrete politico-economic choices in the past have gener­
ated the contemporary tragic situation of Attica, are coming back to 
deliver the final shot by allowing the establishment of new industries 
and the expansion of existing ones (7a Nea, 3 January 1992).
Apart from the above rather harsh and opposition-led reactions, there 
is a fact which has generated reasonable questions as to the true govern­
mental objectives; namely that a crucial for the future of Athenian industry 
initiative was drafted by one Ministry, in absolute secrecy and by ignoring not 
only the citizens of Athens and their collective organizations, but other inter­
ested bodies of the state apparatus like the Ministry of Industry. When the 
Under-secretary of that Ministry was asked by journalists on the above issue, 
he frankly answered that this initiative was undertaken by the Ministry of 
Environment, alone, and therefore his Ministry knew nothing about that (7a 
Nea^  4 January 1992). The same reasonable questions were expressed by the 
President of the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE):
I have to admitt that the aim of this decision is not yet clear to me. 
Fve read the articles of this decision and my uneasiness has been in­
creased. We, as Technical Chamber of Greece, are not going to blame 
(the government) for not asking us. We have been bored of that story.
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I cannot accept the fact that regulations concerned with the establish­
ment of industrial and handicraft firms in Attica take place, sites for 
the location of those industries are defined, and no connection of these 
issues with the environmental problem was made».
Perhaps the intensification of unemployment and deindustrialization 
has created conditions which some people regard as favourable for set­
ting forward a "decisive move" of release of industry from environ­
mental protection concerns. The secrecy under which the draft PD was 
prepared allows us to make such an estimation {Ta Nea, 3 January
1992).
According to the newspaper, many mayors of the Athenian agglomer­
ation expressed their antithesis to the draft PD by declaring that the expan­
sion of existing industries and/or the establishment of new ones could by no 
way be accepted by them, and that they would react dynamically to any offi­
cial attempts of implementing the proposed PD. It was also revealed that the 
then mayor of Athens Anthony Tritsis sent an official letter to the Minister 
of Environment asking him to withdraw the draft PD and accusing govern­
ment for showing an "unacceptable negligence in front of the organized inter­
ests" (connoting probably the industrialists of Athens). Hard were also the 
reactions of the Greek Chamber of Handicraft Industry (VEE) and of the 
Union of Greek Technological Engineers (EETM). The president of VEE 
stated that the draft PD did not propose land use - by manufacturing branch - 
zoning regulations to the areas proposed for industrial location/relocation, did 
not propose environmental protection measures, and has created confusion 
with regard to the necessary infrastructure of those areas as well as with re­
gard to the authority which should be charged with the implementation of 
the new PD’s proposals. Consequently, the draft PD -according to his view- 
should not be regarded as an initiative aiming at the modernization and de­
velopment of Athenian industry, but rather, as a reminiscent "of the mode of 
industrial location prevailing during the I950s"(7’a Nea, 4 January 1992). In a 
similar tone, the Union of the Greek Technological Engineers (EETM) blamed 
government for lack of co-operation with the involved collective organiz­
ations (e.g. local authorities, professional and scientific chambers, etc.), and for 
setting forth regulations which might have hazardous effects upon the envi­
ronmental balances and the public health in Athens.
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After all these reactions, the Ministry of Environment was forced to 
withdraw the draft PD.
It seems, nevertheless, that the Conservative government had already 
committed itself to the industrialists' claim to reform the existing PD 84/84 
-as representatives of the Technical Chamber of Greece had revealed {Ta Nea, 
4 January 1992). Thus, one year later (early 1993), the Ministry of Environment 
came back with another draft PD {Ta Nea, 3 January 1993; Katbimerini, 24 
January 1993). The same "story" was repeated once more. The only difference 
the "new" draft had from the 1992 one was that the areas proposed for loca­
tion of new industries and/or expansions of existing ones were named "Zones
of Controlled Development" (ZEA) which "replaced" the older zones of indus­
trial parks proposed by the Structure Plan of Athens. Just like the previous 
case, the Ministry of Indu^ry was not caHW  ^W the preparation
of the draft PD {Ta Nea, 2 January 1993) -something that raised a number of
questions as to the seriousness with which Presidential Decrees were officially 
prepared and crucial decisions for the future of the Athenian production 
space were made.
As it was pointed out in an article (Tsagaratos 1993), the new draft PD 
included some provisions which were considered as turning on the "green 
light" for the establishment of new industries or the expansion of existing 
ones in Athens. Some of those provisions, were the following:
Vertical expansion of existing industrial buildings would be allowed 
only when it would be necessary for the purposes of installing high 
machinery items, or for the purpose of building vertical type ware­
houses (silos).
On the same time horizontal expansions would be allowed for the pur­
pose of accommodating environmental protection installations. The ex­
pansions could take place by deviation from the building regulations as 
to the maximum height of building, the ratio of the covered by the
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whole plot area, the total floorspace, the distances of the building from 
the boundaries of the plot, etc.
Within the "Zones of Controlled Development" vertical expansion of 
existing industrial buildings would be allowed by deviation from the 
building regulations as to the maximum building height, for the pur­
pose of modernization of industrial plants, and under the condition that 
the newly erected constructions would abide by the other building re­
gulations. The modernization-led deviations from the building regula­
tions should be approved by the Ministry of Environment, after the 
agreement of the Ministry of Industry and of the "Athens Organiz­
ation" (responsible for implementing the SPA).
In concluding, the paper's article asserted that Athens could not stand 
more industrial growth, more pollution, even if this growth were taking place 
in such organized zones, no matter whether they were baptized "industrial 
parks", "zones of controlled development", or whatever. In other words, in the 
newspaper's view, new industry is by definition identical to additional 
environmental pollution. To put it in another way, the article followed the 
traditional anti-industrialism by ignoring (or concealing) that new technology- 
led industrial modernization could reduce additional environmental pollution 
caused, as a matter of fact, by old-fashioned industrial plants. Thus, apart 
from avoiding to stimulate sensitivities about deindustrialization and job loss 
in Athens, the article defended the maintenance of the existing situation in 
the name of environmental protection.
According to another relevant article (Galati 1993) published in Ka- 
tbimerini (24 January 1993), this new draft PD was aiming at:
The removal of restrictions imposed by the existing legislation.
The transfer of industrial plants’ operation controls from state's re­
sponsibility to private organizations
The change of criteria in such a way as to allow Athenian industries to 
expand under the mask of modernization.
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The deprivation of local authorities from  the possibilities to exert 
some controls to the conditions of location and operation of the manu­
facturing plants within the radius of their administrative responsibility.
The article tried to defend the restrictions of the PD 84/84 using -as 
usually- the environmental pollution problem. However, (a) it concealed the 
fact that according to special environmental studies (see Kyriakatikos Rizos- 
lastis^  24 September 1989 for a brief presentation) the contribution of in- 
fdustry to the formation of smog in Greater Athens, in most of the pollutants 
constituting it, is much lower than Jh e  contribution of other pollution sources 
(e.g. cars and traffic congestion, central heat, dust from open air waste dis­
posal areas, etc.); (b) it mistakenly identified the urgent need of implementing 
environmental controls in Athens as a need to "exile" industry from Athens; 
and (c) it did not show any kind of sensitivity and concern about the growing 
problem of deindustrialization and job loss in the Greek capital
Some scepticisms on the new draft PD, were also expressed by the 
Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) in a letter sent to the Ministries of Envi­
ronment and Industry {Enimerotiko Deltio TEE, No 1753: 29). In this letter the 
Chamber’s president requested that the draft should be re-examined by the 
government in collaboration with Chamber’s expert engineers. The central 
point of disagreement was that it aimed at removing the existing restrictions 
for the opening of new industries and/or the expansion of existing ones in 
Athens without securing either the modernization of production, or the effec­
tive protection of environment from manufacturing activity. More specifi­
cally, the central points of TEE’s objections were the following:
In the Chamber’s view the Athenian environment is already polluted 
by existing industrial activities and that any possible addition of new 
ones would engender serious danger for the public health. However, 
the possibility of new industries’ opening within the "Zones of Con­
trolled Development" (as the draft PD proposed) should not be ex­
cluded under certain criteria associated not only with the volume of 
investment or with the estimated number of new jobs, but, mainly.
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with the degree of environmental pollution these new activities would 
be expected to cause.
I
!
With regard to the expansion of existing industrial plants for modern­
ization purposes, the Technical Chamber of Greece has the opinion 
that the provisions of the proposed PD are ambiguous and contradic­
tory. For example, it allows for any type of industrial building con­
struction "by deviation" from the building regulations, and on the same 
time it asks the firms to abide by them during the expansion of their 
installations. In TEE’s opinion only vertical expansions should be al­
lowed for the purpose of installing new mechanical equipment, and 
only when supported by special studies which:
(a) should justify the necessity of such modernization-led expan­
sions in each particular case,
(b) should estimate the implementation possibilities of the expan­
sion projects and the expected returns on the expansion invest­
ments,
(c) should assess the environmental impacts of the proposed expan­
sion projects.
The Technical Chamber requests the provisions related with the expan­
sions for environmental protection purposes to be expressed with 
special clarity. More particularly it requests:
(a) The Ministry of Industry should issue a set of detailed standards 
and criteria by which each expansion project would have to 
abide, and only when it is thoroughly justified that the buildings 
and equipment needed for environmental protection cannot be 
accommodated in the existing spaces of the applying firm.
(b) The Ministry of Industry should undertake concrete engage­
ments for the implementation of the expansion projects accord­
ing to the submitted expansion plans.
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As it was expected, the above reasonable propositions of TEE were not 
accepted by the Conservative administration. However, it seems that these ob­
jections along with the existing negative climate within the public opinion 
and the other collective organizations, averted the government from proceed­
ing to the final approval of the draft PD, probably because this would entail a 
serious political cost for the governing party.
Apart, however, from the substantial dimensions of the whole issue 
-that is, the question of whether or not the industrial space of Athens should 
develop and expand- the way this issue was dealt by the governmental bodies 
(and especially by the Ministry of Environment), revealed a serious lack of 
internal cohesion and collaboration between the initiators of the proposed 
PDs and other involved decision bodies (like the Ministry of Industry), as well 
as incredibility -if not direct hostility- against scientific organizations like the 
Technical Chamber of Greece, the various professional organizations or the 
local authorities. Moreover, the proposed legislative reform was of a piece­
meal character lacking explicit or implicit correlations with a broader urban- 
industrial strategy. Such a reform could only be realised in the context of 
wider policies for the rational development and modernization of industry, 
the re-organization of urban space and the protection of environment 
{Enimerotiko Deltio TEE, No 1651:11), which, simply, did not exist As a result, 
these spasmodic official attempts strengthened the already existing anti-in­
dustrial mentality of the Athenian public opinion, and, as a matter of fact, 
made any possibilities of finding a consensual solution to fade away.
However, there were possibilities of establishing some degrees of con­
sent between the government policy-makers and the social organizations in 
order to sketch out alternative paths for the development, modernization and 
spatial organization of industry in Athens. In an interview given by the presi­
dent of the Technical Chamber of Greece to the Athenian radio station "Sky" 
on 9th of January 1992, he admitted that the existing PD 84/84 needed reform:
What I want to say, is that the notorious PD 84/84 which defines the 
preconditions for the establishment, expansion, location, relocation and 
modernization of manufacturing in Attica, should be reformed. This is
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so because science and technology develop, hence an activity, a produc­
tive process which was causing pollution in 1984, by introducing new 
anti-pollution technologies may well be quite acceptable today. This is 
also why social responsibility and dialogue (between the government 
and the scientific world) has to be established. This is why Presidential 
Decrees should not be drafted out in Ministry offices, alone, but to be 
also discussed with organizations having opinion on these issues, and 
-why not- to be subject to public check and balance controls... There­
fore, there do exist possibilities for the establishment of new manufac­
turing activities in Attica. We do not wish the weakening of Attica’s 
production base. On the contrary. But there is also the development of 
technology that provides all those possibilities, if we take into account 
that the adoption of new technologies in production is a promising in­
vestment and not a concession to the need of environmental protection 
{Enimerotiko Deltio TEE, No 1697:19).
Faced with an increasingly hostile economic and social surrounding, the 
Athenian industrialists reacted by exercising pressures and by handing in suc­
cessive reports to the Ministries of Environment and Industry requesting per­
sistently an overall reform of the existing legislation {Ta Nea, 13 September
1991). In their view, the most crucial problem fostering anti-industrial atti­
tudes and blocking necessary legislative reforms, is the "political speculation" 
of the environmental issue. This speculation has been based upon an effort to 
magnify artificially the participation of industry in the formation of the 
environmental problem, in order to conceal the state’s inability or unwilling­
ness to tackle with it effectively {Express, 22 February 1989). The industria­
lists asserted that they have to face numerous day-to-day problems with 
ministry officials threatening to withdraw their plants operation permits, or 
problems with local authorities declaring publicly that they would motivate 
local people to invade and take over the plants in order to prevent them from 
polluting the environment (ibid.).
Such problems, were met with a lot of scepticism by the president of 
SVAP, Mr. Fyrogenis, in an interview {Kyriakatikos Rizospastis, 19 January
1992). He stated that the problem of environmental degradation in Athens is 
not caused by the big organized manufacturing companies, but rather by the 
numerous small units in branches such as metal smelting, dye-works, tinsmith- 
works and tanneries.^ He further asserted that Athenian industries are
 ^ As it will be shown in the analysis of the Eleonas central city industrial space (chap. 
8, sect 8.2X such units are dispersed in the urban tissue, are sheltered in miserable improvised
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currently "trapped" in a legislative framework which by preventing moderniz­
ation and expansion tends to generate successive waves of labour redun­
dancies threatening to transform Greater Athens into a huge Lavrion.^
The official prohibition of plants* expansions in Athens was met with 
the classical practical manner by those companies whose dynamism led them 
to increase their scale of operations: Closing down of the Athens plants, firing 
the workers and building-up new ones in peripheral areas, contributing, there­
fore, to the deindustrialization of Athens and to growing unemployment rates. 
It seems, however, that the political world and the public opinion, for reasons 
that will be addressed in the last section of this chapter, have been trapped in 
the false dilemma: "industry -vs- environment", without being able to propose 
a comprehensive alternative for industrial development, productive moderniz­
ation and environmental protection of Athens.
7.4. Towards an Explanation of Antl-industriailsm
The origins of the practice and culture of anti-industrialism in Athens, can be 
found in the combined and interacting effects of economic and political-ideo­
logical reasons:
First and foremost, there is a set of economic causes which maintain 
and reproduce anti-industrial attitudes: As it was shown in a previous chapter, 
the post-war model of Greek industrialization was mostly based on the "com- 
parative advantage" of cheap labour and state’s protectionism, without striv­
ing to establish a strong technological background, a well grounded nexus of 
modernization mechanisms and institutions and associated productive working 
attitudes and cultures. Thus, as soon as this industrialization model passed in 
crisis during the 1970s without exhibiting convincing abilities to restructure 
and follow the high-tech developments of the more advanced economies, its
buildings and operate illegally without any official control.
 ^ Lavrion is a traditional industrial town (textiles and mining) situated 50 km south­
east of Athens, near Sounio, which was recently struck by deindustrialization and mass un­
employment (see Kourliouros and Laskaris 1992).
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internal weaknesses were immensely magnified and its past "prestige" was 
widely disputed. The weak position of industrial capital in the Greek econ­
omic system and its inability to modernize and initiate a new developmental 
dynamism, as well as the multiplicity of other (non-industrial) economic in­
terests and their increased ability to influence the state machinery (chap. 2), 
the lack of a homogenous industrial bourgeoisie, etc, are some basic factors 
that have questioned the past "profile" of manufacturing industry as a leading 
power in modern Greek economy and society. Environmental concerns, com­
bined with the "post-industrial" prospects of a fast growing service economy 
in Athens, seem to have gained in importance at the expense of production 
concerns. At the geographical scale, the way the post-war Greek industrializ­
ation model "treated" the Athenian space, was, as a matter of fact, cata­
strophic. The case of Eleonas, which will be examined in the next chapter, 
provides a characteristic example of how industrial capital "treated" urban 
space and quality of life in the Greek capital during many years of "a wild 
and primitive urbanization" (ERG 1992b: 1). The unplanned growth of in­
dustry, the lack of elementary hierarchies in the internal organization of the 
Athenian agglomeration and the associated land-use conflicts and negative 
externalities, are the major factors feeding antitheses between the various 
(non-industrial) service-oriented urban interests on the one hand, and indus­
trial capital on the other.
Second, the sources of anti-industrialism are associated with an ideo­
logical current which expanded rapidly during the 1970s within wider masses 
in the Greek society and which became the mainstream ideology as soon as 
the Socialists came to office in 1981 (for an overall critique of PASOK’s ideo­
logical foundations see Elefantis 1991). The key-points of that ideological cur­
rent rested in the "dependency school" theorems which were "transplanted" 
from Latin American countries to the case of Greece by the Socialists* leader 
Professor Andreas Papandreou (see Papandreou 1975; 1981) as well as by other 
advocates of the "dependency school" (see e.g. Vergopoulos 1975; Fotopoulos 
1985; Lambos 1988). Within the broader context of that current, the structure 
of the post-war Greek economy and society was conceived as being deter­
mined by the dependent position of the country in the "periphery" of world
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capitalist system -a system whose conditions of operation in terms of produc­
tion, distribution and exchange were set and manipulated by the capitalist 
"metropolises" and especially by the USA. Within this system of dependent 
relationships, any industrial accumulation process taking place in a "periphe­
ral" country like Greece, did not necessarily trigger off economic develop­
ment, but, instead, it tended to maintain underdevelopment since the created 
material wealth did not get reinvested in the national economy as to sustain 
an endogenous developmental dynamism, but was exported to the "metropolis" 
(geographical transfer of value) or consumed by the domestic bourgeoisie in 
luxury goods and in a provocatively wealthy way of life. This fundamental 
economic relation was conceived as determining, in its own terms, the role 
and the attitudes of social classes and strata of the Greek social formation. 
Industrial bourgeoisie was conceived as tightly affiliated with that de­
pendency nexus, hence unable by nature to initiate an independent national 
strategy of economic and social development By contrast to the Marxian ap­
proach that viewed industrial bourgeoisie as a historically progressive class 
destined to contribute to the development of capitalism's productive forces 
and thus to the setting of the material base of socialism, the dependency ap­
proaches viewed "peripheral" industrial bourgeoisie as the basic barrier to 
economic development, modernization and social progress. Hence, the state 
apparatus was perceived as the only organized mechanism which -if con­
trolled by a progressive government- would be capable of undertaking such 
economic development initiatives and social transformations from dependency 
to national emancipation and further to socialism.
A whole decade of strict statist restrictions imposed upon the Athenian manu­
facturing within a widespread anti-industrial social, ideological and cultural 
surrounding, contributed to the further degradation and decline of the Greek 
capital's production base. On the other hand, however, it created reverse pol­
itical trends as soon as the Concervatives of ND came back to office in 1990. 
Trends based on the belief that Socialists' statism of the 1980s was unable to 
offer viable solutions to the developmental and locational problems of the
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Athenian industrial space, and that what was needed was a decisive shift 
towards an unfreeze of the market forces. In that context, one of the first 
spatial regulations of the ND government was ratified by Presidential Decree 
74D/1991 for the regeneration and development of Eleonas -a huge inner city 
declining industrial area. The basic production characteristics of this area, the 
details and the underlying logic of that governmental large-scale initiative, as 
well as the socio-political controversies it brought about in the Athenian so­
ciety, will be critically examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
SOCIO-POLITICAL DEBATES AND PRACTICES 
OVER INDUSTRIAL SPACE IN CONTEMPORARY ATHENS: 
THE CASE OF ELEONAS
8.1. The General Framework of Economic Policy 
In the Early 1990s
A basic programmatic commitment of ND Conservatives when they came to 
office in 1990, was the abolition of the public sector and the unfreeze of 
market forces as the only viable policy alternative for the regeneration and 
development of the decaying Greek economy and industry. The theoretical 
foundations of such policy priorities were posed in a couple of articles written 
by A. Andrianopoulos (1987; 1992) -a then key party officer and ideology pro­
ducer in the Conservatives’ apparatus.^ These priorities were broad "reflec­
tions" of New Right policy guidelines developed elsewhere (especially in the 
USA and UK) but moulded especially for the Greek case (see Fotopoulos 1993: 
chap. 3 for a criticism). This model of economic policy, had already started to 
show its demerits in both the USA (Albert 1993: 44-66; Wolff 1994) and the 
UK (Mouzelis 1990a), as its adoption was creating extended social zones of 
economic inequality and new urban poverty, and as its inability to solve the 
major problems of deindustrialization and job loss was becoming increasingly 
evident during the 1980s. In Greece, however, the collapse of Socialists’ stat­
ism in late 1980s along with a more general popular mistrust (due to political 
scandals and trials) favoured the growth of neo-conservatism, which, in the 
1990 general elections grew to dominance (although with a marginal majority 
of 151 votes out of 3(X) in the Parliament). Amongst the new government’s 
basic priorities the most central one was the implementation of a wave of pri­
vatization of big companies formerly controlled or directly owned by the 
' In November 1994 he left the Conservative Party for political and personal reasons.
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state, for the purpose of increasing their productivity and for bringing money 
into the state budget In that context, the biggest cement production company 
of the country, AG ET- Hercules, (and probably one of the biggest in Europe) 
which was formerly owned by the state, was sold to an Italian firm. The 
public enterprise of Urban Transport in Athens (EAS) employing over 8,000 
persons, was also privatized and all staff was made redundant. Many other 
smaller public companies were privatized as well There were also projects for 
the privatization of the Public Telecom Company (OTE) which, however, 
were not materialized due to considerable objections even within the Concer- 
vative party itself.^
Despite the general shift of economic priorities in early 1990s, the 
sphere of spatial policies did not experience any dramatic change. The basic 
legislative framework for urban planning (Law 1337/1983) remained the same. 
The Structure Plan of Athens (Law 1515/1985) did not change at a ll The PD 
84/84 for the development and location of Athenian manufacturing industry 
remained, since all reform efforts failed as we saw in the previous chapter.
The only area chosen as a "pilot-case" for implementing a kind of neo-con-
 i — -    -.......  p. . - .        ,
servative planning model for the Athenian industrial space was Eleonas -the 
most important industrial locality of Greater Athens which was hit by dein­
dustrialization and job loss.
The major production characteristics and problems of that area will be 
addressed in the next section (8.2), while in the following ones we will shift to 
an examination of the Conservatives’ proposal for Eleonas which was ratified 
by a presidential decree (PD 74D/1991), and on this basis to an analysis of the 
socio-political reactions, debates and alternatives which were arisen as soon as 
the PD at issue came into publicity. Throughout this analysis it is hoped to 
show that the basic problems facing the contemporary Athenian industrial 
space (whose major part is Eleonas) are not merely or strictly spatio-economic 
problems, but foremost socio-political problems; that is, problems stemming 
from the inability of establishing even a minimum "amount" of consensus
* A party group, leaded by MEvert and opposing CMltsotakis* leadership, was in fa­
vour of a policy shift towards more socially sensitive objectives. After the coming of Socia­
lists to office, in the October 1993 general elections, MEvert became the party leader.
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between the governmental planning bodies on the one hand, and the various 
social groupings and organizations on the other -a consensus necessary for the 
implementation of planning policies.
8.2. A Summary Survey of the Eleonas Industrial Area
This declining industrial locality is located in the middle of Greater Athens 
agglomeration near to both its administrative/business centre (CBD) and the 
installations of the Piraeus port (fig. 8.1), and it is extended over a vast area of 
about 8,700 stremmas (8,700,000 sq.m. or about 2,175 acres). Although the 
territory of Eleonas -in geographical, historical and economic terms- forms an 
entity, in administrative terms it is fragmented along the five surrounding 
municipalities (city of Athens, Tavros, Agios loannis Rentis, Egaleo and 
Peristeri).
Eleonas was traditionally a place providing Athenian population with 
agricultural products (mainly olive oil). Its olive trees, known from ancient 
times, gave the area its name which literary means "olive grove" -although 
there is little today to remind this name. The area started to obtain a vague 
industrial character during the late 19th century, as Piraeus’ industrial zone 
was expanding northwards along the main road and rail transport arteries 
linking the port with the Athenian centre (chap. 4, sect 4.1). These trends kept 
on during the interwar period, but the character of the area remained mostly 
agricultural Until 1991, the area was outside the statutory city-plan although 
it was surrounded by densely built municipalities, and this was the main rea­
son for keeping land prices in it at relatively low levels. During the first post­
war decades, however, major changes took place: The existence of abundant 
and cheap land in that area and its favourable geographical location, attracted 
a great portion of Athenian industrialization as well as many other associated 
activities (truck transport agencies, warehouses, commercial activities, etc.X 
seeking a cheap oulet in the middle of the metropolitan space-economy. 
Working-class residential clusters and other linked urban activities were grad­
ually created within and around the area. Relatively big plants developed
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Figure 8.1 The location o f Eleonas industrial area in Greater Athens
EL
*
m
SOURCE: Adapted from  L.1515/1985.
303
along the major transport arteries crossing the area (Kifissou, Petrou Ralli, 
Athinon and lera Odos avenues) while small manufacturing units scattered 
across the whole tissue.
By 1984, the dominant land-use in terms of occupied space, was manu­
facturing industry (table 8.1). Manufacturing was also dominant in terms of 
number of establishments and employment It shared the majority of total 
area’s establishments and employment, whereas the shares of service activities 
were much lower (table 8.2). However, as we saw in a previous chapter, dein­
dustrialization and job loss affected especially the inner-city industry of 
Greater Athens. In just a few years (1978-1984), Eleonas experienced a moder­
ate decline in its number of manufacturing establishments (-6.8%) and a sharp 
employment downswing (-23.1%) (ERG 1992a, VoL 1: 30).
T able 8.1 The major land-uses in Eleonas, 1984
Land-use Area (000 sq.m.) %
Manufacturing industry 3,477 39.96
Undeveloped land, agricultural fields, athletic 
fields
1,153 13.25
Open yards (with materials), transport agencies 
and stations
783 9.0
Road network 713 8.19
Warehouses 588 6.76
Military installations 219 2.52
Central Athens vegetable market 233 2.68
Public organizations 523 6.01
Residence 342 3.93
Education 225 2.59
Commercial activities 446 5.13
Total 8,702 100.00
SOURCE: ERG 1992a, VoL2: table 3.
In 1984, small enterprises (employing up to 10 workers) shared the vast 
majority (75.9%) of the total number of the area’s manufacturing establish­
ments, but only a small proportion (17.7%) of total manufacturing employment 
which was concentrated in a few large companies (ERG 1992a, VoL 1; 35).
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Table BJ2 Number o f establishments and employment in Eleonas 1984
Sector No of establi­
shments
% Employment %
Manufacturing industry 2,316 65.1 38,042 88.1
Tertiary (service) sector 1241 34.9 5,132 119
Total 3,557 100.0 43,174 100.0
SOURCE: Adapted from ERG 1992a, VoLB: 2.10.
The branch structure of the area by 1984 (table 8.3), shows that in 
terms of number of manufacturing establishments the capital branch group 
predominated whereas the consumer and intermediate ones shared lower per­
centages. However, in employment terms, it was the consumer branches that 
predominated. More specifically, the ordering of branches according to their 
share in total area*s manufacturing establishments and employment was as 
follows (based on table 8.3):
In terms o f number o f establishments
(35) Metal products (15.59%)
(38) transport equipment (14.64%)
(36) non electric machinery (7.99%)
(30) pubber/plastic (7.86%)
(26) furniture (7.64%)
(37) electric equipment (6.69%)
(20) foods (5.31%)
(23) textiles (4.92%)
(33) non metallic minerals (4.84%)
(24) cloths/footwear (4.66%)
(31) chemicals (4.15%)
(29) leather/fur (3.58%)
(25) wood/cork (3.54%)
(28) printing/publishing (2.98%)
(27) paper (1.90%)
(39) miscellaneous (1.77%)
(34) basic metals (0.73%)
(21) drinks (0.60%)
(22) tobacco (0.09%)
In employment terms
(23) textiles (1179%)
(35) metal products (11.41%)
(31) chemicals (10.14%)
(20) foods (9.38%)
(30) rubber/plastic (8.4%)
(38) transport equipment (7.21%)
(27) paper (6.92%)
(37) electric equipment (6.47%)
(24) cloths/footwear (6.01%)
(26) furniture (4.51%)
(36) non electric machinery (4.22%)
(21) drinks (3.42%)
(28) printing/publishing (2.51%)
(33) non metallic minerals (2.06%)
(29) leather/fur (168%)
(25) wood/cork (1.33%)
(39) miscellaneous (0.83%)
(32) petroleum/coal products (0.82%)
(34) basic metals (0.49%)
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Table 83 Manufacturing establishments and employment in Eleonas
by branch, 1984
Code Branch No of esta­
blishments
% Employment %
Non durable consumer goods 857 37.00 18,560 48.79
20. Foods 123 5.31 3,570 938
2L Drinks 14 0.6 1,300 3.42
22 Tobacco 2 0.09 149 0.39
23. Textiles 114 4.92 4,487 11.79
24. Clothing/Footwear 108 4.66 2,288 6.01
25. Wood/Cork 82 3.54 507 133
26. Furniture 177 7.64 1,717 431
27. Paper 44 L9 2634 6.92
28. Printing/Publishing 69 298 955 251
29. Leather/Fur 83 3.58 638 1.68
39. Miscellaneous 41 1.77 315 0.83
Intermediate goods 402 17.36 8,147 2L42
30. Rubber/Plastic 182 7.86 3,194 8.4
31. Chemicals 96 4.15 3,858 10.14
32 Petroleum and coal products 12 0.52 313 0.82
33. Non metallic minerals 112 4.84 782 206
Capital goods and durables 1,057 45.64 11,335 29.8
34. Basic metals 17 0.73 185 0.49
35. Metal products 361 15.59 4,342 11.41
36. Non electric machinery 185 7.99 1,606 4.22
37. Electric equipment 155 6.69 2461 6.47
38. Transport equipment 339 14.64 2741 7.21
Total 2,316 100 38,042 100
SOURCE: ERG 1992a, VoL3: 2.10.
Although more recent data for the area does not exist, according to 
relevant information stemming from interviews and discussions with the 
area’s industrialists, local authorities, labour unions, etc., manufacturing em­
ployment is constantly decreasing in Eleonas,_and this is not mainly due to  ^ ■ -------------------  ..... .--C? " - -^------------------------------------------------ --
plants’ relocation tendencies, but rather to endogenous problems associated 
with the wider Greater, Athens’ deindustrialization dynamic. In a more de­
tailed survey of 37 large companies employing about 25% of the total manu­
facturing employment in Eleonas (ERG 1992a, VoLl: chap. 5) it was revealed 
that 43% of them had proceeded in labour redundancies during the last years
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due to (a) decrease of the level of demand for their products and (b) techno­
logical modernization initiatives (ibid.: 231-2). According to the survey, the 
major problems Eleonas* industries face are associated with:
market shrinkages (decreases in the level of demand)
strong price competition from imported manufacturing products
high cost of money
production modernization and expansion related difficulties 
problems stemming from the ambiguous legislation for the urban re­
generation and development of the area (see more analytically in the 
following sections)
bad road network and traffic congestion (ERG 1992a, VoLk 245).
Closures of manufacturing plants and transformation of their buildings 
into warehouse or commercial ones is a common situation which is gradually 
transforming the character of the area from industrial into a services one. 
There do exist some trends of production relocation to the suburbs and even 
to peripheral regions, but Eleonas* industries wishing to relocate have to cope 
with a number of problems such as:
established links with the Athenian market 
high relocation costs
lack of skilled labour away from Athens (ERG 1992a, VoL 1: 245).
Soine companies reported that the major factors preventing them from 
relocating outwards are:
the existence of private land in Eleonas and
easy transport accessibility to the Piraeus port installations (ibid.).
Some other companies reported that they would undertake relocation 
initiatives under the following presuppositions:
if there were the appropriate "receiving spaces" in terms of infrastruc­
ture provision and reasonable distance from major urban services, and
if they were subsidized especially for that purpose (relocation grants 
and loans, tax concessions, etc.) (ibid.).
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In the case of Eleonas’ polluting manufacturing branches (metal- 
melting/metallizing works, tanneries, tile/brick-making works and concrete 
production works), the relocation option has been accepted by industrialists, 
but has not yet been materialized due to problems and delays associated with 
the official definition "on the ground" of the appropriate receiving spaces on 
the metropolitan periphery. It is worth noting that special technical/economic 
relocation studies have been long before carried out and the responsible gov­
ernmental bodies (Ministries of Industry and Environment) have agreed to the 
relocation of those polluting branches outside the urbanized areas of Greater 
Athens (ERG 1992a; ERG 1992b).
Another important point stemming from the aforementioned survey, is 
that a dense local network of linkages between industries and other activities 
prevails in the area (ERG 1992a, Volk 233-4). The various linkages can be 
classified as follows:
Linkages between industries and the Athenian consumption m arket 
These are especially important for consumer oriented industries such as 
foods/drinks, paper, paints, detergents or for other industries covering 
basic needs of the population such as clothing/footwear, plastic stuffs 
for home-use, electrical goods, bricks and concrete.
Linkages with other industries especially in products like leather, 
threads, cartons, synthetic resins and greasy acids, or in branches which 
undertake subcontracting work.
Linkages with suppliers of raw materials and products (especially those 
imported in the Piraeus port).
Linkages with the local labour market
Linkages with specialized urban services, technical equipment and 
know-how provided at central Athens areas.
Linkages with the local truck transport agencies. These are particularly 
important for industries distributing their products into wider Greek 
areas. Since the surveyed companies were large ones and most of them
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owned private transport means, the linkages between industries and 
transport agencies must be much more dense and strong in the case of 
smaller manufacturing units.
The landownership structure in Eleonas is extremely perplexed, the 
production units are in $heir great majority sheltered in rented buildings, and 
public organizations own large tracts of land (DEH, OTE, EAS, OSK, Banks, 
Ministries, Army, etc.) (ERG 1992a). Apart from the compactly built zones 
along the major transport arteries, the area as a whole has not been densely 
built. Many activities (e.g. building materials yards, tile and brick-making 
works, warehouses, etc.) are land-consuming, do not offer considerable 
amounts of jobs in the local labour market and burden excessively the area 
with heavy traffic volumes, while many plots and buildings are derelict and 
used as waste disposal places. With the exception of some big industrial units 
which pollute severely the environment (e.g. the ETMA artificial silk produc­
tion plant) and the dispersed metal-melting works, metallizing works and tan­
neries, air quality measurements revealed that considerable air pollution is 
caused by traffic (ERG 1992a). Pollution is further intensified on the one hand 
by the area’s topographical characteristics (lower level of the Athenian basin 
and building up of the natural north-south air corridors), and on the other by 
the chaotic urban structure, the contingent spatial configuration and poor 
condition of the existing road network.
The unplanned conditions under which the area industrialized, drove to 
the creation of a contradictory landscape of "cheap growth" whose maia,cJhuar- 
acteristic is a chaotic mixture of activities lacking even an elementary hier­
archy in terms of land-use zoning, transport arrangement or basic 
infrastructure provision. Highly polluting units like tanneries, metal-melting 
and metallizing works, have been built next to residential buildings, schools 
and kindergardens, army camps next to open waste disposal yards and derelict 
buildings, narrow roads leading to plants and warehouses through agricultural 
fields and vacant plots, public buildings and installations next to truck trans­
port agencies, and so forth. If we add the high traffic volume from the con­
tinuous movement of large trucks along the narrow interior roads (e.g. Agias 
Annis str) and the associated air and noise pollution, one can easily imagine 
the existing situation in Eleonas.
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Severe pollution and environmental degradation problems are caused 
by the numerous small manufacturing units in branches like tanneries, 
metal-melting works, metallizing works, etc. These units are dispersed within 
the whole area, are accommodated in improvised buildings lacking even ele­
mentary hygiene standards, most of them operate illegally during nights (ERG 
1992a), employ mostly low-wage immigrants from Third World countries,^ and 
form niches of "manufacturing misery" in Eleonas (fig. 8.2). By contrast, most 
large companies are accommodated in modern factory-buildings forming a 
typical industrial landscape (fig. 8.3). This contradictory landscape of produc­
tion seems that has led to an underlying "conflict" between large-firm and 
small-firm industrial capitalists in the area: In the previously mentioned sur­
vey the majority of large firms reported that a basic presupposition for any 
production and environmental improvement initiative in the area, is the ur­
gent relocation of all those polluting SMEs away from Eleonas (ERG 1992a, 
VoL L* 246).
8.3. Past Attempts and Alternative Proposals for 
Regulating the Eleonas Industrial Space
Problems and issues relating to Eleonas are by no way new; they had been 
discussed in public and/or even given planning attempts by the state long be­
fore. Public concerns and alternative proposals flourished especially after the 
publication of the Law 1515 in 1985 by which the Structure Plan of Athens 
was ratified; however some planning attempts had been undertaken much 
earlier, but without bringing in practical result as we will see in that section.
The early post-war Master Plans of Greater Athens provided some in­
dicative guidelines for the land uses which were supposedly allowed to devel­
op in Eleonas (Giannikopoulou 1992). The 1954 Master Plan identified the area 
as a residential low density one and only some small land zones were drafted 
up for industrial use. The almost marginal presence of such uses in that Plan 
can be attributed to the fact that by the 1950s industrial growth in Athens 
was still kept at a low pace, hence the demand for space was still low. But in 
the 1965 Master Plan, much more zones for industrial use were drafted
Information from personal vis is is to such "plants*.
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Figure 8.2 Clusters o f "manufacturing misery" in Eleonas
\
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Figure 8.3 Typical industrial landscape in present-day Eleonas
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-especially along Eleonas* major transport arteries. These zones, however, 
were never legislated-by-law as exclusively industrial zones with certain re­
gulations for their development, for the erection of industrial buildings in 
them and for the construction of the necessary infrastructure networks. Eleo- 
nas remained outside the statutory city-plan and legal construction of any in­
dustrial building in it had to take place on relatively large plots of land.^ As a 
consequence, only big and growing manufacturing firms were able to afford 
the cost of purchasing such plots in order to built their plants legally and with 
some care for the organization of built and free spaces. Smaller firms tended 
to shelter their production activities in illegally built improvised constructions 
on small plots of land -constructions which had n ^ th e  slightest similarity to 
the sort of a modern industrial structure, and which were increasingly creat­
ing "clusters of manufacturing misery" as we saw previously.
The lack of historical sensitivity for the situation in which Eleonas was 
driven all those decades of spontaneous growth, was stressed out in an article 
published in the 4 January 1987 issue of the economic review Economikos Ta- 
cbydromos (Stereopoulos 1987). The article pointed out that the growing ex­
pansion of heterogeneous activities at the expense of free spaces is 
threatening the histoncal and càlturaJ identity of that area. The basic point of 
the article was that the Athenian citizens themselves (by undertaking increas­
ing production activity in the area), and mostly the Greek state (by its apathy 
for the area’s future) were systematically deteriorating a rare natural monu­
ment of Greek history, a meeting-place of the ancient Greek "walking philo­
sophers", a place in which more than 150,000 olive trees were growing during 
the classical era and in which only some of them (of an age over 2,000 years) 
still remain among the factories’ chimneys.
There is not even an archaeologist, student, historian, etc., to record 
those living monuments, those unique witnesses of our world and of 
our life, evidently because they do not entail the glamour of discovery 
... since we have been taught to consider them as modest and meaning­
less (Stereopoulos 1987).
 ^ According to PD 717/86, the minimum plot area that could be given building per­
mission for the legal erection of an industrial building was 20,000 sq.m.
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However, it is not only the lack of historical sensitivity that has driven 
this inner-city production area to a situation of degradation and decline, but 
also the way Greek capitalism developed.
This wasteland o f uses had been -and continues to be nowadays- the 
recipient of all those functions the Greek development model, Greek 
capitalism, did not dare to locate anywhere else. Situated in the middle 
of the western part of Greater Athens, this area was never included in 
the statutory city plan although it is firmly surrounded by i t  When in 
extraordinary cases we are obliged to drive along the big transport ar­
teries crossing it, we tend to accelerate or to "close" our eyes «. denying 
carefully to admit that especially here we can touch the field in which 
misery has been established and in which everything has been aban­
doned to its fate (Kloutsinioti 1988: 29).
The 1979 Master.Elan " C a p i t a l Gazette 341B/1980) pro­
posed some measures for the reorganization of Eleonas by drafting zones for 
the exclusive location of medium pollution industries, as well as some envi­
ronmental protection measures. More precisely, the Plan’s basic objectives 
were: (a) the balanced growth of Athens in relation to the other areas of the 
country, and (b) the imprpyement of living conditions and work productivity 
in the Greek capital In one of the Plan’s 18 key points, there was specific ref­
erence to the need of undertaking co-ordinated action for the purpose of or­
ganizing and upgrading the industrial clusters in Athens and of protecting the 
environment from further degradation. There was also a note that residential 
areas should coexist with non-polluting manufacturing activity for the pur­
pose of transport volume minimization and energy saving, whereas medium 
pollution industries should be clustered and organized in industrial zones the 
majority of which was situated within the geographical boundaries of 
Eleonas.
However, these measures, just like the previous ones, were never im­
plemented in practice, and Eleonas was once more left outside the statutory 
city-plan, with all the negative consequences this implied upon it 
(continuation of illegal buildings construction, lack of appropriate energy, 
transport, communications and sewerage infrastructure, traffic congestion, air 
and noise pollution, etc.).
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On August 1981, the PD 791/1981 -addressed to the conditions and 
measures for the development and location of manufacturing industry in 
Attica- was published in the O fficial Gazette (Issue No. 207A/1981) (chap. 6). 
According to this PD, the areas allowed to "receive" new and/or relocated 
manufacturing plants in Athens were drastically restricted. Most of them, re­
aching a total of 4,000 stremmas (400 Ha), were situated in Eleonas and in the 
neighbouring municipalities, where there already existed manufacturing 
clusters from the past. The PD 84/84, which replaced PD 791/1981, restricted 
further the vital space of industry in Athens (chap. 6). The industrial zones in 
Eleonas were reduced from 4,000 to about 3,500 stremmas (350 Ha).
Some more focused planning attempts and relevant discussions on the 
Eleonas issue, started to flourish after the legislation of the Structure Plan of 
Athens by the Socialists’ administration in the mid 1980s (Law 1515/1985). The 
SPA’s orientations were aiming at:
the ecological upgrading of Athens
the protection of its urban landscape
the protection of its historical and cultural heritage, and
the improvement of its downgraded areas
Moreover, article 3 proposed "the improvement of the environment and 
quality of life throughout redistributions of urban functions and activities, re­
location of polluting installations" etc, whereas article 15 proposed the 
"redistribution of manufacturing employment in the whole Greater Athens 
area throughout reorganization and renewal of the traditional industrial con­
centrations into industrial parks with the necessary free spaces for public use 
and green".
In the Structure Plan’s land use map, Eleonas was drafted as a unified 
complex of industrial parks (VIPA) and handicraft parks (VIOPA) surrounded 
by zones of green.
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The general urban plans (GPSs) of the adjacent municipalities which 
were drafted according to L.1313/1983 after the directions of the Structure 
Plan of Athens, proposed the following land-use scheme for Eleonas:
Industrial and handicraft parks reaching a total area of about 5,500 
stremmas (550 Ha) -that is, around 68% of the total GPS area in 
Eleonas.
Residential uses of about 1,400 stremmas (17%)
Administration activities along lera Odos, of about 200 stremmas (25%) 
Education activities of about 430 stremmas (5.0%)
Social activities (of a supra-urban range) of about 300 stremmas (4.0%) 
Transport park of about 150 stremmas (2.0%)
Special activities (military buildings and camps) of about 120 stremmas 
(1.5%).
As it can be remarked, the dominant land-use proposed was manufac­
turing. The actions which were allowed to take place within the boundaries of 
VIP A-VIOPA, were the following:
Expansions of low to medium pollution manufacturing plants. 
Relocation of low to medium pollution plants previously located in 
residential areas of the neighbouring municipalities.
Removal of big plants which pollute the environment and which for 
various technical reasons cannot adopt anti-pollution technologies as to 
fall in the category of medium pollution activities (These units should 
be defined in specific technical-economic and environmental studies). 
Removal of small heavily polluting plants (metal-melting and metalliz­
ing works, tanneries, brickworks-tileworks and asphalt materials).
In the above directions, the Ministry of Environment started to fund 
special planning studies for the VIPA-VIOPA of Attica in 1985. One of those 
studies was carried out by the National Technical University of Athens (RG 
1988) in order to be used as a "pilot project" for the other VIPA-VIOPA 
studies which were appointed to private planning offices. For reasons
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associated with the structure of socio-economic interests in urban space and 
the inability of the state machine to impose rational planning measures (chap. 
2), none of those studies was finally legislated and/or implemented "on the 
ground". Furthermore, the funding of some of them was cut before their full 
completion.
The Eleonas case was addressed in two special planning studies carried 
out during the 1980s (Papagiannis and Associates 1987 and 1988; Katsoufis 
planning office 1987). Both studies followed the basic guidelines of the Athens 
Structure Plan by proposing manufacturing as the major land use in Eleonas 
which was defined as a complex of industrial and handicraft parks. In that 
park-complex, the location of low and medium pollution plants and the re­
location of dispersed ones from residential areas in the neighbouring munici­
palities would take place in an organized manner, and the necessary 
infrastructure, free spaces and spaces for public use and green would also be 
provided.
However, the planning efforts for the reorganization of Eleonas along 
the SPA’s guidelines, were regarded by the press as "ambitious and probably 
expensive illusions" (see e.g. To Vima, 6 June 1991). Moreover, they brought 
about contrasting reactions and debates by various social groupings, as we will 
see in the following lines.
On 3rd of July 1988 the editorial board of A n ti (a radical left review) 
organized a public meeting in Eleonas. In that event, delegates of the Socialist 
government, the major political parties, the area’s local authorities and lots of 
interested citizens were gathered in order to express opinion and to suggest 
alternative solutions to the accumulated problems of the area (see Anti, No 
378; see also the 4 July 1988 dailies: A vriani Ta Nea, Eleutheros Typos, Etbnos, 
Proti). By contrast to the government’s proposal for transforming Eleonas 
into an industrial and handicraft park-complex according to the SPA’s guide­
lines, the periodical {Anti No 377) set forth a quite different alternative: 
Policy priorities should be given to the relocation of the best part of Eleonas’ 
production activities, so that the occupied space to be regained and
317
transformed into a big green park of metropolitan significance. In other 
words, the periodical pushed forward a "green" anti-industrial scenario for 
Eleonas without taking into consideration the already existing dense local net­
work of economic activity which was offering employment to more than 
40,000 working people. The stock of land which would be necessary for the 
implementation of the green scenario, should be gathered -in the periodical’s 
view- from two main sources: (a) from the obligatory land contribution of the 
area’s landowners as Law 1313/83 imposes, and mainly (b) from mass private 
land expropriations.
As soon as this scenario was publicly suggested, the then Minister of 
Environment E. Kouloubis, reacted {Ta Nea, 4 July 1988) by pointing out that 
the periodical’s proposal for land expropriations on a mass scale, was far from 
any sense of economic realism and its likely adoption would only benefit the 
area’s landowners which would claim high compensations for their expro­
priated properties (about ^O^billidn Drs. according to Minister’s estimation). ?
He also rightly stressed out that the implementation of such a proposal and 
the displacement of industry would deteriorate the existing local economic 
nexus -something that would cause immense unemployment problems to the 
Athenian labour market as a whole. He asserted that his Ministry’s guidelines 
given to the planning offices which were carrying out the Eleonas’ planning 
studies, were by contrast aiming at the upgrading of the area by means of a 
bundle of measures such as:
The creation of a system of industrial and handicraft parks for the 
location of new manufacturing activity and/or the relocation of exist­
ing low to medium pollution plants from adjacent residential areas.
The removal of highly polluting activities away from the area.
The provision of adequate social facilities and infrastructure.
The provision of extended green spaces for the environmental upgrad­
ing of the area.
Other ideas and proposals delivered during the event, were roughly 
shared between the above two contrasting alternatives {Anti No 378: 30-2).
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More particularly, the ND delegate, in agreement with the PASOK Minister, 
asserted that it is impossible a capital of 3^ million people to be deprived 
from production activities as the green scenario implied. The other opposition 
parties, contrarily, placed more emphasis upon the social and environmental 
aspect of the problem instead of defending the Eleonas production space. 
Thus, the EAR delegate pointed out that (a) the local planning effort should 
have formed integral part of a wider metropolitan planning strategy; (b) the 
planning effort should be based on a shift of responsibilities from central 
government to the Eleonas* local authorities, and (c) any planning scheme for 
the area should have as its major priority the provision of the necessary stock 
of land for the creation of a large green park equipped with social facilities. 
The KKE delegate suggested a compromise scheme between the need for pro­
duction maintenance and modernization on the one hand, and the need for so­
cial and environmental upgrading of the area on the other. The delegate 
suggested the creation of a decentralized inter-municipal body for the re­
newal and administration of Eleonas, with sufficient financial resources and 
substantial intervention powers. It was further suggested that state financial 
support should be provided to the polluting Eleonas* industries in order to 
help them modernize and adopt effective anti-pollution technologies. It was 
finally asserted that the solution of the area*s problems presupposed a depar­
ture from the two major parties* (Socialists and Conservatives) conformist 
urban policy and the adoption of a radical one decided to confront effectively 
the big private capital interests across urban space. Some months later, the 
KKE newspaper Rizospastis (6 March 1988) criticised the governmental prio­
rities for creating a system of industrial and handicraft parks in Eleonas on 
the grounds that the preliminary studies had paid little attention on the provi­
sion of green space and social facilities, while they tended to overemphasise 
production -a fact which, in the paper*s view, was going to contibute to the 
further degradation of the area. The paper extended the criticism on the basis 
that (a) the land zones owned by various public organizations were not allo­
cated to social uses; (b) measures for environmental protection from the oper­
ation of the Eleonas* VIPA-VIOPA system were not suggested; (c) uses 
serving the population of the wider area were not proposed; and (d) the
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government had not yet shown convincing signs of willingness to create a de­
centralized body for the administration of the whole operation.
Some representatives of scientific organizations (e.g. the rector of the 
Agricultural University of Athens which is located in Eleonas, and the del­
egate of the Technical Chamber of Greece), argued more or less in favour of 
the green scenario. The TEE delegate, in particular, made the point that the 
creation of VIPA-VIOPA in Eleonas, as the Ministry of Environment had 
suggested, was leading to a logic according which "niches of green" would be 
created amongst the factories, whereas in TEE’s view the remaining factories 
in Eleonas should by contrast form "niches" of production in the green {Anti, 
No 378: 31).
The views expressed by the area’s local authorities were also divided 
along the two contrasting options {Anti, No 378: 32). The mayor of Agios 
loannis Rentis asserted that the green scenario was "idealistic" in that its ad­
vocates did not take into account that manufacturing industry was already 
existing in Eleonas and had urgent need for infrastructure and organizational 
support only an industrial park system could potentially provide. He also as­
serted that some free spaces could be immediately transformed into green by 
undertaking action for planting trees into them. The delegate of Egaleo mu­
nicipality, argued by contrast that the first priority for Eleonas should be the 
provision of land for the implementation of the green alternative. The del­
egate of Tavros municipality declared that the city council had accepted the 
logic of Eleonas* VIPA-VIOPA system as a mechanism of the area’s produc­
tive upgrading but under the basic presupposition that its organization and 
planning would provide extended land zones for green and social facilities. 
Some months later, the Egaleo local authority reformed its previous support 
of the green scenario {Eleutherotypia, 17 October 1988). After finding out that 
many manufacturing plants located in its administrative boundaries were 
creating serious environmental and urban degradation problems, the local 
authority suggested the relocation of those plants into industrial parks which 
should be created in Eleonas.
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In the period that followed the completion of Eleonas’ VIPA-VIOPA 
planning studies and the event which was organized by the periodical Anti, 
sporadic contrasting discussions and articles kept on taking place. Thus, in 
February 1989, the Athens department of the "Goethe Institute" and the local 
authority of Athens co-organized a scientific meeting under the general title: 
"Re-use of derelict industrial sites: The case of Eleonas in Athens". In that 
meeting two German professors specializing in urban planning and environ­
mental protection legislation were invited to express expert opinion on the 
Eleonas issue (7b Vima, 12 February 1989). The already existing contrasting 
views and propositions were repeated once more, while the two specialists 
stressed out the need of implementing urgent legislative measures against air 
and noise pollution in the area.
In 1989, the left-wing opposition team in the Athens City Council ("Co­
operation for the Change of Athens"), circulated a document in which the 
problems of Eleonas were identified, the policies and measures undertaken till 
then were criticised as ineffective and unpopular, and the basic lines of an al­
ternative proposal were sketched out (CCA 1989). According to that document, 
the Eleonas’ problems could not be tackled in a piecemeal fashion but only in 
the context of a comprehensive planning and renewal programme which could 
be supported by the area’s working population, the local authorities and the 
labour movement, and which should be given powers to come in contrast with 
the well-established nexus of private socio-economic interests in the area. 
Planning priorities should aim at (a) renewing the area under environmental 
protection criteria on the one hand, and (b) upgrading and protecting its pro­
duction base on the other. These planning priorities and responsibilities should 
be carried out by a decentralized administrative body in which public, social, 
local and private organizations would participate and collaborate.
One year after the first A nti event, the same periodical organized a 
second one at Eleonas, in Agias Annis street, on 27th of August 1989 (see 
Eleutherotypia^ 26 August 1989; Proti, 29 August 1989). As its editor an­
nounced, the aim of this event was the information of the Athenian citizens 
and the strengthening of sensitivities on the Eleonas’ problems which for
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decades had remained in the shadow of public concern. In general lines the 
previous debates and proposals were repeated once more, but this time under 
much more "ecological" anti-industrial mentality.
The problems included in that big area are of a supra-local importance 
and their proper solution is going to change the whole Athenian land­
scape. They also are explosive and complex problems presupposing col­
lective processes and the establishment of a wider social consensus in 
order long-term rational decisions to be made.
The idea of public health protection must predominate in any effort 
towards the solution of the Eleonas’ problems.
The protection of public health and the quality of urban functions 
which would secure a comfortable human life in the city, cannot be re­
placed by any fictitious and false consumerist pattern, (introductory 
speech of the "Anti" editor as quoted in Eleutherotypia, 26 August 1989; 
emphasis added).
The "fictitious and false consumerist pattern", was evidently assigned 
to the views defending Eleonas* production space and blaming the green scen­
ario as disastrous not only for Eleonas but for the Athenian economy and in­
dustry as a whole. However, by contrast to the enhanced "ecological 
sensitivities" prevailing during this event, the delegate of the Technical 
Chamber of Greece proposed a much more realistic scheme (Gimisis 1989) 
whose key points were the following:
The area of Eleonas is of an immense importance in two senses: First, 
it is important to the metrqppHtan economy.M._Athen& as w as to the 
national economy as a whole, and second, it is important in the sense 
that the conditions prevailing in it affect the living conditions of 3.5 
million people residing in Greater Athens.
Eleonas must be re-organized in such a way as to provide large tracts 
of free and green spaces so that manufacturing plants would operate as 
"industrial niches" in the "forest", and not as a "manufacturing forest" 
ITicluding "niches of green" as proposed by the VIPA-VIOPA planning 
studies along the Ministry’s guidelines.
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The highly polluting production activities of Eleonas (e.g. tanneries, 
metal-smelting and metallizing works, etc.) should be relocated im­
mediately outside Greater Athens. The relocation of those activities 
should be programmed in detail
The low and medium pollution activities should remain in Eleonas 
under the precondition that they will have to adopt anti-pollution 
technologies and to get connected with the urban gas network.
The appropriate infrastructure should be constructed (sewerage system, 
gas network, transport and car parking spaces, etc.).
The activities which would remain in Eleonas or the ones which would 
relocate into it, should be strictly controlled.
All tracts of land in Eleonas owned by organizations of the wider 
public sector and do not serve collective needs of the area’s population, 
should be recorded and engaged in order to be allocated to social uses 
and green. The same should take place for private land which is vacant 
or contains cheap buildings or highly polluting activities that should be 
relocated outside Eleonas.
All the above actions and measures should be undertaken and implem­
ented by a "Special Body for the Development of Eleonas" whose ad­
ministrative structure should have a decentralized and representative 
character (e.g. Ministry of Environment, Eleonas* local authorities. 
Local Union of Municipalities and Communities of Attica -TEDKNA- 
Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development -ETVA- Technical Chamber 
of Greece, etc.).
Some other views expressed in that meeting were in accord with TEE’s 
proposal However, the Ministry of Environment kept on expressing its objec­
tions with particular reference to (a) the high cost of land expropriations for 
the creation of large green zones, (b) the problem of unemployment which
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would result from the displacement of industry and the dismantling of the 
area's nexus of economic linkages, and (c) the lack of available spaces in Atti­
ca which could "receive" the relocated activities. Moreover, it was pointed out 
that many of the area’s existing manufacturing units belong to branches serv­
ing the basic needs of the capital’s population, hence it was quite unreasonable 
to be pushed to relocete elsewhere. Other views by contrast -as for instance 
the ones expressed by a MP and a local cultural centre- had a pure ecological 
orientation and adopted the green scenario.
This perspective, was met by a part of press, as rather extreme. As an 
economic daily wrote:
There are moments one comes to believe that some people regard that 
Athens has remained in an epoch around the 1900s. This might have 
been pleasant for everyone. But, anyway, contemporary Athens sup­
ports the best part of the country’s industrial potential
The effort, therefore, of some people wishing to transform Eleonas 
into a real olive grove, can be regarded as rather extreme. This by no 
way means we should forget that Eleonas is a living place. The solution 
should be searched somewhere in the middle {Express, 8 April 1990).
As it was expected, this public meeting -just like the previous one- had 
no practical results, apart from stimulating public concern for the future of 
Eleonas.
Amongst the lengthy discussions and debates on the Eleonas’ issue, 
some practical -but piecemeal- interventions "on the ground" were undertaken 
by activist organizations. One of them was jointly organized by Anti, a local 
organization for the protection of environment (Agios Savas) and a voluntary 
organization ("Paremvasi") helping young drug-addicted people re-enter so­
ciety by undertaking social action. This event took place on June 1990 and re­
ceived a good deal of publicity {Proti, 2 June 1990; Avgi, 1 and 8 June 1990; 
RIzospastis, 1 June 1990; Ethnos, 18 June 1990; Eleutherotypia, 9 and 16 July 
1990; and Anti, 15 June 1990). The voluntary interventions were focused: (a) on 
the creation of a children’s play-yard and a square in a residential sub-area of 
Eleonas (Markoni), (b) on planting trees along an avenue, (c) on the creation
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of an "open school" and (d) on running a photography exhibition for citizen’s 
information on the area’s problems.
All those public discussions, planning attempts and voluntary activities, re­
mained, as we already mentioned, without practical results on a comprehen­
sive planning basis. The Eleonas inner-city decaying area was neither included 
in the statutory city-plan, nor the proposed organized industrial and handi­
craft parks were created in i t  The inability -or unwillingness- of the state 
machine to cope effectively with the established perplexed and contradictory 
nexus of local and wider economic interests, can be regarded as the major 
reason for the maintenance of the existing problematical situation (CCA 1989). 
All these decades of state planning failures, the problems of productive, urban 
and environmental degradation of Eleonas not only remained unresolved, but 
they were further magnified.
As soon as the ND Conservatives came to office in 1990, the Minister 
of Environment S. Manos (one of the key-supporters of strictly market-ori­
ented priorities) regarded that the conditions for solving -once and for a li­
the Eleonas problem had matured. In the Ministry’s opinion the statist 
orientation of urban-industrial policy prevailing during the Socialists govern­
ance in the 1980s had overally failed, hence the only viable solution could 
stem from the introduction of a "new" principle in the planning machine. This 
principle would have to depart from the belief that the public sector could 
offer effective solutions to urban, production and environmental degradation 
problems, like those of Eleonas, and would shift emphasis from state inter­
ventionism to market-led spatial redistribution processes, as we will see more 
analytically in the following section.
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8.4. The Market-Oriented Planning Approach 
(PD 74D/1991): A Critical Analysis
8.4.1. Some Background Legislative Preparatbns
Several months before the publication of the Presidential Decree 74D/1991 for 
the incorporation of Eleonas into the statutory city-plan and for its allocation 
to a new set of land-uses, the Ministry of Environment regarded that it 
should prepare the ground carefully, so as the forthcoming PD would not 
contradict the existing legislative framework and hence would not be legally 
questioned. Thus, it decided to reform two basic PDs published in the 1980s 
during Socialists’ administration. The first one (PD 166D/1987) defined the cat­
egories and content of land uses appearing in the General Urban Plans (GPS). 
The second (more precisely group of PDs) ratified the General Urban Plans of 
the municipalities whose parts were included in Eleonas -that is, Athens (PD 
80D/1988), Agios loannis Rentis (PD 1038D/1990), Egaleo (PD 205D/1988), Per- 
isteri (PD 332D/1989) and Tavros (PD 834D/1987).
The first PD was replaced by another one (PD 706/1990) which:
(a) added to the official GPSs land-use list one more use, namely "indu­
strial and handicraft park under cleansing", in order the Ministry of 
Environment to be able to identify Eleonas, in the forthcoming project, 
under this land-use definition;
(b) allowed manufacturing to be mixed up with residential uses in the 
"VIPA-VIOPA under cleansing" category.
With regard to point (a): The former PD (166D/1987) under the cat­
egory "general land uses" (article 1, section A) included the following ones:
1. Unmixed residence
2. General residence
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3. Urban centres - central functions of the city -  local neighbourhood
centres
4. Non polluting manufacturing and handicraft industries, industrial park
(low to medium pollution industries)
5. Polluting manufacturing and handicraft industry
6. Wholesale
7. Tourism - recreation
8. Free spaces - urban green areas
9. Social facilities
The latter PD (706D/1990), after land-use category 4 added the "VIPA 
-VIOPA under cleansing" one.
With regard to point (b): Article 5 of the former PD provided that the 
following uses could be allowed within industrial parks:
1. Low and medium pollution industrial installations
2. Low and medium pollution handicraft installations
3. Low and medium pollution professional laboratories
4. Warehouse buildings and plots
5. Car parking buildings and plots
6. Gasoline stations
7. Residence of industrial parks’ security personnel
8. Offices
9. Restaurants
10. Cafes and bars
11. Spaces for public gathering
12 Buildings accommodating social facilities
13. Athletic facilities
14. Installations for commercial exhibitions
15. Mass transport installations
The latter PD (706D/1990), added to the previous article that in areas 
characterized by the GPSs as "VIPA-VIOPA under cleansing", residential uses
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were allowed, by exception, to coexist with industrial ones (ranging from low 
to high pollution).
The next move of the Ministry of Environment before proceeding to 
the publication of the Eleonas* PD, was the publication of another one (PD 
729/ 1990), which reformed the GPSs of the Eleonas* municipalities so as to 
include in them the VIPA-VIOPA under cleansing" land-use category which 
was legislated a few days earlier by PD 706D/1990. In this new PD, it was 
clearly stated that the parts of municipalities included in Eleonas, were de­
fined as VIPA-VIOPA under cleansing, and that in those areas "C type land 
zones" were allowed to develop (that is, zones which apart from industrial 
activities included various ancillary installations as well as residence).
In this way, the existing legislative framework -which in the Ministry*s 
view could cause juridical problems to the forthcoming initiative for Eleonas- 
was reformed, so as to abide a-priori by the forthcoming project*s very logic. 
The ground was therefore "cleared" for the publication of PD 74D/1991, which 
was the most crucial one for the future of Eleonas.
8.4.2. The PD 740/1991: Objectives and Relevant Regulations
Just a few days after the publication of the PD 74D/1991, the Minister of 
Environment S. Manos announced the following:
The incorporation of the unplanned compactly built industrial area 
known as ‘Eleonas* into the statutory city-plan, integrates the various 
relevant studies which, since 1979, were moving to and fro between the 
planning offices and the local authorities, and sets forth the beginning 
of the cleansing of a particularly downgraded area which is situated in 
just 1 km distance from Acropolis. This means:
Provision and planting of green spaces
Provision of collectively used spaces for the functioning of the
city.
Provision of infrastructure (transport, sewerage, etc.)
Motives for the shift of the area from industrial to a mixed one.
328
In the context of this endeavour, the state» the local authorities and the 
area's landowners are requested to help in order to attain the best and 
fastest results (YPECHODE 1991).
However, the first newspapers’ reactions differed considerably from 
the Minister’s enthusiastic vision. In an article published by a mass circulation 
Sunday paper and entitled "Mr. Manos’ prosaic illusions", it was asserted that 
the proposed governmental initiative
(does not provide) any central planning regulations apart from the pri­
vate engagements of the new users, (does not provide) any public or 
green spaces. (It does not) provide any regulations for the future of the 
polluting activities in the area...
To the fundamental question "which is the Eleonas’ renewal model Mr. 
Manos envisages", the answer is "it is the prosaic model of a typical 
municipality of western Attica, based on private urban development 
initiatives, and without even the inadequate infrastructure which has 
been constructed in those municipalities over the last years"-.. Mr. 
Manos’ plan is obvious: "Build whatever you want under profitable 
building regulations, and by doing so renew the area as much as pos­
sible." It is much better to transform the area into a typical western 
municipality than to maintain the today’s stable.
This confirms once more the strict governmental orientation to assign 
everything -including the renewal of downgraded urban areas- to pri­
vate initiatives and market forces, by pursuing on the same time the 
collection of "new revenues" from property transaction taxes and from 
the expected upswing of building activity (7b Vima, 2 June 1991).
Another critical assessment of the government’s project (7b Vima, 13 
October 1991) focused upon the proposed measure of creating a private devel­
opment agency (in the form of S.A.) for the management and development of 
Eleonas. The fact that this agency was going to operate under strict private 
criteria, was the best proof -in the paper’s opinion- that the governmental 
project was going to transform Eleonas into a pack of cement blocks.
The above contrasting viewpoints make necessary a more detailed 
analysis of the governmental project and a comparison of its main objectives 
and directions for action with the official -Ministry’s- declarations. Analysis 
is based on material stemming from: (a) the official document (PD) text; (b) 
the Eleonas’ proposed land use scheme assigned to the text and (c) the written
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views of high-ranking government officials which were delivered at a scien­
tific meeting organized by the Technical Chamber of Greece on June 1991 for 
that purpose {Technika Cbronika /Technical Annals -Scientific Bulletin of the 
Technical Chamber of Greece), No. 3/1992).
The PD 74D/1991 proposed that seven general land-use categories could 
develop in Eleonas (fig. 8.4). More precisely, in zone category A (general resi­
dence) the specific uses allowed to develop were: Residence, offices, banks, 
shops, professional laboratories, etc. In zone B, the allowed uses were: In­
dustry, handicraft activities, offices, banks, shops, wholesale, warehouses and 
commercial exhibitions. In that zone category the establishment of new indus­
trial and handicraft activities was not allowed; instead, expansions of existing 
ones and/or relocations from the adjacent municipality were allowed In zone 
category C, all previous B category uses were allowed plus residential ones. In 
zone D, the allowed uses were: Residence, administration, commerce, offices, 
banks, as well as cultural activities. The PD provided three more land-use cat­
egories: Public green spaces, athletic installations and specific uses (e.g. public 
organizations, military installations, etc.). In general lines the share of land 
uses proposed is shown in table 8.4.
Legally operating manufacturing industries which are highly polluting, 
would have to adopt anti-pollution technologies. They would be allowed to 
repair or modernize their mechanical installations but not to expand their 
plants. After a period of 20 years they would have to relocate elsewhere.
The first critical point that could be made, is that according to the 
governmental PD, the area of Eleonas -which in its present situation is not 
densely built and has still kept enough undeveloped spaces (see sect 8.2)- 
would be going to get burdened with a lot of typical CBD activities of a high 
commercial demand, like e.g. office buildings, shopping centres, banks, com­
mercial exhibitions, etc. This would be going to stimulate an increasing de­
mand for land and floorspace which would extend over an area exceeding 
55% of the total Eleonas territory as we can remark in table 8.4. If we add to 
this percentage the land reserved for transport and for accommodating the
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Figure 8.4 The proposed (PD 74D) Land-Use Plan o f Eleonas, 1990.
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Table 8.4 General use o f land in Eleonas as proposed by PD 74D/1991
General use of land Area (stremmas) percent
-Green and free spaces 1,200 128
-Transport network 1,100 11.7
-Land for building development 5,200 55.3
-Land belonging to public enterprises 1,900 20.2
Total 9,400 100.0
1 stremma=l,000 sq.metres (0.1 Ha)
SOURCE: Tecbnika Chronika (Technical Annals) -scientific bulletin of the
Technical Chamber of Greece- No 3/1992: 29.
various public organizations, only a small portion of 128% would be left fo r 
social use and green. The proposed commercialization of the area is also veri­
fied by the building regulations the PD proposed for the various land zones, 
and especially by the high floorspace/plot ratios.’ Thus, the ratios assigned to 
residential uses are escalated from 0.8 to 1.6 according to the plot size, where­
as those assigned to non residential uses are a little bit lower. More particular­
ly, the proposed ratios assigned to plots exceeding 2,0(X) square metres, are 
shown in table 8.5.
Table 8.5 Floorspace/plot ratios by type o f land-use as proposed by the 
PD 74D/1991 for Eleonas 
Type of land use (for plots of 2,000+ sq.metres) Ratios
-Residence 1.60
-Manufacturing and handicraft industry, wholesale, 0.80
warehouses
-Offices, administration L20
-Commercial establishments, shops, banks, commercial 1.20
exhibitions, car parking buildings
SOURCE: PD 74D/1991 and YPECHODE 199L
It should be stressed at this point that the proposed floorspace/plot ra­
tios for Eleonas contradict directly Law 1337/1983 which is the general
’ According to the Greek building regulations, the floorspace/plot ratio (or otherwise 
'land appropriation ratio") is a specific number appointed to each plot of land, which de­
notes the ratio of the floorspace allowed to be built on that plot to the total plot’s size. For 
instance, on a plot of land of say 2,000 sq.metres, with a plot ratio=1.60, 3,200 (2,000X1.60) 
sqjnetres of built space can be erected (of course in a multi-storey building). As a general 
rule, the higher the plot ratio, the higher amount of floorspace can be erected on it, hence 
the higher the plot’s market price.
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legislative framework for urban planning in Greece, and which does not allow 
those ratios to exceed 0.8 in any case {Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992: 28). It is 
obvious that these high floorspace/plot ratios in an area which has till now­
adays been kept at a low building rate, would be going to stimulate upswing­
ing land demand for high profitability CBD activities. Increasing land demand 
for such activities would push land prices at immense heights. This price up­
swing, in turn, would impose two major sets of negative effects upon the 
area’s spatial and production structure:
(a) The gradual disappearance of free or vacant spaces (which otherwise 
could be allocated to social uses and organized green) by their trans­
formation into profitable building plots.
(b) The gradual displacement of manufacturing from the area due to in­
tense land price competition from more profitable tertiary uses, lead­
ing, therefore, to intensification of the deindustrialization problem in 
Athens. In discussing with industrialists during the Eleonas’ survey, we 
were told that many companies have closed down their plants, have re­
located to peripheral lower cost areas, and have transformed their 
former plants into office buildings, warehouses, etc., of a higher com­
mercial value in rent or sale prices. This information is corroborated by 
an earlier empirical study (Tsekouras et aL 1985: 271) in which it was 
shown that almost all the surveyed manufacturing firms that decided 
to close down their production unit in Athens and to relocate outwards, 
tended to keep a kind of commercial or administrative activity in the 
initial site such as warehouses, commercial exhibitions or offices.
As we can also remark in the proposed land-use scheme, the "provision 
and planting of green spaces" -according to Minister’s declaration- is nothing 
more than narrow strips of land along the transport arteries -i.e. land which 
has been incrementally added up from the obligatory land contributions of 
the area’s landowners as an "exchange" for their properties’ inclusion in the 
statutory city plan according to Law 1337/1983. It is at least paradox to declare 
(as the Minister of Environment did) that in such a downgraded place, these
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strips which at the aggregate do not exceed 12.8% of the total Eleonas* area, 
are going to contribute to its environmental improvement Moreover, those 
strips of "green" are dispersed within the whole area in such a way as to be 
impossible to form bigger land entities that could be allocated to public use 
and real parks of green and recreation. As it can be remarked, the proposed 
land-use scheme did not define concrete land zones for public use apart from 
(a) two football fields (which by the way belong to private athletic com­
panies), (b) the Agricultural University and its gardens (Votanikos kipos) and
(c) a tract of land belonging to a public school building organization (OSK). 
The only public uses verbally "provided" by the PD text but not appearing on 
the land-use map so as to be concretely drafted and legalized on the ground, 
were the "cultural buildings" which would be supposedly allowed to get con­
structed in land category D (including, moreover, residence, banking, office 
uses etc.). Of course, it is at least paradox to believe that "cultural buildings" 
(that is, social spaces having no exchange value in the market) would be going 
to develop "naturally" in an area of a high commercial value for tertiary 
economic activities. The only convincing solution would be specific tracts of 
land and/or building complexes to be engaged and legislated as "zones of so­
cial activities" -something that as mentioned above was neither declared in 
the PDs text, nor drafted in the accompanying land-use map. It is therefore 
obvious, that the Minister’s declarations for providing social, cultural etc. faci­
lities in Eleonas, aimed rather at political impressions and relating ideological 
gains, than at creating real presuppositions for the renewal and upgrading of 
this area along socially sensitive objectives.
The governmental proposal seems to have based itself upon a com­
pletely misleading assumption: The assumption that the area’s upgrading 
would come as a "natural" result of the intensification of building activity 
through the free operation of m arket forces over land and built space -that is, 
through the intensification of urban land rent production and distribution 
mechanisms. Put in other words, what the governmental PD seemed to pursue, 
was the encouragement of private property developers and other related 
economic interests to invest in Eleonas without the state budget being obliged 
to contribute to the renewal and upgrading operation costs (i.e. what the
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president of the "Athens’ Organization" (OA) Mr. Charisis called "self-renewal 
and cleansing" of Eleonas) (Charisis 1992: 57). Basic belief seemed to be that 
throughout such a layer of private investments, it would be quite possible the 
today’s miserable situation of Eleonas to be soon reversed, and this "waste­
land" of industrial activity to be transformed into a typical urban services 
area.
According to the then OA president, which was in charge for carrying 
out and implementing the renewal project, only two alternatives were left 
open: The first one was the transformation of Eleonas into a huge metropoli­
tan green park and the second was the creation of the necessary preconditions 
for the development of central-city activities in it (ibidj 57-9). The first alter­
native, according to this simplistic logic, would entail immense state expendi­
tures in order to get implemented (in the president’s estimation the cost of 
land expropriations and infrastructure construction would exceed 6(X) billion 
Drs) which, simply, was not possible to be afforded even if this alternative 
was the desirable one. Thus, the only "realistic option" left for Eleonas was 
the adoption of the second alternative. As he pointed out
I think that the view favouring a low intensity building growth (in 
Eleonas) -much like what’s happening now there- should be excluded 
from discussion, because it is obvious that it is not capable of attract­
ing private interests which could reverse the existing situation (ibid.: 
59).
The previous analysis makes obvious that the early 1990s marked a 
turning point in the way urban structure and organization was officially con­
ceived. Whereas during the 1980s the public sector was regarded as the prime 
agent in stimulating spatial change, the Eleonas proposal tried to turn this 
"model" upside-down in favour of the private sphere. Put in other words, it 
tried to do in a state-led manner what was taking place in Athens sponta­
neously for decades -that is, the production of exchange values in the form of 
built environment through the intensification of land appropriation and urban 
land rent production and distribution mechanisms.
Without doubt the motive force underlying the decision for the incor­
poration of this area into the statutory city plan and for its
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development, is the adoration of the market, the neo-liberal mania 
which in the case of Eleonas leads to decisions that are going to trans­
form this historically important area in a field of auctions and land 
appropriation Stock Exchange. It is a decision which is made in the 
context of today's social and environmental conditions of Athens, and 
which creates a land appropriation scheme that would embarrass even 
V. Pareto. Unless those persons making political decisions nowadays 
believe that in the case of Eleonas the private sector is going to pursue 
its interests pursuing on the same time social welfare in that area 
{Tecbnika Cbronika No 3/1992: 99).
The very logic underlying the Eleonas’ project was based on the ideo­
logical doctrine that when the public sector proves to be ineffective in man­
aging urban change due to internal contradictions and lack of a "critical mass" 
of social consent, the "weight" should inevitably shift towards market mech­
anisms. However, this "public planning -versus- market" dichotomy is a naive 
mode of viewing urban processes. It is based upon a bipolar logic which is un­
able to see that the crucial question is not how much state planning and how 
much market should be mixed-up in spatial organization endeavours, but 
what kind of planning and what kind of market, and which should be their 
mutual relations; relations in which neither the state would hamper private 
initiatives, nor private initiatives would impose their short-term profit seek­
ing optic upon the collective interests of society across space. It is well-known 
to all those involved in spatial development and planning, that the organiz­
ation of urban space is an extremely complex social phenomenon. It has noth­
ing to do with simplistic viewpoints tending to assign superficial powers to 
the market forces, nor with paternalist logics imposed rigidly by the state’s 
planning bureaucracies upon the individual urban interests. The market forces 
are not (and cannot) be "free" in the absolute sense of the word; they cannot 
function efficiently without legislative frameworks and policy guidelines 
which help market surpass internally generated irrationalities and problems, 
and which unfreeze dynamic initiatives within the market sphere itself.
As it is generally accepted in the history of world economic develop­
ment, there is not even an example of country whose development was 
not supported seriously by the state, by means of various combinations 
of policy tools that have no the slightest relation to the phenomenal 
laissez faire of the free market ideology (Giannitsis, ed. 1993: 9-10).
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With regard to the role of "free market" in urban space, it is also 
known that the rules stemming from its own very logic lead to the maximiza­
tion of individual capitalist profits from the production and appropriation of 
the built environment -space treated as an "exchange value"- and to the mini­
mization of social benefit from urban space as a "use value" (see Harvey 1973 
for a detailed analysis). The implication of that profit maximization logic is 
long before experienced in the case of Athens; it has led to the existing major 
problems every Athenian citizen is confronted with: That is, lack of free 
spaces for public use, densely built overcrowded neighbourhoods lacking ap­
propriate infrastructure, inadequate natural lighting and airing, inadequate 
spaces for traffic and car parking facilities, destruction of Athens* cultural 
heritage throughout the demolition of historical buildings and the erection of 
profitable multi-storey apartment and office blocks in their place, etc. On the 
other side, the overestimation of the state’s planning capabilities during the 
Socialists governance in the 1980s, led to serious setbacks in the way planning 
was perceived by broad urban strata. Even with the best of intentions, real 
citizen’s participation, democratization and decentralization of planning pro­
cedures (as the governmental rhetoric was then declaring) (see MNE 1985) 
were not achieved to any considerable extend as we saw in previous chapters. 
Urban planning continued to be strictly centralized (statist) and citizen’s 
"participation" was confined -as before- to the right of submitting written ob­
jections against predetermined spatial regulations (Christofilopoulos 1990). 
Citizens’ "participation" took therefore a typical form at the "end" of the 
planning process, without being able to affect substantially the process itself 
during its evolution. It therefore functioned as an ideological legitimation 
mechanism rather, than as an actual force of spatial change across consensual 
planning objectives. Within this wider context, the citizens continued to meet 
with suspicion any planning endeavour -suspicion that usually was trans­
formed to serious resistance and pressure blocking any planning attempt and 
leading to the maintenance of existing problems.
What, therefore, should be pursued by the ND government, was not a 
shift to the free market experiences, but, instead, an effort to establish new 
relationships and partnership links between public bodies and private urban
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interests, based on processes of social dialogue, real participation and consent 
But this, was obviously contradicting the very ideological basis of the Conser­
vative government Thus, what was adopted as a viable solution for Eleonas 
was a planning model seeking to maximize the flow of private investments in 
the area, without taking into account the past experiences associated with the 
increased social concerns for green space provision and environmental im­
provement It should be therefore expected that the governmental proposal 
would be met with serious social scepticism, objections and growing resis­
tance. Such attitudes were expressed by a wide variety of social groupings and 
collective organizations in an effort to question the juridical authority of the 
PD 74D/1991 and to postpone its implementation "on the ground". The actions 
which were undertaken, the various arguments against the governmental PD, 
as well as the proposed alternatives, will be examined in the following section 
of this chapter.
8.5. Socio-Political Reactions Against the PD 740/1991 
and Contrasting Views on the Future of Eleonas*
Industrial Space
6.5.1. Judicial Re view Applications
The first practical reactions after the PD’s publication, were initiated (a) by 
the Coalition of the Left (SYN) and (b) by the Athens local authority legally 
represented by the then mayor Anthony Tritsis. In 10th of April 1991, six SYN 
MPs, a SYN member of the European Parliament and six Athenian citizens, 
submitted a written application at the Council of State requesting the judicial 
review of the PD at issue ( Tecbnika Cbronika No 3/1992: 21-3). The key points 
of that application were the following:
- A set of Ministry’s decisions and Presidential Decrees -related to re­
forms of the General Urban Plans (GPSs) of Eleonas* municipalities- drove to 
the identification of a land zone (zone C) in which mixed (industrial and resi­
dential) land uses were allowed to develop. This, in turn, drove to PD 74D/1991 
for the regeneration and development of Eleonas as a whole, which, took
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place in a way coming in conflict with the Athenian citizens’ legal rights. 
More precisely:
-  The Ministry’s project was sent to the local authorities of the Eleonas 
area in August 1990, while the General Urban Plans of those municipalities 
and the PD 166D/1987 which proposed different land uses from those pro­
posed by the project, were still in power. Thus, both local authorities and in­
terested citizens were misled, since they exercised their legal right to express 
and submit written objections to the proposed regulations on the basis of the 
existing frameworks and not on the basis of the new ones as set out by the 
Ministry’s project.
- The term "industrial park under cleansing" which was introduced by 
the Ministry’s project, is contradictory and incompatible with what is meant 
-in scientific terms- by the industrial park concept Industrial parks, by de­
finition, are supposed to be planned areas for the location of industry, ap­
propriately organized and equipped with the necessary infrastructure for the 
orderly functioning of plants, as well for the protection of environment from 
production activity. Such areas, therefore, have by definition no need of any 
"cleansing operation". Moreover, one basic characteristic of such areas is the 
existence of extended green zones around the industrial plots, and the in­
cluded plants have to abide by environmental protection measures (e.g. adop­
tion of anti-pollution technologies). The PD 74D/1991, as well as the reforms 
of the General Plans that preceded and underpinned it, come in direct conflict 
with both the orientations and objectives of the Structure Plan of Athens 
(Law 1515/1985) and with the scientifically acceptable concept of "industrial 
park" as highlighted previously. More specifically:
-The total green area in Eleonas as proposed in the Ministry’s PD reach 
about 15% of its whole territory. This percentage is considered as ex­
tremely low for the identification of the area as an "industrial park", 
and contradicts article 15, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Law 1515/85, which 
states that the organization of traditional industrial areas into indus­
trial parks should secure the necessary green spaces for collective use.
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Thus, it is estimated that in a capital city whose total green spaces 
reach hardly 15% of its whole territory, an equal percentage provided 
for Eleonas is going not only to legitimize the existing situation in an 
area that has n ^ th e  slightest similarity with industrial parks, but, 
moreover, will probably contribute to the maintenance and further in­
tensification of a major environmental pollution source in the heart of 
Athens, by contrast to article 3, paragraph IB of Law 1515/1985 which 
aims at improving the quality of life for all Athenian citizens.
-The building regulations proposed by the governmental PD, will defi­
nitely contribute to a considerable increase of the built space in an area 
which, in spite of its legal and/or illegal building growth over the dec­
ades, has still kept a low built/free space ratio, and hence it is one of 
the few remaining land reserves that can potentially contribute to the 
environmental upgrading of the Greek capital by increasing consider­
ably its green spaces. The increase of the built space in Eleonas will 
bring about major increases of polluting activities and traffic volume, 
contradicting therefore articles 1, 2 and 3 of Law 1515/85 that provide 
directions for the protection of environment, for the improvement of 
quality of life, and for the restriction of further growth of Athenian 
activities.
- The PD’s proposal of allowing the development of mixed industrial 
and residential uses in adjacent blocks and even in the same block, is 
not only scientifically and socially unacceptable, but, also, antithetical 
to the directions and objectives of Law 1515/1985 (article 15, paragraphs 
2 and 3c) which clearly state that the industrial parks must be located 
in reasonable distances from residential areas.
- Law 1515/1985 provided that special care should be taken for the re­
location of polluting manufacturing plants which are dispersed across 
the urban tissue. However, such a special care is absent in the PD at 
issue: There are no concrete engagements, nor a specific timetable for 
the relocation of heavily polluting plants which are currently located
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within the boundaries of Eleonas a few meters away from residences 
and schools.
- The PD at issue contradicts a joint decision of 9 Ministries (No. 
69269/5387 -published in O fficial Gazette 678/V.9/25-10-1990) which was 
made on the basis of the country’s abiding by the EC directives 84/360 (28 
June 1984) and 85/337 (27 June 1985), and which impose that any initiative 
aimed at regulating and/or constructing industrial zones and other urban 
works, must be adequately justified by specific environmental impacts asses­
sment studies. The Ministry’s study that led to the PD 74D/1991 for Eleonas, 
not only lacked such a justifying documentation, but, moreover, the study it­
self did not include even the slightest prediction of the impacts the proposed 
regulations might have upon the local and the wider Athenian environment 
This, also, contradicts article 24 of the Greek Constitution which asserts that 
the protection of the country’s natural and cultural environments is one of the 
state’s major responsibilities, and that special protective and repressive 
measures should be undertaken for that purpose. Moreover, the same article 
asserts that the basic criterion which should underlie every spatial planning 
initiative, is, among other things, the securing of good living conditions for 
the whole of the area’s population. There is no evidence nor a specific study 
which could ensure that the PD for the regeneration and development of 
Eleonas, abides by such a fundamental criterion. For that reason, as well as 
for the reasons previously described, the Council of State is requested to re­
peal the PD’s 74D/1991 juridical validity and prevent it from being implem­
ented on the ground.
The then mayor of Athens Anthony Tritsis, submitted, also, a written 
application at the Council of State against PD 74D/1991. After the submission 
he made the following announcement
In defence of the rights of the Athenian city and of its citizens for a 
better life and with respect for nature and history, we were obliged to 
apply to the Council of State requesting the judicial review of the 
Ministry’s PD.
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The area of Eleonas -which has come in such a situation today under 
the state’s responsibility- is the only hope left for Athens to obtain an 
extended green zone, to preserve some natural elements like Profet’s 
Daniel torrent which is the last renmant of Athens’ historical rivers 
buried under the asphalt, as well as to revive the memories of the 
ancient Olive Grove site, of the Holly Road and of the other archae­
ological sites which the offended PD tries to turn into building blocks.
Since the PD at issue violates on the same time basic EC directives re­
lated to the protection of environment, we are also addressing our ob­
jections to the respective European bodies.
Our action should not be given political or party hue. We have sworn 
to serve with determination the interests of the city of Athens, and 
that’s what we are doing now {Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992: 24).
The key-points of the mayor’s written application against PD 74D/1991 
(ibid.: 25-8) were identical to those of the previous application, hence they 
will not be repeated here. The results, however, were that first the judicial re­
view applications postponed the implementation of the PD, and second they 
prepared the ground for the rise of a wave of social reaction and debate 
against the governmental project as we will see in the following subsection.
8.5.2. Other Contrasting Views and Propositions (Political Parties,
Local Authorities, Scientific and Professional Organizations)
Reactions and alternative views were raised by various social groupings 
(political parties and movements, local authorities, scientific and professional 
organizations etc.) as soon as the PD was published and the judicial review 
applications were submitted to the Council of State. It should be mentioned 
from the outset, that all those views -with the exception of those expressed 
by the mayor of Agios loannis Rentis which were in tune with the PD’s 
market oriented priorities- converged to a common point That the likely im­
plementation of the governmental initiative was going to be disastrous not 
only for Eleonas, but for Athens as a whole, since it was going to deprive the 
capital from the only land reservoir of a reasonable size which could poten­
tially contribute to its urban and environmental upgrading under different 
planning orientations with more social and environmental sensitivities. But
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this seems to be the only converging point; the various views and prospects 
for the future of Eleonas diverged from each other in varying extends, as we 
will see in the following analysis. The political parties tended to view the 
problem through their different political and ideological "prisms". Other social 
organizations, and especially the local authorities, tended to view the problem r-^  
and the prospects of its solution through the narrow of their own ^
local needs, socio-economic pressures and political prospects. Others, especial­
ly various scientific organizations, tended to express a rather utopian perspec­
tive pursuing the removal of any production activity and the transformation 
of Eleonas into a huge metropolitan green park (the "green scenario" again). 
Other more realistic viewpoints took into consideration the importance of the 
area’s production nexus and seeked to underline the "balance points" between 
economic regeneration and environmental protection of the area. Let us ana­
lyze in some more detail the above diverging considerations as expressed in 
TEE’s ( Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992) scientific meeting.
The views held by the delegate of the governing Conservative party 
had a rather apologetic character. They gave the impression that while the 
government was aware of the need for green and public spaces provision, it 
was quite impossible to proceed to a radical dealing with the problem chiefly 
because of its geographical extend and of the perplexed nature of the estab­
lished local socio-economic interests. It was therefore impliciriy  ^admitted that 
the-governmegt-was^eluctant to undertake the political cost a radical treat­
ment of the problem would entail in the context of a comprehensive renewal 
strategy for Eleonas. Thus, the logic of the governmental project -as the ND 
delegate admitted- was the implementation of some urgent measures which 
would prevent Eleonas from further degradation (continuation of illegal 
building-up of the area). He also stated that since the weak state budget was 
unable to afford the cost of extended land expropriations for the creation of 
large tracts of green and public spaces, the proposal confined itself (a) to the 
green linear zones that could stem from the obligatory land contribution of 
area’s landowners, and (b) to the green of private plots’ unbuilt parts. The del­
egate finally stated that the expected building boom after the implementation 
of the governmental PD, will operate as a strong incentive for the area’s
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inhabitants to remain in place and as a disincentive for the area’s industries 
pushing them to migrate to the metropolitan periphery.
Such an "excuse", however, could be questioned on four particular 
grounds: First, the proposed linear green zones along the transport arteries are 
dispersed in the whole area, hence they would operate rather as "decorative" 
elements than as real public green spaces. Second, the "unbuilt parts" of plots, 
as everyone who has walked along Eleonas knows, are mostly used by in­
dustries for open-air warehousing, trucks loading-unloading manoeuvres and 
parking, etc., hence they cannot count as "green space" for Eleonas. Third, the 
notion of "high cost" (for land expropriations on a mass scale) is relative; it 
depends on the extend of social benefit that might result. Fourth, the "ex­
pected building boom" after the implementation of the governmental project 
is not going to keep the area’s inhabitants in place, since the upswinging land 
demand for office space and the associated land price increase is going to re­
place any other activity of a lower profitability potential (be it residential or 
industrial).
The opposition Socialist delegate presented an alternative proposal 
whose main points were the following:
Engagement of all land owned by public organizations (with the excep­
tion of that owned by the Public Enterprise of Electricity) for the pur­
pose of allocating it to social uses.
Increase of green in extended compact land zones.
Removal of all highly polluting industrial units according to the exist­
ing relocation-by-branch studies.
Renewal of the Eleonas’ residential clusters and their separation from 
low to medium pollution activities by means of thick green belts. 
Reorganization of Eleonas’ production activities into industrial and 
handicraft parks (VIPA-VIOPA).
Decrease of the floorspace/plot ratios to the level (0.8) as proposed by 
the Planning Law 1337/1983.
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Creation of a decentralized administrative body for the development 
of Eleonas in which all interested parts (public, social and local author­
ities) would jointly participate.
No one would be able to question the sincerity of the above directions, 
if the proposer had on the same time explained why these objectives (which 
were also set when Socialists were to office) were never implemented during 
the crucial period of the 1980s. Such a self-critical stance was completely ab­
sent, hence, the proposed alternative -in spite of its concern for the mainten­
ance of industrial employment in the area- was rather aiming at political 
opposition reasons and ideological gains, than at concrete engagements of 
what Socialists would actually do after coming back to office.
The Coalition of the Left (SYN) held the view that any planning inter­
vention should not restrict itself within the geographical boundaries of Eleo­
nas, only, but had to be associated with the wider needs of Athens for 
residential, cultural and social facilities. Eleonas was the last chance for a 
large-scale_urban_and environmental upgrading of the whole Athenian ag­
glomeration. Such an intervention, according to the Coalition delegate, should 
not be guided by narrow economic criteria, but by ecological ones. In such a 
perspective, the dominant land use in Eleonas should be the green. The del­
egate did not make any point about how the green scenario would be fi­
nanced, or about its impacts upon the urban economy, or by whom the whole 
project would be carried out.
By contrast to the Coalition, the proposal of EAR (a left-wing political 
party participating in the Coalition) showed remarkable sensitivities for the 
problem o f ^ roductipn and empleyment-mainttnance jn  the area. First, the 
proposer made the point that the problems of Eleonas had not "technical" ori­
gins but social and political ones, and then stated that this area could poten­
tially form a challenging field of a modern intervention policy based upon 
two directions: First, the allocation of a major portion of land to extended 
green, social and cultural uses which would contribute to the environmental 
upgrading of central Athens and to the strengthening of its historical identity.
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and second, the creation of organized industrial parks which would contribute 
to industrial revitalization and development of the area. The EAR proposer 
finally commented on the need of establishing a participatory administrative 
body for Eleonas in which the area’s local authorities and their inter-munici- 
pal associations would have a determinate role.
The proposal of the "Ecologists-Alternatives" political movement, de­
veloped along the following directions:
Eleonas should be included in the Structure Plan o f Athens as an area 
of predominantly green and agricultural land uses.
Any new urban activity should not be allowed to locate in the area.
The polluting industries should be removed, and handicraft manufac­
turing should be re-organized into handicraft parks (VIOPA).
The land should be allocated to public uses.
Provision of special incentives to industries wishing to decentralize and 
disincentives to those wishing to remain in place.
Creation of an inter-municipal administrative body for the imple­
mentation of the operation.
The DIANA delegate pointed out that the governmental PD should be 
postponed and that a constructive dialogue between the state’s planning ma­
chinery and the interested social groupings and organizations should start 
afresh. However, the delegate made no concrete propositions on which direc­
tions the area should develop.
The party of KKE es., in criticising the governmental proposal, linked 
its underlying planning principles with other facets of conservative policy. As 
the party delegate stated,
The Manos’ PD for Eleonas, which provocatively ignores the social role 
this huge area could play, is not an individual -probably thoughtless or 
rash- governmental decision. It was not the easy solution. Unfortunate­
ly it is a solution forming organic part of a much wider political plan 
which is currently implemented at a lot of levels. Just like economy, 
education, public health and institutions. New Democracy is aiming at
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introducing and materializing its neo-concervative viewpoint in the 
field of urban planning, environment and quality of life. But -especial­
ly in the field of urban planning and environment- there is an ... ex­
tremely negative practice ... and a wider culture (which) deteriorated 
the environment and produced our unliveable cities (Tecbnika Cbroni- 
ka. No 3/1992: 47).
The alternative proposed by KKE es. was centred upon the prospect of 
transforming Eleonas into a metropolitan park of green at the long-run, 
whereas at the short-run small niches of industrial production should be pre­
served, and the existing residential clusters should be upgraded. The costs of 
financing such a long-term project could be incrementally afforded over a 
100 years period of time.
The views and proposals of the Athens’ city local authority were pres­
ented by the assistant mayor in five key-points:
(i) Eleonas is an area whose size, location, historical and specific natural 
characteristics make it a unique case. These characteristics request that 
Eleonas should be among the first priorities in every endeavour aimed 
at strengthening the historical-cultural identity of Athens, at restoring 
and protecting its landscape and at improving living conditions in i t
(ii) The incorporation of Eleonas in the statutory city-plan, should seek to 
accomplish the organization, restoration and renewal of the area on a 
comprehensive basis. Co-ordinated measures and actions, by taking into 
consideration the structure of economic activities and employment, 
should tend to maximize the possibilities provided in the area for the 
creation of collectively used green spaces, along with the possibilities 
for organizing a modern, environmentally friendly, production area. 
The unique nature of Eleonas imposes a planning treatment differing 
from any other area outside the statutory city-plan. The existing pro­
duction activities should be examined in every detail in order to decide 
which should remain in Eleonas and which should relocate elsewhere.
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(iii) The proposed alternative should have as its first priority the upgrading 
of the area’s environment, the protection of the neighbouring residen­
tial clusters and the wider urban tissue. The industrial and handicraft 
activities should be clustered in clearly specified zones away from resi­
dential ones and should be surrounded by thick green belts. The highly 
polluting industries should immediately relocate as the Structure Plan 
of Athens imposes. The manufacturing activities which are necessary 
to remain in Eleonas or to relocate into it from neighbouring residen­
tial areas, should be clearly specified with relation to their size, their 
branch structure, their environmental impacts and their building re­
gulations. The dispersed small manufacturing and handicraft units 
should be gathered and accommodated in appropriately equipped 
buildings in order to help them modernize, to introduce anti-pollution 
technologies and on the same time to release the occupied land. With 
regard to the large polluting industries, some of them would remain in 
Eleonas if they decided to introduce environmentally friendly technol­
ogies, while others should estimate the cost of introducing anti-pollu­
tion technologies in relation to their relocation costs. The area’s 
transport network should be spatially reorganized and planned under 
environmental criteria, while most of the public organizations that oc­
cupy large tracts of land have no relevant reasons to remain in Eleonas 
and should relocate as to release precious space for social use.
(iv) Dominant land use in Eleonas can -and must- become the green. Ex­
tended free spaces should be gradually engaged, planned and added-up 
flexibly in order to create anti-pollution green zones separating resi­
dential from production uses and heavy traffic flows. Such a possibility 
stems from the existing low built/free space ratio in the area -a ratio 
that will be gradually becoming lower as long as previously occupied 
spaces will be released after the relocation of public organizations and 
polluting manufacturing activities such as tanneries, metal-melting and 
metallizing works.
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(v) The role of Eleonas for the future of Athens cannot be only a central 
government’s concern, but requests increased responsibility on the part 
of the area’s local authorities. The Eleonas issue cannot be confined to 
the drafting and approval of a land-use plan, only. It leads to the 
necessity of creating an autonomous and flexible administrative body, 
capable of supervising and managing the implementation of planning 
measures and actions, of utilising every possible financial resource, of 
solving problems that may eventually arise during the whole pro­
cedure, and of surpassing possible objections and internal conflict In 
such a body central government should collaborate with local autho- 
rites, which, moreover, should be given increased responsibilities in re­
lating decision-making.
The mayor of Agios loannis Rentis was the only representative of the 
area’s local authorities supporting the governmental PD’s market oriented 
priorities in that meeting. As he asserted, the problems experienced in his 
municipality (major portion of which is situated in Eleonas) were so pressing, 
that they could no longer stand any further delay, endless discussions, unfin­
ished plans etc., but, on the contrary, necessitated immediate practical regula­
tions. According to his views, 65% of his municipality’s territory was outside 
the statutory city-plan so that the local authority was unable to control the 
wave of illegal factory-building constructions which were causing serious 
environmental pollution and which were increasingly occupying every square 
metre of free space.
Nowadays, there is not even the minimum infrastructure in the area... 
Sewerage systems, roads, free spaces, planning, do not simply exist and 
this makes the situation become worse day by day. The need of includ­
ing the area in the statutory city-plan was urgent, and much more ur­
gent was the implementation of a land-use plan. The long-lasting 
inefficient studies led nowhere; they just maintained the existing situ­
ation and consequently very soon it would be impossible for us to find 
even one square metre of free land {Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992; 78).
The incorporation of the area in the statutory city-plan according to 
the governmental PD and the construction of new transport infrastructure, 
was supposedly going to decrease the traffic congestion in the municipality
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and to provide better possibilities of controlling air pollution. In the mayor's 
view, the mixed land-use scheme (residence-tertiary activities) proposed by 
the governmental PD would contribute to the economic revitalization of his 
municipality, whereas the industrial activities would inevitably be forced to 
relocate gradually since the favourable conditions for their operation would 
be lost
The mayor of Egaleo, by contrast, disagreed with the governmental 
project and supported the green scenario on a long-term basis. On the short­
term, however, he stated that the industrial installations which have been 
legally built in Eleonas should remain into organized industrial parks for a 
period of ten years, with the prospect to relocate by the end of that period. 
Generous incentives should be provided for that purpose. The industrial acti­
vities which have been sheltered in illegal buildings or which have not oper­
ation permits, should be removed immediately from the area. The remaining 
industries for the 10 years period, should have to abide by strict environ­
mental anti-pollution controls and should not be allowed to expand. Working 
people in these industries should have to know from the outset that their jobs 
would not be permanent. In the mayor’s view, it would be preferable these 
jobs to be "sacrificed" if the purpose of improving the living conditions of 3.5 
million Athenian people were to be attained. Establishment of new industries 
should not be allowed in the area. The floorspace/plot ratios should fall to 0.8 
for residential uses and to 0.4 for industrial ones. This would force land prices 
fall considerably, so that the expropriations cost for the creation of extended 
green spaces would fall as well This cost could be afforded partly by green 
taxes for a period of five to ten years, and partly by combined state budget 
and EC funding.
The alternative proposal of Tavros local authority, was based on the 
following points:
Eleonas is one of the most downgraded areas of the Athenian agglom­
eration, since it has operated for years as a receiving place for all those 
activities which were "undesirable" at other typical urban areas.
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Eleonas, however, has become a production place of great importance 
to the Greek economy as a whole and to the Athenian labour m arket 
Eleonas is a major source of air and water pollution affecting the 
whole metropolitan area.
Despite the unplanned -and to a good extend illegal- building growth 
of the area, there still exist possibilities of revitalizing its production 
base and the other linked economic activities, and on the same time of 
protecting and upgrading its wider environment
In the above context, the alternative objectives for the renewal and de­
velopment of Eleonas should be the following:
Removal of polluting activities from residential areas. Clear geographi­
cal definition of those areas and provision of appropriate social faci­
lities and infrastructure networks.
Provision of the maximum available space (up to 50% of the whole 
area) for public use and green.
Undertaking of anti-pollution measures for the existing industrial in­
stallations and carrying out of comparative cost studies for the reloca­
tion of highly polluting ones.
Removal of tanneries, metal-melting and metallizing works from the 
area within a predefined time-schedule, according to the directions of 
the Structure Plan of Athens.
Prohibition of new manufacturing and handicraft activities in Eleonas. 
Creation of industrial parks for the relocation of production units 
which are currently dispersed within the municipalities’ residential 
tissue.
Creation of transport and other infrastructure networks in the area.
These objectives should be materialized gradually, by starting from 
some piecemeal "soft" measures (such as for instance expropriation of vacant 
land, relocation of public organizations, widening of the existing roads, etc.) 
and ending up to the implementation of the whole "hard" package of objec­
tives. Such a comprehensive operation necessitates the creation of an inter-
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municipal development agency, in which state organizations, local authorities, 
scientific institutions and professional chambers will participate, and which 
will be given increased legal and financial powers to tackle with crucial issues 
such as:
supervision of the process of land and money contributions according 
to the provisions of Planning Law (1337/1983) 
anti-pollution controls and implementation of measures 
recording of needs and implementation of relocation programmes 
expropriations and/or purchases of land and buildings 
creation of money deposits from landowners’ financial contributions 
(L.1313/1983) and from any other external source of funding 
responsibilities for creating and upkeeping green zones
By contrast to Tavros local authority’s structured and comprehensive 
proposal, the local authority of Peristeri presented a brief set of rather scat­
tered thoughts in which the green scenario was adopted and the removal of 
every production activity was proposed. No comments were made about the 
loss of thousands of manufacturing jobs, the dismantling of the local econ­
omic linkages, the financial resources for the implementation of the green 
scenario, or the composition of the administrative body for carrying out the 
whole project.
The president of the league of Eleonas (Syndesmos Eleona) in which 
the area’s local authorities were represented, proposed a balanced scheme, in 
which the need to protect the environment co-existed with the need to pro­
tect the industrial space and labour of Eleonas. He first connected the govern­
mental PD with the class character of the area by stating that since the 
wealthier social strata have moved to the suburbs, Eleonas is now populated 
by working-class communities which cannot afford the increased costs of 
suburban living. This social segregation of space can probaly explain the gov­
ernment’s inability to face the real problem and to realise that the imple­
mentation of the PD at issue is going to contribute to the further degradation 
of the area. He then repeated the league’s position, which had been submitted
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to the Ministry of Environment on 25th of January 1989, namely: (a) That 
Eleonas is one of the most downgraded areas in Greater Athens and one of 
the most severe sources of air and water pollution; (b) That the economic 
activities which have been developed in the area play a much important role 
in the Athenian labour market (especially in industrial, transportation, whole­
sale and warehousing employment) and in the national economy as a whole, 
(c) That despite the unplanned growth of the area there still exist possibilities 
for both its productive regeneration and environmental improvement In that 
context, the governmental PD should be postponed and Eleonas should devel­
op along the following directions:
Removal of highly polluting activities from residential areas. 
Construction of infrastructure networks and provision of social faci­
lities in those areas.
Creation of large green spaces.
Implementation of anti-pollution measures and comparative cost 
studies for relocation of highly polluting industrial plants.
Improvement of the road system and of the other infrastructure 
networks.
Creation of modern industrial parks for gathering the dispersed manu­
facturing units.
Some other relating directions were set forth as well: (a) coping with 
the area’s problems should be given priority of immense importance for the 
social, economic and environmental structure of Athens; (b) a new definition 
of the Eleonas’ geographical boundaries should take place, in order to include 
neighbouring areas that function as a totality; (c) securing of the necessary 
financial sources; (d) carrying out of new planning studies based on more de­
tailed information about the area’s characteristics; (e) definition of criteria 
under which production activities could locate or relocate into Eleonas, etc. 
Finally, the development of the area should be managed in all its stages by a 
representative inter-municipal body.
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A balanced scheme between green and production was also proposed 
by TEDKNA (Local Union of Municipalities and Communities in Attica). The 
objections of the Union against the governmental PD were the following:
The rise of floorspace/plot ratios as proposed by the governmental PD, 
would stimulate an upswing of the property prices so that the acquisi­
tion of land for public use (above the amount that could be gathered 
by the obligatory contributions imposed by Law 1337/1983), would be­
come practically impossible.
The PD legitimizes the co-existence of residence with incompatible in­
dustrial activities.
The PD does not propose the removal of activities (such as tanneries, 
metal-melting and metallizing works, etc.), which are incompatible 
even with other manufacturing activities located in industrial parks.
The PD is going to maximize the building volume at the expense of 
green spaces.
The PD does not propose the participation of the area’s local author­
ities in the whole operation.
According to the Union’s proposal the following actions and measures 
were of immense importance:
Land owned by public organizations should be listed and engaged for 
the purpose of being allocated to social uses.
The historical and natural monuments of the area should be preserved. 
The percentage of green should be drastically increased in unified ex­
tended spaces.
The transport network should be planned as to provide freeways de­
creasing traffic congestion.
The highly polluting units should be removed from the area under a 
concrete time-schedule
Low to medium polluting activities should be separated from residen­
tial ones.
The residential areas of Eleonas should be renewed
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The floorspace/plot ratios should fall to 0.8 (at maximum) for residen­
tial uses and to 0.4 for industrial ones regardless of plots’ sizes.
A participatory administrative body for Eleonas should be created.
The Development League of Western Attica (ASDAX presented an 
elaborate proposal, according which planning actions would focus upon three 
key issues: (a) green (b) industry and (c) transport More precisely:
(a) With regard to green provision, land owned by public organizations 
should be engaged and transferred to the responsibilities of the area’s 
local authorities. On the same time, all Eleonas’ activities having no 
relevant reason to be in close proximity to the Athenian centre should 
be pushed to relocate, and the land they presently occupy should be ex­
propriated. The expropriations cost should be calculated on the basis of 
the previous land prices (those prevailing before the price upswing 
caused by PD 74D), and should be afforded partly by the state budget, 
partly by the remaining manufacturing industries, and partly by a 
special tax afforded by all Athenian citizens. The land deposit collected 
and allocated to green, should reach at least 50% of the whole area.
(b) With regard to industry, major concern should be given to production 
modernization initiatives and to job maintenance. Production modern­
ization should develop in tyne with environmental protection criteria. 
For every industry in Eleonas special feasibility and environmental im­
pacts assessment studies should be carried ou t The highly polluting in­
dustries would have either to relocate, or to introduce environmentally 
friendly technologies if they wished to remain in place. All manufac­
turing activities should be arranged in industrial and handicraft parks 
which should provide considerable amounts of land for green and so­
cial uses. These parks should also receive manufacturing plants relo­
cated from adjacent residential areas.
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(c) With regard to transport, the area’s road network should be spatially 
reorganized as to separate supra-local from local flows, which are 
today mixed-up and cause serious traffic congestion problems.
A decentralized body for managing the whole operation should be 
created. The decisive role should be given to the area’s local authorities; pri­
vate investment agencies and scientific-technical organizations should also 
participate in that body.
The Association of Athens and Piraeus Industries (SVAP), accepted the 
basic logic of the governmental PD, but under the precondition that definite 
steps towards its improvement -with regard to industry- should be followed. 
The delegate of SVAP stressed out emphatically (a) that an efficient approach 
to the Eleonas’ problems necessitates every involved part to exhibit a sense of 
good will and collaboration; (b) that the maintenance of the existing situation 
and the unbridged schism between the various contrasting views could not be 
acceptable any more; (c) that the problems of Eleonas necessitate immediate 
interventions, since the long-lasting lack of concern and the state’s planning 
failures perplex further the existing setbacks, create new problematic situ­
ations and raise the costs of intervention at immense heights.
In other words, what was yesterday feasible has now become unfeas­
ible without even asking us, and what is today possible ... will tomor­
row become impossible, leaving us to blame each other about which 
one loves this place more than the others, which one strives to impose 
his views upon the others {Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992:120).
In that context, the Association called every involved part to contrib­
ute to a relaxation of internal conflict and to a convergence of the various 
contrasting views and propositions.
With regard to the specific problems, the industrialists’ representative 
stated that the Association (a) accepts the prohibitions iposed by PD 84/84 
upon the establishment of new industries not only in Eleonas but in the wider 
area of Athens, and that (b) certain industries is necessary to relocate from 
Eleonas, under specific criteria such as:
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Relocation should encompass whole branches and not separate 
companies.
Plants’ relocation should be subsidized (since it differs from house­
holds’ moves).
The receiving spaces should be properly organized and equipped with 
the appropriate infrastructure.
All parameters constituting the relocation problem (costs, firms’ 
technical and economic possibilities, employment change, timing, exist­
ence of properly skilled labour in the new location, etc.) should be 
carefully estimated in detailed relocation studies.
With regard to the future of Eleonas, the SVAP delegate made the fol­
lowing points:
Eleonas is by definition a downgraded polluting area. Putting emphasis 
on its historical past is therefore meaningless, since every corner of the 
Greek land has such a historical past
The area is not a "new land", hence we cannot plan it "in vacuum". The 
supporters of the green alternative, should realise the huge amount of 
capital invested in it over the decades, as well as the thousands of 
people which work in it and which would be reluctant to follow the 
relocated industries in the new unknown places.
The propositions requesting the withdrawal of the Eleonas’ PD, are 
going to add 10 more years in a period of planning failures, and hence 
to perplex further the existing problems.
In SVAP’s opinion, the PD 74D/91 should be implemented, under the 
following necessary immediate improvements:
Reform of the existing PD 84/84 as to allow technological moderniz­
ation of existing manufacturing in Greater Athens.
Immediate construction of the necessary infrastructure in Eleonas and 
creation of an administrative body in which those contributing in land
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and money (i.e. industrialists and other private interests) should 
participate.
The option of relocating the old residential clusters away from Eleo­
nas’ industries should be examined (wherever necessary). Measures for 
the peaceful coexistence of industrial and residential activities should 
be undertaken.
Exclusion of industries from the regulations imposed by Law 1337/1983; 
otherwise, the upswing of land prices due to the inclusion of the area 
in the statutory city-plan is going to make the money contribution of 
industries unbearable.
The Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) held the view that despite 
the area’s ongoing degradation there still were possibilities for a comprehen­
sive renewal policy which could generate the conditions for an ecological up­
grading of Athens through the creation of a large metropolitan park 
combined with niches of work and residence. Emphasis, however, was put on 
environmental protection initiatives:
The area’s planning should aim at decreasing environmental pollution 
of Greater Athens, which means first the decrease of pollutants pro­
duced in Eleonas, and second the undertaking of regulations and 
measures that could make the area function as an anti-pollution filter 
of Athens. Its dominant use could not be other but green {Tecbnika 
Cbronika, No 3/1992: 52).
A special administrative body -in which central and local governments 
should participate- could be created for implementing the proposal During 
the first decade of its implementation the following goals should be pursued:
Release of public land from its present uses and its allocation to green. 
Expropriation of large tracts of privately owned land and their alloca­
tion to green as well Preference should be given to vacant land, or to 
land sheltering cheap constructions or highly polluting activities which 
should be obliged to relocate outside Greater Athens.
Control of pollution produced by big industrial units in Eleonas 
through the obligatory adoption of anti-pollution technologies.
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Construction of production niches (industrial parks) in which only 
branches serving the basic needs of the neighbouring population will 
be allowed to locate and/or relocate.
In TEE’s proposal, the land-use composition by the end of the first 
decade would be as shown in table 8.6.
Table 8.6 Land-use configuration o f Eleonas as suggested by the
Technical Chamber o f Greece
Land use Area (in 
stremmas)
Percent
A. Private activities 2,775 30.83
-Big industrial units 1,100 1222
-Industrial parks 1,000 11.11
-Recidential areas 675 7.50
B. Public organizations (Agricultural Uni­
versity, athletic installations. Ve­
getables Market, METRO repair station, 
and DEH
750 8.33
C. Collectively used spaces 5,475 60.84
-Road network 700 7.78
-Green park 4,775 53.06
Total 9,000 100.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Tecbnika Chronika, No.3/92: 52-3.
During the second decade, certain measures for the further increase of 
green space could be undertaken -as for instance relocation of existing manu­
facturing plants, or of certain public organizations.
All those measures, in TEE’s estimation, would result in a total of 
20,000 labour redundancies in the area. Paradoxically, in an era of ongoing 
deindustrialization of Athens, the TEE’s delegate stated that "the problem is 
not so terrible and can be faced." {Tecbnika Cbronika, No 3/1992: 53). However, 
there was no a particular suggestion about how this could be accomplished.
The cost of the TEE’s renewal proposal was roughly estimated as 
follows:
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-Cost of private land expropriation: 125 billion drs.
-Cost of industrial buildings expropriation: 145 billion drs.
-Cost of construction of industrial parks: 30 billion drs.
-Cost of construction of green park: 25 billion drs.
The total cost of about 325 billion drs. could be covered by the follow­
ing sources:
EC funding (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes)
Incomes from selling and/or renting floorspace in the industrial parks 
Incomes from a special indirect tax added up in the price of gasoline (5 
drs/litre).
Incomes from a special direct tax paid annually by all Athenian inhab­
itants according to their residence* size (25 drs/sq.metre of residential 
floorspace).
Money contribution of all Athenian industries according to size» profits 
and degree of pollution.
Funding from the state budget
The delegate of the Faculty of Architecture suggested that the govern­
mental proposal not only was unable to solve the complex problems of the 
area, but also was about to aggravate them in both economic and environ­
mental terms. The inclusion of the area in the statutory city-plan under 
conditions of land appropriation maximization, would benefit only the area's 
landowners, whereas, contrarily, the whole Athenian population would be 
called to undertake the social and environmental costs of that profit maximi­
zation logic. Moreover, the upswing of land prices and rents would worsen the 
position of industry, and the negative externalities caused by excessive ag­
glomeration of people and activities to the area would make impossible the 
improvement of working and living conditions in i t  In this context.
the only acceptable proposal under the existing environmental condi­
tions is the one suggesting the gradual transformation of the area into 
a recreation zone as part of a wider metropolitan system of green
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spaces which would be able to develop under a long-term plan with 
concrete stages of growth, organization and implementation {Technika 
Chronika. No 3/1992: 99).
According to the suggestion, the area’s industrial activity could be 
gradually relocated into industrial parks on the metropolitan periphery, which 
could be able to provide favourable infrastructural and organizational support 
to the relocated industries, contributing on the same time to the protection of 
environment by imposing strict criteria of operation and control upon the re­
located plants. In the above direction, some urgent measures should be also 
undertaken:
Withdrawal of the governmental PD and postponing of the building 
permissions in Eleonas.
Creation of a special administrative body and a property registration 
system for the area.
Identification of the area as "zone in transition" and public sectors’ 
priorities in land purchases.
Beginning of planning studies for the system of Attica’s industrial 
parks as a whole and implementation of the existing ones for individ­
ual industrial areas.
Creation of a system of incentives for encouraging relocation of the 
Eleonas’ industries into the peripheral industrial parks.
Beginning of technical-economic studies for the creation of a system 
of metropolitan green, integral part of which would be the area of 
Eleonas.
Of parallel environmental priorities was the proposal suggested by the 
Association of Greek Civil Engineers (SPME). In its view, Eleonas should be 
transformed into a wide green belt connecting the archaeological inner-city 
sites with the rest of the Athenian urban tissue. As the previous proposal, this 
one suggested the relocation of production to peripheral sites in parallel with 
construction of high-speed transport networks connecting them with Athens. 
Some immediate restrictive measures were also suggested:
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Prohibition of any new building activity in Eleonas and monitoring of 
the area on a permanent basis.
Imposition of heavy penalties to those building illegally in the area. 
Prohibition of landed property transactions (which inflate land prices 
in the area).
Prohibition of operation permits for new industries.
Controlled renewal of old operation permits.
The cost of SPME’s proposal was estimated to be around 400 billion 
drs and could be covered by combined sources such as EC funding» state 
budget and special taxes paid by the Athenian citizenry.
The proposal of the Association of Greek Architects (SADAS) fa­
voured the same green option, but its underlying logic was based upon the 
unique topographical and ecological characteristics of the area in relation to 
those prevailing in the wider Athenian space. According to this view, the area 
included in Eleonas is the lowest level of the Athens basin and any further 
building volume in it would lead the whole ecosystem in certain deterioration.
Manos’ project says nothing about the impacts of such a (building) 
growth, about the dramatic increase of densities, of traffic, of smog, 
about the destruction of the only possibility left for the compactly 
built areas around Eleonas to breath; (it makes) no comment on some 
planning principles or on some kind of Master Plan {Tecbnika Chronika, 
No 3/1992:127).
In that context, the only acceptable alternative in SADAS’ view, is the 
transformation of Eleonas into a metropolitan park of green. No suggestion 
was made about how this goal would be accomplished and what this would 
entail for the local and wider metropolitan economy.
In a brief presentation, the delegate of the Association of Survey En­
gineers (SATM) suggested: (a) the withdrawal of governmental PD; (b) the 
postponing of building permits in Eleonas; (c) the prohibition of new oper­
ation permits for manufacturing plants; and (d) the beginning of a substantial 
dialogue between the interested parts for reaching a consensual solution. The
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basic suggestion was the transformation of Eleonas into green, combined with 
some restricted zones of work and residence.
In a text submitted jointly by four collective organizations (TEDKNA, 
TEE, EKA, SYNDESMOS ELEONA), the governmental PD was criticised on 
the grounds that the proposed regulations lacked vision and did not take into 
account the role Eleonas could potentially play in both economic development 
and environmental upgrading of Athens. The disagreement of the joint text 
with the PD was centred on the following points:
The extremely low and dispersed into strips green proposed by the PD. 
The extremely big floorspace/plot ratios.
The mixture of polluting and non polluting activities.
The long period of time (20 years) provided to the polluting industries 
in order to relocate.
The maintenance of land owned by public organizations in its present 
use, without any prediction for the future.
The adding up of new public organizations that have no the slightest 
relation with the character of the area, nor any profound reason to be 
located near the city centre.
The lack of special environmental studies which are necessary in such 
large-scale urban projects.
On the basis of those objections, the four organizations suggested the 
withdrawal of the PD, the creation of a decentralized body for the adminis­
tration and renewal of the area, and the identification of Eleonas as an area 
of strategic significance for Athens. The goals of a new approach should be:
(a). The provision of large green spaces combined with: (a.1) athletic, cul­
tural and recreation activities and (a.2) measures that would strengthen 
the historical and archaeological significance of particular areas as for 
instance Holly Road (lera Odos).
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(b). Modernization of the existing production base and job maintenance. 
This goal should be combined with: (b.l) 5-years timetables for the re­
location of highly polluting industries; (b.2) construction of industrial 
parks in properly selected sites of Eleonas for the organized clustering 
of the dispersed manufacturing units. (Non polluting units which are 
necessary for the basic needs of the population and which have a sig­
nificant scale of production and modern infrastructure, would be able 
to remain in place), (b.3) carrying out of special environmental and 
feasibility studies for each manufacturing unit which would remain in 
the area.
(c). Selective allowance of other non-industrial uses to develop (residence, 
commerce, warehouses, offices etc.). Special studies should be carried 
out in order to decide which uses should be regarded as necessary for 
the area and which should not
(d). Special transport regulations aimed a t  (d.1) preventing supra-local 
traffic flows from being mixed up with local; (d.2) facilitating trans­
port connections of the area with the wider urban network; and (d.3) 
helping pedestrians to access easily the green and public spaces.
The financing of such a project could come from combined sources 
such as (i) the programme of public investments, (ii) money contributions of 
the area’s landowners as imposed by Law 1337/1983, (iii) likely special taxes 
and (iv) likely incomes that would be collected by the Eleonas’ administration 
agency.
8.6. Conclusion: Which Policy for Eleonas?
If we try to codify in very rough lines the basic propositions for Eleonas, we 
can sketch table 8.7 in which the degrees of convergence/divergence between 
the various social actors involved in Eleonas are shown. Convergence/diver­
gence is related with the following priorities:
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Priorities in green and free spaces provision
Priorities in maintaining industrial employment
Priorities in employment shift from production to tertiary activities
Priorities in strictly marked-led initiatives for the area’s renewal and
development
Priorities in participatory processes for the area’s renewal and 
development.
All above priorities have been graded according to the degree of in­
terest expressed by the involved social groupings and organizations for each 
one of them. Although the information included in this table abstracts from 
the complexity and multiplicity of ideas and proposals expressed, we found no 
other way to make our point clear. Le., that there is no still a "common 
ground" on which a long-term consent on the future of a major portion of the 
Athenian industrial space could be established.
Table 8.7 Codification o f Various Social Actors* Prospects and Priorities 
______ for the Development o f Eleonas_______________________________
SOCIAL ACTORS IN­
VOLVED IN ELEONAS
PRIORITIES IN 
GREEN A FREE-
SPACES PROVI­
SION
PRIORITIES IN 
MAINTAINING 
INDUSTRIAL 
EMPLOYMENT
PRIORITIES IN 
EMPLOYMENT 
SHIFT TO TER­
TIARY 
ACTIVITIES
PRIORITIES IN 
MARKET-LED 
INITIATIVES 
FOR RENEWAL A
DEVELOPMENT
PRIORITIES IN 
PARTICIPATORY 
PROCESSES FOR 
RENEWAL A 
DEVELOPMENT
POLITICAL 
PARTIES ft 
ORGANIZATIONS
A.GOVERNMENTAL
MINISTRY OF ENVI­
RONMENT (PD74D)
+ + +  +  + +  +  + —
ND
B.NON-GOVERNME-
KEAL
+ + +  +  + +  +  +
PASOK 4- + +  +  + — — +  +  +
SYN +  4-4- + — — —
EAR +  +  + +  +  + — — +  +  +
EœiOGISTS-
ALTERNATIVES
+  +  + + — — +  +  +
DIANA — ----- — — —
KKEes.
LOCAL AUTHORI­
TIES
+  +  + +
■
365
SOCIAL ACTORS IN­
VOLVED IN ELEONAS
PRIORITIES IN 
GREEN *  FREE-
SPACES PROVI­
SION
PRIORTTIESIN
MAINTAINING
INDUSTRIAL
EMPLOYMENT
PRIORTTIESIN 
EMPLOYMENT 
SHUT TO TER­
TIARY 
ACTIVITIES
PRIORITIES IN 
MARKET-LED 
INITIATIVES 
FOR RENEWAL A
DEVELOPMENT
PRIORITIES IN 
PARTICIPATORY 
PROCESSES FOR 
RENEWAL A 
DEVELOPMENT
ATHENS +  +  + 4- 4- — — -F-F-F
AGIOS lOANNB 
RENTIS
+ 4- 4-4-4- 4-4-4- —
EGALEO 4-4-4- 4- — — —
TAVROS 4-4-4- 4- 4- — — +  4-4-
PERISTERI 4-4-4- -F — — —
LEAGUE OF 
ELEONAS
4-4-4- -F 4- 4- — — 4-4-4-
TEDKNA 4-4-4- 4-4-4- — — 4-4-4-
ASDA 4-4-4- 4- 4- -F — — 4-4-4-
INDUSTRIALISTS
ORGANIZATION
(SVAP)
S C IE N T IF IC *
PRO FESSIO NA L
ORGANIZATIONS
4- 4-4-4- -F 4- 4- 4-
TEE 4-4-4- 4- — — 4-4-4-
FACULTY OF
ARCHITECTURE
(NTUA)
-F 4- 4- 4-
SADAS 4-4-4- 4- — —
SPME 4-4-4- 4- — — —
SATM 4-4-4- 4- — — —
JO INT PROPOSAL 
(TEDKNA, TEE, 
E K A *  LEAGUE OF 
ELEONAS)
4- 4- -F -F -F -F 4-4-4-
+ + + High degree of interest
+ + Medium degree of interest
+ Low degree of interest
— Lack of any consideration
Apart from the market oriented approach which was previously pres­
ented and criticized, the alternative views and proposals can fall into two 
major groups:
A first group considers that the most crucial problem of the Athenian 
agglomeration as a whole, is the environmental problem. That is, the
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tremendous lack of free green spaces -spaces which Eleonas would potentially 
provide if it were transformed into a large green park of metropolitan 
significance.
Although this alternative does have a real basis (the problem of 
environmental pollution in Athens) there is a major problem associated with 
its practicability. The dismantling of a huge production space offering 
employment to more than 40,000 people and its transformation into a 
metropolitan park, would inevitably result in serious political costs for the 
government at office in an era of ongoing de-industrialization, job loss and 
general social unrest. Even if the financial cost of such a greening operation 
could be practically afforded (by means of a combined state and EC funding, 
and/or by green taxes paid by all Athenian citizens for a certain period of 
time as various views have proposed), it would be much difficult for the 
decision-makers to convince that 40,000 lost working positions would be 
normally absorbed at the short-run in other, tertiary, activities of the wider 
metropolitan space-economy, provided that there was no a strategic 
development plan -or even an elaborated vision- for the tertiarization of the 
specific area of Eleonas.
Probably the supporters of the green option have regarded that its 
likely implementation would not affect the economic base of Greater Athens 
as a whole, since it could evolve in parallel with policy measures aimed at in­
itiating plants' relocations into industrial parks at the fringe of the Athenian 
agglomeration {Tecbnika Chronika, No 3/1992: 100). Such a perspective, how­
ever, underestimates two crucial points:
First, it is the European experience pointing to the opposite direction. 
Le. to the need of maintaining a variety of employment opportunities, econ­
omic interactions and ways of life at city-centres. Past economic processes
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have favoured the migration of manufacturing from inner city sites outwards 
(chap. 1), while the deindustrialization processes of the 1970s and 1980s have 
reinforced the abandonment of inner-city sites. The city-centres, therefore, 
lost their past warmth and variety which was based on interactive communi­
cation between different social groupings, mentalities, working cultures and 
ways of life, and criminal behaviour has largely increased in such derelict 
areas. The deterioration of their industrial base, the ageing of their infrastruc­
ture and the degradation of their environment have put public alarms on: 
Integrated programmes and measures were undertaken during the 1980s in 
major European urban centres (chap. 6, sect 6.4) aiming at economic regener­
ation and environmental improvement of their declining inner-city areas. 
Special care was given to initiatives aimed at making inner cities more human 
and productive, at improving living and working conditions in them, at stimu­
lating social and cultural interaction and at diminishing problems of social al- 
lienation and exclusion. Special concern was particularly given in finding ways 
to attract light non-polluting manufacturing activities at inner city sites (see 
Chapman and Walker 1987: 240-7; CE/CDUP/CD 1985).
Second, it is the problem of relocation /?er (see Kourliouros 1995 for 
a detailed reference). This problem, as expressed in the concrete case of Eleo­
nas, has various "facets" and options as it can be schematically shown in fig. 
8.5 More precisely:
In-Out Relocation
There are manufacturing branches (eg. metal-melting works, metalliz­
ation works and tanneries) which, due to the "nature" of their produc­
tion process, cannot remain in place and should relocate into isolated 
sites on the metropolitan periphery. Manufacturing units linked-up 
with the building industry -e.g. brick and tileworks, or concrete pro­
duction works- are land consuming ones, offer little employment op­
portunities, and their relocation to peripheral sites would provide 
ample space for public use and green in Eleonas. Moreover, these
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Figure 8.5 Facets o f  the relocation problem in Eleonas
ADJACENT MUNICIPALITIES
OUT-IN RELOCATION
ELEONAS
IN-OUT RELOCATION
APPROPRIATE RECEIVING SPACES 
ON THE METROPOLITAN PERIPHERY
t \
IN-IN RELOCA- 
c|]TION
GROWTH
#  HIGHLY POLLUTING UNITS (METAL MELTING/METALLIZATION WORKS AND 
TANNERIES) OR LAND-CONSUMING UNITS (TILE/BRICK WORKS. CONCRETE 
PRODUCTION WORKS)
O  DYNAMIC COMPANIES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE METROPOLITAN 
AND NATIONAL ECONOMY
□  NOT POLLUTING SMEs SCATTERED ACROSS ELEONAS' TISSUE 
■  NOT POLLUTING SMEs SCATTERED WITHIN ADJACENT MUNICIPALITIES
INDUSTRIAL AND HANDICRAFT PARKS (VIPA-VIOPA)
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industries have no profound reasons to remain in place: The central 
areas of Athens have been built-up, so that those industries’ past com­
parative advantage of "proximity to market" makes no sense any more. 
Many Eleonas* units belonging to the above branches have realised that 
there is no future for them in this area, and they could relocate into 
the metropolitan periphery if the Ministry of Environment had de­
fined and organized the appropriate "receiving" spaces -something 
which has not still been accomplished. So, these units have no other op­
tion than to remain in Eleonas.^ There are also manufacturing in­
dustries which decide to migrate outwards for a number of reasons the 
most pressing of which are: their inability to expand in situ because of 
shortages and high cost of available land, or because of restrictions im­
posed by the existing legislative framework (PD 84/84), various nega­
tive externalities that increase the individual plants’ costs (e.g. transport 
delays due to traffic congestion, obligatory closure of plants in days 
when air pollutants reach very high levels), reactions of citizens and/or 
local authorities, etc.
In Situ Growth (expansions and new plants births)
There are modern dynamic companies in Eleonas which not only 
should not relocate (since this would probably entail firing of the ex­
isting workforce and recruitment of new one in the receiving area), but 
to be further supported by securing appropriately organized space in 
Eleonas (industrial parks) for their expansion in situ, and by reforming 
the existing legislative framework. This is so because such enterprises 
not only contribute to the maintenance of local employment and econ­
omic linkages, but also because their scale of production, the technol­
ogies they adopt and their more general economic profile are such that 
can be regarded as important not only for the area but for the national 
economy as a whole. And what is more important, due to their modern 
technological equipment they do not cause serious environmental 
pollution as special measurements have shown (ERG 1992a). To the
Information provided in interviews.
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degree some of them cause pollution, they do have the economic capa­
bility to modernize their anti-pollution installations if legally obliged 
to do so. The possibilities of establishing new ones in modern branches 
should be also pursued.
In-In Relocation
Their is a great number of SMEs in Eleonas which employ a good por­
tion of the local workforce and which may not cause environmental 
pollution, but their "random" location within the area -and especially 
along narrow roads- causes serious traffic congestion problems, feeds 
industry-vs-residence tensions and anti-industrial attitudes, and con­
tributes to the maintenance of urban "chaos". As it is known, the sur­
vival of such small firms is heavily dependent on the network of 
external economies they can only get in central city locations 
(Chapman and Walker 1987: 232-34; Bale 1988: 158-64; Wassenhoven et 
aL 1989: 74-86). Any proposal of relocating them outside their initial 
setting, equals to proposal of closing down them, not only because re­
location implies the loss of their "vital" economic space in the city 
centre (suppliers, markets, etc.), but also because their small family- 
type size and weak economic abilities make them usually unable to af­
ford the costs of relocation even if they are subsidized by the state. 
Moreover, their relocation option implies wider negative side-effects 
on the urban economy in that the complex nexus of their interlinked 
activities (buyers, suppliers, products, etc.) will be dissolved. As Was­
senhoven et al have put i t
Wherever we intervene, especially at inner-city areas of manu­
facturing activity, we must never forget that we have to do with 
a sensitive economic "ecosystem" whose chains of internal rela­
tions could not be dissolved without a considerable social cost
It is about a permanent effort o f  establishing an equilibrium be­
tween environmental protection and urban regulation on the one 
band, ànd maintenance -as much as possible- o f the complex life  
o f the production system on the other. (Wassenhoven et aL 199k 
41).
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Such SMEs could undertake relocation within Eleonas, in 
properly organized multi-storey buildings offering common accomoda­
tion, infrastructure and support to the relocating SMEs in order to help 
them minimize the initial risks and develop.
Out-In Relocation
Eleonas' industrial parks and multi-storey artisanal buildings could also 
offer accomodation to non-polluting SMEs located within residential 
areas of the adjacent municipalities and feeding "industry-vs- 
residence" tensions.
For all above reasons, it is not so simple to propose a wave of mass re­
locations from Eleonas in order to obtain space for implementing the green 
alternative, without taking into account all those perplexed particularities of 
the relocation problem. It would be much wiser, instead, to propose first the 
undertaking of special feasibility studies for the area’s SMEs in order to find 
out:
which branches could be modernized in sitUy
which could relocate into industrial and handicraft parks (VIPA- 
VIOPA) created within Eleonas,
which could relocate into VIPA-VIOPA outside Greater Athens, or to 
ETVA’s regional estates,
which are not viable and have to modernize or, otherwise, to close 
down and
which could relocate from adjacent municipalities in Eleonas’ 
VIPA-VIOPA.
It is evident that relocation proposals delivered -even with the best of 
intensions- without a lot of scepticism and careful calculation of the pros and 
cons, contribute to the reinforcement of the anti-industrial climate and feed 
deindustrialization and job loss tendencies in Athens.
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Another group of views and proposals accepts that priorities should be 
directed to green and environment improvement, but on the other hand it 
keeps some degrees of concern about the need to maintain economic activity 
and productive employment in the area. This group of views comes mainly 
from the area’s local authorities and inter-municipal leagues, many citizens of 
which work in Eleonas and can quite clearly envisage which the impacts of 
the green option upon the local labour market would be if this option were 
implemented "on the ground". However, the degree of concern for productive 
jobs maintenance varies from low to average (with some exceptions), whereas 
green concerns still remain dominant
It should be stressed out that this thesis’ persistent antithesis to anti- 
industrialism does not imply the justification of the past industrial location 
practices which drove this inner-city production space to its present problem­
atical situation. Instead, it underlines the need of establishing a "platform" on 
which initiatives aimed at stimulating economic and industrial regeneration of 
the area and initiatives aimed at environmental improvement and social inter­
action could coexist and interrelate -provided, of course, that bo^tlie-sta te^  
pjanmng machin^y  and the social groupin^ _ a nd organizations involved, 
would be willing and able to re-examine their roles and mutual relations on 
the^-basis ofjong-^ r m  strategic choices  ^and not on the basis of short-term 
calculations. In the final analysis, the crucial point has not to do with the de­
bate on how much green and how much production activity should develop in 
this area. These are "technical" issues which would be easily tackled if there 
were a critical mass of consensus between the state on the one hand, and all 
those social groupings on the other. What therefore makes us pessimistic 
about the future of that area (and in extension of Athens as a whole), is the 
fact that one of the most important parts of the Athenian production space 
has entered in an "auction" of contrasting claims within which rational think­
ing and strategic vision do not seem to predominate, but, instead, short-term 
pursuits leaded either by the "blind" market forces, or by occasional and fluid 
balances between local contrasting interests lacking internal coherence and 
developmental perspective on a long-term basis.
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CHAPTER 9 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis aimed at analyzing some fundamental facets of the development 
and location of manufacturing industry in contemporary Athens and at exam­
ining the role of social political and cultural forces -in parallel and in inter­
nal connection with the role of economy- in those processes. The study, 
therefore, tried to establish a holistic approach to its subject, by departing 
from a conventional tradition confining itself to strictly economic concepts 
and interpretations. The notion of "economic rationality" which underlies the 
deep logical structures of conventional approaches to urban industrial geogra­
phy -irrespective of whether "rationality" refers to individual firms* locational 
decisions (location factors approaches), or to the "rationale" of capital's accu­
mulation and reproduction across space as a whole (structural or "capital re­
structuring" approaches) (chap. 1)- could not match the particularities and 
experiences of the G reeksemi-peripheral capitalism, in which the spheres of 
politics, social interaction, ideology and culture seem to play as much import­
ant role in spatial-industrial processes as the economic sphere does. Thus, the 
study tried to sketch the lines of an alternative approach addressed to the 
complex relationships between the modern Greek society, the organization of 
urban space and the role of the political sphere in spatial development and 
planning (chap. 2). The "building blocks" of that approach were provided by 
the intersection of three major intellectual currents: (a) the stjucturaLscbool 
of thought in approaching indi^trial location in the capitalist mode of pro­
duction, (b) the basics o f ^ e  Marxian approach to capitalist social dynamics, 
and (c) the criticism to ecpnomism and the substantiation of the specificity of 
the political and cultural spheres of capitalist formations. The first current 
provided us with the initiative to search behind the surface aspects and trans­
formations of the Athenian industrial space for more general transformative 
processes in the structure of the post-war Greek economy and society as a 
whole. The Marxian intellectual current provided us with a concern for the 
structure of socio-economic interests and conflicts upon the contemporary
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Athenian urban-industrial space. The third current, finally, led us to analyse 
the(un iq^  nature of the Greek political sphere and of its mutual relations to 
society in order to address the effects of planning policies and the role of cul­
tural attitudes upon the industrial spatiality of contemporary Athens.
The partial research findings are dispersed in the preceding chapters of 
the study. In this one we will try to synthesize and address the basic points by 
putting more emphasis on those which could be considered as the most 
important
The analysis of post-war Greek economic and industrial change as the pro­
duction system shifted from a phase of incomplete industrialization to a 
phase of deindustrialization and negative res^ucturing, revealed that these 
changes l^ d  neither_dA&tri^t iv e ^ f e c ^ n o r  they imposed dramatic shifts on 
the country’s geography of production -and especially on the role_of_Ajthens 
wider^area-a»-a--nQdal point in that geogaphy. However, ( ^ t^ e  intra-metro­
politan scalejkf Greater Athens, the shifts were much more dramatic  From
th e jyd  1970s till the late 1980s (the last indu^riaLcenSus took place on 1988), 
the Greater Athens area as a whole experienced a drastic process of deindus- 
trializatiefl-and-jûhJass. This process affected unevenly the various sub-areas 
and industry groups of the Athenian agglomeration. Crisis and negative re­
structuring triggered off the emergence of an unequal industrial configur­
ation characterized by new suburban manufacturing growth and inner city 
decline.
The study set forth a further inquiry of the Athenian industrial g e ^  
ography by surveying in detail a developing suburban industrial locality situ­
ated at the northern fringe of the Athenian agglomeration. It was revealed 
that the surveyed locality developed its production capacity during the crisis^ ~ ____________ —it— *■_ ^ -*■________________    _— ---- - ----- —^ —     — ,—
period^ f  1970^ndL198Q&_z#_ development which was initiated not only by 
plants’ relocation from congested Athenian areas but by plant births as w ell 
Economic crisis and deindustrialization did not pose severe obstacles to new
7
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suburban manufacturing investments, or, otherwise, the obstacles were over­
whelmed by very favourable locational/relocational conditions. This "paradox" 
can be explained by the small size of manufacturing establishments 
characterising both the Greek industrial system as a whole and the Athenian 
industry as a major part of it. Because SMEs have no great demands in inputs 
(capital equipment, energy, raw materials, or labour), they are able to resist 
more efficiently in periods of economic instability and crisis, where the cost 
of inputs is rapidly increasing. Moreover, since such firms share relatively 
small proportions of the market, variations in the level of demand during cri­
sis periods do not affect them to the same extend as the larger companies. In 
other words, small finns have more flexibility to adjust their "mix" of inputs 
and outputs in order to survive during such periods. The firms, therefore, 
which grew in the surveyed locality, are in their great majority small and me­
dium ones (with 1-49 employees), while the larger ones (with 50+ employees) 
represent only a small percent of the total number. Single-plant independent 
SMEs predominate by any respect in the production magnitudes of the sur­
veyed locality with the exception of employment which was highly concen­
trated in a few large firms. In the production profile of the area traditional 
labour-intensive consumer industries predominate while the presence of a few 
modern large companies does not change its overall production morphology. 
The industrial land is not used intensively for production purposes and this 
has led to the emergence of expansion pressures. The old-fashioned intra-firm 
organization of production (administration-production-stocking-distribution 
activities under the same factory "roof") is also dominant, and the linkages 
with the local economy -in terms of jobs, market area and supplies- are quite 
unimportant Male workforce predominates in both blue and white collar jobs. 
The factory building stock of the survey area is generally in a good condition, 
but the awkward condition of the infrastructure networks poses serious prob­
lems to the smooth running of the production processes.
By contrast to what happened in the advanced cities in which the sub­
urbanization of industry was led by combined firms’ "economic rationality" 
and land-use planning policy initiatives, the development of the survey area 
took place in a spontaneous way. The lack of planned development (apart
One of the thesis’ major contributions is associated with the way the 
uneven geography of industrial production in Greater Athens makes itself 
evident as a complex phenomenon consisted of interlinked processes which 
produce on the one hand extended inner-city zones of manufacturing decline 
and on the other poles of spontaneous suburban industrial growth. It was 
revealed in this thesis that the inadequacies of the state machinery in coping 
effectively with the perplexed nexus of local interests, the internal 
contradictions of the institutional framework for the location of industry in 
Athens and the relevant lack of any realistic planning concerns are the 
common elements that bound together those two facets of the uneven 
geography of production in Athens as the two sides of one and the same coin.
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from the official characterization of the area as an "industrial zone") and the 
associated bad infrastructure conditions, have kept land prices at compara­
tively low levels, presenting, therefore, favourable conditions for the attrac­
tion of manufacturing units (both first-time locations and relocations). The 
favourable geographical siting of the area with respect to the administrative 
and business centre of Athens reinforced these processes. Environmental pres­
sures at previous inner-city locations have pushed a good number of plants to 
relocate into the area -hoping that this would help them avoid the economic 
and social costs of pollution.
The thesis tried to show that the fundamental forces which reproduce 
the developmental problems of Athenian industrial space and of its unplanned 
geographical configuration, are ^sociated with prevailing political choices, 
social behaviours and relating cultural attitudes. The analysis of the legislative 
framework for the development and location of Athenian industry during the 
crucial period of 1980s, as well as the analysis of the attitudes of various so­
cial and political organizations and the press, were of immense importance to 
our study. Analysis of those forces revealed that the 1980s marked a turning 
point in the process of industrial development in Athens, a turning point in 
which the post 1973/74 deindustrialization trends were further strengthened 
and acquije<T-an-4deolegic^ a n d  Cultural) covering of an explicit or implicit 
^nti-industrial character. Policy priorities followed during this decade, in spite 
of their positive intentions, did not manage in practice to contribute 
effectively to the protection of Athenian manufacturing as a whole from the 
impacts of crisis and negative restructuring. Instead, the adopted legislative 
framework imposed_a number of strict restrictions upon the Athenian in­
dustry; restrictions which contributed to the further decline of the capital’s 
productive base. The Athens’ industrial parks initiative -which would suppos­
edly stimulate the spatial reorganization of existing manufacturing activities 
and would provide ample spaces and infrastructure for the establishment of 
new ones- was not completed nor implemented in practice. The major politi­
cal parties, in discussing the directions of the 1985 Structure Plan of Athens, 
paid no special attention to the developmental and locational problems of 
Athenian manufacturing. If, therefore, public policies should be judged and
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criticised on the basis of their practical effects and not on the basis of their
intentions or rhetoric, then, the urbjan=indus^ial policy of the 1980s could be—— —————   -
defined/^as a state's support of the already existing anti-industrial 
Tientality within the Athenian civil society*'.
The study revealed that the culture of anti-industrialism stems from 
twom ajor interlinked causes -economic and politico-ideological: The (fi^jpis 
related with the weak position of industrial capital within the Greek econ­
omic system, the lack of industrial modernization initiatives on a large scale, 
the multiplicity of petty economic (non-industrial) interests across urban 
space and their ability to influence the state machine. The^ s^ecÿWd, can be at­
tributed to the effects of the early Socialists’ (mid 1970s-mid 1980s) political 
ideology upon the great majority of urban working strata. This ideological 
platform, which soon became dominant, adopted Third World dependency 
theorems to identify the basic features of contemporary Greek society and to 
trace ways of social and economic change. The role of industrial capital in the 
country’s economic development was perceived with much suspicion and hos­
tility as dependent upon foreign centres, and therefore as unproductive and 
comprador.
The negative official attitude against Athenian industry was explicitly 
expressed in the serious restrictions posed by the Presidential Decree 84/84. 
The already weakened industrial base of the Athenian agglomeration received 
a further downswing: Dynamic high-tech and environmentally friendly in­
dustries which should be encouraged to open and/or expand were left outside 
the PDs provisions; instead, it was the traditional consumer branches which 
were encouraged. The polluting branches (metal-melting and metallization 
works, tanneries, etc.) which were scattered in central city areas causing se­
vere urban and environmental degradation problems and needing relocation to 
the metropolitan periphery, were not included in the PDs scope. Furthermore, 
the PD was inspired by a simplistic "negative" logic which hampered the de­
velopment of industry in Athens without offering on the same time positive, 
alternatives to its existing developmental and locational problems. Alterna­
tives which if combined with effective urban policies and measures on a com­
prehensive basis would provide opportunities for the reorganization.
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modernization and development of Athenian manufacturing in space. As it 
stood, without being part of a wider long-term developmental strategy, did 
nothing else than reinforcing the deterioration of the Athenian production 
space. On the other hand, the reactions of the Conservatives,when they came 
to office on 1990, were rather spasmodic. They tried to reform the prohibitive 
statutes of the 1980s by setting forth successive draft PDs, without however 
taking into consideration either the need of co-ordination between the in­
volved governmental bodies, or the need of establishing a "critical mass" of 
consent between the state machine on the one hand, and the various social 
groupings involved in the process of economic, industrial and spatial develop­
ment of Athens on the other. This lack of ^ i a l  sensitivity and concern, 
created -as it was expected- tensions and reactions preventing the establish­
ment of a "starting point" for discussions and for setting forth consensual 
policy objectives. The climate of polarization between extreme views and 
proposals was therefore widened. The press, for its own marketability reasons, 
took advantage of that situation by overemphasising the plasmatic dilemma 
"industrial development -vs- environmental prot^tion" in Athens and by dis­
puting any prospects of legislative reform aiming at modernization and devel­
opment of the Athenian industry. In most cases the press magnified 
artificially the real problems, promoted selectively some dimensions by con­
cealing others, and generally set forth what the popular masses wanted to 
read and not what realism imposed. In general lines, the role of press contrib­
uted to the reproduction of the anti-industrial climate against any prospects 
of industrial development of Athens.
The views and proposals expressed by the various social groupings and 
organizations involved in the city’s industrial development, were mostly "os­
cillating" within this climate without being able to set forth realistic alterna­
tives. The inckstriali^’ organizations tried to defend their interests by 
stressing the problem of deindustrialization and job loss, but their efforts 
were unable to persuade that they were interested -apart from their strictly 
economic concerns- in a real productive reorganization of the Athenian 
industrial space evolving in pace with concerns for the protection of the city’s 
natural and historical environments. Other social and scientific organizations
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tried to set forth more realistic approaches. However, in most cases their 
views were affected by the widespread anti-industrial mentality and lacked 
specificity, practicability and clarity. The same can be said about the local 
authorities. Their views were in most cases unable to surpass the level of a 
simple complaint against the governmental choices. In the case of setting 
forth concrete proposals -as in the case of Eleonas- the ways local authorities 
viewed the problem and sketched out priorities for the spatial reorganization 
and development of industry, were so diverse and contradictory to each other 
as to make impossible the promotion of a uniform, coherent and practical 
solution.
In this context, the problem of the Athenian industrial space remained / 
"encircled" in a political and cultural "environment" averting from the search 
of viable solutions. Under conditions of unplanned location of economic activ­
ity, the operation of the unequal geography of production created zones of 
spon^taneous suburimiUndiislaa 1 growthjwithoutJJifi-Jiecessary^infrastructure 
on the one hand, and a declimng_ huge jnner_d ty  industrial area (Eleonas) on 
the other. Efforts of planning industrial location in Athens undertaken during 
the 1980s, as well as efforts of reforming PD 84/84 in the early 1990s, were 
met by the press and the involved social groupings with a growing hostility 
and resistancefor reasons of environmental protection^However, the legislat­
ive prohibition of new plants* births and expansions of existing ones in 
Greater Athens imposed by the existing statutes, was increasingly over- 
whehned^ y  ^ I k ^ ^lnduslriaHocation practices and plants’ constructions that 
led to severe urban and environment degradation problems in the historical 
area of Eleonas. Inner-city industrial decline since the mid 1970s, by leaving 
behind derelict buildings and industrial wastes, enhanced the "scenery of mis­
ery" in that area. During many years of lost chances for a planned reorganiz­
ation of that important industrial space of Athens, new illegal industrial 
installations were built-up, and lots of air pollution and traffic congestion 
problems were incrementally packed up. The inability of the economically 
healthy enterprises in Eleonas to develop due to the strict legislative restric­
tions imposed by the PD 84/84, created a feeling of suffocation to them. 
Because of those restrictions -and of other negative externalities in the area-
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D^any manufacturing industries were forced to close-down their plants in 
Eleonas and to relocate elsewhere, feeding therefore the problem of inner- 
city job loss and production decay. The free spaces were increasingly occupied 
by other non manufacturing activities seeking a "cheap" outlet within the / 
metropolitan space economy. A zcfi^ of "cheap grow th"^as therefore created
in^ e  middle of the Athenian agglomerafiM just a couple of kilometres away 
from Parthenon. The situadon so formed was in fact the "mirror image" of an 
urban society pursuing a ^ s u r f ^  economic prosperity and a consumerist pat­
tern prevailing in advanced societies, without on the same time being willing 
or able to afford the costs of such a "development" by undertaking the ap­
propriate planning measures and land use controls. The area of Eleonas was 
treated as a waste disposal yard in which all those activities that could not be 
accepted in the typical urban tissue but which were necessary for the func­
tioning of the urban economy as a whole, could be "thrown" without any 
further concern.
The state planning machinery, on the other hand, by ignoring or under­
estimating the problem, contributed to its further enlargement It was only in 
the 1980s under the Socialists* administration that the state showed some 
intentions to tackle with it. However, during this decade, lot of discussion and 
hot public debate on the Eleonas issue took place, detailed planning studies 
were carried out, but concrete practical measures for plans’ implementation 
on the ground were not undertaken. This important portion of the Athenian 
ind^ tr ia l  space, was left to operate under the prevailing spontaneous pro­
cesses—The complex and contradictory nature of socio-economic interests 
across urban space, and the political costs a decisive planning intervention 
would entail, prevented the undertaking of concrete policy measures for the 
reorganization and development of this inner-city industrial space on a com­
prehensive basis. The alternative proposals delivered during the late 1980s by 
various social organizations and groupings, had either an extreme anti-in­
dustrial "green" orientation, or were piecemeal activist interventions lacking 
comprehensiveness and strategic vision.
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As soon as the Conservatives came to office in early 1990s, tried to 
break the links with the p a J P ^ tis t"  orientation of urban-industrial policies, 
by setting forth a Presidential Decree which would supposedly solve, once and 
for all, the problems of Eleonas. The fundamental principle underlying this 
PD was that Eleonas could be renewed and developed only by means of a de- 
cisive unfreeze of market mechanisms upon land and built environment That 
is, by creating favourable conditions for priyate investments in building con­
structions and land allocation to profitable tertiary uses (service offices, com­
mercial centres etc.). The distinctive element this planning perspective 
introduced, was part of a wider conservative political ideology according 
which statist practices prevailing during the 1980s had fully failed in 
managing economic processes, and that only strictly private capitalism could 
be able to propose viable solutions to the pressing economic, social and spatial 
problems. In other words, this "new" political optic tried to replace the pre­
vailing inflexible statist logic of the 1980s with an equally inflexible adoration 
of the free market mechanisms, ignoring, evidently, that the crucial question
j^acing^modftfn sncifttips powaday^ is not related with dilemmas of a "state ^
-versus- marlœt" kind, but with "what kind of state" and "what kind of mar- 
ket" and which should be their mutual relations in the process of economic, 
social and spatial development. The governmental initiative for the reorganiz­
ation of Eleonas, therefore, underestimated the complex nexus of economic, 
social and spatial relations which were operating for long in that area, as well 
as its historical, productive and environmental significance, and tried to level 
them under the free-market mechanisms leading to maximization of property 
development profits. By appointing the regeneration and renewal of Eleonas 
exclusively to market-led initiatives, the Conservative’s PD seeked to mini-
/
mize the necessary state expenditures in infrastructural works and public 
^aces_constructinn in__the._area, without however taking into account the 
maximization of social and environmental costs this would entail It thorough­
ly underestimated the fact that Eleonas was one of the few areas in Athens 
which could potentially provide opppttunitms for both an environmental up­
grading of the historical centre and of its wider area on the one hand, and for 
the productive reorganization and development of a major part of the capi- 
tal’s industrial base, on the other. Moreover, the Conservative’s PD
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underestimated one more crucial factor The operation of the free market 
would increase land demand and price competition for profitable tertiary
uses, which, in turn, by swinging land prices upwards, would inevitably result 
ii^a gradua l  remavaljofLmaaufacturing from the area and its transformation 
from a productive to a typical services one, feeding therefore further dein- 
dustrialization and job loss trends. All above complex interrelationships were 
underestimated by the Conservative’s belief that private capitalism and free 
market property development initiatives would "re-arrange" spatial relations 
in desirable directions without any problem In other words, the proposed in­
itiative for the reorganization and development of Eleonas was as if someone 
was trying to repair a personal computer with the aid of a hammer (ERG 
1992b: 3).
The publication of the Conservative’s PD raised -as it was expected- 
considerable tensions within Athenian society and various reactions by a 
multiplicity of social, political and scientific organizations. Two judicial re­
view applications which were submitted to the Council of State, postponed 
the implementation of the project. This action was followed-up by a public 
meeting organized by the Technical Chamber of Greece. However, the pre­
vailing tensed "atmosphere" made impossible the creation of a starting point 
for cool-headed discussions aiming at establishing consensual alternatives.
Each grouping and organization involved in those discussions tended to view 
the problem through its own narrow "window" and to address alternatives 
matching its own economic, political, or ideological priorities and prospects.
The various views and alternatives oscillated along all the spectrum between 
"utopian" and "idealistic" green options on the one hand, and "realistic" de­
fences of the market-oriented governmental proposal on the other. The vari­
ous views and proposals were so diverging from each other, that a political ^
party delegate wished the discussions to accomplish at least "a clear under- 
standhig^oT~what^ea^ wheiTtalking a5out Eleonas" (TecEnika
Cbronika, VoL 3/1992: 41). The final result was that the establishment of a 
"minimum" planning platform -accepted by both government and involved 
social groupings- was once more driven to failure. As Wassenhoven et al 
wrote:
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The implementation of a rational, effective and mainly socially just 
policy is in this field -as well as in others- a matter not only of practi­
cal measures but also a matter of securing a consent that requires un­
derstanding and acceptance by both governors and governed of a 
conceptual framework ... What we ask from future Athens? In what 
city we want to live? What we want it to provide us? (Wassenhoven et 
aL 1991: 38).
It becomes therefore evident, that a minimum presupposition for re­
aching a consensual planning framework for regulating the problems of the 
Athenian industrial space could be accomplished if the state's planning ma­
chinery on the one hand and all collective organizations, social groupings and 
movements involved in the city’s economic and social development on the 
other (political parties, local authorities, industrialists’ and labour’s organiz­
ations, professional and scientific societies, ecological organizations, citizens’ 
movements, etc.), were decided to answer sincerely the fundamental question 
of "What we ask from future Athens? In what city we want to live? What we 
want it to provide us?" and then to undertake concrete practical actions 
matching the answers they would give.
As Wassenhoven et a / (1991: 38 ff.) have asserted, a modern city should 
satisfy four fundamental sets of objectives:
(a) the improvement of living conditions, the preservation of the city’s 
physiognomy and the protection of its environment
(b) the reinforcement of social justice in the city, the securing of equal ac­
cess to the city’s resources for all its citizens as well as the provision of 
equal opportunities for action.
(c) the reinforcement of the city’s economic efficiency and of its con­
tribution to the country’s economic development process, and
(d) the maintenance of the variety of forms and conditions of urban life 
and of employment opportunities
The above sets of objectives could form a "starting point" for social 
dialogue between the state planning agencies and the collective organizations
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in order the following particular questions to be sincerely addressed and ans­
wered:
'T
1. Is it necessary^^j^^  lQ m aintain,^roject and modernize the produc­
t ion base of Athens in order to increase its economic efficiency, to pre­
serve the various forms of productive employment and life in it and to 
reinforce the contribution of its economy to the national economy as a 
whole? How much desirable is the prospect of a modern European me­
tropolis oriented exclusively to services provision without a supportive 
production background? Could ever such a prospect be accepted by the 
majority of the Athenian population, and if yes which would be its 
economic and social costs? How socially just would be the transform­
ation of Athens into a services city and which would be the social 
classes and strata that would be benefited/harmed by such a shift? 
How the p ro b l^ m ^ ([m ^  unëïn^ployment such a ^ ^ p e c l^ n W ls  cou 7  
be faced in economic, social and political terms? Which would be the 
direct and indirect costs of that prospect for the national economy as a 
whole and its position in the international division of labour?
2. If the answers given to the above questions converge in favour of the 
need to maintain, protect, and develop further the capitaFs production 
space, then is it necessary or not to promote the modernization of 
Athenian manufacturing activities and their organized location/reloca­
tion in properly planned and equipped industrial parks as to help com­
panies benefit from external economies of agglomeration and on the 
same time to contribute to the protection of environment? Is it necess­
ary or not to encourage the birth of new manufacturing activities in 
modern branches with increased importance to the national economy as 
a whole and to direct their location in properly organized industrial 
spaces within the Athenian agglomeration? Is it necessary or not to 
provide properly organized "receiving" spaces on the metropolitan pe­
riphery for the relocation of manufacturing plants which are currently 
scattered at inner-city residential areas and which create problems of 
environmental pollution, traffic congestion, etc.? But on the other hand.
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is it desirable or not small non-polluting manufacturing and handicraft 
activities serving the basic needs of the urban population to remain in 
properly planned inner-city clusters, since these activities not only con­
tribute to the maintenance of the variety of urban mentalities, work 
cultures and ways of life but, moreover, feed the nexus of local econ­
omy with important backward and forward linkages? In what sense we 
have to preserve a legislative framework that prohibits the establish­
ment of new manufacturing activities in Athens, even if these acti­
vities increase employment opportunities in modern competitive 
branches, contribute to the decrease of environmental pollution due to 
the adoption of new technologies and help to the upgrading of the 
capital’s manufacturing sector as a whole?
3. Is it clear or not that the planned re-organization and development of 
the Athenian industrial space can play a decisive direct or indirect role 
in various aspects of the city’s life, as for instance (a) in the improve­
ment of working conditions, (b) in the urban and environmental up­
grading of the whole metropolitan complex, (c) in the creation of 
multiple employment opportunities, (d) in improving the city’s material 
and social infrastructure networks and (e) in increasing the city’s ma­
terial wealth and in enhancing its economic role within the national 
economy and the single European market? If the answers to the above 
questions are positive, then which immediate actions and measures 
should be undertaken at the short-run in order to protect the land that 
has still left from speculative tertiarisation pressures, illegal building 
and environmentally uncontrollable urban and production activities? 
Which strategy should be adopted at the long-run in order the metro­
politan production base to be upgraded and the environment effective­
ly protected? Which partnership schemes should be created for the 
purpose of implementing such a long-term strategy and which legislat­
ive framework should be used to underpin the relating processes?
The contradictory and inconsistent character of the various views and
prospects about the future of the Athenian industrial space, makes clear that
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not only the objectives for the development of a modern metropolis have not 
yet been addressed by the ppliticaLdedsion-makers. not only the questions 
posed previously have not been systematically discussed, but, moreover, every 
social grouping and organization involved j e nds to view the problem j^rough 
its own narrow "window", by showing a complete indifference towards the 
perspectives of the others, undermining, therefore, the social basis of estab­
lishing even a minimum planning consensus.
*  *  *
Analysis carried out in this thesis should have revealed that the problem of 
reorganization, planned location and development of the Athenian industrial 
space, is neither a "technical" nor an economic -in the strict sense of the 
word- problem. The economic dimensions are definitely of special importance 
and have to do with the role of private investors and of the public sector in 
undertaking co-ordinated spatial development initiatives under a more gen­
eral strategy of economic and industrial development of the country’s terri­
tory and of its major urban centres. The crucial dimension, however, is that 
the reorganization and development of the Athenian industrial space is basi­
cally a socio-polidcal and cultural problem. This is the major "arena" on 
which the developmental efforts, the modernization initiatives and the con­
sensual planning endeavours should meet each other -if, of course, we accept 
the optimistic assumption that there are still political and social forces pursu­
ing the use of the Athenian production space as a means of economic devel­
opment and social welfare and not as a "lever" for the maintenance and 
reproduction of "free rider" attitudes.
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APPENDIX I 
STATISTICAL TABLES
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SERIES A: ECONOMY/INDUSTRY
MiHion dra •( oonttant 1070 prk
YEAR AGRI­ INDUSTRY MINING ENERGY MANUFA- CON8TRU- SERVICES TRANSPORT TRADE BANKING OWNERSHIP PUBLIC ADMINfON HEALTH A OTHER GDP TOTAL
CULTURE TOTAL -QUARRYING 4NATER CTURINO CTION8 TOTAL A COMMUN. IN8UR.alo OF DWELLINGS A  DEFENCE EDUCATION SERVICES
1051 23.475 14.782 502 470 0.281 4.439 42.254 5.408 8.438 1.518 8.286 0.038 4.423 5.077 80.511
1052 22.150 15.121 717 408 0.170 4.738 43.488 5.741 8.108 1.580 8.747 0.103 4.582 5.436 80.746
1053 27.808 17.810 884 501 10.574 5.770 45.574 5,831 9.188 1.601 9.150 9.296 4.837 5.673 91.201
1054 27.170 10.124 055 638 11.787 5.788 47.820 8.209 10.214 1.538 0.509 9.684 5.052 5.618 04.123
1055 20.078 21.101 1.060 755 12.801 6.366 50.354 8.527 10.405 1.766 0.890 10.227 5.474 5.975 100.533
1058 20.851 23.860 1.237 871 14.280 7.402 55.568 8.817 11.380 2.001 10.326 12.455 1108 8.470 109.277
1057 33.738 25.011 1.330 987 15.221 7.484 57.109 7.179 12.351 2.270 10.763 11.482 6.330 6.736 115.858
1058 31.413 27.053 1.423 1.033 16.554 8.043 81,115 7.500 11352 2.505 11.200 12.568 6.710 7.181 120.481
1050 32.047 20.515 1.430 1.220 18,778 10.087 82.848 7.025 11383 2.526 11.671 12.783 7.008 7.550 125.308
1080 20.863 33.406 1,571 1.358 18.430 12.047 65.032 8.531 11870 2.760 12.158 13.422 7.413 7.779 120.201
1061 37.838 35.858 1.868 1.828 10.888 12.878 70.078 0.467 15.215 3.031 12.750 11778 7.710 1118 143.772
1062 32.888 37.504 1.600 1.753 20.034 13.118 74.220 10.131 15.887 3.244 13.318 14.894 1261 8.707 144.812
1063 30.504 40.378 1.877 2.082 22.881 13,758 79.190 10.767 17.357 3.679 13.929 16.322 8.772 9.373 150.171
1064 30.446 48.147 2.020 2.373 25.537 16.208 85.584 11.427 19.189 4.023 14,619 16.280 9.135 10.911 171.177
1065 43.377 51.047 2.278 2.880 28.148 17.943 02.585 12.518 21.580 4.368 15.483 17.305 9.640 11.502 187.009
1068 43.687 53.871 2.413 3.222 30.672 17.564 99.453 13.833 23.163 4.527 16.456 18.635 10.174 12.865 197.011
1067 44.311 56.834 2.414 3.587 33.348 17.507 105.031 14.505 24.157 4.827 17.391 19.405 10.607 14 049 206.176
1068 40.484 85.430 2.032 3.754 37.208 21.545 111.072 18.404 25.803 5.337 18.330 20.409 10.874 14.725 217.895
1060 43.085 74.030 3.327 4.408 42.837 24.477 120.177 18.296 28.131 5.799 10.654 21.303 11.252 15.652 238.201
1070 47.058 80.078 3.541 5.152 49.288 23.017 129.068 19.761 31.050 8.088 21.099 22.550 11.030 17.479 258.000
1071 48.662 00.802 4.031 5.011 54.588 26.274 130,087 21.864 32.834 6.810 22.510 21722 12.651 18.898 278.551
1072 51.643 101.055 4.405 7.380 58.892 31.179 150.475 24.447 38.080 7.372 24.303 24.659 13.155 20.459 303 973
1073 51.204 113.827 5.082 8.133 88.888 31,924 163.698 27.191 41.452 7.619 26.347 21834 13.883 21.372 328.729
1074 57.780 101.823 4.774 7.701 67.268 22.082 187.643 27.460 41.017 8.401 27.008 28.432 14.558 10.887 327.255
1075 56.733 107.572 4.885 8.506 70.044 23.147 175.528 28.616 42.823 8.861 20.031 29.342 11136 21.719 339.833
1078 55.071 117.800 5.242 0.753 78.029 24.578 188.823 31.270 41198 0.714 30.403 30.877 15.663 23.608 360.394
1077 51.830 123.224 5.707 10.728 70.143 27.558 105.988 32.938 48.878 10.130 32.017 32.546 16.414 25.047 371.022
1078 57.214 130.071 5.723 12.158 84.341 28.751 208.818 35.151 40.507 10.384 33.889 33.850 17.015 26.822 394.803
1070 53.616 138.842 6.302 12.006 88.008 30.546 216.617 37.892 51.144 10.805 36.043 35.500 17.363 28.070 409.075
1080 60.400 135.488 6.245 13.724 89.125 26.392 221.525 30.898 50.833 11.037 38.097 38.708 17.503 27.640 417.510
1081 50.518 132.141 5.727 14.140 88.084 24.201 224.868 41.277 40.024 10.482 30.607 38.000 17.814 27.504 418.516
1082 80.040 130.388 6.537 14.816 88.048 22.280 220.313 41.510 51.388 10.408 41.086 30.110 18.280 27.624 420.141
1083 55.518 130.818 0.082 15,172 85.438 23.025 238.218 42.071 53.238 11.758 42.400 40.088 18.720 27.054 422.361
1084 50.304 132.244 7.827 18,052 88.475 21.800 243.088 45.038 53.238 12.074 43.830 41.080 10.315 27.835 434.726
1085 60.523 137,054 7.088 17,032 80.520 22.525 251.842 48.733 55.505 12,608 44.500 42.012 18.078 28.426 440,419
1088 62,038 138,483 8.000 17,475 80,449 23.503 256,715 40.414 57.008 11381 45,705 41.708 20.000 28.324 457,214
1087 58.781 138,202 8.084 18,410 87,308 22.503 258,865 40.138 57.153 11305 48,085 41.774 21.800 28.721 453,018
1088 82,681 144,251 0,084 10,543 01,208 24.438 287,323 51,054 80.125 13,080 48.348 42.200 22.222 20.324 474,158
1080 81180 148,530 0,372 20,442 03.203 25.813 270,776 63,488 62.410 14.853 40.780 44.867 24,040 30.380 401.488
1000 86,888 140,028 0,188 22,038 00.781 27.044 284,149 83.983 82.785 18.817 81.243 44.170 24.332 31.140 480.741
1001 81.287 148.818 8,818 24,542 «9171. 25.584 288,842 84.223 52,720 30.424 ____ 4 0 « l? t
Avaraga ammual obamga (%)
1051-80 3.2 0.8 11.7 12.8 8.0 12.0 5.1 5.0 18 7.0 4.4 4 8 59 4 0 55
1080-73 4.7 0.0 0.8 14.0 10.7 8.1 7.3 94 8 8 8 2 11 52 5.0 11 76
1073-81 2.2 2.1 1.7 7.3 32 -24 4.1 5.4 24 4.1 13 5.0 12 34 10
1081-01 0.5 1.2 4.8 5.7 0.2 0.7 2.5 2.8 2 6 1 3 2 0 1.7 3 8 1.0 1.8
CO
GO<o
1000: Provisional date 
1001: EaUmataa
SOURCE -Por 1051-57: ‘National Aocounia ofGraaca 1058-1075" (No 23) 
Alhana 1078:108-7.
-For 1058-74: ibid: 140-1
-For 1075-77: "National Aocounia of Oraaoa 1070 and 1074-81* 
-For 1078-81: Bank o( Oraaoa, "Monlbly Slatiatioal Bullatin".
-For 1082-84: Bank of Oraaoa. "Monlh^ Slatiatioal Bullatin*.
-For 1085-01: Bank of Oraaoa. "Monthty Slatiatioal Bullatin".
(Own calculation of paroantagaa)
(Own calculationa of lha totala of industry and aarvicaa aaclors 
from 1080-77).
Alhana. wkhoul yaar:41.
Alhana. Dao.1085:labla48a. 
Alhana. Jsn.1088:labls48s. 
Athans. Juna-July 1002:1s bis 40a.
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TABLE A.2
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF VARIOUS PRODUCTION MAGNITUDES 
IN GREECE AND IN OTHER SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES. 1060-1988 (%)
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH INDUSTRIAL DECLINE
1960-68 1068-73 1073-70 1070-88
I. REAL GDP
Greece 7.3 8.2 3.7 1.5
-United States 4 5 3.2 2.4 2.8
-Japan 10.2 8.7 3.6 4.1
-Germany 4.1 4.9 2.3 1.7
-France 5.4 5.5 2.8 1.9
-United Kingdom 3.0 3.4 1.5 2.2
-Italy 5.7 4.5 3.7 2.4
Canada 5.5 5.4 4.2 3.2
-Total of European 
OECD countries 4.7 4.9 2.6 2.2
-Total of OECD countries 5.1 4.6 2.7 2.7
I. REAL GDP PER CAPITA
-Greece 6.7 7.8 2.6 0.9
-United States 3.1 2.0 1.4 1.8
-Japan 9.1 7.1 2.5 3.4
-Germany 3.1 4.0 2.5 1.7
-France 4.2 . 4.6 2.3 1.4
-United Kingdom 2.3 3.0 1.5 2.0
Italy 5.0 3.9 3.2 2.2
-Canada 3.6 4.1 2.9 2.2
-Total of European 
OECD countries 3.7 4.0 2.0 1.6
-Total of OECD countries 3.9 3.5 1.9 2.0
REAL VALUE-ADDED IN INDUSTRY
-Greece 8.8 11.8 3.3 0.3
United States 4.4 2.4 1.4
-Japan 13.7 11.3 3.1 5.3
-Germany 4.3 5.1 1.4 0.4
-France 6.9 7.0 2.4 0.5
-United Kingdom 2.7 1.9 -02
-Italy 7.1 52 3.5 1.9
-Canada 5.9 5.4 1.6 2.7
-Total of European 
OECD countries 5.3 5.4 1.8 1.4
-Total of OECD countries 5.5 4.8 1.8 2.4
D. REAL VALUE-ADDED IN MANUFACTURE
-Greece 9.2 13.2 4.3 0.3
United States 5.5 3.7 1.9
-Japan 15.6 11.7 3.6 6.8
-Germany 5.0 5.5 1.7 0.6
-France 7.4 8.1 2.7 0.0
-United Kingdom 3.1 2.9 -0.7
-Italy 8.0 6.8 5.5 2.5
-Canada 7.0 5.5 2.5 2.4
-Total of European 
OECD countries 5.7 6.3 2.1 1.4
-Total of OECD countries 6.4 5.8 2.2 2.8
E. PRODUCTIVITY IN INDUSTRY
-Greece 6.0 7.4 1.2 0.3
-United States 2.5 1.4 -0.1
-Japan 9.3 8.5 3.5 4.5
-Germany 4.5 A2 3.2
-France 5.7 5.3 3.5 2.6
-United Kingdom 3.0 3.0 1.1
-Italy 6.2 4.8 3.2 3.2
-Canada 3.3 Z2 -0.3 2.2
-Total of European 
OECD countries 4.7 4.7 2.6 2.5
-Total of OECD countries 4.0 3.7 1.8 2.7
F. PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURE
-Greece 7.1 7.8 2.7 -0.8
-United States 3.2 3.5 0.9
-Japan 11.1 9.5 5.0 5.8
-Germany 4.7 4.5 3.1
-France 6.8 5.8 3.7 2.2
United Kingdom 3.4 3.9 0.6
-Italy 72 6.4 5.3 4.0
-Canada 4.1 4.6 1.3 2.3
-Total of European 
OECD countries 5.2 5.6 3.0 2.6
-Total of OECD countries 4.7 5.0 2.6 3.3
(*) Real value-added per worker.
SOURCE: Adapted from OECD 'Historical Statistics 1960-1988', Paris 1990:48-52
TABLE A 3
ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTOR. 1951-1991
SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY (,000 persons) (% )CHANGE (% )CHANGE (% )CHANGE (% )CHANGE (% )CHANGE
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1951-91
PRIMARY (AGRICULTURE, etc) 1,886.4 1,960.4 1,312.6 972.1 806.5 3.9 -33.0 -259 -17.0 -57.2
SECONDARY (INDUSTRY) 550.2 697.2 856.7 1,039.1 1,000.6 26.7 22.9 21.3 -3.7 81 9
-MINING AND QUARRYING 13.6 21.5 21.1 23.0 19.3 58.1 -1.9 9 0 -16 1 41 9
-MANUFACTURING 450.4 488.6 554.4 664.3 699.0 8.5 13.5 19.8 52 552
-ENERGY AND WATER 11.2 19.8 24.8 25.4 36.6 76.8 25.3 24 44.1 2268
-CONSTRUCTIONS 75.0 167.3 256.4 326.4 245.7 123.1 53.3 27.3 -24.7 227 6
TERTIARY (SERVICES) 745.6 859.4 1,001.3 1,443.6 1,825.3 15.3 16.5 44.2 26.4 144.8
ACTIVE POPULATION 3,182.2 3,517.0 3,170.6 3,454.8 3,632.4 10.5 -9.8 9.0 5.1 14.1
NOT CLEARLY DECLARED ACTIVITIES 176.4 121.5 64.4 89.0 -31.1 -47.0 38.2
GRAND TOTAL 3.358.6 3,638.5 3,235.0 3,543.8 3,933.6 8.3 -11.1 9.5 11.0 17.1
W
<o
SOURCE:
-For 1951 and 1961: Adapted from Antonopouiou (1987:368).
-For 1971 ; NSSG, "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1978". Athens 1979;table 111:4 
-For 1981: NSSG. "Statistical Yeaitook of Greece 1986". Athens 1987:table 111:7 
-For 1991; NSSG. "Greece in Figures 1994." Athens. 1994: table II.
(Own calculation of the percentages).
GTOS^PRODUCT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY BY BRANCH. 1961-1901
BRANCH 1951 1962 1953 1954 1955 1958 1957 1958 1959 1960 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989 1970
A NON-DU RABLE CONSUMER GOODS 7,191 7,081 7,769 8,649 9,360 10 294 10,884 11,599 11,426 11,996 12,583 13,043 14,410 16,161 17,527 18,816 20,512 22,676 24,711 27 504
-FOOD,BEVERAGES & TOBACCO 2,484 2,602 2,825 3,325 3,463 3,927 3,911 4,065 4,310 4,119 4,310 4,346 5,052 5,610 6,030 6,756 6,763 7,569 8,085 9317
-TEXTILES 1,785 1,712 1,890 2,003 2,366 2,397 2,580 2,771 2,512 2,933 2975 3,250 3,353 3,759 4,427 4 424 4,886 5,675 6,262 6,937
-CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR 1,783 1,601 1,768 1,974 1,972 2,160 2,392 2,518 2,211 2 357 2,481 2,429 2,629 3,084 3,103 3,275 3,916 3,770 4,007 4 627
-WOOD A FURNITURE 489 461 494 543 660 760 901 976 1,011 1,124 1,207 1,267 1,380 1,596 1,731 1,834 2,244 2,404 2,832 3,051
-PAPER A PRINTING 373 410 479 472 558 668 681 786 833 907 988 1,067 1,250 1,357 1,461 1 700 1 805 2,107 2,388 2 268
-MISCELLANEOUS 277 295 313 332 341 382 419 483 549 556 622 684 746 755 775 827 898 1 151 1,137 1,304
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 838 848 1,047 1,114 1,406 1,692 1,782 1,935 2,188 2,679 2734 2,901 3,369 3,772 4,699 4 933 5504 6,271 7813 9,231
-CHEMICALS A ALLIED 366 377 436 507 595 680 787 902 1,150 1,495 1,454 1,467 1,771 1,905 2,462 2,645 3,168 3,600 4,806 5,495
-NON-METALLIC MINERALS 472 471 611 607 811 1,012 995 1,033 1,038 1,184 1,280 1,434 1,598 1,867 2,237 2,288 2,336 2,671 3,007 3,736
C CAPITAL GOODS A DURABLES 1,252 1,241 1,758 1,994 2,125 2274 2555 3,020 3,164 3755 4 569 4990 4 882 5,604 5920 6 923 7 330 8 261 10 113 12531
-BASIC METALLURGY 45 46 55 84 96 118 146 175 197 288 306 336 383 407 406 944 1 243 1 702 2590 3638
-METAL MANUFACTURES, 
MACHINERY AND ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPMENT
-TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT __
MANUFACTURE TOTAL
995 1,006 1,304 1,446
__212 _ _ 1 8 9 ___ 399  464
9,281 9,170 10,574 11,767
1,517 1,618 1,844 2,177 2,219
512 538 565 668 748
1_189Ï_ 1 4 . ^  _ 1 5 ^  16,554 1 6 ,^ 8
2,596 3 061 3,288 2,996 3,621 3,914 4,411 4 726 5,096 5,792 6 298
. 671, 202 _1.366_ 1.503 1,576 1.600^ , 1 . ^  ^ _1463_ 1Z31___2,595
.16.430 19 886 20.934 22.661 _ ^ 5 3 7  28 J4 6  %.672 3 3 .^ 6  3 7 . ^  ^ 6 3 7  49.266
BRANCH 1971 1972 1973 1974 1978 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1988 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 30,551 33,418 38,058 37,037 40,616 44,769 45,371 48,069 60,846 49,964 49,076 48,630 47,112 48,176 60,772 60,800 49,697 60,413 51,424 49,629 49,096
-FOOD,BEVERAGES A TOBACCO 10,312 11,008 12,370 11,995 12,420 13,895 14,490 15,911 16,743 16,977 16,841 17,740 17,833 18,773 20,041 18,986 18,055 19,559 21,086 20,002 20,555
-TEXTILES 8,133 9,096 10,791 10,675 12,598 14,460 14,098 14,861 16,115 15,728 15,885 14,665 14,366 14,340 14,866 15,934 16,057 15,563 15,245 15,016 13,390
-CLOTHING A FOOTWEAR 5,045 5.545 6,129 6,409 6,770 7,355 7,598 7,660 8,090 7,969 7,563 6,869 6,303 6,203 6,420 6,370 5,872 6,115 5,725 5,689 5,740
-WOOD A FURNITURE 3.321 3,668 4,142 3,389 3,980 3,981 4,013 4,044 4,095 3,583 3,246 3,730 2,863 2,540 2,551 2,538 2,351 2,484 2,638 2,637 2,521
-PAPER A PRINTING 2,272 2,527 2,865 2,728 2,667 2,757 2,821 3,279 3,611 3,568 3,589 3,475 3,652 4,008 4,444 4,666 5,111 4,821 4,833 4,419 4,557
-MISCELLANEOUS 1,468 1,574 1,761 1,841 2,080 2,321 2,351 2,304 2,192 2,139 1,951 2,051 2,095 2,311 2,450 2,106 2,251 1,871 1,897 1,866 2,332
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 10,151 10,469 13,043 13,426 14,478 15,745 16,786 18,257 19,159 19,207 19,180 18,815 19,149 19,699 20,151 19,933 20,137 22,197 22,971 23,026 21,139
-CHEMICALS A ALLIED 6,114 6,446 8,648 8,385 9,260 9,789 10,118 11,169 11,593 11,384 11,623 11,505 12,090 12,579 13,225 12,737 12,803 14,543 15,634 15,359 14,384
-NON-METALLIC MINERALS 4,037 4,023 4,395 5,041 5,218 5,956 6,668 7,088 7,566 7,823 7,557 7,310 7,059 7,120 6,926 7,196 7,334 7,654 7,337 7,667 6,755
C CAPITAL GOODS A DURABLES 13,884 15,005 17,587 16,803 15,951 17,515 16,986 18,025 18,993 19,954 19,809 19,601 19,175 18,601 18,606 18,916 17,472 18,506 18,808 18,206 19,337
-BASIC METALLURGY 3,247 3,222 4,612 4,656 4,554 4.870 4,043 5,093 5,306 5,396 4,597 4,477 4,880 4,987 5,067 4,864 4,718 5,284 5,273 5,170 5,427
-METAL MANUFACTURES. 
MACHINERY AND ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPMENT 7,412 8,605 9,573 8,712 8,062 9,395 9,571 9,646 9,937 10,493 10,944 10,822 10,320 9,725 9,958 10,177 8,687 8,952 9,207 8,420 8 901
-TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 3.225 3,178 3,402 3,435 3,335 3,250 3,372 3,286 3,750 4,065 4.268 4,302 3^75 3,889 3.581 3,875 4.067 4,270 4.323 4.616 5,009
MANUFACTURE TOTAL 54,586 58,892 68,688 67,266_ 70,944 78.029 79.143 84.M1 88.998_ 89,125 .88,064 88JM6 85,436 8%529 8 9 .^ 9 87.306_„ »3J03_ .?0 .7 6 J_
1990 Provwional data
1991 Estimates
SOURCE -For 1951-57 "National Accounts of Greece 1958-1975" (No 23), Attiens 1976 196-7 
-For 1958-74 lt)id 140-3
-For 1975-77 "National Accounts of Greece 1970 and 1974-81", Athens (n d 41)
-For 1978-81 Bank of Greece, "Monthly Statistical Bulletin". Athens Dec 1985 tat>le 48a 
-For 1982-84 Bank of Greece, "Monthly Statistical Bulletin". Athens Jan 1988 table 48a 
-For 1985-91 Bank of Greece, "MontNy Statistical Bulletin", Athens June-July 1992 labile 49a
CO
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TABLE A 5
NUMBER AND % SHARE OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS BY SIZE AND BRANCH. 1978.
ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT
Code BRANCH TOTAL %
0-4 % 5-9 % 1 0 -tt % 50+ %
TOTAL OF 
S M Et (0-49) %
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 82 434 100 69 789 847 7.202 8 7 4,498 5 5 935 11 81,489 989
20 FOODS 19311 100 16 289 844 1,837 9 5 957 5 0 228 12 19.083 988
21 BEVERAGES 1.903 100 1 533 806 189 9 9 145 7 6 36 19 1.867 981
22 TOBACCO 131 100 36 290 13 9 9 38 290 42 32 1 89 67 9
23 TEXTILES 5.049 100 3272 648 787 156 709 140 281 5 6 4 768 944
24 CLOTH ING-FOOTWEAR 21 926 100 18915 863 1.548 7 1 1.258 5 7 205 0 9 21,721 99 1
25 WOOD-CORK 12 365 100 11 352 91 8 707 5 7 282 2 3 24 0.2 12,341 998
26 FURNITURE 10.788 100 9 598 89 0 770 7 1 383 3 6 27 0 3 10,751 997
27 PAPER 444 100 238 53 6 84 189 93 209 29 6 5 415 935
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING 2.848 100 2136 750 425 149 246 8 6 41 14 2,807 986
29 LEATHER-FUR 3.770 100 2 947 78 2 556 14.7 255 6 8 12 0 3 3,758 997
39 MISCELLANEOUS 3.899 100 3471 890 286 7 3 132 3 4 10 0.3 3,889 9 97
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 8682 100 6.090 701 1.261 14.5 1.064 125 247 2 8 8,435 97 2
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 2 184 100 1 558 71 3 287 131 272 125 67 31 2,117 969
31 CHEMICALS 1,095 100 538 491 227 20.7 239 2 1 8 91 8 3 1,004 91 7
32 PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS 123 100 46 37 4 35 2 85 31 2 5 2 11 8 9 112 91 1
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 5280 100 3 948 74 8 712 13.5 542 103 78 15 5,202 9 85
C CAPITAL GOODS & DURABLES 37 882 100 33 412 882 2.567 6 8 1,557 4 1 346 0 9 37,536 991
34 BASIC METALLURGY 59 100 15 25 4 3 51 15 2 54 26 44 1 33 55 9
35 METAL PRODUCTS 14 685 100 13219 90.0 842 5 7 522 3 6 102 0 7 14,583 993
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 4 465 100 3 482 780 561 126 372 8 3 50 11 4,415 989
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 5308 100 4 554 8 58 380 7 2 283 5 3 91 17 5,217 983
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 13 365 100 12.142 908 781 5 8 365 2 7 77 0 6 13,288 994
GREECE TOTAL 128 9 9 8 " j q o 109 291 847 11.030 8 6 7,139 5 5 1,528 12 127,460 988
SOURCE Adapled from NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry,
Handicraft. Commerce and Other Services on 30 Sept 1978". Athens 1981
(Own cakaAaÉion of the sulXotals totals and percentages)
TABLE A 6
NUMBER AND % SHARE OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS BY SIZE AND BRANCH. 1984.
ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT
C ode BRANCH TOTAL %
0-4 % 5-9 % 1(M9 % 50+ %
TOTAL OF 
SM Et (CM9) %
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 86 405 100 73 305 848 7,546 8 7 4,647 5 4 907 1.0 85,498 990
20 FOODS 19.674 100 16 566 84 2 1,858 9 4 1,028 5 2 222 1.1 19.452 98.9
21 BEVERAGES 2 266 100 1.870 825 200 8 8 150 6 6 46 2 0 2,220 980
22 TOBACCO 142 100 37 261 14 9 9 46 324 45 31 7 97 683
23 TEXTILES 4,652 100 3.155 67 8 677 14.6 594 128 226 4 9 4,426 95 1
24 CLOTH ING-FOOTWEAR 21.781 100 18,277 83.9 1,897 8 7 1,367 6 3 240 1.1 21,541 989
25 WOOD-CORK 13.805 100 12.916 936 621 4.5 244 18 24 0.2 13,781 998
26 FURNITURE 11,209 100 9856 87 9 881 7 9 458 4 1 14 0.1 11,195 999
27 PAPER 575 100 297 51 7 125 21 7 125 21,7 28 4 9 547 95 1
28 PRWTING-PUBLISHING 3053 100 2.407 788 387 12.7 214 7.0 45 1.5 3,008 985
29 LEATHER-FUR 4701 100 3.830 81 5 581 124 282 6.0 8 0.2 4,693 998
39 MISCELLANEOUS 4.547 100 4 094 900 305 6 7 130 31 9 0.2 4,538 998
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 10.547 100 7 644 725 1,481 14.0 1,179 11.2 243 2 3 10,304 977
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 3.023 100 2.305 , 76 2 362 120 296 9 8 60 2 0 2,963 980
31 CHEMICALS 1,293 100 707 547 235 18Z 247 19.1 104 8.0 1,189 920
32 PETROLEUM A COAL PRODUCTS 210 100 81 386 58 276 54 257 17 81 193 919
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 6,021 100 4.551 756 826 13.7 582 9 7 62 10 5,959 990
C CAPITAL GOODS A DURABLES 47,511 100 43.013 905 2,677 5 6 1,552 3.3 269 0 6 47,242 994
34 BASIC METALLURGY 112 100 35 313 18 16.1 29 2 5 9 30 268 82 732
35 METAL PRODUCTS 15.609 100 14Z31 91.2 835 5.3 458 2.9 85 0 5 15,524 995
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 5,218 100 4 195 804 599 115 390 7 5 34 0 7 5,184 993
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 6.922 100 6.178 893 380 5.5 297 4.3 67 1.0 6,855 99.0
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 19,650 100 18.374 935 845 4.3 378 19 53 0 3 19,597 997
GREECE. TOTAL 144,463 100 123.962 858 11,704 8.1 7,378 51 1,419 1.0 143,044 990
SOURCE Adapted from NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufactunng Industry. 
Handicraft and Commerce, on 28 Sept 1984". Athens 1988
(Own catenation of the subtotals, totals and percentages)
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TABLE A.7
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND % SHARE BY PLANTS' SIZE AND BRANCH, 1978
PLANTS' SIZE
Code BRANCH TOTAL % CM
emptoyeea
% W
emptoyeee
% ICMO
empfoyeae
% 60*
empfoyeee
% TOTAL OF SMEs 
(0 4 0  employees)
%
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 401 883 100 123 808 308 46.324 115 87 427 21 8 144.324 359 257 550 84 1
20 FOODS 94 323 100 33 842 35 9 11684 124 18.715 10 8 30.082 319 64.241 68 1
21 BEVERAGES 12.723 100 1 818 14 3 1.211 9 5 3.000 2 3 6 6.694 526 6 029 47 4
22 TOBACCO 9.770 100 69 0 7 88 0 9 1 098 112 8.515 872 1.255 126
23 TEXTILES 78.378 100 6 958 8 9 5253 6 7 14 505 1 6 6 51.572 658 26 806 3 4 2
24 CLOTHING-FOOTWEAR 87.284 100 28 737 32 9 10.135 116 24.743 2 8 3 23 669 27 1 63.615 7 2 9
25 WOOD-CORK 33 008 100 18 669 566 4.397 133 5.231 158 4.711 14 3 28.297 8 5 7
26 FURNITURE 31262 100 16 737 53 5 4 848 155 8.561 2 1 0 3.116 100 28146 9 0 0
27 PAPER 11.023 100 585 5 3 567 51 1.945 176 7.926 719 3.097 28 1
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING 17.283 100 4 355 25 2 2.734 158 4 662 2 7 0 5,532 320 11.751 6 8 0
29 LEATHER-FUR 15 549 100 6 487 41 7 3.578 2 3 0 4.309 2 7 7 1.175 76 14.374 924
39 MISCELLANEOUS 11.280 100 5 551 49 2 1.829 16 2 Z568 2 2 8 1.332 118 9.948 8 8 2
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 89.753 100 12.454 139 8.396 9 4 21.690 24 2 47.213 526 42.540 474
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 19.481 100 2.913 150 1,913 9 8 5.830 2 8 9 9.025 463 10.456 537
31 CHEMICALS 26.009 100 1.182 4 5 1,494 5 7 5.005 196 18,238 701 7.771 2 9 9
32 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 4 746 100 119 2 5 239 5.0 562 116 3.836 808 910 192
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 39.517 100 8 240 209 4,750 120 10.413 264 16,114 408 23.403 592
C CAPITAL GOODS & DURABLES 179 858 100 56 636 31 5 16.524 9 2 30.053 187 76.645 426 103213 574
34 BASIC METALLURGY 9815 100 37 04 20 0.2 381 3 9 9.377 955 438 4 5
35 METAL PRODUCTS 54 316 100 21471 39 5 5.454 100 9.857 18 1 17.534 32 3 36.782 67 7
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 22 323 100 6556 294 3.675 16 5 7.073 31 7 5.019 22 5 17.304 77 5
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 30.400 100 6.981 23 0 2.466 8 1 5 634 18 5 15,319 504 15,061 49 6
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 63.004 100 21.591 34 3 4.909 7 8 7.108 1 1 3 29.396 487 33.608 533
671.494 10Ô] 192 8 9 6 _ % 7 71.244 106 130.170 2 0 7 268 182 399 403 312 60 1
SOURCE: Adapted from NSSG ‘Results of the Census of Manufacturing indusfry.
Handicraft. Commerce and olher Services on 30 Sept 1978‘ Attiens 1981
(Own cakulalion of the subtotals totals and psr:»ntages)
TABLE A.8
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND % SHARE BY PLANTS' SIZE AND BRANCH. 1964
PLANTS' SIZE
Code BRANCH TOTAL %
0 4 % W % 104 9 % 80* % TOTAL OF SMEs %
employses employees employeee employeee (049  employeee)
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 409.093 100 132 4 73 324 48.655 119 89,885 2 2 0 138,080 338 271,013 6 6 2
20 FOODS 99.413 100 35.610 358 11.773 11 8 20276 204 31,754 319 67.659 681
21 BEVERAGES 14.058 100 2.072 14 7 1,304 9 3 3,147 2 2 4 7,535 53.6 6.523 464
22 TOBACCO 10.223 100 77 0 8 102 1.0 1,098 107 8,946 875 1277 125
23 TEXTILES 65.548 100 6738 10 3 4.473 6 8 12723 194 41.614 635 23.934 365
24 CLOTHING-FOOTWEAR 96.906 100 30.110 31 1 12.320 127 27259 28 1 27,217 281 69 689 71 9
25 WOOD-CORK 33.532 100 21.004 62 6 3.959 118 422 2 126 4.347 130 29 185 87 0
26 FURNITURE 31.679 100 16 808 53 1 5.693 18.0 7.744 24 4 1,434 4 5 30245 95 5
27 PAPER 10.852 100 717 6 6 810 7 5 2497 2 3 0 6.828 62.9 4.024 37 1
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING 17.514 100 4 914 28 1 2.551 14 6 3,877 22 1 6.172 352 11.342 6 4 8
29 LEATHER-FUR 17.117 100 7797 45 6 3.736 21 8 4,483 2 6 2 1.101 64 16.016 9 3 6
39 MISCELLANEOUS 12.251 100 6 626 54 1 1.934 158 2559 2 0 9 1,132 9 2 11.119 908
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 93.610 100 15322 16 4 9.743 104 22,374 2 3 9 46.171 493 47.439 507
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 20,712 100 4 186 202 2.359 114 5,484 2 6 5 8.683 419 12,029 58 1
31 CHEMICALS 27.541 100 1.652 6 0 1.541 5 6 5278 1 9 2 19,070 692 8,471 308
32 PETROLEUM 4 COAL PRODUC TS 5.636 100 208 3 6 404 6 9 1,067 1 8 3 4,157 712 1,679 2 8 8
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 39.521 100 9.276 235 5.439 138 10,545 2 6 7 14.261 361 25260 6 3 9
C CAPITAL GOODS 4  DURABLES 181.440 100 70.479 388 17.198 9 5 28,797 15 9 64.968 358 116.474 64 2
34 BASIC METALLURGY 10.749 100 76 0 7 129 1 2 663 6 2 9.881 919 868 8 1
35 METAL PRODUCTS 51.372 100 22 190 43 2 5,450 106 8,111 158 15,621 304 35.751 6 9 6
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 24,233 100 7,674 31 7 3,911 16 1 7,195 2 9 7 5,453 225 18.780 7 7 5
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 28,701 100 9.139 31 8 2,436 8 5 5,698 1 9 9 11,430 398 17273 60.2
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 86.385 100 31.400 4 7 3 5272 7 9 7.130 10.7 22,583 340 43,802 66.0
GREECE. TOTAL 684.143 1 0 ^ 218.274 319 75,596 11 0 141,056 2 0 6 249,219 364 434,926 6 3 6
SOURCE: Adapted from NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing industry. 
HandicrafI and Commerce on 28 Sept 1984‘. Athens 1988
(Own calculation of the subtotals, totals and percentages)
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TABLE A 9
INSTALLED MANUFACTURING HORSEPOWER AND % SHARE BY PLANTS' SIZE AND BRANCH. 1978
HP
Code BRANCH TOTAL %
0-4
oployeea
% 5-9
em ptoyeee
% 10-49
emptoyeee
% 50*
emptoyeee
% TOTAL OF SMEt 
0-49 emptoyeee
%
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 1,969 842 100 519 514 264 140.845 7 2 320,014 16.2 989 448 502 980,373 49 8
20 FOODS 662.627 100 256 089 386 55,304 8 3 109 571 16 5 241,663 365 420,964 63 5
21 BEVERAGES 80 808 100 11 797 14 6 4.459 5 5 34.200 42 3 30,352 37 6 50,456 624
22 TOBACCO 22.304 100 94 04 249 11 2 983 134 18,978 85 1 3 326 14 9
23 TEXTILES 497133 100 21 606 4 3 18.065 3 6 69.821 14 0 387 641 78 0 109.492 22 0
24 CLOTHING-FOOTWEAR 67.164 100 23.088 34 4 8.172 122 17.685 26 3 18,219 27 1 48,945 72 9
25 WOODWORK 214.509 100 111 672 52 1 21.935 102 31 092 14 5 49,810 23 2 164 699 76 8
26 FURNITURE 120,896 100 70 411 582 15.520 128 23.924 198 11,041 9 1 109.855 909
27 PAPER 223.794 100 1.353 0 6 1.770 0 8 9,597 4 3 211.074 94 3 12.720 57
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING 32.282 100 8.874 27 5 4 892 15.2 7.631 23.6 10.855 33 6 21,397 663
29 LEATHER-FUR 32.296 100 9 556 296 7.851 24 3 7.600 235 7 298 22 6 25.007 774
39 MISCELLANEOUS 16 029 100 4 974 31 0 2 628 164 5.910 369 2,517 157 13,512 84 3
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 1,231.628 100 80.193 6 5 79.359 6 4 185.069 15 0 887.007 72 0 344,621 280
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 146.931 100 16.281 11 1 13,304 9 1 37.120 25 3 80,226 54 6 66.705 45 4
31 CHEMICALS 321.702 100 3 866 1 2 6.738 2 1 22 584 7.0 288.514 89 7 33,188 103
32 PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS 96 885 100 1.486 1 5 2.154 2 2 3,596 37 89,649 9 2 5 7,236 7 5
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 666.110 100 58 560 8 8 57.163 8 6 121,769 183 428,618 64 3 237,492 357
C CAPITAL GOODS & DURABLES 1.318.452 100 161 864 12 3 58 098 4 4 118,065 9.0 980,425 74 4 338.027 25 6
34 BASIC METALLURGY 547.777 100 77 0 0 48 0 0 1,873 0.3 545,779 9 9 6 1.998 04
35 METAL PRODUCTS 296 458 100 80513 27 2 23.880 8 1 50.244 16 9 141.621 4 7 8 154,637 522
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 109.252 100 39.601 362 17.988 16 5 32,662 29 9 19.001 174 90.251 826
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 125.402 100 7.574 6 0 4.994 4 0 12943 103 99,891 79 7 25,511 20 3
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 239 563 100 34.099 14 2 11.188 4 7 20 343 8 5 173,933 7 2 6 65 630 27 4
GREECE. TOTAL ^ 5 1 9 :9 2 2 1ÔÔT 7 6 j :5 7 r 16 8 278.302 6 2 623 148 138 2.856.880 6 3 2 1.663.021 368
SOURCE. Adapted from NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufactunng industry
Handicraft Commerce and other Services on 30 Sept 1978" Athens 1981
(Own calculation of the subtotals totals and percentages)
TABLE/Lie
INSTALLED MANUFACTURING HORSEPOWER AND % SHARE BY PLANTS' SIZE AND BRANCH. 1984
HP
Code BRANCH TOTAL % 0-4
emptoyeee
% 5-0
em ptoyeee
% 10-49
emptoyeee
% 50*
emptoyeee
% TOTAL OF SMEe 
(0-49 em ptoyeee)
%
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 2,607 388 100 694 868 26 6 189.208 7 3 462 052 177 1.261.260 4 8 4 1 346.128 51 6
20 FOODS 927 872 100 338.106 364 67.440 7 3 161,424 17 4 360,902 389 566.970 61 1
21 BEVERAGES 97.556 100 13,416 138 7.073 7 3 18,363 188 58.704 602 38,852 398
22 TOBACCO 36.084 100 222 0 6 139 0 4 6,616 189 28.907 80 1 7.177 199
23 TEXTILES 567.820 100 26.475 4 7 21.782 3 8 110.263 194 409.300 72 1 158.520 27 9
24 CLOTHING-FOOTWEAR 91.280 100 27,553 302 11.708 128 23.714 26 0 28.305 31 0 62.975 690
25 WOOD-CORK 321,469 100 158,863 49 4 31 257 9 7 40,997 128 90.352 28 1 231.117 71 9
26 FURNITURE 166,963 100 89,324 535 27.698 16 6 42.010 252 7.931 4 8 159.032 952
27 PAPER 278.788 100 2,686 10 2.223 0 8 23.485 84 250.394 8 9 8 28.394 102
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING 50,770 100 15,826 31 2 6 856 13 5 14.849 292 13.239 261 37.531 73 9
29 LEATHER-FUR 41.717 100 13 029 31 2 8.802 21 1 11,750 28.2 8.136 195 33.581 80 5
39 MISCELLANEOUS 27 069 100 9 368 346 4.230 15 6 8.381 31.0 5.090 188 21.979 81 2
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS 1.927.628 100 139 435 72 145.252 7 5 298,439 15.5 1.344.502 69 7 583.126 30 3
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 229.087 100 32 888 14 4 27.266 119 52.572 22.9 116.361 508 112.726 492
31 CHEMICALS 399,918 100 9934 2 5 8,539 2 1 36.461 9,1 344.984 8 6 3 54.934 137
32 PETROLEUM 4 COAL PRODUCTS 192 666 100 6653 3 5 7,987 4 1 10,421 54 167,605 8 7 0 25.061 130
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 1.105.957 ICO 89,960 81 101.460 9 2 198,985 180 715.552 64 7 390.405 35 3
C CAPITAL GOODS 4  DURABLES 1.608,952 100 251.879 157 93.319 5 8 188.585 117 1.075.169 6 6 8 533.783 332
34 BASIC METALLURGY 607,926 100 432 0 1 1.994 0 3 16.391 2 7 589.109 9 6 9 18.817 3.1
35 METAL PRODUCTS 408,916 100 104,775 256 36.590 8 9 69.762 17 1 197.789 484 211.127 51 6
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 160,676 100 58,717 36 5 27.390 17.0 46.527 2 9 0 28.042 175 132,634 82 5
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 137.680 100 10,820 7 9 6.067 4 4 21.096 15.3 99.697 724 37.983 276
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 293,754 100 77.135 26 3 21.278 7.2 34,809 11 8 160.532 54 6 133.222 454
GREECE. TOTAL 6,143,968 100 1,086.182 177 427.779 7.0 949.076 15 4 3.680.931 59 9 2.463.037 401
SOURCE: Adapted from NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry, 
Handicraft and Commerce on 28 Sept 1984", Athens 1988
(Own calculation of the percentages)
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TABLE A 11
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1950-1991 
(Million dre at constant 1970 pnces)
YEAR AGRICULTURE MINING- MANUFACTURING ENERGY TRANSPORT ft DWELLINGS
*1C QUARRYING COMMUNICATION
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
OTHER SERVICE TOTAL 
INDUSTRIES GFCF
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1 818 
1 864 
1.279 
1 150 
1 262 
1 270 
1 700 
2.577 
3.378
3 844 
5.070 
5 368 
4.710 
5 131 
5 688 
6035 
5 591 
6,209 
7 079 
7443
7 523
8 052
8 949
9 685 
7 174 
7 843
7 740
8 302 
7209 
7 623 
6.169 
5658 
5 548 
5.902 
7416 
7 571
4 870 
4 064 
4 441 
4 663 
4 732 
4.648
184 
722 
455 
224 
184 
137 
279 
367 
398 
151 
160 
213 
270 
430 
451 
606 
584 
719 
803 
1 219 
1 471 
1 827 
1 478 
1 985 
1 462 
1760 
1 859 
1 457 
2077 
2.064 
5468 
6 613 
3479 
3.476 
3408 
3693
1 827
2 154 
2056 
1 970 
1 817 
1.741
3.696 
3222 
3.197 
2.039 
1.781 
1.941 
2.372 
2.819 
3.473 
3.081 
2,873 
3.634 
4.280 
4 390 
5.628 
7.006 
6 660 
6.053 
7 245 
8.426 
10.044 
11.198 
13238 
14 457 
14 855
13 143 
13.288 
12.599 
12.244 
13.824
14 899 
13.973 
13.120 
12,208 
12.101 
11.052 
13.033 
13 480 
15.138 
15.694 
16.895 
16.274
559 
2 148
1 410 
1.563 
1.577 
1.632 
2.531 
1.409
1.901 
2.613 
2.323 
2.260
2 902 
2.727 
3.888
4 759 
3957
5 341 
5 500 
6827 
5.091 
7480 
7987 
8736  
8.166 
6.123 
6.021 
5.711 
6.097 
7.319 
6710  
5.379 
7.040 
9.081 
8 864
10.614
7.393
5.479
4.666
7.051
7.149
6.902
2.786
1.393
1,139
882
1.186
1.477 
1,963 
2,604 
3,828 
3,774
5.477 
6,146 
6,269 
6.188 
7.977 
8,384
10,440
10,167
11,547
14,181
14,677
17,348
18.529
20.570 
15,268 
14,178 
15,853 
16,732 
19.098 
20,676 
19,424 
19,192 
22,415
18.570 
16,186 
18,128 
14,873 
12,534 
12,580 
15,463 
17,290 
19,888
4.830
4.333
4.491
6.091
6.096
7.045
7.818
6.911
8,352
7,857
8,506
9,132
10,391
11,287
13,712
15,482
15,642
13,956
19,445
23,212
19.740 
23.641 
29.964 
30,576 
15,869 
20,476 
21,909 
26,428 
30,074 
31,572 
27,290 
21,452
20.398 
21,124 
17.083 
17.097
19.399 
20.044 
20.691
21.741 
24,151 
20,181
1990 Provisional data
1991 Estimates
1,024
114
694
702
403
378
371
389
145
304
417
340
317
343
296
181
433
469
367
628
828
803
781
675
458
579
642
582
669
555
482
549
594
733
1,022
1,022
874
684
700
935
968
1,317
1,365
1,299
1,315
1,601
1,900
2,064
2,361
2,044
2,694
3,640
4,295
4,383
4,989
5.500
5.805
6.550
7.260
6.856
8,411
9,717
11,289
10.209
12.051
13,409
11,188
10,538
12,438
14,139
13,632
14,637
12,263
12,934
11,506
11,906
12,220
13,183
14,965
14,876
18,083
20,322
19,818
20,020
16.262
15.095
13,980
14,252
14,389
15,944
19,395
19.120 
24,169 
25,264
29.121 
31,476 
34,128 
35,996 
43,445 
49,003 
50,567 
49,770 
60,397 
71,653 
70 663 
80 558 
92977
100,093
74.440
74.640
79.750 
85,950
91.100 
96,270 
92,705
85.750
84.100 
83.000 
78,300 
82.360 
77.234 
73,315 
78,355 
87,839 
92,820 
90,971
SOURCE:
-For 1950-57 "National Accounts of Greece 1958-1975" (No 23) Athens 1976 204-5 
-For 1958-75 Ibid 152-5
-For 1976-79 "National Accounts of Greece 1970 and 1974-81 " Athens (n d 49)
-For 1980-84 Bank of Greece "Monthly Statistical Bulletin" Athens Jan 1988 table 50a. 
-For 1985-91 Bank of Greece Monthly Statistical Bulletin". Athens. July 1992 table 51a
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TABLE B1
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS. 
BY PLANNING REGION AND PREFECTURE. 1969-1988
PLANNING REGIONS AND 
INCLUDED PREFECTURES
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
1969 1978 % 1988 %
1969-78 % Change 
1969-1978
1978-86 % Change 
1978-1988
128,988 100.0 144,717 100 0 4337 3 5 15729 122
6,350 4.9 6,613 46 -80 -1.2 263 4 1
1,613 13 1,748 12 169 11 7 135 8 4
1.091 0 8 984 07 -99 -83 -107 -98
799 0.6 853 0 6 24 3 1 54 6 8
1,691 13 1,774 12 -140 -7 6 83 4 9
1,156 0 9 1,254 OS -34 -29 98 8 5
21,420 166 27,999 19 3 580 2 8 6579 307
2440 19 2,740 19 39 16 300 123
756 0 6 970 0 7 -28 -3 6 214 28 3
13,082 10.1 18,232 12 6 375 3 0 5150 394
856 0 7 975 0 7 22 2 6 119 13 9
1,146 0 9 1,357 0 9 8 0 7 211 184
1,681 1.3 1,946 13 255 179 265 158
1,459 11 1,779 12 -91 -59 320 219
5,362 4 2 6,504 4 5 1022 235 1142 213
480 0 4 465 0 3 -77 -138 -15 -3 1
2,482 1 9 3,031 21 1194 927 549 22 1
2,003 16 2,629 18 29 1 5 626 313
397 0 3 379 03 -124 -238 -18 -45
3,246 2 5 3,661 2 5 5 0.2 415 128
GREECE. TOTAL________
I EASTERN MACEDONIA+THRACE 
-Evros
-Rodopi
-Xanthi
-Kavala
-Drama
II CENTRAL MACEDONIA 
-Serres
-Kilkis
-Thessaloniki
-Chalkidiki
-Plena
-Imathia
-Pella
III WESTERN MACEDONIA_________
-Fiorina
-Kasforia
-Kozani
-Grevena
IV EPIRUS
124.651 100 0
6 430 
1 444
1.190 
775
1 831
1.190 
20 840
2:401
784
12707
834
1.138
1.426
1,550
4.340M7
1.288
1.974
521
3.241
5 2  
1 2 
1 0 
0 6  
1 5 
10 
16 7 
1 9 
0 6  
102 
07  
0 9  
1 1 
1 2 
3 5  
0 4  
1 0 
1 6 
0 4  
2 6
-loannina 1.621 1 3 1,701 1.3 1,990 14 80 4 9 289 170
-Thesprotia 381 0 3 386 0.3 412 03 5 13 26 67
-Preveza 567 0 5 566 0.4 600 04 -1 -0.2 34 6 0
-Aria 672 0 5 593 0 5 659 0 5 -79 -11.8 66 111
V THESSALY 8 230 6 6 8,150 6 3 9,158 63 -80 -1 0 1008 124
-Trikala 1015 1 1 1,495 1.2 1,823 13 180 137 328 219
-Karditsa 1 466 1 2 1299 1.0 1,379 1 :■ -167 -114 80 62
-Lansa 2 785 2 2 2,880 2 2 3,508 24 95 34 628 218
-Magnisia 2664 21 2,476 19 2,448 1 7 -188 -7 1 -28 -11
VI STEREA HELLAS 6 473 5 2 5 685 4 4 6,403 44 -788 -12 2 718 12 6
-Phthiotis 1913 1 5 ' 1,661 13 1,741 12 -252 -132 80 48
-Evntama 266 0 2 107 01 159 01 -159 -598 52 486
-Phokida 583 0 5 399 0 3 497 03 -184 -31 6 98 246
-VkJtia 1.247 1 0 1,312 1.0 1,559 11 65 5 2 247 188
-Evia 2464 2 0 2,206 17 2,447 17 -258 -105 241 109
VII ATTICA 43 803 35 1 51,350 398 54,707 37 6 7547 172 3357 6 5
-Greater Athens 40.956 32 9 ' 47,332 367 48,656 336 6376 156 1324 28
-Rest of Attica 2847 2 3 4,008 31 5,552 38 1161 408 1544 385
Vll WESTERN GREECE 6 762 54 6.584 5.1 7,190 50 -178 -26 606 9.2
-Etolia and Akarnania 1,958 1 6 1,856 14 2,034 14 -102 -52 178 9 6
-Achata 2.979 2 4 3,161 2 5 3,430 24 182 61 269 8 5
-Ilia 1 825 1 5 1,567 12 1,726 12 -258 -14 1 159 10 1
IX PELOPONNESOS 7.570 61 6,518 51 7,127 4 9 -1052 -13.9 609 9 3
-Argolida 1.250 1 0 1,261 10 1,398 10 11 0 9 137 109
-Korinthia 1 672 1 3 1,307 10 1,750 12 -365 -218 443 339
-Arkadia 1.249 1 0 966 0,7 980 07 -283 -227 14 14
-Lakonia 1.228 1 0 1,052 0 8 1,006 07 -176 -143 -46 -4 4
-Messinta 2171 1 7 1,932 15 1,993 14 -239 -110 61 32
X IONIAN ISLANDS 2754 2 2 2,332 18 2,226 15 -422 -153 -106 -45
-Kerkyra 1 528 12 1,338 1.0 1,252 0 9 -190 -12.4 -86 -64
-Lefkada 352 0 3 255 0.2 252 02 -97 -27 6 -3 -12
-Kefalinia 447 0 4 351 0 3 307 02 -96 -21 5 -44 -125
-Zakynthos 427 0 3 388 0 3 415 0 3 -39 -9 1 27 7 0
XI NORTHERN AEGIAN 3.770 3 0 2,781 2 2 2,655 18 -989 -262 -126 -45
-LesVOS 2.115 1 7 1,601 1.2 1,568 1 1 -514 -243 -33 -21
-Chios 738 0 6 521 0.4 534 04 -217 -294 13 2 5
-Samos 917 0 7 659 0 5 553 04 -258 -281 -106 -161
X'l SOUTHERN AEGIAN 3291 2 6 2,463 19 2,702 19 -828 -252 239 97
SOURCE 
-For 1969 
-fo r 1978 
-fo r 1988
NSSG "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1978", Athens 1979 224. 
NSSG "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1986". Athens 1987 207 
NSSG "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1990-91". Athens 1994 269
-Cyclades 1.558 12 957 0 7 1231 0 9 ■601 -386 274 266
-Dodekamssos 1.733 1 4 1,506 12 1,471 10 -227 -13.1 -35 -23
XIII CRETE 7,147 57 6,757 5 2 8,253 57 -390 -5 5 1496 22 1
-Lassithi 1.086 0 9 858 0.7 952 0 7 -228 -21.0 94 11.0
-Iraklio 3,295 2 6 3,437 2.7 3,831 2 6 142 4 3 394 11 5
-Rethymno 959 0 8 855 0.7 1,443 10 -104 -10.8 588 688
-Chema 1.807 14 1,607 1.2 2,027 14 -200 -11 1 420 261
(Own calculation of percentages)
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TABLE B 2
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
BY PLANNING REGION AND PREFECTURE. 1969-1988
PLANNING REGIONS AND 
INCLUDED PREFECTURES
AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT
1969
1969-78 % change 1978-88 % Change
1978 % 1988 % 1969-1978 1978-1988
671,496 100 0 706.308 100 0 169974 339 34812 5 2
25453 38 37 463 53 7706 43 4 12010 47 2
4 751 07 6,375 09 1277 368 1624 34 2
2839 04 4,187 06 376 15 3 1348 47 5
4 268 06 6,949 1 0 2259 1124 2681 628
8 053 1 2 11,279 1 6 1106 159 3226 40 1
5,542 08 8,673 /  ^ 2688 94 2 3131 56 5117,991 17 6 155.669 {22I 38155 478 37678 31 9
8 273 12 10,208 2400 40.9 1935 23 4
3,721 06 6,002 08 2196 144 0 2281 61 3
82,886 12,3 106,919 151 23605 39 8 24033 29 0
2,183 0 3 2,759 04 761 535 576 26 4
3,375 0.5 6,228 09 989 41 5 2853 845
10,103 15 12.048 17 4723 87 8 1945 19 3
7450 1.1 11,505 1.6 3481 87 7 4055 544
17,385 26 19,641 28 4275 326 2256 13 0
1 195 0 2 1,208 0,2 89 8 0 13 11
8,900 13 8,748 12 3558 66 6 -152 -1 7
6410 10 8,821 12 538 9 2 2411 37 6
880 01 864 0 1 90 11.4 -16 -18
10,351 15 11,992 17 2651 34 4 1641 159
5,634 08 6,397 09 1737 44 6 763 13 5
876 0 1 1,435 02 270 446 559 63 8
1,821 0 3 2,064 03 570 456 243 13 3
2,020 0,3 2,096 03 74 3 8 76 38
37,571 56 41,246 58 11945 46 6 3675 9 8
4 878 07 5,633 08 1376 39 3 755 15 5
3,174 05 3,830 05 -154 ^ 6 656 20 7
14 731 2 2 17,171 24 6105 708 2440 166
14,788 22 14,612 21 4618 45 4 -176 -1 2
40,228 6 0 44,393 63 19064 90 1 4165 104
8529 13 8,480 12 3890 83 9 -49 -06
430 0 1 634 0.1 -2 -05 204 47 4
793 0 1 1,125 0 2 -239 -23 2 332 41.9
15,705 23 19,171 27 8821 128.1 3466 22 1
14,771 22 14,983 6594 806 212 1.4
327,779 48 8 292,509 '4 1  4 \ -  76068 30 2 -35270 -10 8
281,821 42.0 246,880 -  48042 206 -34941 -12 4
45,958 6 8 51,397 ^ 3  '+ 28026 156 3 5439 118
31,808 4 7 31,905 4 5 6231 24 4 97 0.3
6,076 09 5,822 0.8 1467 31 8 -254 •4 2
21,119 3 1 21,186 30 4694 28 6 67 0 3
4,613 07 4,897 0,7 70 15 284 6 2
26,058 39 25,871 3.7 4647 21 7 -187 -0.7
5,974 09 5,617 0 8 1344 29 0 -357 -6 0
8,082 12 8,419 12 2255 38 7 337 4 2
2,629 04 2,956 04 170 6 9 327 124
2.133 0 3 1,978 03 -295 -12 1 -155 -7 3
7,240 1.1 6,901 10 1173 19 3 -339 -4 7
5,248 08 5,267 07 -263 ■4 8 19 0,4
3,408 05 3,020 0 4 253 8 0 -388 -114
450 0 1 489 0.1 -198 -306 39 87
618 01 700 01 -132 -17 6 82 13 3
772 0 1 1,058 0.1 -186 -19 4 286 37.0
6 309 09 6,181 09 -1619 -20 4 -128 -2 0
GREECE. TOTAL
EASTERN MACEDONIA+THRACE
-Evros
-Rodopi
-Xanthi
-Kavala
-Drama
CENTRAL MACEDONIA
-Serres
-Kilkis
-Thessaloniki
-Chalkidiki
-Plena
-Imathia
-Pella
WESTERN MACEDONIA
-Fiorina 
-Kastoria 
-Kozani 
-Grevena 
IV EPIRUS
-loannina
-Thesprotia
-Preveza
-Ada
V THESSALY________
-Tnkala
-Karditsa
-Lanssa
-Magnisia
VI STEREA HELLAS 
-Fthiotida 
-Evritania 
-Fokida
-Viotia
-Evia
VII ATTICA____________
-Greater Athens 
-Rest of Attica
VIII WESTERN GREECE 
-Etolia and Akarnania 
-Achaia
-Ilia
IX PELOPONNESOS 
-Argolida 
-Korinthia 
-Arkadia 
-Lakonia 
-Messin ia
X IONIAN ISLANDS 
-Kerkyra 
-Lefkada 
-Kefalinia 
-Zakynthos
XI NORTHERN AEGIAN
17 747 
3,474 
2,463 
2,009 
6 947 
2,854 
79,836 
5873 
1,525 
59,281 
1,422 
2,386 
5,380 
3,969 
13,11_0 
1106 
5,342 
5,872 
790 
7,700 
3,897 
606 
1,251 
1,946 
25626 
3,502 
3,328 
8 626 
10,170 
21,164 
4 639 
432 
1,032 
6,884 
8,177 
251,711 
233 779 
17,932 
25^77 
4,609 
16425 
4 543 
21,411 
4630 
5827 
2,459 
2428 
6,067 
5611 
3 155 
648 
750 
958 
7,928
3 5
0 7
0 5
0 4
I 4
0 6  
159
1 2 
0 3  
118
0 3
0 5  
1 1
0 8  
2 6  
0 2 
1 1 
1 2 
0 2
15  
0 8 
0 1 
0 2
0 4
5 1 
0 7
0 7 
1 7  
2 0
4 2 
0 9  
0 1 
0 2 
14
1 6  
50 2 
46 6
3 6
5 1 
0:9
3 3 
0 9
4 3
0 6
1 2 
0 5
0 5 
1 2
I I  ae 
0 1 
0 1 
0 2
1 6
-Lesvos 4,814 1 Ô 3,638 05 3,392 0 5 -1176 -24 4 -246 -68
-Chios 1,681 0 3 1,421 0 2 1,544 0 2 -260 -15 5 123 8 7
-Samos 1,433 0 3 1,250 02 1,245 0 2 -183 -128 -5 -0.4
XII SOUTHERN AEGIAN 7,714 15 7,414 1,1 8,664 12 -300 -39 1250 169
-Cyclades 3,244 0 6 2,870 0.4 4,186 06 -374 -11.5 1316 459
-Dodekamssos 4,470 0 9 4,544 0.7 4,478 06 74 17 -66 -1.5
XIII CRETE 16,484 3 3 17,900 27 19,739 28 1416 8.6 1839 10.3
-Lassithi 2,040 0 4 1,783 0 3 1,927 0,3 -257 -12,6 144 8,1
-Iraklio 8,988 1.8 9,124 1,4 10,631 1,6 136 1.5 1507 16 5
-Rethymno 1,458 0 3 1,707 0.3 2,313 0.3 249 17.1 606 355
-Chania 3,998 08 5,286 08 4,868 0,7 1288 32 2 -418 -7 9
SOURCE:
-For 1969: NSSG 'Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1978", Athens 1979 224 
-For 1978: NSSG "Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1986", Athens 1987 207 
-For 1988 NSSG "Statistical Yearbook 1990-91" Athens 1994 269
(Own calculation of the percentages)
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lA B lF  B S
N U IflE R  OF MANUFACTURMQ EBTABLISHkCNTS M OREATER AT>CN8 BY BRANCM, la a B -I lM
Coëa BRANCH
QREATCT ATMEMB 
18Ba «  1 M  «  i m  « IM S  1#7* II
A NON DURABLE CONSUME R i iOOOS 18.552 72 2 26 973 6 59 29 129 61.5 29,118 598 77,029 87,781 62,424 88,691 24 1 307 3 6 3 3 3 6
20 FOOOS 1,947 7 6 2 848 7.0 3.474 73 3,827 7 9 16688 20,649 19,311 19,776 1 19 13.8 1 80 194
21 BEVERAGES 180 0 7 218 0 5 163 0 3 135 0.3 2,085 2,882 1,903 2339 8 6 7 8 8 3 4.8
22 TOBACCO 28 01 36 0.1 20 0.0 IS 0.0 292 303 131 120 9.6 119 1 53 108
23 TEXTEES 1,461 5 7 2259 5 5 2 252 4 8 1,846 3 8 3,570 5,109 5,049 4 3 7 0 4 0 9 4 4 2 4 4 8 4 2 2
24 CLOTHMOFCWTWEAR 8.589 334 9.926 2 4 2 9,515 20 1 10,007 2 0 6 32,819 28249 21,928 22,948 2 8 2 351 4 3 4 4 3 6
25 WOOOOORK 1,283 5.0 2545 6 2 3.386 7 1 2 6 5 0 5 9 10,065 12,045 12385 12,721 1 23 21 1 7 7 2 224
28 FURNITURE 2.523 9 8 4,587 112 4,986 105 4 2 8 5 8 8 6,679 10,082 10,778 10,479 3 7 3 4 5 6 4 8 3 4 0 9
27 PAPER 167 0 6 278 0 7 321 0.7 348 0.7 242 388 444 595 69.0 71 6 7 23 5 8 2
28 PRMTMG-PUBLBUNG 876 3 4 1 523 3 7 1,939 4 1 2,382 4.9 1,400 2 288 2648 3 309 6 2 6 6 7 2 681 6 2 0
29 LEATHERFUR 420 1 6 672 16 737 16 835 1 3 1,441 2,143 3,770 4,136 29.1 31.4 1 9 5 15.4
39 MISCELLANEOUS 1,078 4 2 2,"81 5 1 2,358 5.0 2,810 5 8 2,080 3,703 3,899 4 3 9 8 5 1 3 5 8 2 8 0 4 57.4
8  M TERMED1ATE GOODS 1.441 5 6 3 166 7 7 3.661 7 7 3,847 7 9 11,909 7,740 6 682 10253 121 4 0 9 4 2 2 3 7 5
30 RU88ERPLASTIC 152 0 6 871 21 1 187 2 5 1,812 3.3 323 1,364 2,164 3,091 47 1 8 3 9 5 4 3 52.2
31 CHEMICALS 361 14 511 12 575 12 538 11 7,955 965 1,095 1252 4 5 5 1 9 5 2 5 43.0
32 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRIXXICTS 30 0 1 61 0 1 53 0.1 55 0,1 38 117 123 245 8 3 3 52.1 431 2 24
33 NON METALLIC MMERALS 898 3 5 1.723 4 2 1.846 3 9 1,642 3.4 3,595 5274 5280 5,685 25.0 327 35.0 29.0
C CAPITAL GOODS 8  DURABLES 5.716 222 10.817 26 4 14.542 30 7 16,143 3 3 2 20298 29,130 37.882 47,773 2 8 2 37 1 3 84 3 3 8
34 BASIC METALLURGY 46 0 2 34 0.1 28 0.1 48 0.1 58 52 59 108 821 6 5 4 4 7 5 434
36 METAL PRODUCTS 2,825 10.2 4 389 10 7 4,508 9 5 3,733 7 7 11,935 13,904 14,685 13,715 2 2 0 3 1 6 30.7 272
36 NON ELECTRIC MACMMERY 590 2 3 1.2119 3.0 1,612 3 4 1,526 3.1 1,443 3297 4,466 5294 40.9 38.7 381 2 *8
37 ELECTRIC EQUPMENT 1.089 4 2 2.124 5 2 2 829 6.0 2,958 6.1 2,023 3,546 5 308 7,001 5 38 5 9 9 5 3 3 42.3
38 TRANSPORT EQLIPMENT 1,366 5 3 3."61 7 5 5,567 118 7,880 182 4641 8,331 13,385 21,657 2 8 2 36.7 41 7 36.4
TOTSr I Z r  I C M " 4M.!>56~îi»:ô 4 7 3 5? ~ ï Ôô o 46,flsfl W O  W j W  43^,654 i » . i M  K »  M .7 ~ S 5 T
SOURCE:
F o r 1958: NSSG  "Census ol M anulxlunng. Hiindimft and Commefcul «i Ganeral EMabishmenls*. AJhent 1980.
F o r  1988: N SSG ’C aniu» d  M anuladunng. MandicraK and ConatiMcial ai General EalaMWimenla", Atfien* 1971 
f o r  1978: N SSG "Sttti»#c»l Yeaiboo* ol Greece 1986" Athens 19671abte X 2  
f o r  1968: NSSG "Stabalicml Yeaibooh d  Greece 199081" A liens 1994 268
(Own catculeian d  lie  suU dals. Idats and percentages)
TABLE B 4
AVERAGE AWMAL EIPIOYM ENT M MANUFACTURMQ MDUSTRY M GREATER A T ItN S  BY BRANCH. 18B8-19M.
G R A TER  ATHENB 
1988 «  187*
GREECE. TOTAL
1888 1818 1878 1888
ANON (XJRABLE CONSUMER GOODS 117.511 6 4 6 138.396 59.2 158,378 562 145,652 50.0 291,856 321,119 401825 436,019 4 0 5 43.1 3 94 334
20 FOOOS 17,306 9.5 21.618 9 2 22,418 8 0 24570 10.0 60,982 81517 94524 104507 28.4 2 6 5 2 3 8 236
21 BEVERAGES 1.593 0.9 4273 1 8 4,652 1.7 3,881 1 5 7,752 10,923 12.722 13530 2 0 5 391 3 6 6 2 7 2
22 TOBACCO 5.808 3 2 4 164 18 2,717 1.0 2,140 0 9 14,457 13,191 9,711 12,896 4 0 2 3 1 6 2 8 0 166
23 TEXTEES 29217 161 30.571 13.1 33,019 117 21,787 8 8 56,858 54,981 7*577 86,403 5 1 6 55.6 42.1 3 28
24 CIOTHMGFOOTWE AR 28,564 15 7 30.792 132 41,538 14.7 42,797 17.3 74,974 62232 87284 118,924 381 4 9 5 4 7 6 36.8
25 VTOOO-CORK 5,840 3 2 9.049 3 9 9,082 3 2 6,339 2.6 25,050 30274 33,009 30,949 2 3 3 2 9 9 2 7 5 2 0 5
28 FURNITURE 11,762 6 5 13,411 5 7 14,789 5 2 11,992 4 9 23,652 28507 31263 30,467 49.7 50.8 4 7 5 39.4
27 PAPER 2.889 1.6 4.197 18 5,804 21 5,132 2.1 4,914 7,784 11,023 12,011 5 8 8 5 3 9 52.7 427
28 PRMTMGPUBLISHMG 7,535 4 1 11.123 4 8 13.721 4 9 15,730 6.4 10,133 14,123 17285 22,621 74.4 788 7 94 695
29 LEATHERFUR 2.354 1.3 3069 1.3 3.448 12 2,973 1 2 8,473 10312 15,548 12,018 364 2 9 8 2 2 2 24 7
39 MBCELLANEOUS 4.641 2 6 6.129 2 6 7,190 2 6 8511 3.4 8811 9295 11279 13893 68.1 8 5 9 63.7 8 1 5
B MTERNCDIATE GOODS 22.539 124 30.523 13.1 38,140 135 3 1542 12.7 88,939 60875 69,751 92596 32.7 501 4 2 5 33.9
30 RUB6ERPLASTC 3,060 1.7 6.351 3.8 11,504 4.1 7,832 3.1 4,151 10845 19,480 19296 7 4 2 7 70 59.1 3 9 6
31 CHEMXALS 10,498 5 8 10,459 4.5 14,964 5 3 14242 5 8 42,006 16250 26,009 27,769 25.0 84.4 5 7 6 5 1 5
32 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 454 0 2 1.127 OS 809 0.3 1,718 0.7 959 2,921 4,745 7,483 4 7 5 3 8 6 17.0 23.0
33 NON METALLC MMERALS 8,507 4 7 10.586 4.5 10,843 3 8 7,750 31 21,821 30859 39517 37,848 39.0 3 4 5 27.4 2 0 5
C CAPITAL GCXTOS 8 DURABLES 41,810 2 3 0 64.860 27 7 85,302 30.3 89,886 2 8 3 60297 119527 179861 177893 52.1 5 4 5 3 9 5
34 BA SC  METALLURGY 1,881 0 9 1.232 0.5 1,174 0.4 993 0.4 2,922 5,709 9816 10,418 5 7 5 2 1 6 12.0 9 5
35 IrCTAL PRODUCTS 16.161 8 9 21.317 91 23,461 8 3 16,814 6.8 34,007 43268 54517 47.061 4 7 6 49.3 4 3 2 35.7
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHMERY 4,803 2 5 8,694 3 7 9,022 3 2 7,183 2.9 9,741 17214 22523 22520 4 7 5 5 0 5 4 0 4 3 2 2
37 ELECTRIC EQUPMENT 6,820 3 8 13.419 5.7 17,049 6.0 13,413 5.4 9,909 18282 30,401 28,424 6 8 6 73.4 56.1 4 7 2
38 TRANSPORT EQUPMENT 12,525 8 9 20.198 8 6 34,596 123 31,483 1 28 23,718 35,058 63,004 69,650 5 2 8 5 7 6 54,9 4 5 2
TOTAL l6 l.« 6 ii l4i.V?5 J55.7'79“ n » ‘0
SOURCE:
■For 1858: NSSG "Census d  M anuladunng HandicraN and Commercial é i General E stabishm enis" Athens 1960 
-For 1988: NSSG "Census d  M anuladuraig. Handicral and Commercial in  General EstaW hhnienls " A liens, 1971 
■For 1978: NSSG "Statistical Yeaihook d  G reece 1986 " A liens, 1987la d e  X 2  
F o r 1988: NSSG "Substical Yearbook d  G reece 1990-81", A liens 1994 288 
(Own cakailalion d  the su b id a ts . totals and percentages)
TABLE B.5
MSTALLED HORSEPOWER M MANUFACTURMQ MOUSTRY M GREATER ATHENS BY BRANCH, 1868-1884.
GREATER ATHENS GREECE. TOTW. QA-fM
C ode BRANCH
1968 % 1969 % 1978 % IBM « 186* 18*9 1B78 19*4 196* 1*8* 1*7* 19*4
ANON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 139,042 5 0 2 267,307 4 5 6 425,696 4 3 6 495,960 48.3 415257 967,143 1 969838 2,607,388 3 3 5 2 7 6 21.6 190
20 FOODS 41,872 15.0 81,5t.lO 10.5 82,453 8 4 115,659 1 08 188,973 399,028 662,827 927872 24.7 15.4 12.4 125
21 BEVERAGES 3,746 1.4 11.377 1.9 14,848 1 5 13,442 1 5 18520 37,394 80806 97556 22.7 30.4 18.1 138
22 TOBACCO 2,034 0.7 5 125 0.9 6,989 0.7 7,770 0.7 5231 19,834 22500 36,064 38.9 2 5 8 3 1 5 21.5
23 TEXTEES 45,658 18 5 78220 13 4 135,889 139 111,678 10.4 106897 173,727 497,133 567820 43.1 45 0 2 7 5 197
24 (XOTHMGFOOTWEAR 2,745 1 0 11,951 2 0 28,612 2.9 38,992 3.6 3,941 18532 87,164 9 1280 69.7 8 4 5 42.6 427
25 WOODOORK 11,527 4 2 27,917 4 8 34,515 3.5 40,498 3 8 49,112 131806 214509 321,469 2 3 5 2 1 2 16.1 12.8
26 FURNITURE 8,737 2.4 24.688 4 2 38,588 3 9 47,965 4 5 15,165 84,448 120896 166,963 44.4 3 8 5 3 1 9 26.7
27 PAPER 9 5 3 9 3 4 18.965 3 2 40,935 4 2 59,889 5.6 26,151 79,156 223,794 278,788 3 6 5 24.0 1 * 5 2 1 5
28 PRMTMGPUBLISHMG 6,517 2.4 14.683 2.5 26,314 2.7 36550 3.4 8,057 18294 32282 50,770 80.9 8 0 5 8 1 5 71.6
29 LEATHERFUR 4,358 1.8 8,108 14 8,893 0 9 10818 1.0 11,148 18,180 32296 41,717 39.1 44.8 2 7 5 2 5 9
39 MBCELLANEOUS 4,509 1.6 4.775 0.8 7,880 0 8 12,912 1 2 5,062 6,746 16,029 27,069 89.1 7 08 4 9 2 47.7
B MTERMECHATE GOCXTS 70274 254 147218 25.1 215,887 22.1 257,046 24.0 221,717 584,451 1 2 31828 1927,628 31.7 2 5 2 1 7 5 135
30 RUBBERPLASTIC 3 590 1 2 32,113 5.5 85,887 8.7 80532 7 5 5,970 50934 146931 229,067 5 6 8 63.0 44.7 352
31 CHEMICALS 38,451 1 32 38,875 6.6 83525 6 5 87,791 8 2 122970 178848 321,702 399,918 29.6 21.7 19.7 22.0
52 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 1274 0 5 2.734 0.5 3,501 0.4 5,054 0 5 11,063 38,625 988*5 192,666 1 1 5 7.1 3 8 2.6
33 NON METALLIC MMERALS 29,159 105 73,494 12 5 82,994 8 5 83,869 7 8 81,714 318,044 666,110 1,108,957 35.7 2 3 5 1 2 5 7.8
C C A M A L GOODS 8  DURABLES 87,696 24.4 171287 29.2 335,043 3 4 3 317,349 29.6 138,788 462,823 1518,152 1,606,952 4 8 8 37.0 25.4 1 97
34 BASIC METALLURGY 11,068 4 0 15.447 2.6 14,584 1.5 7864 0.7 42,454 173,090 547,777 607,926 28.1 8 9 2.7 1 5
35 METAL PRODUCTS 27,450 9 9 82,537 10.7 94,774 9 7 8 8219 8 2 40902 125239 298,458 408,918 67.1 49.9 32.0 2 1 8
38 MON ELECTRC MACHMERY 10,006 3 8 28,756 4 9 38596 3.7 52,134 4.9 21,020 60802 109252 160,676 47.6 4 7 5 3 3 5 32.4
37 ELECTRIC EtaUPMENT 4 5 4 9 1.8 19,003 3 2 33,062 3.4 28,978 2.7 8,412 269*9 125,102 137,680 70.9 7 0 5 26.4 21.0
38 TRANSPORT EQUPMENT 14,803 5 5 45,544 7 8 156,027 16.0 140,154 131 28,018 76,723 239563 293,754 52.1 59.4 *5.1 47.7
TOTAL iflOO 1 ,6 7 0 3 7 5 "
SOURCE : F o r  1858 (Greece, total) NSSG "Census d  Manutactudng. Handicralt and Commercial -in General- Establshm ents" Athens 19801sble 15.
F o r  1858 (Greater A liens) NSSG 1980 (tbid table 25)
F o r  1888: NSSG "Census d  Manutactudng, Handicial and Commercial in General- E stab lshm en ts.'A liens, 1971 tab le  1.
F o r  1873: NSSG "R esuls d  l i e  C ensus d  Mandacturaig kidusly, Handicrall and Mning, on 29 Sept 1973 " A liens 1975tabie 1.
F o r  1878: NSSG "Results d  l i e  C ensus d  Manuladuraig bidusly, Handicralt, Commerce and CMier Sendees on 30 S ept 1978." A liens IM Ita td a  1. 
F o r  1884: NSSG "R esuls d  l i e  C ensus d  Manutadunng kidustry, Handkralt and Commerce on 28 Sept. 1884." A liens 1988tab le  1.
(CMm calculation d  l i e  subtotals, mtals and percentages)
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TABLE B.6
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBLITION OF THE NUMBER OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS. 
BY SIZE OF PLANTS. 1978-1984.
1978 1984
PLANNING REGIONS AND 
INCLUDED PREFECTURES SMEs (0-49 +50 Total SMEs (0-49 +50 Total
mployees) employees employees) employees
127.460 1.528 128.988 143.044 1.419 144.463
6.285 65 6.350 6.352 96 6,448
1.604 9 1.613 1.724 12 1,736
1.085 6 1.091 995 11 1,006
787 12 799 860 26 886
1.668 23 1,691 1.649 31 1,680
1.141 15 1.156 1,124 16 1,140
21.106 314 21,420 26,825 335 27,160
2.427 13 2.440 2.693 16 2.709
741 15 756 807 22 829
12,860 222 13.082 17.585 212 17,797
852 4 856 956 4 960
1.139 7 1.146 1,332 16 1,348
1.652 29 1.681 1,829 38 1,867
1.435 24 1,459 1,623 27 1,650
5.351 11 5.362 6.402 7 6,409
479 1 480 553 1 554
2.478 4 2.482 3.160 1 3,161
1.998 5 2.003 2.331 4 2.335
396 1 397 358 1 359
3.231 15 3.246 3.815 17 3.832
1.693 8 1,701 2.050 10 2.060
389 0 389 453 1 454
564 2 566 598 4 602
588 5 593 714 2 716
8.060 90 8.150 9.157 99 9.256
1.484 11 1.495 1.763 10 1,773
1,298 1 1,299 1.337 4 1,341
2,842 38 2,880 3.474 46 3.520
2,436 40 2.476 2.543 39 2.582
5,564 121 5.685 6.397 115 6.512
1,637 24 1.661 1.827 17 1.844
106 1 107 146 1 147
398 1 399 500 2 502
1.254 58 1.312 1.439 58 1.497
2.169 37 2,206 2.485 37 2.522
50.613 727 51.340 54,116 588 54.704
6,511 73 6.584 7.410 67 7.477
1,845 11 1.856 1.969 9 1.978
3.107 54 3.161 3.568 50 3.618
1.559 8 1.567 1.873 8 1.881
6.448 70 6.518 7.119 53 7.172
1,233 28 1,261 1.287 17 1.304
1,280 27 1,307 1.717 25 1.742
965 1 966 985 1 986
1,051 1 1.052 1.056 1 1,057
1,919 13 1,932 2.074 9 2.083
2,327 5 2.332 2,369 2 2.371
1,334 4 1,338 1,341 1 1.342
255 0 255 247 0 247
351 0 351 340 0 340
387 1 388 441 1 442
2,773 8 2,781 2.842 9 2.851
1,598 3 1.601 1.706 4 1.710
518 3 521 550 4 554
657 2 659 586 1 587
2,453 10 2.463 2.915 10 2.925
953 4 957 1.333 5 1.338
1,500 6 1.506 1.582 5 1.587
6.738 19 6.757 7.325 21 7.346
GREECE. TOTAL
I. EASTERN MACEDONIA+THRACE
-Evros
-Rodopi
-Xanthi
-Kavala
-Drama
CENTRAL MACEDONIA
-Serres
-KMkis
-Thessaloniki
-Chalkidiki
-Pierla
-Imathia
-Pella
WESTERN MACEDONIA
-Fkxina
-Kastoria
-Kozani
-Grevena
IV EPIRUS________
-loannina
-Thesprotia
-Preveza
-Arta
V. THESSALY_____
-Trikala
-Karditsa
-Larissa
-Magnisia
VI. STEREA HELLAS
-Fthiotida
-Evritania
-Fokida
-Viotia
-Evia
VII. ATTICA_________ _
VIII.WESTERN GREECE 
-Etolia and Akarnania 
-Achaia
-Ite
IX. PELOPONNESOS 
-Argolida 
-Korinthia 
-Arkadia 
-Lakonia 
-Messinia
X. IONIAN ISLANDS 
-Kerkyra 
-Lefkada 
-Kefalinia 
-Zakynthos
XI. NORTHERN AEGIAN 
-Lesvos
-Chios
-Samos
XII. SOUTHERN AEGIAN 
-Cyclades 
-Dodekanissos
XIII. CRETE
-Lassithi 857 1 858 799 0 799
-Iraklio 3.424 13 3.437 3.726 16 3,742
-Rethymno 855 0 855 980 0 980
-Chania 1.602 5 1.607 1.820 5 1.825
SOURCE: For 1978: NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry. Handicraft. 
Commerce and otf>er Services, on 30 Sept 1978". Atfiens 1981.
For 1984 NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry. Handicraft 
and Commerce on 28 Sept 1984". Athens 1988
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TABLE B.7
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
BY SIZE OF PLANTS. 1978-1984.
1978 1984
PLANNING REGIONS AND
INCLUDED PREFECTURES SMEs (0-49 +50 Total SMEs (0-49 ♦50 Total
employees) employees employees) employees
GREECE, TOTAL 403,312 268,180 671,492 434,922 249,256 684,178
1. EASTERN MACEDONIA+THRACE 16,621 8,830 25,451 17,282 15,267 32,549
-Evros 3.834 916 4,750 4,006 1,597 5,603
-Rodopi 2,323 515 2,838 2,383 1,509 3,892
-Xanthi 2,402 1,865 4,267 2,504 3,833 6,337
-Kavala 5,116 2,937 8,053 5,402 4,328 9,730
-Drama 2.946 2,597 5,543 2,987 4,000 6,987
II. CENTRAL MACEDONIA 71.876 46,117 117,993 89,632 49,884 139,516
-Serres 6,173 2.100 8,273 6,897 2,179 9,076
-Kilkis 2,242 1.479 3,721 2,880 2,284 5,164
-Thessaloniki 49,795 33,091 82,886 64,246 32,481 96,727
-Chalkidiki 1,905 278 2,183 2,071 404 2.475
-Pieria 2,862 513 3,375 3,297 1,683 4,980
-Imathia 4,942 5,163 10,105 5,555 6,415 11,970
-Pella 3.957 3,493 7,450 4,686 4.400 9,086
III. WESTERN MACEDONIA 15,375 2,009 17,384 17,799 2.220 20,019
-Fiorina 1,107 88 1,195 1,303 99 1,402
-Kastoria 8,650 250 8,900 10,306 84 10,390
-Kozani 4.789 1,620 6,409 5,456 1,985 7,441
-Grevena 829 51 880 734 52 786
IV. EPIRUS 8,223 2.127 10,350 9,933 2,483 12,416
-loannina 4,564 1,070 5,634 5,547 1,058 6.605
-Thesprotia 875 0 875 987 441 1,428
-Preveza 1,374 447 1,821 1,553 661 2,214
-Arta 1,410 610 2,020 1,846 323 2,169
V. THESSALY 22,940 14.630 37,570 24,385 16,232 40,617
-Trikala 3,988 888 4,876 4,324 768 5,092
-Karditsa 3,119 56 3,175 3,289 225 3.514
-Larissa 9,190 5,541 14,731 9,904 6,600 16,504
-Magnisia 6,643 8,145 14,788 6,868 8,639 15,507
VI. STEREA HELLAS 14,557 25,672 40,229 17,315 29,658 46,973
-Fthiotida 4,102 4,518 8,620 4,900 3,771 8,671
-Evritania 216 214 430 299 293 592
-Fokida 735 57 792 1,063 342 1,405
-Viotia 4.735 10,971 15,706 5.347 13,946 19,293
-Evia 4,859 9,912 14,771 5,706 11,306 17,012
VII. ATTICA 187,746 140,033 327,779 186,907 105,602 292,509
VIII.WESTERN GREECE 19,233 12,575 31,808 20,263 13,775 34,038
-Etolia and Akarnania 4,700 1,377 6,077 4,728 1,409 6.137
-Achaia 10,788 10,331 21,119 11,191 11,318 22,509
-Ilia 3.745 867 4,612 4,349 1,048 5.397
IX. PELOPONNESOS 15,889 10,167 26,056 17,458 8,731 26,189
-Argolida 3,585 2,389 5,974 4,055 1,654 5,709
-Korinthia 3,437 4,645 8,082 4,364 4,077 8.441
-Arkadia 2,147 481 2,628 2,150 558 2,708
-Lakonia 2,081 53 2,134 2,153 55 2,208
-Messinia 4,639 2,599 7,238 4,736 2,387 7,123
X. IONIAN ISLANDS 4,660 588 5,248 5.022 401 5,423
-Kerkyra 2.919 490 3,409 3,056 82 3,138
-Lefkada 450 0 450 436 0 436
-Kefalinia 618 0 618 679 0 679
-Zakynthos 673 98 771 851 319 1,170
XI. NORTHERN AEGIAN 5,527 783 6,310 5,769 860 6,629
-Lesvos 3,264 374 3,638 3,369 399 3.768
-Chios 1,146 275 1,421 1,232 261 1,493
-Samos 1,117 134 1,251 1,168 200 1,368
XII. SOUTHERN AEGIAN 5,323 2,091 7,414 6.696 2,472 9,168
-Cyclades 1,808 1,061 2,869 2,700 1,816 4,516
-Dodekanissos 3,515 1,030 4,545 3,996 656 4,652
XIII. CRETE 15,342 2,558 17,900 16,461 1,671 18,132
-Lassithi 1,726 57 1,783 1,789 0 1,789
-Iraklio 8,017 1,106 9,123 8,590 1,193 9,783
-Rethymno 1,706 0 1,706 1,898 0 1,898
-Chania 3,893 1,395 5,288 4,187 478 4,665
/
SOURCE: For 1978: NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry, Handicraft, 
Commerce and other Services, on 30 Sept 1978", Athens 1981.
For 1984 NSSG "Results of the Census of Manufacturing Industry, Handicraft 
and Commerce on 28 Sept 1984", Athens 1988
TABLE 8 8
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN GREATER ATHENS (G.A.), REST OF ATTICA (R.A.) AND ATTICA (REGION TOTAL) (ATT.) BY BRANCH. 1963-1984.
Code BRANCHES
1963 1969 1973 1978 1984
G.A. R.A. ATT. G.A. R.A. ATT. G.A. R.A. ATT. G A. R.A. ATT. G.A. R.A. ATT.
A NON DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 133,096 6,623 139,719 138,396 6,680 145,076 157,228 9,968 167,196 158,378 14,230 172,608 141,011 16,424 157,435
20 FOODS
21 BEVERAGES
22 TOBACCO
23 TEXTILES
24 CLOTHING-FOOTWEAR
25 WOOD-CORK
26 FURNITURE
27 PAPER
28 PRINTING-PUBLISHING
29 LEATHER-FUR 
39 MISCELLANEOUS
B INTERMEDIATE GOODS
18,935
2,331
5,412
31,426
32,776
8,362
11,629
3,564
10,024
3,344
5,293
27,441
2,020 20,955 21,618 2,046 23,664 21,719 2,726 24,445 22,418 3,195 25,613 22,417
472 
0
2,349
929
473 
208
16
18
71
67
2,803
5,412
33,775
33,705
8,835
11,837
3,580
10,042
3,415
5,360
4,273
4,164
30,571
30,792
9,049
13,411
4,197
11,123
3,069
6,129
478
0
2,520
584
493
331
45
32
76
75
4,751
4,164
33,091
31,376
9,542
13,742
4,242
11,155
3,145
6,204
4,443
3,175
34,659
38,058
10,175
15,667
4,686
13,048
3,568
8,030
55
0
3,941
833
997
804
154
97
70
291
4,498
3,175
38,600
38,891
11,172
16,471
4,840
13,145
3,638
8,321
4,652
2,717
33,019
41,538
9,082
14,789
5,804
13,721
3,448
7,190
570
0
4,721
1,348
1,688
1,825
447
114
95
227
5,222
2,717
37,740
42,886
10,770
16,614
6,251
13,835
3,543
7,417
3,979
2,481
22,473
41,231
7,889
12,609
4.722
12,941
3,092
7,177
4,067
872
0
3,934
1,522
1,789
2,307
872
552
126
383
26,484
4,851
2,481
26,407
42,753
9,678
14,916
5,594
13,493
3,218
7,560
3,866 31,307 30,523 4,852 35,375 36,517 8,196 44,713 38,140 12,581 50,721 32,404 13,358 45,762 8
30 RUBBER-PLASTIC 6,184 29 6,213 8,351 116 8,467 10,307 738 11,045 11,504 1,838 13,342 9,073 2,226 11,299
31 CHEMICALS 9,670 1,255 10,925 10,459 1,369 11,828 12,978 2,421 15,399 14,984 4,127 19,111 14,312 4,547 18,859
32 PETROLEUM-COAL PRODUCTS 563 573 1,136 1,127 871 1,998 1,310 1,397 2,707 809 2,739 3,548 750 2,630 3,380
33 NON METALLIC MINERALS 11,024 2,009 13,033 10,586 2,496 13,082 11,922 3,640 15,562 10,843 3,877 14,720 8,269 3,955 12,224
C. CAPITAL GOODS & DURABLES 60,135 4,401 64,536 64,860 5,287 70,147 86,079 14,157 100,236 85,302 19,145 104,447 70,735 18,575 89,310
34 BASIC METALLURGY 575
35 METAL PRODUCTS 20,488
36 NON ELECTRIC MACHINERY 8,289
37 ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 10,892
38 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 19,891
1,712 2,287 1,232 2,548
658
374
296
1,361
21.146
8,663
11,188
21,252
21,317
8,694
13,419
20,198
1,304
289
358
788
3,780
22,621
8,983
13,777
20,986
988
21.494
12,777
20,975
29,845
2,787
3,676
1,187
1,002
5,505
3,775 1,174 2,984 4,158
25,170
13,964
21,977
35,350
23,461
9,022
17,049
34,596
5,445
2,077
1,543
7,096
28,906
11,099
18,592
41,692
634
18,401
8.564
13,834
29,302
2.673 
5,399 
2.798
1.674 
6,031
3,307
23,800
11.362
15,508
35,333
TOTAL 220,672 14,890 235,562 233,779 16,819 250,598 279,824 32,321 312,145 281,820 45,956 327,776 244,150 48,357 292,507
SOURCE: NSSG, Censuses of Manufacturing Industry (1963,1969, 1973,1978, 1984). 
(Own calculation of sub totals and totals).
T A B L E B 9
MAMUBACTUmNO BMPLOYMENT IN OREATER ATHENS’ MUNiaPAUTIES BY BRANCH, IBM
MUNICIPAUTieS 
Of OREATER ATHENS
DRINKS TOBACCO TEXTILES CLOTHING- 
FOOTWEAR
WOOD FURNITURE 
CORK
PAPER PRINTING- LEATHER- 
PUBLISHING FUR
RUBBER-
PLASTIC COAL PRODUCTS
ALLIC BASIC METAL NON ELECTRIC ELECTRIC TRANSPORT OTHER TOTAL
:rals METALS PRODUCTS MACHINERY EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT
1393 444 2510 1843 3442 6790 4787 70366
268 30 1515 1522 1434 4964 291 21293
813 0 45 95 23 125 3 2565
200 0 145 111 101 936 42 3071
44 0 93 152 43 2250 3 3119
140 77 212 114 115 395 158 3213
164 0 104 12 44 106 90 1811
55 0 145 75 86 3973 146 5512
71 0 58 13 13 60 26 967
742 79 852 252 215 871 97 9874
346 2 1533 832 837 1479 254 16981
20 0 92 4 23 34 33 753
117 0 395 108 146 362 85 4218
19 0 80 57 22 69 4 1265
71 0 157 34 81 210 85 1967
11 0 46 7 69 104 29 1168
43 5 27 21 45 102 195 1666
97 0 258 124 190 304 118 6853
63 0 111 14 89 279 89 2059
95 0 144 58 48 126 89 2896
178 0 363 111 879 279 140 6857
408 0 88 11 431 29 48 1812
0 0 13 0 5 17 3 533
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
31 0 9 5 53 48 5 465
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
175 13 106 2 61 365 76 2673
721 46 64 73 289 263 46 4114
41 0 149 83 261 81 27 3783
15 0 28 0 11 43 2 760
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 2 2 11 23 18 282
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 12
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
29 0 6 1 16 16 8 260
23 0 82 12 35 204 31 897
37 0 46 45 40 34 7 460
36 0 42 4 112 160 91 1850
14 0 46 10 28 109 52 1067
67 0 94 15 112 188 123 2245
5 0 2327 7 11 41 2 2647
23 0 52 14 54 89 60 1587
47 0 68 39 167 135 79 1381
103 0 344 89 1041 1096 198 7910
137 237 472 213 335 126 105 6266
153 0 478 199 742 303 218 7702
289 59 2375 522 1021 504 74 10543
33 0 81 25 64 150 44 1535
88 0 456 92 303 464 136 5097
98 0 194 39 123 237 103 2565
98 0 53 39 92 163 64 1564
39 0 179 68 114 2520 100 6689
54 0 71 12 130 212 28 1479
14 0 2 0 4 43 0 160
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
7750 991 16814 7183 13413 31483 8511 246867
1 A TH EN S «OOe 300
2 P IR A EU S 2 738  110
3D R A P E T S O N A  91 4
4 KERATSINI 516  7
5 P E  RAMA 71 0
6  NIKEA 396 3
7 KORVDALLOS 313 6
8  HAIDARI 135 5
9  AGIA VARVARA 109 7
10 EGALEO 534 868
11 PE R ISTER I 1550  29
12 P E  TROU POLI 153 0
1 3N E A L K JS IA  396 4
14 KAMATERO 310  0
15 AGIOI A N A R G V R d  195 2
16 NEA HALKIOONA 54 0
17 NEA PHILADELPHIA 158 9
18 NEA IONIA 322 10
19G A LA TSI 231 0
20  IRAKLEIO 145 2
21 M ETA M O RPH O SIS 964 32
22 LYKOVRVSI 53  0
23  PEFKI 47 0
24  PSY CH IK O  15 0
25  N EO  PSY CH IK O  187 0
26  FILOTHEI 0  0
27  HALANDRI 343  1
28  M AROUSI 2 72  4 69
29  KIFISSIA 212  1216
30 NEA ERYTHREA 104 5
31 EKAU 0  0
32  M EU SSIA  31 0
33  NEA PE N T E U  5  0
34  P E N T E U  4  0
35  V R IU SSIA  46  7
36  AG4A PARASKEVI 155 0
37  H O LA R G O S-PA PA G O S 119 0
38 ZO G R A FO S 2 82  0
39K ESA R IA N I 118 10
4 0  VYRON 222 9
41 YMITTOS 43  0
4 2  DAFNI 128 0
4 3  NEA SMYRNI 254  3
44  KALUTHEA 715  142
4 5  TAVROS 1871 189
48  M OSCHATO 869  2
4 7  A G IO S lOANNIS R E N TIS 658  115
48  PA LEO  FA U R O  371 13
4 9  A G IO S DIMITRIOS 313  18
50  lU O U P O U S  298 2
51 A R G Y R O U PO U S 190 23
52  A U M OS-ELUNIKO 865 21
53 GLYFADA 295 39
54 VOULA 66 0
55  VOUUAGM ENI 23  0
G R EA TER  ATH EN S TOTAL 2 4570  3681
285
1742
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
62
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
4 5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4207
2340
270
4
151
91
63
43
1847
2418
53
170
34 
207 
610 
272
2391
158
674
1266
320
2200
35 
0
50
246
206
231
0
0
0
0
9
9
15 102
32110
16 
39 
50
495
309
882
352
37
278
89
117212
49
2
0
21787
15989
1159
65
362
51 
859 
520 
456 
117
1262
3387
176
1134
243
466
146
538
1906
711
783
690
100
34
0
52 0
237
173
270
60
5
01
93
81
67
548
428
780
50
608
327
1549
598
1227
490
3891122
566
432
1136
395100
42797
951
388
41
154
83
133
130
138110
264
740
75
413
87
113
17
17120
87
92
242
24
7 0 
4 0
38
57
47 
300
4
5 010
59
4
54
46
988 
61 
38
124
98
128
179
48 
354 212
82
65
56
2670
692
26
155
19
267
120
97
46
5841111
58 
341 
113 
153
19
50
217
12788
448
16
1631
90
82
95
59 
13
0
9
0
0
1
53
38
134
82
168
42
189
106
365
272
250
914
118
776
300
112
146
80
2
0
2994
291
0
7
13 10222
288
8
59
16
25
0
54 10210
23
55 
40
3
0002
14 
71000001100
119
31
5
7
8 112
48
125
193
1
32
28
24 
97000
5132
8193 ■ 
500 
18 21 
2 
43 
16 
14 
6 
191 
918 
4
274
50
43
3121
484
28
78
173
45
3 
0
7 
0
797
568
93
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6
45
2
97 21
98 
82
175
18
315
441
291
631
33
344
132
16
34112
8 
0
1262111
3
0
0
11
1322
3
106
6011
18
0
26
0
24
48
16
5
2412
0
0
3
0
7
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
45110
3
3620
138
233
120
349
41
19
45
2
010
0
0
1371
28520
3611
115
64
7112
769
832
9
51 
62 22 
15
52 
105
21
217
238
108
5 
0 
9 
0
13
41 
144
1
0
2
0
0
1
25
6 
28 11 
35
5
7 
11
153 
418
1141
713
77
154
42 
15 
74
8 
5 
0
7632
4138
896
11391210
1411
10
263111
539
0
129
99
67
11
32
59
25
229
740
17
13 
0 
0 
0
305
651
821
265
0
160
0
0
0
83
0
25
14
15 
0
4611
532
164
565
1024
9
148
57
42
712
28
0
0
14232
791
17 
50
2
283
0
0
8
0
8
28
0
16
0100
1
0
0
0
35 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0
18 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3980
9
36 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I
SOURCE UnpU)IHhê<l<J«to(ooniputofpontoul»)of»i6NSSGo6fnu6orindu»H«l6to •6tabliNifTi6nti. 1988
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SERIES C: SURVEY MATERIAL
TABLE C.1
METAMORPHOSIS INDUSTRIAL AREA (M.I.A.): NON INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITES -VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS
EMPLOYMENT BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
NAME OF FIRM ACTIVITY
YEAR OF 
LOCATION MALE FEMALE TOTAL
BUILT
PLOT (SQ.M) SPACE (SQ.M) LEVELS
ABATZIS N
ANATEKO
ATENE
DOUMANIS
DOU RIDAS
GIOVANOS P.
LAINOPOULOS
MELI
METOPI
MILUPA HELLAS
MITSUKO
OMEGA
SALAVRAKOU N. SONS 
SAXYL
TELEMECHANIC
TRANSALKO
TSIKNAKOU-KARAMOUSAS
VIO-PLYN
VOGIATZOGLOU
TOTALS
STOCKYARD (MACHINES)
COMMERCIAL 
COMMERCIAL (WOOD)
COMMERCIAL (TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT) 
COMMERCIAL (FURNITURE)
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL (TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT) 
COMMERCIAL (FURNITURE-DECORATIONS 
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL (BABY FOODS) 
COMMERCIAL 
COMMERCIAL (FOODS)
COMMERCIAL (BROOMS)
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL (ELECTR. MATERIALS) 
COMMERCIAL (COSMETICS-MEDICINES) 
COMMERCIAL (BUILDING MATERIALS) 
SERVICES (LAUNDRY)
COMMERCIAL (FURNITURE)
5 0 5 10000 30 1
1983 11 4 15 4000 1500 3
1975 22 3 25 8500 1200 2
1975 4 , 0 4 850 20 1
1984 1 ' 1 2 2500 1400 6
1975 6 0 6 1000 1000 4
1977 30 10 40 6000 2140 2
1982 22 12 34 1000 500 2
1984 12 15 27 12000 10000 2
1978 36 26 62 2000 1900 2
1982 10 4 14 2000 2000 4
1980 1 3 4 1000 500 2
1986 3 0 3 2300 800 2
1981 4 1 5 4000 200 1
1987 0 0 0 4000 850 2
1983 14 0 14 1500 750 1
1983 1 1 2 1000 25 1
1980 10 10 20 1000 600 1
1982 6 0 6 3700 3300 2
198 90 288 68350 28715
O0>
SOURCE; Questionnaires
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TABLE C.2
Ml A  PLANTS’ LOCATlONmELOCATION REASONS
Cod* FIRM’S NAME PRODUCT
YEAR OF 
LOCATION TYPE OF MOVEMENT
PREVIOUS
PLACE
REASONS FOR MOVING 
TO THE AREA
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED 1972 FIRST LOCATION AM
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY 1978 RELOCATION CENTATHENS L
20 ANTHOS WFISSIAS JAMS 1970 FIRST LOCATION L, LK
20 EKONOMIOIS & CO BUSCUITS 1975 FIRST LOCATION AM. PL
20 FACE MILK PRODUCTS 1975 FIRST LOCATION AM
20 GEREOESV AGO OLIVE OILS 1963 FIRST LOCATION IZ
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS 1973 RELOCATION KOKWNIA ET
20 KATSEUSH SONS BAKERY 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
20 PAPAOOPOULOS D DRY FRUITS 1980 RELOCATION CENTJLTHENS PE. ET
20 TELEION-CeUOLANIS ICE-CREAMS 1973 FIRST LOCATION L. AM. RM
20 THILIVERIS1 & P RICE-MILL 1967 RELOCATION PELOPONNESE L
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS 1967 FIRST LOCATION AM, L
21 I.BSAE SOFT DRINKS 1985 FIRST LOCATION IZ
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS 1968 RELOCATION PIRAEUS AM
21 SIFNEOS K. & CO VINEGAR 1977 RELOCATION MOSHATO PE. ET. AM
23 BYRON ANDREAS TEXTILES 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
23 HABALOGLOU BROS TEXTILES 1976 FIRST LOCATION L
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES 1974 FIRST LOCATION IZ
23 HARODAKJS 1 TEXTILES 1979 FIRST LOCATION IZ. L
23 ILIOPOULCM PROS TEXTILES 1970 RELOCATION NEA IONIA PE . PL
23 lOANNOU K 4 CO TEXTILES 1980 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS IZ
23 KONSTAOtNOU S & CO TEXTILES 1976 FIRST LOCATION RM. AM
23 KRIKOPOULOS M TEXTILES 1984 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET
23 KRI-KO TEXTILES 1982 FIRST LOCATION IZ. L
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES 1984 RELOCATION NEA IONIA PE. L. AM. LK
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES 1975 RELOCATION PERISTERI PE
23 PADAZOPOULOS TEXTILES 1974 FIRST LOCATION L
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A 4 SON TEXTILES 1963 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET
23 PAULIDISM BROS TEXTILES 1974 FIRST LOCATION IZ. AM
24 AKRIDAS BROS CLOTHING 1973 FIRST LOCATION PL
24 ALMA SHOES 1987 RELOCATION NEA IONIA PE
24 AMALIA KOORAROU KNITWEAR 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 1987 FIRST LOCATION IZ. AM. L
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 1983 FIRST LOCATION IZ. AM
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING 1986 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS IZ
24 DICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES 1981 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING 1983 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 EFSTATWOU P 4 CO CLOTHING 1983 FIRST LOCATION L
24 FESKOS CLOTH-STAMPING 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
24 HARISIOTIS 4 CO CLOTH FINISHING 1980 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 KAPADAISF 4 SON COTTON-RAGS 1975 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 KEISOGLOU BROS CLOTHING 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1 SILK LININGS 1981 FIRST LOCATION PR
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES 1970 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET. PE
24 LEVAOEAN COTTON PROCESSING 1962 FIRST LOCATION PR
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING 1970 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING 1969 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 LYMNEOS K QUILTS 1981 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
24 MAKE CLOTHING 1984 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 MARKOPOULOS N EMBROIDERIES. THREADS 1977 RELOCATION NEA IONIA ET. IZ
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING 1976 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS OR. L
24 NATHANAEL P CLOTHING 1973 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 NEOTEX SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES 1985 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET. PE
24 PADELIDIS D SHOES 1983 RELOCATION NEA IONIA ET. RM
24 PAPAIOANNOU S KNITWEAR 1985 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 PAPALEOOlOU BROS CLOTH-DYEING 4 STAMPING 1970 RELOCATION NEA IONIA PE
24 PAPANOREOU D CLOTH-STAMPING & FINISHING 1975 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
24 TRAGALOS D 4 BROS CLOTHING 1975 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE. AM
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS 1976 FIRST LOCATION IZ
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING 1980 FIRST LOCATION L
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S WOOD FACTORY 1986 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY 1980 FIRST LOCATION L
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D FURNITURE 1982 FIRST LOCATION L
26 ASLANIDIS FURNITURE 1986 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET AM. PL
26 GOVESIS E -PETRAKIS S 4 CO FURNITURE 1986 FIRST LOCATION LK
26 KAGALOS P FURNITURE FOR TV SETS 1984 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET
26 LARO FURNITURE 4 WOODEN TOYS 1984 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
26 NEONANS S FURNITURE 1985 FIRST LOCATION IZ
26 PANANI BROS FURNITURE 1981 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE. AM
26 PAPATHANASlOU E F 4 SON FURNITURE 1980 FIRST LOCATION L
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE 1978 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. IZ
26 SKORPtOS FURNITURE 1984 FIRST LOCATION IZ
26 VARELAS K FURNITURE 1969 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS ET
26 VIELEX FURNITURE 1970 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS L. PL
27 AGYRA PAPER 1972 FIRST LOCATION L
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS 1986 RELOCATION NFILADELPHIA PE. AM
27 HART-PAK CARTONS 1987 FIRST LOCATION IZ
28 DIKAIOSI PRINTING 1978 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE. L
28 KYRIAMS E PRINTING 1987 FIRST LOCATION L. IZ
28 PERIS G PRINTING 1983 FIRST LOCATION ET
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-8ELTS 1975 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
30 ARVANITIS M PLASTIC 1976 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE. ET
30 ATANALIS P 1 4 CO PLASTIC 1980 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE. ET
30 BITSOU BROS 4 BLAZADONAKIS E PLASTIC 1984 RELOCATION PERISTERI OR. L
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES 1978 FIRST LOCATION IZ
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC 1983 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS OR L
30 EUROPE PLASTIC 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES 1972 RELOCATION PIRAEUS ET
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS 4 CO PLASTIC ROPES 1980 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
30 HAI PLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES 1975 FIRST LOCATION L
30 KASISG PLASTIC 1977 FIRST LOCATION L
30 MANESIS T PLASTIC ROLLS 1979 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC 1987 FIRST LOCATION IZ
30 PISKlTZtS V 4 CO PLASTIC SACKS 1977 FIRST LOCATION IZ
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P V C) 1983 FIRST LOCATION LK
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS 1987 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE AM
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC 1981 FIRST LOCATION OR. L
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE 1978 FIRST LOCATION AM RM
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS 1984 RELOCATION TATOI PE IZ
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASTIC 1983 FIRST LOCATION IZ AM
30 VEEM PLASTIC 1970 FIRST LOCATION L
30 VOPAR PLASTIC 1984 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE
31 ANONYMOUS COSMETICS 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
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TABLE C.2
M.l A  PLANTS' LOCATION/RELOCATION REASONS
Cod* FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
YEAR OF 
LOCATION TYPE OF MOVEMENT
PREVIOUS
PLACE
REASONS FOR MOVING 
TO THE AREA
31 BENCWSER HELLAS DETERGENTS 1979 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS 1986 RELOCATION CENTATHENS L, AM.IZ
31 GEFEX PESTICIDES 1971 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
31 HELP MEDICINES 1976 FIRST LOCATION AM
31 lOANNOS AIMILIOS WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS 1975 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMETICS 1976 RELOCATION CENTATHENS L. PR
31 MANKO COSMETICS 1987 FIRST LOCATION PL. AM
31 MERKOLA MEDICINES 1972 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. AM
31 MONOPORA INSULATING SLABS 1974 FIRST LOCATION L. AM, RM
31 ODESSA PAINTS.PLASTIC.INSULATORS 1979 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. PE
31 PAPOUTSANIS P D COSMETICS 1969 FIRST LOCATION AM
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO GLUES 1986 FIRST LOCATION L.IZ
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES 1969 FIRST LOCATION AM
31 STOHOS COSMETICS 1986 FIRST LOCATION AM
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS 1972 FIRST LOCATION AM
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES 1970 FIRST LOCATION L
31 VIAFREL GLUES 1970 RELOCATION PERISTERI ET
31 VIANEX MEDICINES 1978 FIRST LOCATION L
31 VIKENT PAINTS 1981 RELOCATION PERISTERI PE
31 VIOBEN PAINTS 1976 RELOCATION CENTATHENS LET
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS 1965 RELOCATION PERISTERI PE
33 BILLYS & SON MARBLECUTTING 1973 FIRST LOCATION IZ
33 BISDOULIS TH BONITSIS D MARBLECUTTING 1975 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE. AM
33 GRIGORIS BROS MARBLECUTTING 1972 RELOCATION N.HALKIDONA ET. L
33 HATZIPETROS K. MARBLECUTTING 1970 FIRST LOCATION L
33 IKTINOS HELLAS MARBLECUTTING 1974 FIRST LOCATION IZ
33 KIOSEPIDIS H SAFETY CRYSTAL 1987 FIRST LOCATION IZ. L
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS & CO MARBLECUTTING 1972 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. IZ
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES MARBLECUTTING 1982 FIRST LOCATION AM. L
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS MARBLECUTTING 1974 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET . AM IZ
34 ELVIOR-PAPAIOSIF E BRASS FOUNDRY 1970 FIRST LOCATION IZ
34 SOUTZOGLOU SMELTING WORKS 1975 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET
34 SOULTATIS A METALLURGY 1968 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET.L
35 AFEDOULIS S METAL CONSTRUCTS 1982 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 ALOUMINKO IRON 4  ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 1983 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. IZ
35 ANALOG OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM 1987 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PRODUCTS 1978 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 ANONYMOUS ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 1975 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET
35 BELLINOX STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 1985 FIRST LOCATION AM RM
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH CONVEYER BELTS 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 1987 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. IZ. AM RM
35 FINIKIS M METAL MANUFACTURES 1980 FIRST LOCATION L
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PRODUCTS 1981 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 KOLIOS G & KYRIAKOULIS S STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS 1981 FIRST LOCATION L
35 KOUNOUPAS & CO ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 1979 FIRST LOCATION AM
35 KREOUZIS G BROS METAL PRODUCTS 1980 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 LEFASP&I ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 1986 RELOCATION METAMORPHOSIS PE, L
35 MEKAMO METAL PRODUCTS 1977 FIRST LOCATION PR
35 PAGONAS E METAL MOULDS 1979 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K METAL MOULDS 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT 1976 FIRST LOCATION IZ
35 POLYZOISTH 4 CO METAL ACCESSORIES 1980 RELOCATION NFILADELPHIA IZ. AM
35 SABANIS METAL PRODUCTS 1977 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS PE. AM E~
35 SOFIANOU E METAL ATTACHMENTS 1982 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE.IZ
35 TECHNOSOL METALLIC SHELVES 1974 FIRST LOCATION L
35 TSONOPOULOSP SCO HOT-WATER RADIATORS 1983 RELOCATION NEA IONIA ET. PR
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 1967 RELOCATION ERYTHREA LET
35 VOULGARIS A. METAL MANUFACTURES 1985 FIRST LOCATION ET
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 1975 FIRST LOCATION IZ. PL
36 AGRIC MACHINERY AGRICUL MACHINERY 1977 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET. AM
36 ARPA K.BARGETIS 4 CO AGRICUL MACHINERY 1977 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE. L
36 ELKAMAS MACHINERY 1986 RELOCATION MENIDI PE. IZ. AW
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 1978 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE. ET AW
36 HADJI KONST ADI NOU TH BAKERYS MACHINERY 1975 RELOCATION NEA IONIA ET
36 PAPASTAMOU 1 MACHINE-WORKS 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY 1971 RELOCATION EGALEO PE. AM
36 SALTANIS N MACHINE-WORKS 1986 FIRST LOCATION IZ
36 STATHAWS BROS BULGING MACHINERY 1980 FIRST LOCATION L
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 1970 FIRST LOCATION L
36 VOUNATZIS G 4 CO MACHINE-WORKS 1985 FIRST L(X)ATION L
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS 1979 FIRST LOCATION L
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 1972 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
37 DRAGATIDIS K 4 CO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 1970 RELOCATION CENTATHENS IZ. PE
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS 1969 RELOCATION PERISTERI PE IZ
37 KYRIAKOULIS V CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 1974 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 1984 RELOCATION CENT ATHENS L
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS 4 CO LIFT-CAGES 1973 RELOCATION CENTATHENS ET
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4 CO ELECTRICAL KILNS 1974 FIRST LOCATION LAM
37 PETROPOULOSG SCO ELECTR SOUND-BOXES 1986 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE IZ
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS 1985 RELOCATION METAMORPHOSIS ET. L AW
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 1974 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
36 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 1972 FIRST LOCATION L. AM
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS 1979 RELOCATION PIRAEUS L. AM
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS 4 CO SCHOOL REQUISITES 1983 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS 1974 RELOCATION CENTATHENS PE
SOURCE Ouestennaires
ABBREVIATIONS
L LAND-COST RELATED FACTORS (LOW COST OF LAND/LOW RENT OF BUILDING/
PRE-EXISTING PRIVATE PLOT OR BUILDING 
IZ INSTITUTIONAL REASONS (EXISTENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZED INDUSTRIAL ZONE 
AM TRANSPORT ACCESSIBILITY TO MARKET AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRE 
PE NEED OF FREE SPACE FOR PLANT EXPANSION
ET ENVIRONMENTAL TOLERANCE (AVOIDANCE OF SOCIAL TURMOIL RELATED TO POLLUTING PLANTS 
PL PROXIMITY TO LABOUR MARKET 
OR ORGANIZATIONAL REASONS (MERGING CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP ETC)
RM TRANSPORT ACCESSIBILITY TO RAW MATERIALS 
LK LINKAGES WITH OTHER INDUSTRIES
PR PURELY PERSONAL REASONS (E G PROXIMITY TO THE OWNER'S RESIDENCE)
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TABLE C 3
M.IA: INTRA-FIRM SPATIAL SEGREGATION OF ACTIVITIES
FIRfcfS ESTABLISHMENTS IN OTHER AREAS
Code FIRiyrSNAME PRODUCT PRODUCTION
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY .
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS JAMS .
20 EKONOMIOIS 4  CO BUSCUITS -
20 FAGE MILK PRODUCTS .
20 GEREDESV 4 C O OLIVE OILS .
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS .
20 KATSEUSH SONS BAKERY .
20 PAPAOOPOULOS 0 DRY FRUITS .
20 TELEION-OELKXANIS ICE-CREAMS +
20 THILIVERIS 14 P RICE-MILL .
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS .
21 I.B.SAE SOFT DRINKS .
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS -
21 SIFNEOS K. 4  CO VINEGAR .
23 BYRON ANOREAS TEXTILES -
23 HABALOGLOU BROS TEXTILES -
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES -
23 HAROOAKIS 1 TEXTILES -
23 ILKDPOULOI PROS TEXTILES -
23 lOANNOU K 4  CO TEXTILES -
23 KONSTAOINOU S 4  CO TEXTILES -
23 KRIKOPOULOS M TEXTILES -
23 KRPKO TEXTILES -
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES .
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES .
23 PADAZOPOULOS TEXTILES -
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A 4  SON TEXTILES -
23 PAULIOIS M BROS TEXTILES -
24 AKRIOAS BROS CLOTHING -
24 ALMA SHOES .
24 AMALIA KOORAROU KNITWEAR +
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING -
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING -
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING .
24 OICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES -
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING .
24 EFSTATHIOU P 4  CO CLOTHING .
24 FESKOS CLOTH-STAMPING -
24 HARISIOTIS 4  CO CLOTH FINISHING -
24 KAPADAISF 4  SON COTTON-RAGS -
24 KEISOGLOU BROS CLOTHING -
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1 SILK LININGS .
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES .
24 LEVADEAKI COTTON PROCESSING .
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING .
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING *
24 LYMNEOS K QUILTS -
24 MAKE CLOTHING .
24 MARKOPOULOSN EMBROIDERIES THREADS -
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING .
24 NATHANAEL P CLOTHING .
24 NEOTEX sy n t h e t ic  FURS FOR SHOES -
24 PADELIDIS D SHOES -
24 PAPAIOANNOU S KNITWEAR -
24 PAPALEOOlOU BROS CLOTH-DYEING 4  STAMPING -
24 PAPANOREOU D CLOTH-STAMPING 4 FINISHING -
24 TRAGALOS D 4  BROS CLOTHING .
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS -
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING .
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S WOOD FACTORY .
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY -
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D FURNITURE -
26 ASLANIDIS FURNITURE .
26 GOVESIS E-PETRAKIS S 4  CO FURNITURE -
26 KAGALOS P FURNITURE FOR TV SETS .
26 LARO FURNITURE 4  WOODEN TOYS .
26 NEONAKIS S FURNITURE .
26 PANANI BROS FURNITURE .
26 PAPATHANASlOU E F 4  SON FURNITURE -
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE .
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE .
26 VARELAS K FURNITURE .
26 VIELEX FURNITURE .
27 AGYRA PAPER -
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS .
27 HART-PAK CARTONS .
28 DIKAIOS 1 PRINTING .
28 KYRIAKIS E PRINTING .
28 PERIS G PRINTING .
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS .
30 ARVANITIS M PLASTIC -
30 ATANALIS P I 4  CO PLASTIC .
30 BITSOU BROS 4 BLAZADONAKIS E PLASTIC .
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES .
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC .
30 EUROPE PLASTIC -
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES -
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS 4 CO PLASTIC ROPES .
30 HAIPLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES .
30 KASISG PLASTIC .
30 MANESIS T PLASTIC ROLLS
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC .
30 PISKITZIS V 4 CO PLASTIC SACKS .
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P V C) .
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS .
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC .
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE -
WAREHOUSE
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TABLE C 3
M.IA; INTRA-f IRM SPATIAL SEGREGATION OF ACTIVITIES
FIRM S ESTABLISHMENTS IN OTHER AREAS
Coda FIRMS NAME PRODUCT PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS .
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASTIC - -
30 VEEM PLASTIC - .
30 VOPAR PLASTIC - -
31 ANONYMOUS COSMETICS - -
31 8ENCKISER HELLAS DETERGENTS -
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS -
31
31
GEFEX
HELP
PESTICIDES
MEDICINES
-
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS -
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMETICS -
31 MANKO COSMETICS *
31 MERKOLA MEDICINES .
31 MONOPORA INSULATING SLABS -
31 ODESSA PAINTS PLASTIC INSULATORS .
31 PAPOUTSANIS P D COSMETICS .
31 PETKO, TOUSOUNIDOU 4 CO GLUES -
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES -
31 STOHOS COSMETICS -
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS .
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES .
31
31
VIAFREL
VIANEX
GLUES
MEDICINES
31 VIKENT PAINTS .
31 VIOBEN PAINTS .
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS .
33 BILLYS 4  SON MARBLE-CUTTING -
33 BISDOULIS TH BONITSIS 0 MARBLE-CUTTING -
33 GRIGORIS BROS MARBLE-CUTTING -
33 HATZIPETROS K MARBLE-CUTTING .
33
33
IKTINOS HELLAS 
KIOSEPIDIS H
MARBLE-CUTTING 
SAFETY CRYSTAL
33
33
NIKOLOPOULOS BROS 4 CO 
PSOFAKIS MARBLES
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
-
33
34
SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS 
ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF E
MARBLE-CUTTING 
BRASS FOUNDRY
-
34 SOUTZOGLOU SMELTING WORKS .
34 SOULTATIS A METALLURGY -
35 AFEDOULIS S METAL CONSTRUCTS .
35 ALOUMINKO IRON 4 ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS .
35 ANALCO OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM .
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PRODUCTS -
35 ANONYMOUS ANODIZED ALUMINIUM .
35
35
BELLINOX
DIAKINISI BITHAS TH
STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 
CONVEYER BELTS
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS .
35 FINIKIS M METAL MANUFACTURES -
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PRODUCTS .
35 KOLIOS G 4  KYRIAKOULIS S STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS .
35 KOUNOUPAS 4  CO ANODIZED ALUMINIUM -
35 KREOUZIS G BROS METAL PRODUCTS -
35 LEFAS P 4  1 ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS -
35 MEKAMO METAL PRODUCTS -
35 PAGONASE METAL MOULDS -
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K METAL MOULDS .
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT -
35 POLYZOIS TH 4 CO METAL ACCESSORIES +
35 SABANIS METAL PRODUCTS .
35 SOFIANOU E METAL ATTACHMENTS -
35 TECHNOSOL METALLIC SHELVES
35 TSONOPOULOS P 4  CO HOT-WATER RADIATORS .
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS -
35 VOULGARIS A METAL MANUFACTURES -
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS + ■f
36 AGRIC MACHINERY AGRICUL MACHINERY ♦ -
36 ARPA K BARGETIS 4  CO AGRICUL MACHINERY -
36 ELKAMAS MACHINERY .
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFTING MACHINES-CFIANES .
36 HADJIKONSTAOINOU TH BAKERY'S MACHINERY .
36 PAPASTAMOU 1 MACHINE-WORKS -
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY .
36
36
SALTANIS N 
STATHAKIS BROS
MACHINE-WORKS 
BULGING MACHINERY
-
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS -
36 VOUNATZIS G 4 CO MACHINE-WORKS .
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS +
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTAT .
37 DRAGATIDIS K 4 CO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT .
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS .
37 KYRIAKOULIS V CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS .
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT .
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPUwOS 4  CO LIFT-CAGES -
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4 CO ELECTRICAL KILNS .
37 PETROPOULOS G 4  CO ELECTR SOUND-BOXES .
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS .
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT .
36 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) -
30 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS .
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS 4 DC SCHOOL REQUISITES -
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS -
ADMINISTRATION WAREHOUSE
So u r c e  Questionnaires
4 1 1
NUMBER O f a m  OYED
C o * POWI K(HF>) MAII (PROD) FLM A*t(P«O0) PROD TOTAL MALE (ADM) FEMALE (ADM) ADM TOTAL MALE (TOTAL) FEMALE (T O T ^) TOTALS
20 AijROTSk cattle  f eed 0 1 0 i 4 0 6
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT HDUSTRt 0 0
ANlwOSKf^SVkS 11
EKONOMIOIS 4  CO BUSCUITS
20 u t f  PflODurTS 361Y) 265 40 24
20 REDESV 4 CO 35 4 3 2 4 12
20 KA1.AMARAS 15 0 2 1 0 3 0
KATSEl IS M SONS 14 23
PAPAOOPOULOS D DRY FRUITS 2 2 4 0
20 TEIEI0N43EICIANIS (E-CREAMS 40L> 9 11
20 TM EV ERlSt4P RICE MIL 12U 2 1 0
21 GREEK BOTTl HO C OMPAN r ST'FT DRH^S 2260 160 44 30
IB S A E SOFT DR#IKS 65 3 3
21 METAXA ALtOHCLC DRtiKS
21 SfN E O SK  4 CO VHE'jAR 6
23 BYRON ANDREAS TEVTIES 1 2
23 MABALOOIOUBROS t e x t l e s 1 2 0
23 h a m it o n t e x t l e s TE-<Tl£S 10 3 10
23 KAR00AA6I rC .'T lE S 6 4
23 lO PO U lO lPRO S TE-vT IE S
23 lOANNOU K 4 CO TEVTiES
23 KONSTAONOU S 4 CO TE-.TIES 3 1 0
23 KRUCPOULOSM TEaT i ES 0 1 0
23 KRIAO t c x t ie s 17 0 18
23 MUROPOUIOS-SPARTNOS TEaT IE S 2 2 e 9
23 NOVOLAN TE<TlES 4 14 1 0 4 IS
23 PADAZOPOULOS TE..-TIES 2 2 1 0 1 2 3
23 PAPARINOPOULOSA 4 SON T t a i E S 4 2 2 2 8
PAUL IDS M BROS TEXTLES 41 4 4 10
AKROASBROS c io t h h g 2 43
24 ALMA SHOES 60 200 20 220
24 AMALIA KOORAROU KNiTAEAR 0 1 0
24 ANONYMOUS c l o t h h g 30 1 0 5 0 4
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTh n G 43 1 0 0
24 ARGOTYP CLOTh -STAKPHG 40 1 0 1
24 O C O ST A H aiA S CHIORENSHOES 40 3 2 44
EBEY c lo th  STAKPf-iG 14 0 14
24 EFSTATHIOU P  4 CO c io t m n g 1 2 1 1 2
24 FESKOS CIOTH-STAAPI-i-j 0 3 1 0 0
24 H A RSO T6 4 CO CLOTH FHISh h G 4
KAPADA6 F 4 SON C0TTCN-RA-5S 7
24 KE&OGIOUBROS c l o t h n g 66 6 2 3 6
24 KONST AOHiOS 1 S IK IN H G S 30 0 1 0 0 1
24 K 0ROSI06 CLOTH FOR SHOES 130 9 1 1 2 11
24 LEVADEAKI c o t t o n  PROCESSNG 0 4 1 0
24 lEVEOAKG 10 4 110 220
24 LOUVRE VEL WET a O T H #40 1 0 6
24 I  YIHEOS K OUITS 76 2 4 20 24
24 c l o t h n g 76 1 0 1 5
MARKOPOULOS N EKeROlOERiES. t h r e a d s 20 0 3 0 3
MEOKA CLOTHHG 300 2 4
24 NATHANAEL P c l o t h h g 104 1 3
24 NEOTEX SYNTHfTC FURS FOR SHOES 26 1
24 P A O aiO S D 160 0 4
24 PAPAOANNOUS KNrrwEAR 100 6 12
PAPALEOOOUBROS CLOTh .DyENG 4 STakP h G 2 1 16
PAPANOREOU 0 CL0TH.STAKPHG4 FHISh NG 0 2 2 6 17
24 TRAGALOS 0 4 BROS CLOTh h G 3 0 3 37
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LHHGS 3 2 5 1 0 2
24 TSIAPASAONMLRG c l o t h h g 2 2 1 0 0 3
DIAMADOPOULOS S YVOCrO FACTORY 3 3 1 0 1
25 KASTRI W<X*OFACTn«i 0 3
2$ APOSTOLOPOULOS D FURNITURE 1 0 0 6
26 ASLAN06 FURNITURE 12 1 0 1 12
26 G OVESSE-PETRAKSS 4 C 0 FURNITURE 106 12 1 1 2 13
26 KAGALOSP FURNITURE FOR TV SETS 20 1 18 1 0 1 16
LARO FURNITURE & WOC*OEN TOYS 100 2 IT 2 2 17
NEONAKSS FURNITURE 20 1 2 0
26 PANANI BROS FURNITURE 76 16 24 26
26 PAPATHANASlOU E f  4 SON FURNITURE 12
26 S4VESTROR FURNITURE S3 40 32 99
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE 3 3 0
26 VARELAS K FURNITURE 1 0 8
26 VCLEX FURNITURE 19 13 32 72 100
27 AGYRA 2 0 2 14 20
27 GOLDEN PACK 4 10 8 39
27 HART^AK 1 0 0
26 OKAIOSI 3 T .  0 3
26 KYRIAK6E 3 2 4 2 0 4 2
26 PE R BO 30 2 1 0 2 1
TZEVaEKOSBROS ICAIHER WATChSTRAPS-BELTS 26 2 1 2 3
ARVAN7T6M PIASTC 120 3 T 1 0 8
ATANALGPI 4 CO FLASTC 100 0 1 0 2 2
30 BITSOU BROS 4 BLAZADONAa S  E PlASTC 112 0 4 2 12 14
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PP E S 170 1 6 2 0 1
30 El-PLAST PLASTC 2 6 1 0 2
30 EUROPE PLASTC 0 4 1 0 1 0
30 FIALOR.AST PlASTC BC'TTiES 3 6 1 1 2
30 GORGOGLANN&BROS 4 CO PLASTC RCPES 12 0 1 0 1 13
HAPIASTC F^ASTCBCTTLES 220 11 4 0 2 11
KASGG PlASTC 127 0 3 0 9
MANESST PLASTC ROLLS 26 1 8
30 PCOPIASTKI R.ASTC 0 2 1 0 3
30 PG K irZSV  4 CO PlASTC SACKS SO 0 8 1 2 7
30 p i a s t h PLASTC (PV C) 21 0 2 2 0
PTOTEX PLASTC BAI4ISTERS 63 1 1
REKOR RUBBER ANC PlASTC 316 21
RCOMEX POlYCwjRETHAfiE 220 34
SUPERCARLAVDASL PCIYESTERCCNSTRUCTS ISO 4 0
30 SYSKEUASTKIEUAOOS PLASTC 3 12
30 VEEM PLASTC 2 5
30 VOPAR PLASTC 0 2
ANONYMOUS COSMETCS 7 8 6
31 BENCKGERM aiAS DETERGENTS 18 37 22
31 DALCOHEM CHEMCALS 0 6 1 0
31 GEFEX PESTC'DES 2 5 4 3 S
31 HELP MEDCHES 40 2 3 22 23
31 OANNOISAMIIOS WATER-T*iHT m aterials 0 9 2
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC 4SLKEU COSMETCS 31 62 31 62 137
31 MANKO COSMETCS 7 10 31
MERKOLA MEOCNES 4 4 10 9 IS
31 MONOPORA NSULATHG SLABS 0
31 ODESSA PAHTS PLASTC HSULATORS 0 1 1 2 2
31 PAPOUTSANISPO CCGMETCS 40 39 22 61 114 62 177
PETKO TOUSOUNIDOU 4 CO a u E s 2 11 3 13 3 16
31 s a n d o z h q l a s MEDCHES 90 66 146
31 STOHOS 9 3 3 0 6 0
31 T R Y in DETERGENTS 245 17 47 8 2S
31 UNI-FARMA MEOCHES 96 2 3 4 27
VIAFREL '3LUES 10 18 7 24 32 17 49
VIANEX MEOCtlES 21 20 26 84 112
VKENT PAHTS IS 0 1 0 2 2
VIOBEN 25 0 2 2
VIORYL CHEMCALS 226 26 26 M 34 31 65
B IIY S 4 S 0 N m ar b le-c u t t h g 2 0 2
BGDOULGTH BONfTSS D MARBIE-CUTTHG 1 0 1
GRIGORSBROS MARBLE-CUTTt-lG 0 1 0 7
HATZPETRCS K MARBLE-CUTTHG 0 1 0 1 2 2
HTHOS HELLAS MARBLE-CL'TTf^G 600 0 4 3 8 36 36
33 KIOSEPIDIS H safety  c ry sta l 333 10 1 30
33 NKOLOPOULOSBROS 4  CO MARBlE-CUTTHG 650 s 0 11
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NUMCROr B#m.OYtD
C«d» PRODUCT POW LR(TP) MALE (PROD) F U M E  (PROD) PROD TOTAI FEMALE (AOM) AOM TOTAL MALE (TOTAL) FQAAlE(TOTM.) TOTALS
W PSOfAKfe m a r b les MARBlECUTTN'S 630 26 0 26 1 31
JS V 0UR00MHN1S-SA>AL a s UARBLECunNO 0 0 7U (IV O R  PAPAOS'f E BRASS 0 0
S4 SOUTZOGLOU sm clîn ô y v o r^ s 0 2u S'XRTATSA MCTALlL«*>f
A fE O O U lftS METAL CCNSTR'XTS 0 6
ALOUMWKO k N .‘.tMNM IM PROOL»CTS 0 0
ANAiCO Oa OCEP Al».*M#HUM 0 0
ANONYMOUS SfiON PRODUCTS 0 0
ANONYMOUS AM.'OCED All«MNIVM 66 0 0
eCLlNOX STAfAESS CONSTRUCTS 63 0 0 0
36 DlAKNSrBffHASTH CCNvEfERBElTS 16 0 0 0H OlAMAND STAR m arble-c u t t h g t o c is 400 9 0 0 0
% EMKRM metal LMNVFACTURES 10
36 AARAOCROJS-l YKOL‘«AM  AT2IS STEEL PRC'DlHZTS 68 3 1
K aiO S O  6KYR&M.0UIISS STAI-KESSSTEEL PRCOUCTS 100 0 1 2
36 KOUNOUPAS 4 CO ANC'DCEPALUMNHJM 260 0 0 1
36 KRE0UZ6 Q BROS metal PRODUCTS IS 0 0
36 AH.IA4NKAI PRODUCTS 60 9
36 MEKAMO metal PRC»OUCTS 10 9 9 1
PAOONASE metal AC'Ul OS TO 1 0
PANAOIOTOPOW.OSK metal MOULDS iO 0 1 0 0
36 POLMETEX NCBLE metals REFNEMEnt 36 3 0 2 0 1
36 POlYZOSTM 4 CO metal ACCESSORIES 2 1 2
36 SAfiANiS METAA PRODUCTS 5 0 1 2
36 SOFIANOU E metal atta ch m ents 1 1 0 1
TECHNOSa metallic shelves 0 2 1
TSONOPOULOSP 4 C 0 hT'T nater radators 0 1
TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S ALL*M#<HJM PRODUCTS 7 2
VOUIQARSA metal 4MNUFACTURES 16 3 1 0
36 AOAMADOTECMNKI MARBLE-CUTTH-3TOCAS 62 7 2 6
36 AGRCMACHNERy aôr c ul  m a c h in er » 90 0 1 0
36 ARPAK BAR0ETR4C0 AOfllCUlMACHfJERr 0 2 31
36 ELKAMAS MACHNERr 0 0 1 10 1
aiM K lT E C M N kl LIFTN.SMAL HNES-CRANES 2 2 12 0 12
MADJKONSTAONOVTM BA^.ERfSMAcHNERr 0 3 1 0 1 0
PAPASTAMOU 1 MA:HNE WVf'RKS 2 0 2 0
BU10M3MACHNERT 0 40 4 3 44
SAiTANfSN MAC HNE WORKS 0 1 2 2
ST AT MAKS BROS BULDNGMACHNERv 2 2 0 2
technooiamao MARfitE-CUTTNG TOOLS 10 2 0 2 11
VOUNATZIS 0  4 CO m a c h n e w c r k s 1 1 2 0 2
BARBY UECTRCALGOC'OS 17 0 17 0
CAYZER SCLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 1 2 0 2
DRAGATIDBK 4 CO ELECTRONIC EOUPMEHT 26 3 3
&CO-VA6IONIS ELECTRCAl >X»OOS 204 32 36 223 240
KYRMK0UL6V CENTRAL-HEAT BOLERS 3 0
METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUPMENT 30
MfHALOPULOS-THOMOPUtOS 4 CO liftoages 9 9 4
PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4 CO ELCCTRCAL KINS 1 0
PETROPOULOSG 4C0 ELECTR SOUI40BOXES 2 2 2 0 2 0
SOLE SCO AR HEATERS 14 14 1 0 1 0
T E v n a iA S electronic ecupmemt 16 30 26
auto  SPARE p a r t s  (BRAKES) 97 0 1 0
ItSHTCElN^ SS 60 0 2
LTK00IANN6BA0S 4 CO SCHOCKREOURfTES 30 3 1
techncal SWMhlNOPOClS ‘ 0 *
SOURCE WW#*
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TABLE C.5
M.l>; SPATIAL SEGREGATION BETWEEN PLACE OF WORK AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE
9
yUy
(Number of workers)
DISTANCES OF LABOURERS' RESIDENTIAL AREAS FROM PLANT
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT Km 1.1-5 Km 5.1-10 Km 10.1-20 Km 20.1-30 Km +30 Km
0 0 0 5 0 0
0 0 5 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0
0 12 2 3 0 0
0 0 330 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 0 0
0 62 0 15 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 0
0 27 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 3 0 0
15 14 10 127 66 22
0 11 10 0 0 0
7 7 141 94 221 0
8 0 0 3 0 0
0 0 0 3 0 0
0 0 2 1 0 0
0 0 13 0 0 0
0 10 3 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0
0 7 0 0 0 0
0 0 7 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 18 0 0 0
0 0 8 7 0 0
0 0 15 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 46 0 0 0
0 14 34 0 0 0
0 22 121 66 11 0
0 0 10 0 0 0
0 0 5 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0
0 10 0 0 0 0
0 45 0 0 0 0
0 0 15 0 0 0
0 0 4 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0
0 13 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 9 0 0
0 0 14 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 2 9 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 220 0 0 0
0 4 8 2 0 0
4 6 9 5 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0
0 9 0 0 0 0
0 35 0 4 0 0
0 0 7 0 0 0
0 2 7 0 0 0
0 0 5 0 0 0
0 0 12 0 0 0
0 13 0 4 0 0
0 0 17 0 0 0
0 0 37 0 0 0
0 3 2 1 0 0
0 0 3 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0 0
0 14 6 0 0 0
0 9 0 0 0 0
1 0 12 0 0 0
0 0 14 0 0 0
0 14 0 5 0 0
1 4 8 5 3 0
0 0 0 26 0 0
14 0 0 14 0 0
0 6 6 0 0 0
5 15 30 49 0 0
0 3 0 3 0 0
0 2 6 0 0 0
0 0 0 100 0 0
20 AGROTSIK
20 ANONYMOUS
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS
20 EKONOMIOIS & CO
20 FAGE
20 GEREDES V & CO
20 KALAMARAS
20 KATSEUSH SONS
20 PAPAOOPOULOSD
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS
20 THILIVERIS l& P
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY
21 I.B.SAE
21 METAXA
21 SIFNEOS K & CO
23 BYRON ANDREAS
23 HABALOGLOU BROS
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES
23 HAROOAKIS I
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS
23 lOANNOU K & CO
23 KONSTAOINOU S & CO
23 KRIKOPOULOS M
23 KRI-KO
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS
23 NOVOLAN
23 PADAZOPOULOS
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A 4  SON
23 PAULIOIS M BROS
24 AKRIDAS BROS
24 ALMA
24 AMALIA KOORAROU
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ARGOTYP
24 DICOSTA HELLAS
24 EBEY
24 EFSTATHIOU P 4  CO
24 FESKOS
24 HARISIOTIS 4  CO.
24 KAPADAISF 4  SON
24 KEISOGLOU BROS
24 KONSTADINIDIS I
24 KOROSIDIS
24 LEVADEAKI
24 LEVEDAKIS
24 LOUVRE
24 LYMNEOS K
24 MAKE
24 MARKOPOULOS N
24 MEDIKA
24 NATHANAEL P
24 NEOTEX
24 PADELIDIS D
24 PAPAIOANNOU S
24 PAPALEOOlOU BROS
24 PAPANOREOU D
24 TRAGALOS D 4  BROS
24 TRIA KAPA
24 T»APAS-KONIARIS
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S
25 KASTRI
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D
26 ASLANIDIS
26 GOVESIS E -PETRAKIS S 4  CO
26 KAGALOS P
26 LARO
26 NEONAKIS S
26 PANANI BROS
26 PAPATHANASlOU E F 4  SON
26 SILVESTRIDIS
26 SKORPIOS
26 VARELAS K
26 VIELEX
CATTLE FEED
MEAT INDUSTRY
JAMS
BUSCUITS
MILK PRODUCTS
OLIVE OILS
OLIVE OILS
BAKERY
DRY FRUITS
ICE-CREAMS
RICE-MILL
SOFT DRINKS
SOFT DRINKS
ALCOHOLIC DRINKS
VINEGAR
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
CLOTHING
SHOES
KNITWEAR
CLOTHING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-STAMPING
CHILDREN SHOES
CLOTH-STAMPING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-STAMPING
CLOTH FINISHING
COTTOf4-RAGS
CLOTHING
SILK LININGS
CLOTH FOR SHOES
COTTON PROCESSING
CLOTHING
VELVET CLOTHING
QUILTS
CLOTHING
EMBROIDERIES THREADS
CLOTHING
CLOTHING
SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES
SHOES
KNITWEAR
CLOTH-DYEING 4 STAMPING
CLOTH-STAMPING 4 FINISHING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-LININGS
CLOTHING
WOOD FACTORY
WOOD FACTORY
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE FOR TV SETS
FURNITURE 4  WOODEN TOYS
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
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TABLE C.5
M.l>: SPATIAL SEGREGATION BETWEEN PLACE OF WORK AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE (Nimber of workers)
Code FIRM’S NAME PRODUCT
DISTANCES OF LABOURERS’ RESIDENTIAL AREAS FROM PLANT 
1 Km 1.1-6 Km 6.1-10 Km 10.1-20 Km 20.1-30 Km +30 Km
27 AGYRA
27 GOLDEN PACK
27 HART-PAK
28 DIKAIOS I
28 KYRIAKIS E
28 PERIS G
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS
30 ARVANITIS M
30 ATANALIS P I & CO
30 BITSOU BROS & BLAZADONAKIS E
30 COMER-PLAST
30 EL-PLAST
30 EUROPE
30 FIALOPLAST
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS 4  CO
30 HAIPLASTIC
30 KASIS G
30 MANESIS T
30 PIGOPLASTIKI
30 PISKITZIS V 4  CO
30 PLASTIN
30 PTOTEX
30 REKOR
30 RICOMEX
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS
30 VEEM
30 VOPAR
31 ANONYMOUS
31 BENCKISER HELLAS
31 DALCOHEM
31 GEFEX
31 HELP
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN)
31 MANKO
31 MERKOLA
31 MONOPORA
31 ODESSA
31 PAPOUTSANIS P D
31 PETKO, TOUSOUNIDOU 4  CO
31 SANDOZ HELLAS
31 STOHOS
31 TRYLET
31 UNI-FARMA
31 VIAFREL
31 VIANEX
31 VIKENT
31 VIOBEN
31 VIORYL
33 BILLYS 4  SON
33 BISDOULIS TH., BONITSIS D.
33 GRIGORIS BROS
33 HATZIPETROS K
33 IKTINOS HELLAS
33 KIOSEPIDIS H
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS 4  CO
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS
34 ELVIOR-PAPAIOSIF E
34 SOUTZOGLOU
34 SOULTATIS A
35 AFEDOULIS S
35 ALOUMINKO
35 ANALCO
35 ANONYMOUS
35 ANONYMOUS
35 BELLINOX
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH
35 DIAMAND STAR
35 FINIKIS M
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS
35 KOLIOS G 4  KYRIAKOULIS S
35 KOUNOUPAS 4  CO
35 KREOUZIS G BROS
35 LEFAS P 4  I
35 MEKAMO
35 PAGONAS E
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K
35 POLMETEX
PAPER 0 4
CARTONS 0 0
CARTONS 0 0
PRINTING 0 0
PRINTING 0 0
PRINTING 0 1
LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS 0 22
PLASTIC 0 4
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC PIPES 1 7
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC BOTTLES 0 13
PLASTIC ROPES 0 0
PLASTIC BOTTLES 0 0
PLASTIC 0 6
PLASTIC ROLLS 0 6
PLASTIC 0 3
PLASTIC SACKS 1 0
PLASTIC (P VC) 0 1
PLASTIC BANISTERS 0 0
RUBBER AND PLASTIC 0 0
POLYOURETHANE 0 0
POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS 0 3
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC 0 0
PLASTIC 0 1
COSMETICS 0 0
DETERGENTS 0 0
CHEMICALS 0 0
PESTICIDES 0 0
MEDICINES 0 0
WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS 0 0
COSMETICS 0 41
COSMETICS . 0 0
MEDICINES 7 8
INSULATING SLABS 0 19
PAINTS PLASTIC INSULATORS 0 0
COSMETICS 0 25
GLUES 0 5
MEDICINES 0 0
COSMETICS 0 0
DETERGENTS 13 10
MEDICINES 1 13
GLUES 0 0
MEDICINES 0 22
PAINTS 0 2
PAINTS 0 0
CHEMICALS 0 13
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 11
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 19 4
SAFETY CRYSTAL 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0 2
BRASS FOUNDRY 0 0
SMELTING WORKS 0 2
METALLURGY 0 5
METAL CONSTRUCTS 0 5
IRON 4  ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 9
OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM 0 19
IRON PRODUCTS 0 0
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 0 0
STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 0 0
CONVEYER BELTS 0 3
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0
METAL MANUFACTURES 0 2
STEEL PRODUCTS 0 0
STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS 0 0
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 0 0
METAL PRODUCTS 0 0
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 8
METAL PRODUCTS 0 10
METAL MOULDS 0 1
METAL MOULDS 0 0
NOBLE m e t a l s  REFINEMENT 0 0
13
31
4
0
0
2
0
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0
13
17 
3
5 
0 
7 
3 
0
2468
1
0
6 
1
13
30
5 
0
45
0
022
0
0
3
57
3
31 
0 126 
022
02
0
0
5
7
2
9
3011
162
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 2
4 
1
3 10
0
4 
012
9
0
0
0
1
0
3
80
40
70
1
0
2
14 0
7 
5 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5
9401
1800
0
29
5 12
012
96
9
0
0
0
46
8
78
6 
46
15 
49 
5600
52
0000
600
16 
3 0 0
440100
2000000
900
2000
3
0000000000000000000
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0000
00
00
0000
490
310
130012000000000000000000000000000000000
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TABLE C.5
SPATIAL SEGREGATION BETWEEN PLACE OF WORK AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE (Number of worlrers)
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
DISTANCES OF LABOURERS' RESIDENTIAL AREAS FROM PLANT 
1 Km 1.1-6 Km 5.1-10 Km 10.1-20 Km 20.1-30 Km +30 Km
35 POLYZOISTH. 4  CO.
35 SABANIS
35 SOFIANOU E
35 TECHNOSOL
35 TSONOPOULOS P 4  CO
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S.
35 VOULGARIS A
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI
36 AGRIC MACHINERY
36 ARPA K BARGETIS 4  CO
36 ELKAMAS
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI
36 HADJIKONSTAOINOU TH.
36 PAPASTAMOU I.
36 ROBOKAS
36 SALTANIS N
36 STATHAKIS BROS
36 TECHNODIAMAD
36 VOUNATZIS G 4  CO
37 BARBY
37 CAYZER
37 DRAGATIDIS K. 4  CO
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS
37 KYRIAKOULIS V
37 METELCO
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS 4 CO
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4  CO
37 PETROPOULOS G 4  CO
37 SOLE
37 TEVHELLAS
38 ELVIFREN
39 INTERNA
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS 4  CO
39 TECHNICAL
METAL ACCESSORIES 0 0
METAL PRODUCTS 0 0
METAL ATTACHMENTS 0 4
METALLIC SHELVES 0 0
HOT-WATER RADIATORS 0 3
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 1
METAL MANUFACTURES 1 2
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0
AGRICUL MACHINERY 0 15
AGRICUL.MACHINERY 0 2
MACHINERY 6 0
LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 0 0
BAKERY'S MACHINERY 0 4
MACHINE-WORKS 0 2
BUILDING MACHINERY 0 0
MACHINE-WORKS 0 2
BULDING MACHINERY 0 1
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0
MACHINE-WORKS 0 2
ELECTRICAL GOODS 2 4
SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 0 0
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 0
ELECTRICAL GOODS 0 0
CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 0 0
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 12
LIFT-CAGES 0 0
ELECTRICAL KILNS 0 0
ELECTR SOUND-BOXES 0 0
SOLAR HEATERS 0 3
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 0
AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 0 0
LIGHT CEILINGS 0 14
SCHOOL REQUISITES 0 4
SWIMMING POOLS 0 0
4
7 01008 0 0 0
15
5 12000
0
3
0
0
3 
0 0
240
4 
0
1300
9202121
4
000000000000000000000
2900
28000000000
TOTALS 152 802 1995 1762 463 40
SOURCE Questionnaires
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TABLE C.6
M .l^: LABOURERS’ MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM WORK (Number of workers)
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
LABOURERS’
PUBLIC
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT MEANS
FIRM'S TRANS­
PORT MEANS
PRIVATE
MEANS
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED 0 0 6
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY 0 0 5
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS JAMS 12 0 4
20 EKONOMIOIS & CO. BUSCUITS 0 0 14
20 FAGE MILK PRODUCTS 0 165 165
20 GEREDES V. & CO. OLIVE OILS 0 0 19
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS 0 0 3
20 KATSELIS H. SONS BAKERY 0 0 77
20 PAPAOOPOULOS 0. DRY FRUITS 0 0 4
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS ICE-CREAMS 0 0 27
20 THILIVERIS 1.4 P. RICE-MILL 0 0 3
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS 0 127 127
21 I.B.SAE. SOFT DRINKS 7 7 7
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS 0 329 141
21 SIFNEOS K. 4 CO. VINEGAR 0 0 11
23 BYRON ANDREAS TEXTILES 0 0 3
23 HABALOGLOU BROS. TEXTILES 0 3 0
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES 0 0 13
23 HAROOAKIS 1. TEXTILES 0 0 13
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS. TEXTILES 0 4 0
23 lOANNOU K. 4 CO. TEXTILES 0 7 0
23 KONSTAOINOU S. 4 CO. TEXTILES 0 0 7
23 KRIKOPOULOS M. TEXTILES 0 0 4
23 KRI-KO TEXTILES 0 0 18
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES 0 15 0
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES 0 8 7
23 PAOAZOPOULOS TEXTILES 0 0 3
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A. 4 SON TEXTILES 0 0 6
23 PAULIOIS M. BROS. TEXTILES 0 46 0
24 AKRIOAS BROS. CLOTHING 0 19 29
24 ALMA SHOES 0 220 0
24 AMALIA KOORAROU KNITWEAR 0 0 10
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 0 0 5
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 0 0 4
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING 0 0 10
24 DICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES 0 45 0
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING 0 0 15
24 EFSTATHIOU P. 4 CO. CLOTHING 0 4 0
24 FESKOS CLOTH-STAMPING 2 0 2
24 HARISIOTIS 4 CO. CLOTH FINISHING 0 13 0
24 KAPAOAIS F. 4 SON COTTON-RAGS 0 0 9
24 KEISOGLOU BROS. CLOTHING 0 14 0
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1. SILK LININGS 0 0 1
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES 0 5 6
24 LEVADEAKI COTTON PROCESSING 5 0 0
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING 0 176 44
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING 0 7 7
24 LYMNEOS K. QUILTS 0 20 4
24 MAKE CLOTHING 0 5 0
24 MARKOPOULOS N. EMBROIDERIES. THREADS 0 0 9
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING 0 35 4
24 NATHANAEL P. CLOTHING 0 3 4
24 NEOTEX SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES 0 2 7
24 PADELIDIS D. SHOES 0 0 5
24 PAPAIOANNOU S. KNITWEAR 0 6 6
24 PAPALEOOlOU BROS. CLOTH-DYEING 4 STAMPING 0 0 18
24 PAPANOREOU D. CLOTH-STAMPING 4 FINISHING 0 0 17
24 TRAGALOS D. 4 BROS. CLOTHING 0 37 0
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS 0 6 0
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING 0 3 0
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S. WOOD FACTORY 0 0 4
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY 4 0 16
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D. FURNITURE 0 0 9
26 ASLANIDIS FURNITURE 6 7 0
26 GOVESIS E.-PETRAKIS S 4 CO. FURNITURE 0 14 0
26 KAGALOS P FURNITURE FOR TV SETS 0 10 9
26 LARO FURNITURE 4 WOODEN TOYS 0 10 11
26 NEONAKIS S. FURNITURE 0 21 5
26 PANANI BROS. FURNITURE 0 28 0
26 PAPATHANASlOU E.F. 4 SON FURNITURE 0 6 6
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE 10 64 25
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE 0 0 6
26 VARELAS K. FURNITURE 0 0 8
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TABLE C.6
M.IA: LABOURERS’ MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM WORK (Number of workers)
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
LABOURERS’
PUBLIC
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT MEANS
FIFIM-S TRANS­
PORT MEANS
PRIVATE
MEANS
26 VIELEX FURNITURE 0 80 20
27 AGYRA PAPER 0 16 4
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS 0 0 39
27 HART-PAK CARTONS 0 0 4
28 DIKAIOS 1. PRINTING 0 20 20
28 KYRIAKIS E. PRINTING 0 7 0
28 PERIS G. PRINTING 0 0 3
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS. LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS 0 0 23
30 ARVANITIS M. PLASTIC 0 8 0
30 ATANALIS P I. & CO. PLASTIC 1 0 1
30 BITSOU BROS. & BLAZADONAKIS E. PLASTIC 0 14 0
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES 0 0 10
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC 0 7 0
30 EUROPE PLASTIC 0 5 0
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES 0 13 0
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS. & CO. PLASTIC ROPES 0 6 7
30 HAIPLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES 0 17 0
30 KASIS G. PLASTIC 0 0 9
30 MANESIS T. PLASTIC ROLLS 0 0 11
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC 0 3 0
30 PISKITZIS V. & CO. PLASTIC SACKS 1 3 5
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P.V.C) 0 0 4
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS 2 3 0
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC 0 59 59
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE 0 68 0
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L. POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS 0 0 5
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASTIC 0 18 0
30 VEEM PLASTIC 0 0 6
30 VOPAR PLASTIC 0 0 2
31 ANONYMOUS COSMETICS 0 13 0
31 BENCKISER HELLAS DETERGENTS 0 40 19
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS 0 0 10
31 GEFEX PESTICIDES 0 12 0
31 HELP MEDIQNES 0 0 45
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS 0 0 12
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMETICS 0 68 69
31 MANKO COSMETICS 0 31 0
31 MERKOLA MEDIQNES 0 15 0
31 MONOPORA INSULATING SLABS 0 19 0
31 ODESSA PAINTS.PLASTIC.INSULATORS 0 0 3
31 PAPOUTSANIS P.D. COSMETICS 18 89 70
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO. GLUES 1 0 15
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES 0 78 78
31 STOHOS COSMETICS 0 3 3
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS 0 56 38
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES 0 20 15
31 VIAFREL GLUES 0 37 12
31 VIANEX MEDICINES 0 90 22
31 VIKENT PAINTS 2 0 0
31 VIOBEN PAINTS 0 0 2
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS 13 0 52
33 BILLYS & SON MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0 11
33 BISDOULIS TH.. BONITSIS D. MARBLE-CUTTING 0 5 0
33 GRIGORIS BROS. MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0 7
33 HATZIPETROS K. MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0 2
33 IKTINOS HELLAS MARBLE-CUTTING 4 0 34
33 KIOSEPIDIS H. SAFETY CRYSTAL 0 0 30
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS & CO. MARBLE-CUTTING 0 11 0
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0 32
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS MARBLE-CUTTING 0 0 7
34 ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF.E BRASS FOUNDRY 0 18 0
34 SOUTZOGLOU SMELTING WORKS 0 0 2
34 SOULTATIS A. METALLURGY 0 34 15
35 AFEDOULIS S. METAL CONSTRUCTS 0 0 5
35 ALOUMINKO IRON & ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 0 19
35 ANALCO OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM 0 10 9
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PRODUCTS 0 4 0
35 ANONYMOUS ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 0 0 4
35 BELLINOX STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 0 0 1
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH. CONVEYER BELTS 0 6 0
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0 10
35 FINIKIS M. METAL MANUFACTURES 0 0 2
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TABLE C.6
M .IA LABOURERS’ MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM WORK (Number of workers)
LABOURERS' TRANSPORT MEANS
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT PUBLIC
TRANSPORT
FIRM'S TRANS­
PORT MEANS
PRIVATE
MEANS
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PRODUCTS 0 0 4
35 KOLIOS G. & KYRIAKOULIS S. STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS 0 9 0
35 KOUNOUPAS & CO. ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 0 0 12
35 KREOUZIS G. BROS METAL PRODUCTS 0 0 9
35 LEFAS P.& 1. ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 0 10
35 MEKAMO METAL PRODUCTS 0 0 10
35 PAGONAS E. METAL MOULDS 0 1 0
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K. METAL MOULDS 0 0 1
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT 0 0 3
35 POLYZOIS TH. & CO. METAL ACCESSORIES 0 0 14
35 SABANIS METAL PRODUCTS 0 0 7
35 SOFIANOU E. METAL ATTACHMENTS 0 0 4
35 TECHNOSOL METALLIC SHELVES 0 11 0
35 TSONOPOULOS P. & CO. HOT-WATER RADIATORS 5 0 0
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S. ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0 0 10
35 VOULGARIS A. METAL MANUFACTURES 0 0 3
38 ADAMADOTECHNIKI MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0 8
36 AGRIC.MACHINERY AGRICUL. MACHINERY 0 15 0
36 ARPA K.BARGETIS & CO. AGRICUL.MACHINERY 8 15 8
36 ELKAMAS MACHINERY 0 0 11
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 0 6 6
36 HADJIKONSTAOINOU TH. BAKERY’S MACHINERY 0 0 4
36 PAPASTAMOU 1. MACHINE-WORKS 0 0 3
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY 0 47 0
36 SALTANIS N. MACHINE-WORKS 0 0 2
36 STATHAKIS BROS. BULDING MACHINERY 0 0 4
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0 0 12
36 VOUNATZIS G. & CO. MACHINE-WORKS 0 0 2
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS 3 0 14
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 0 0 2
37 DRAGATIDIS K. & CO. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 0 29
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS 0 0 240
37 KYRIAKOULIS V. CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 2 0 2
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 20 20
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS & CO. LIFT-CAGES 0 13 0
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS & CO. ELECTRICAL KILNS 0 0 5
37 PETROPOULOS G. & CO. ELECTR. SOUND-BOXES 0 4 0
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS 0 7 8
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0 50 0
38 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 0 2 3
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS 1 0 15
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS & CO. SCHOOL REQUISITES 0 22 3
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS 0 0 9
TOTALS 107 2719 2386
SOURCE: Questionnaires
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TABLE C.7
M .l^: PLANTS' SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
LOCAL ATHENS OTHER AREAS
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT AREAS WIDER AREA OF GREECE IMPORTED
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED + + .
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY - - + -
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS JAMS - - + -
20 EKONOMIOIS & CO. BUSCUITS - + -
20 FAGE Mft.K PRODUCTS - - + ♦
20 GEREDES V. & CO. OLIVE OILS - - + -
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS - - + -
20 KATSELIS H. SONS BAKERY - + + -
20 PAPAOOPOULOS 0. DRY FRUITS - + + -
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS ICE-CREAMS - + -
20 THILIVERIS I.& P. RICE-MILL - - + -
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS - + + ♦
21 I.B.SAE. SOFT DRINKS - - - ♦
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS - + + -
21 SIFNEOS K. & CO. VINEGAR - ♦ -
23 BYRON ANOREAS TEXTILES - + - -
23 HABALOGLOU BROS. TEXTILES - + - -
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES - - - ♦
23 HAROOAKIS 1. TEXTILES - ♦ + -
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS. TEXTILES - + - -
23 lOANNOU K. & CO. TEXTILES - - - ♦
23 KONSTAOINOU S. & CO. TEXTILES + - - -
23 KRIKOPOULOS M. TEXTILES - + + ♦
23 KRI-KO TEXTILES - - ♦ -
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES - + + -
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES - + - -
23 PAOAZOPOULOS TEXTILES - + - -
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A. & SON TEXTILES - - + -
23 PAULIOIS M. BROS. TEXTILES - - - +
24 AKRIOAS BROS. CLOTHING - - + ♦
24 ALMA SHOES - ♦ + ♦
24 AMALIA KOORAROU KNITWEAR - - + ♦
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING - + - -
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING - + - -
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING - - - ♦
24 OICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES - - + -
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING - + - -
24 EFSTATHIOU P. & CO. CLOTHING - + *■ -
24 FESKOS CLOTH-STAMPING - + ♦
24 HARISIOTIS & CO. CLOTH FINISHING - + ♦ -
24 KAPAOAIS F. & SON COTTON-RAGS - + - -
24 KEISOGLOU BROS. CLOTHING - - + -
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1. SILK LININGS - + - -
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES - - + -
24 LEVADEAKI COTTON PROCESSING - + + -
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING - + - -
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING - + + +
24 LYMNEOS K. QUILTS + - - ♦
24 MAKE CLOTHING - ♦ + -
24 MARKOPOULOS N. EMBROIDERIES. THREADS - ♦ - -
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING - + - ♦
24 NATHANAEL P. CLOTHING - - + ♦
24 NEOTEX SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES - + - ♦
24 PADELIDIS 0. SHOES - ♦ - -
24 PAPAIOANNOU S. KNITWEAR - ♦ + ♦
24 PAPALEOOlOU BROS. CLOTH-DYEING & STAMPING - - - ♦
24 PAPANOREOU 0. CLOTH-STAMPING & FINISHING - - - ♦
24 TRAGALOS 0. & BROS. CLOTHING - + - -
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS - ♦ - -
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING - + - -
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S. WOOD FACTORY - ♦ - ♦
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY . - - +
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS 0. FURNITURE - - + -
26 ASLANIDIS FURNITURE - + - -
26 GOVESIS E.-PETRAKIS S. & CO. FURNITURE - + + -
26 KAGALOS P. FURNITURE FOR TV SETS - + + -
26 LARO FURNITURE & WOODEN TOYS + + -
26 NEONAKIS S. FURNITURE - ♦ + -
26 PANANI BROS. FURNITURE - - ♦ -
26 PAPATHANASlOU E.F & SON FURNITURE - - ♦ -
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE - - + ♦
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE - ♦ -
26 VARELAS K. FURNITURE - - ♦ ♦
26 VIELEX FURNITURE - - ♦ ♦
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TABLE C.7
M.\A: PLANTS' SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
LOCAL ATHENS OTHER AREAS
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT AREAS WIDER AREA OF GREECE
27 AGYRA PAPER +
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS -
27 HART-PAK CARTONS -
28 DIKAIOS 1. PRINTING -
28 KYRIAKIS E. PRINTING
28 PERIS G. PRINTING -
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS. LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS *
30 ARVANITIS M. PLASTIC -
30 ATANALIS P.l. & CO. PLASTIC -
30 BITSOU BROS. & BLAZADONAKIS E. PLASTIC - -
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES -
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC - -
30 EUROPE PLASTIC - -
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES - -
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS. & CO. PLASTIC ROPES - -
30 HAIPLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES - -
30 KASIS G. PLASTIC - -
30 MANESIS T. PLASTIC ROLLS + -
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC -
30 PISKITZIS V.& CO. PLASTIC SACKS - -
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P.V.C) -
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS -
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC ■f
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE — - -
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L. POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS - *
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASTIC - -
30 VEEM PLASTIC -
30 VOPAR PLASTIC -
31 ANONYMOUS COSMETICS -
31 BENCKISER HELLAS DETERGENTS •
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS -
31 GEFEX PESTICIDES - -
31 HELP MEDICINES - -
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS -#- -t-
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMETICS - -
31 MANKO COSMETICS -
31 MERKOLA MEDICINES - -
31 MONOPORA INSULATING SLABS ♦
31 ODESSA PAINTS.PLASTIC.INSULATORS ■f -
31 PAPOUTSANIS P.D. COSMETICS -
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO. GLUES -
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES - -
31 STOHOS COSMETICS - -
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES - -
31 VIAFREL GLUES - -
31 VIANEX MEDICINES — - -
31 VIKENT PAINTS -
31 VIOBEN PAINTS -
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS -  - *
33 BILLYS & SON MARBLE-CUTTING - *
33 BISDOULIS TH., BONITSIS D. MARBLE-CUTTING *
33 GRIGORIS BROS. MARBLE-CUTTING - *
33 HATZIPETROS K. MARBLE-CUTTING - ♦
33
33
IKTINOS HELLAS 
KIOSEPIDIS H.
MARBLE-CUTTING 
SAFETY CRYSTAL
+
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS. & CO. MARBLE-CUTTING - *
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES MARBLE-CUTTING - *
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS MARBLE-CUTTING
34
34
ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF E 
SOUTZOGLOU
BRASS FOUNDRY 
SMELTING WORKS
♦
34
35
SOULTATIS A. 
AFEDOULIS S
METALLURGY 
METAL CONSTRUCTS
♦
35 ALOUMINKO IRON & ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS +
35 ANALCO OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM -
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PRODUCTS -
35 ANONYMOUS ANODIZED ALUMINIUM -
35 BELLINOX STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS -
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH CONVEYER BELTS -
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS -
35 FINIKIS M METAL MANUFACTURES -
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PRODUCTS -
35 KOLIOS G & KYRIAKOULIS S. STAWLESS STEEL PRODUCTS -
35 KOUNOUPAS & CO. ANODIZED ALUMINIUM -
IMPORTED
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TABLE C.7
M .l^: PLANTS' SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
LOCAL ATHENS OTHER AREAS
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT AREAS WIDER AREA OF GREECE IMPORTED
35 KREOUZISG. BROS. METAL PRODUCTS +
35 LEFAS P.4 1 ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS - -
35 MEKAMO METAL PRODUCTS - -
35 PAGONASE. METAL MOULDS - -
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K. METAL MOULDS -
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT -
35
35
35
POLYZOISTH.&CO. 
SAB AN IS 
SOFIANOU E.
METAL ACCESSORIES 
METAL PRODUCTS 
METAL ATTACHMENTS
+
+
35
35
TECHNOSOL 
TSONOPOULOS P. & CO.
METALLIC SHELVES 
HOT-WATER RADIATORS +  +
+
35
35
36
TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S. 
VOULGARIS A. 
ADAMADOTECHNIKI
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 
METAL MANUFACTURES 
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS
+
+
36
36
36
AGRIC.MACHINERY 
ARPA K.BARGETIS & CO. 
ELKAMAS
AGRICUL. MACHINERY 
AGRICUL.MACHINERY 
MACHINERY + +
+
+
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES + +
36 HADJIKONSTADINOU TH. BAKERY'S MACHINERY - - +
36 PAPASTAMOU 1. MACHINE-WORKS -
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY -
36 SALTAN IS N MACHINE-WORKS ■f -
36 STATHAKIS BROS. BULDING MACHINERY - +
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS - - ♦
36 VOUNATZIS G. & CO MACHINE-WORKS -
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS -
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS -
37 DRAGATIOIS K. & CO. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT - - ♦
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS ♦
37 KYRIAKOULIS V. CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS -
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT - - +
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS & CO. LIFT-CAGES -
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS & CO. ELECTRICAL KILNS . - +
37 PETROPOULOS G. & CO. ELECTR. SOUND-BOXES - - ♦
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS +
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT -
38 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) . - +
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS + +
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS & CO. SCHOOL REQUISITES - + +
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS - -
SOURCE; Questionnaires
TABLE C.8
M .l^: PLANTS' MARKET AREAS
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(% of production volume)
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
LOCAL
AREAS
MARKET AREAS
GREATER OTHER AREAS
ATHENS OF GREECE ABROAD
20 AGROTSIK
20 ANONYMOUS
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS
20 EKONOMIDIS & CO.
20 FAGE
20 GEREDES V. & CO.
20 KALAMARAS
20 KATSELIS H. SONS
20 PAPADOPOULOS D.
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS
20 THILIVERIS I.& P.
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY 
21 I.B.S.A.E.
21 METAXA
21 SIFNEOS K. & CO.
23 BYRON ANDREAS
23 HABALOGLOU BROS.
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES
23 HARODAKIS I.
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS.
23 lOANNOU K. & CO.
23 KONSTADINOU S. & CO.
23 KRIKOPOULOS M.
23 KRI-KO
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS 
23 NOVOLAN
23 PADAZOPOULOS
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A. & SON
23 PAULIDIS M. BROS.
24 AKRIDAS BROS.
24 ALMA
24 AMALIA KODRAROU
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ARGOTYP
24 DICOSTA HELLAS
24 EBEY
24 EFSTATHIOU P. & CO.
24 FESKOS
24 HARISIOTIS & CO.
24 KAPADAIS F. & SON
24 KEISOGLOU BROS.
24 KONSTADINIDIS I.
24 KOROSIDIS
24 LEVADEAKI
24 LEVEDAKIS
24 LOUVRE
24 LYMNEOS K.
24 MAKE
24 MARKOPOULOS N.
24 MEDIKA
24 NATHANAEL P.
24 NEOTEX
24 PADELIDIS D.
24 PAPAIOANNOU S.
24 PAPALEODIOU BROS.
24 PAPANDREOU D.
24 TRAGALOS D. & BROS.
24 TRIA KAPA
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S.
25 KASTRI
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D.
26 ASLAN ID IS
26 GOVESIS E -PETRAKIS S. & CO 
26 KAGALOS P.
26 LARO
26 NEONAKIS S.
26 PAN AN I BROS.
26 PAPATHANASlOU E .F.& SON
26 SILVESTRIDIS
26 SKORPIOS
26 VARELAS K
26 VIELEX
27 AGYRA
27 GOLDEN PACK
27 HARTPAK
CATTLE FEED 0
MEAT INDUSTRY 0
JAMS 0
BUSCUITS 0
MILK PRODUCTS 0
OLIVE OILS 0
OLIVE OILS 0
BAKERY 0
DRY FRUITS 0
ICE-CREAMS 0
RICE-MILL 0
SOFT DRINKS 0
SOFT DRINKS 0
ALCOHOLIC DRINKS 0
VINEGAR 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 20
TEXTILES 0
TEXTILES 0
CLOTHING 0
SHOES 0
KNITWEAR 0
CLOTHING 0
CLOTHING 0
CLOTH-STAMPING 0
CHILDREN SHOES 0
CLOTH-STAMPING 0
CLOTHING 0
CLOTH-STAMPING 100
CLOTH FINISHING 0
COTTON-RAGS 0
CLOTHING 0
SILK LININGS 0
CLOTH FOR SHOES 0
COTTON PROCESSING 0
CLOTHING 0
VELVET CLOTHING 0
QUILTS 0
CLOTHING 0
EMBROIDERIES. THREADS 0
CLOTHING 0
CLOTHING 0
SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES 0
SHOES 0
KNITWEAR 0
CLOTH-DYEING & STAMPING 0
CLOTH-STAMPING & FINISHING 0
CLOTHING 20
CLOTH-LININGS 0
CLOTHING 0
WOOD FACTORY 0
WOOD FACTORY 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE FOR TV SETS 0
FURNITURE & WOODEN TOYS 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 30
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
FURNITURE 0
PAPER 0
CARTONS 0
CARTONS 0
0
100
80
60
40
2
100
70
70
50
100
85
60
30
80
100
50
50
70
100
33
30
100
80
40
80
80
90
50
40
11
100
100
60
20
50
80
90
0
20
100
50
100
80
80
50
100
55
90
40
100
90
50
100
90
100
60
80
100
100
100
75
20
70
50
100
40
95
50
35
70
80
80
40
25
95
80
100
0
20
40
40
0
0
30
30
50
0
15
40
30
0
0
50
50
30
0
33
70
0
20
60
20
0
10
50
30
17
0
0
40
20
50
20
10
0
20
0
50
0
20
20
50
0
45
10
60
0
10
50
0
10
0
35
0
0
0
0
25
80
30
50
0
40
5
50
35
30
20
20
60
75
5
20
0
0
0
0
40
98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
20
0
0
0
0
0
33
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
72
0
0
0
60
0
0
0
0
60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
LOCAL
AREAS
MARKET AREAS
GREATER OTHER AREAS 
ATHENS OF GREECE ABROAD
26 DIKAIOS I.
28 KYRIAKISE.
28 PERIS G.
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS.
30 ARVANITIS M.
30 ATANALIS P.l. & CO.
30 BITSOU BROS. & BLAZADONAKIS E.
30 COMER-PLAST
30 EL-PLAST
30 EUROPE
30 FIALOPLAST
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS. & CO.
30 HAIPLASTIC
30 KASIS G.
30 MANESIS T.
30 PIGOPLASTIKI
30 PISKITZIS V. & CO.
30 PLASTIN
30 PTOTEX
30 REKOR
30 RICOMEX
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L.
30 SYSKEUASTIKIELLADOS
30 VEEM
30 VOPAR
31 ANONYMOUS
31 BENCKISER HELLAS
31 DALCOHEM
31 GEFEX
31 HELP
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN)
31 MANKO
31 MERKOLA
31 MONOPORA
31 ODESSA
31 PAPOUTSANIS P.D.
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO
31 SANDOZ HELLAS
31 STOHOS
31 TRYLET
31 UNI-FARMA
31 VIAFREL
31 VIANEX
31 VIKENT
31 VKDBEN
31 VIORYL
33 BILLYS4SON
33 BISDOULIS TH.. BONITSIS D.
33 GRIGORIS BROS.
33 HATZIPETROS K.
33 IKTINOS HELLAS
33 KIOSEPIDISH.
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS. & CO.
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS
34 ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF.E
34 SOUTZOGLOU
34 SOULTATIS A.
35 AFEDOULIS S.
35 ALOUMINKO
35 ANALCO
35 ANONYMOUS
35 ANONYMOUS
35 BELLINOX
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH.
35 DIAMAND STAR
35 FINIKISM
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU -B AKLATZIS
35 KOLIOS G. & KYRIAKOULIS S.
35 KOUNOUPAS A CO.
35 KREOUZIS G. BROS.
35 LEFAS P.& I.
35 MEKAMO
35 PAGONAS E.
35 PANAGWTOPOULOS K.
35 POLMETEX
35 P0LYZ0ISTH.4C0.
PRINTING 0
PRINTING 0
PRINTING 0
LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS 0
PU^STIC 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC PIPES 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC BOTTLES 0
PLASTIC ROPES 0
PLASTIC BOTTLES 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC ROLLS 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC SACKS 0
PLASTIC (P.V.C) 0
PLASTIC BANISTERS 0
RUBBER AND PLASTIC 3
POLYOURETHANE 0
POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS 70
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC 0
PLASTIC 0
COSMETICS 0
DETERGENTS 0
CHEMICALS 0
PESTICIDES 0
MEDICINES 0
WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS 10
COSMETICS 0
COSMETICS 0
MEDICINES 0
INSULATING SLABS 20
PAINTS.PLASTIC.INSULATORS 5
COSMETICS 0
GLUES 0
MEDICINES 0
COSMETICS 0
DETERGENTS 0
MEDICINES 0
GLUES 0
MEDICINES 0
PAINTS 5
PAINTS 0
CHEMICALS 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 30
MARBLE-CUTTING 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 10
SAFETY CRYSTAL 0
MARBLE-CUTTING 70
MARBLE-CUTTING 20
MARBLE-CUTTING 100
BFIASS FOUNDRY 0
SMELTING WORKS 0
METALLURGY 0
METAL CONSTRUCTS 0
IRON 4 ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 40
OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM 0
IRON PRODUCTS 0
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 0
STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 0
CONVEYER BELTS 100
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0
METAL MANUFACTURES 0
STEEL PRODUCTS 0
STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS 0
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 40
METAL PRODUCTS 0
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0
METAL PRODUCTS 0
METAL MOULDS 100
METAL MOULDS 0
NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT 0
METAL ACCESSORIES 0
100
100
90
30
100
90
20
0
60
100
80
70
90
100
100
100
90
40
90
30
55
0
70
100
80
90
45
35
10
30
60
65 
60 
75 
75 
40 
35 
60 
50
100
45
60
66 
100
50
30
50
80
100
40
100
0
80
30
15
0
80
100
40
50
0
100
100
100
100
0
30
100
90
50
60
60
80
40
0
100
100
60
0
0
10
70
0
10
80
100
40
0
0
30
10
0
0
0
10
60
0
67
43
30
30
0
20
10
55
65
90
50
30
35
40
25
5
55
55
40
50
0
55
40
30
0
45
70
15
20
0
30
0
0
20
0
15
0
20
0
40
50
60
0
0
0
0
0
60
0
10
50
0
40
20
60
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
35
0
0
0
0
90
0
0
50
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
TABLE C.8
M.I.A: PLANTS' MARKET AREAS
4 2 4
. of production volume)
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
LOCAL
AREAS
MARKET AREAS
GREATER OTHER AREAS 
ATHENS OF GREECE ABROAD
35 SABANIS
35 SOFIANOU E.
35 TECHNOSOL
35 TSONOPOULOS P. & CO.
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S.
35 VOULGARIS A.
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI
36 AGRIC MACHINERY
36 ARPA K.BARGETIS & CO.
36 ELKAMAS
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI
36 HADJIKONSTADINOU TH.
36 PAPASTAMOU I.
36 ROBOKAS
36 SALTANIS N.
36 STATHAKIS BROS.
36 TECHNODIAMAD
36 VOUNATZIS G & CO.
37 BARBY
37 CAYZER
37 DRAGATIDIS K. & CO.
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS
37 KYRIAKOULIS V.
37 METELCO
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS & CO.
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4 CO.
37 PETROPOULOS G. 4 CO.
37 SOLE
37 TEVHELLAS
38 ELVIFREN
39 INTERNA
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS. 4 CO.
39 TECHNICAL
METAL PRODUCTS 100
METAL ATTACHMENTS 0
METALLIC SHELVES 0
HOT-WATER RADIATORS 0
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 0
METAL MANUFACTURES 0
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0
AGRICUL. MACHINERY 0
AGRICUL.MACHINERY 5
MACHINERY 0
LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 0
BAKERY’S MACHINERY 0
MACHINE-WORKS 0
BUILDING MACHINERY 0
MACHINE-WORKS 0
BULDING MACHINERY 0
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 0
MACHINE-WORKS 0
ELECTRICAL GOODS 0
SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 0
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0
ELECTRICAL GOODS 0
CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 0
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0
LIFT-CAGES 0
ELECTRICAL KILNS 0
ELECTR SOUND-BOXES 0
SOLAR HEATERS 0
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0
AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 0
LIGHT CEILINGS 10
SCHOOL REQUISITES 0
SWIMMING POOLS 60
0
100
40
100
100
100
50
20
0
30
30
50100
70
100
10
60
50
60
80
50
40
60
10
70
40
90
40
60
50
20
50
0
0
0
60
0
0
0
50
80
95
40
70
50
0
30
0
90
40
50
40
20
50
40
40
0
0
60
10
60
40
50
60
40
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
0
90
30
0
0
0
0
0
10
10
30
SOURCE: Questionnaires
425
TABLE C.9
M .IA  PLANTS* BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
Code FIRMS NAME PRODUCT
DT SIZE 
(Sq.m)
BUILT
IND.SPACE
(Sq.m)
NUMBER OF 
LEVELS
CONDITION OF 
BUILDINGS
NEED FOR 
EXPANSION
1,500 1,600 2 AVERAGE .
1,500 500 1 AVERAGE -
3,000 2,000 2 GOOD -
1,000 1,300 2 GOOD
55,000 12,000 4 GOOD
12,500 4,000 1 AVERAGE
1,000 180 1 BAD
10,000 1,200 3 GOOD
6,000 800 2 GOOD
1,300 1,000 1 AVERAGE
2,000 600 1 AVERAGE
50,853 19,932 2 GOOD
3,000 1,200 1 GOOD
59,235 22,240 4 GOOD
4,500 1,000 1 GOOD
4,100 300 1 GOOD
2,800 350 1 GOOD
3,000 1,400 2 GOOD
2,000 750 1 AVERAGE
3,000 1,400 2 GOOD
1,500 900 2 GOOD
1,500 680 2 GOOD
3,000 550 1 GOOD
3,200 7,000 5 GOOD
6,000 3,900 3 GOOD
5,000 1,320 3 GOOD
1,000 80 1 AVERAGE
3,000 650 2 GOOD
6,500 4,500 3 GOOD
12,000 5,540 2 GOOD
5,960 6,700 3 GOOD
2,000 550 2 GOOD
2,100 1,000 1 AVERAGE
2,100 1,000 1 AVERAGE
3,000 800 1 GOOD
3,000 1,500 1 GOOD
2.100 1,000 1 AVERAGE
2,500 462 1 GOOD
1,400 380 1 AVERAGE
2,500 1,000 2 GOOD
4,000 850 1 AVERAGE
2,850 750 1 GOOD
2,500 500 2 GOOD
5,350 1,200 1 GOOD
500 400 1 BAD
15,000 35,000 4 AVERAGE
7,978 5,600 2 GOOD
12,000 2,800 1 GOOD
4,500 750 1 AVERAGE
3,000 600 2 AVERAGE
6,500 1,700 2 GOOD
2,200 2,200 2 GOOD
5,350 1,000 1 GOOD
2,500 85 1 GOOD
2,850 750 1 GOOD
4,000 2,300 2 GOOD
3,500 1,800 2 GOOD
9,000 1,200 2 GOOD
3,000 800 1 GOOD
1,100 450 1 GOOD
880 190 1 GOOD
6,000 1,600 2 GOOD
8,000 800 1 AVERAGE
5,000 1,000 2 GOOD
12,850 2,500 1 GOOD
2,500 1,000 3 GOOD
4,500 4,400 2 GOOD
5,967 2,850 2 GOOD
2,800 2,300 2 GOOD
1,600 1,140 2 GOOD
9,552 5,730 3 GOOD
800 500 2 GOOD
650 600 2 GOOD
27,000 8,000 4 GOOD
6,900 1,860 1 GOOD
17,000 4,700 2 GOOD
10,000 550 1 AVERAGE
12,850 3,500 1 GOOD
700 700 2 GOOD
1,000 180 1 GOOD
2,180 1,650 4 GOOD
1,600 200 1 GOOD
3,500 500 1 GOOD
1,500 700 2 AVERAGE
4,000 1,300 2 GOOD
2,000 400 2 GOOD
1,500 350 1 AVERAGE
4,600 1,000 2 AVERAGE
3,300 490 2 GOOD
2,500 450 1 GOOD
20 AGROTSIK
20 ANONYMOUS
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS
20 EKONOMIDIS 4  CO
20 FAGE
20 GEREDES V 4  CO
20 KALAMARAS
20 KATSELIS H SONS
20 PAPADOPOULOS D
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS
20 THILIVERIS I 4 P
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY 
21 I.BSAE.
21 METAXA
21 SIFNEOS K. 4  CO
23 BYRON ANDREAS
23 HABALOGLOU BROS
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES
23 HARODAKIS I
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS
23 lOANNOU K 4  CO
23 KONSTADINOU S 4 CO 
23 KRIKOPOULOS M
23 KRI-KO
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS 
23 NOVOLAN
23 PADAZOPOULOS
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A 4  SON
23 PAULOIS M BROS
24 AKRIDAS BROS
24 ALMA
24 AMAUA KODRAROU
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ANONYMOUS
24 ARGOTYP
24 DICOSTA HELLAS
24 EBEY
24 EFSTATHIOU P 4  CO
24 FESKOS
24 HARSOTIS 4  CO
24 KAPADAIS F 4  SON
24 KEISOGLOU BROS
24 KONSTADINIDIS I
24 KOROSIDIS
24 LEVADEAKI
24 LEVEDAKIS
24 LOUVRE
24 LYMNEOS K
24 MAKE
24 MARKOPOULOS N
24 MEDIKA
24 NATHANAEL P
24 NEOTEX
24 PADELIDIS D
24 PAPAIOANNOU S
24 PAPALEODIOU BROS
24 PAPANDREOU D
24 TRAGALOS D 4  BROS.
24 TRIA KAPA
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S
25 KASTRI
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D 
26 ASLANCIS
26 GOVESIS E.-PETRAKIS S  4  CO 
26 KAGALOS P
26 LARO
26 NEONAKIS S
26 PANANI BROS
26 PAPATHANASKXJ E F 4  SON
26 SILVESTRIDIS
26 SKORPIOS
26 VARELAS K
26 VIELEX
27 AGYRA
27 GOLDEN PACK
27 HART-PAK
28 DIKAIOS I
28 KYRIAKIS E
28 PERIS G
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS
30 ARVANITIS M
30 ATANALIS P I 4 CO
30 BITSOU BROS 4  BLAZADONAKIS E 
30 COMER-PLAST
30 EL-PLAST
30 EUROPE
30 FIALOPLAST
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS 4  CO 
30 HAIPLASTIC
CATTLE FEED
MEAT INDUSTRY
JAMS
BUSCUITS
MILK PRODUCTS
OLIVE OILS
OLIVE OILS
BAKERY
DRY FRUITS
ICE-CREAMS
RICE-MILL
SOFT DRINKS
SOFT DRINKS
ALCOHOLIC DRINKS
VINEGAR
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
TEXTILES
CLOTHING
SHOES
KNITWEAR
CLOTHING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-STAMPING
CHILDREN SHOES
CLOTH-STAMPING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-STAMPING
CLOTH FINISHING
COTTON-RAGS
CLOTHING
SILK LININGS
CLOTH FOR SHOES
COTTON PROCESSING
CLOTHING
VELVET CLOTHING
QUILTS
CLOTHING
EMBROIDERIES. THREADS
CLOTHING
CLOTHING
SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES
SHOES
KNITWEAR
CLOTH-DYEING 4  STAMPING
CLOTH-STAMPING 4 FINISHING
CLOTHING
CLOTH-LININGS
CLOTHING
WOOD FACTORY
WOOD FACTORY
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE FOR TV SETS
FURNITURE 4  WOODEN TOYS
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
FURNITURE
PAPER
CARTONS
CARTONS
PRINTING
PRINTING
PRINTING
LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
PLASTIC PIPES
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
PLASTIC BOTTLES 
PLASTIC ROPES 
PLASTIC BOTTLES
TABLE C 9
M .IA  PLANTS' BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
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BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
Cod# FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
DT SIZE 
(Sq.m)
BUILT 
IND SPACE 
(S qm )
NUMBER OF 
LEVELS
CONDITION OF 
BUILDINGS
NEED FOR 
EXPANSION
1,500 480 1 GOOD
2,500 800 1 GOOD
4,000 800 1 GOOD
2,000 500 1 GOOD
2,500 1,600 2 GOOD
880 190 1 GOOD
8,000 3,800 3 GOOD
6,940 4,260 5 GOOD
1,500 380 1 GOOD
6,000 1,000 1 AVERAGE
752 1,050 3 AVERAGE
3.500 500 1 GOOD
2,000 700 2 GOOD
5,000 3,800 3 GOOD
3,100 240 2 GOOD
5,300 1,300 2 GOOD
3,000 2,400 2 GOOD
3,000 1,600 4 GOOD
5,000 2,360 2 GOOD
1,500 1,100 2 GOOD
6,000 1,100 2 GOOD
800 800 2 AVERAGE
4,000 1,500 3 GOOD
28,016 13,347 3 GOOD
2,800 900 1 GOOD
8,993 5,276 5 GOOD
1,000 320 1 GOOD
8,544 5,500 4 GOOD
3,300 2,400 4 GOOD
10,000 3,300 1 GOOD
10,050 6,806 5 GOOD
1,000 300 1 GOOD
1,000 400 1 AVERAGE
8,000 13,000 3 GOOD
3,500 1,000 1 AVERAGE
1,600 188 1 GOOD
7,000 500 1 AVERAGE
510 60 1 GOOD
10,000 1,000 1 GOOD
2,600 640 2 GOOD
8,000 350 2 GOOD
12,000 2,000 2 GOOD
4,000 960 1 BAD
2,300 700 1 GOOD
1,000 830 1 BAD
4,000 2,000 2 GOOD
2,000 500 1 GOOD
15,000 800 1 GOOD
2,000 2,000 2 GOOD
2,000 100 1 BAD
1,500 500 1 BAD
2,000 500 1 GOOD
2,000 200 1 GOOD
2,500 170 1 GOOD
500 100 1 BAD
2,000 250 1 AVERAGE
4,000 2,000 1 AVERAGE
700 450 1 GOOD
2,500 340 1 GOOD +
4,300 700 1 GOOD
3,000 400 1 AVERAGE
4,000 540 1 GOOD
2,000 900 2 GOOD
1,200 200 1 AVERAGE ♦
4,000 620 2 GOOD ♦
2,000 900 2 AVERAGE
3,000 600 1 AVERAGE
3,000 1,000 1 GOOD
4,000 540 2 GOOD
2,100 1,140 2 AVERAGE
500 200 1 AVERAGE >
2,900 360 1 AVERAGE
1,500 1,000 2 AVERAGE 4-
4,000 700 1 GOOD +•
4,380 840 1 GOOD
1,000 400 1 AVERAGE
2,800 650 1 GOOD
2,800 450 1 AVERAGE
15.000 2,400 2 GOOD
2.000 500 2 GOOD
2.000 650 1 GOOD
3.000 1,500 1 GOOD
1,000 150 1 BAD
1,500 500 1 AVERAGE
2,000 300 1 AVERAGE
3,000 1,600 2 GOOD
25 000 14,500 4 GOOD
1Z00 450 1 AVERAGE
4,000 1,300 2 GOOD
3,000 1,200 1 GOOD
3,000 600 1 AVERAGE -
30 KASIS G
30 MANESIS T
30 PIGOPLASTIKI
30 PISKITZIS V & CO
30 PLASTIN
30 PTOTEX
30 REKOR
30 RICOMEX
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS 
30 VEEM
30 VOPAR
31 ANONYMOUS
31 BENCKISER HELLAS
31 DALCOHEM
31 GEFEX
31 HELP
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN)
31 MANKO
31 MERKOLA
31 MONOPORA
31 ODESSA
31 PAPOUTSANIS P D
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO
31 SANDOZ HELLAS
31 STOHOS
31 TRYLET
31 UNI-FARMA
31 VIAFREL
31 VIANEX
31 VIKENT
31 VIOBEN
31 VIORYL
33 BILLYS 4  SON
33 BISDOULIS TH., BONITSIS D
33 GRIGORIS BROS
33 HATZIPETROS K
33 IKTINOS HELLAS
33 KIOSEPIDISH
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS 4  CO
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS
34 ELVIOR-PAPAIOSIF E
34 SOUTZOGLOU
34 SOULTATIS A
35 AFEDOULIS S
35 ALOUMINKO
35 ANALCO
35 ANONYMOUS
35 ANONYMOUS
35 BELLINOX
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH
35 DIAMAND STAR
35 FINIKIS M
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS
35 KOLIOS G 4  KYRIAKOULIS S
35 KOUNOUPAS 4  CO
35 KREOUZISG BROS
35 LEFAS P 4  I
35 MEKAMO
35 PAGONASE
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K
35 POLMETEX
35 POLYZOISTH 4 C 0
35 SABANIS
35 SOFIANOU E
35 TECHNOSOL
35 TSONOPOULOS P 4 CO
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S
35 VOULGARIS A
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI
36 AGRIC MACHINERY
36 ARPA K.BARGETIS 4  CO
36 ELKAMAS
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI
36 HADJIKONSTADINOU TH
36 PAPASTAMOU I
36 ROBOKAS
36 SALTANIS N
36 STATHAKIS BROS
36 TECHNODIAMAD
36 VOUNATZIS G 4  CO
37 BARBY
37 CAYZER
37 DRAGATIDIS K 4  CO
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS
37 KYRIAKOULIS V
37 METELCO
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS 4 CO 
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4  CO
PLASTIC 
PLASTIC ROLLS 
PLASTIC 
PLASTIC SACKS 
PLASTIC (P  V C)
PLASTIC BANISTERS
RUBBER AND PLASTIC
POLYOURETHANE
POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
COSMETICS
DETERGENTS
CHEMICALS
PESTICIDES
MEDICINES
WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS
COSMETICS
COSMETICS
MEDICINES
INSULATING SLABS
PAINTS PLASTIC INSULATORS
COSMETICS
GLUES
MEDICINES
COSMETICS
DETERGENTS
MEDICINES
GLUES
MEDICINES
PAINTS
PAINTS
CHEMICALS
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
SAFETY CRYSTAL
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
MARBLE-CUTTING
BRASS FOUNDRY
SMELTING WORKS
METALLURGY
METAL CONSTRUCTS
IRON 4  ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS
OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM
IRON PRODUCTS
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM
STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS
CONVEYER BELTS
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS
METAL MANUFACTURES
STEEL PRODUCTS
STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS
ANODIZED ALUMINIUM
METAL PRODUCTS
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS
METAL PRODUCTS
METAL MOULDS
METAL MOULDS
NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT
METAL ACCESSORIES
METAL PRODUCTS
METAL ATTACHMENTS
METALLIC SHELVES
HOT-WATER RADIATORS
ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS
METAL MANUFACTURES
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS
AGRICUL MACHINERY
AGRICUL MACHINERY
MACHINERY
LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 
BAKERYS MACHINERY 
MACHINE-WORKS 
BUILDING MACHINERY 
MACHINE-WORKS 
BULDING MACHINERY 
MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 
MACHINE-WORKS 
ELECTRICAL GOODS 
SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
ELECTRICAL GOODS 
CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
LIFT-CAGES 
ELECTRICAL KILNS
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TABLE C.9
M.I.A: PLANTS' BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
Cod* FIRM'S NAME
BUILT CHARACTERISTICS
PRODUCT
PLOT SIZE BUILT NUMBER OF CONDITION OF NEED FOR
(Sq.m) IND.SPACE LEVELS BUILDINGS EXPANSION
(Sq.m)
37 PETROPOULOS G A CO ELECTR SOUND BOXES 4,000 1,500 3 AVERAGE .
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS 3,600 620 2 AVERAGE -
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 4,000 2,318 2 GOOD ♦
38 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 3,500 400 1 GOOD .
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS 3,000 1,239 1 GOOD -
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS A CO SCHOOL REQUISITES 3,000 2,100 3 GOOD ♦
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS 3,124 800 2 GOOD *
TOTALS 956,644 373,853
SOURCE Questionnaires
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TABLE c. 10
M.I.A; FIRMS' PROBLEMS WITH THE PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS JAMS
20 EKONOMIDIS & CO BUSCUITS
20 FAGE MILK PRODUCTS
20 GEREDES V & CO OUVE OILS
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS
20 KATSELIS H. SONS BAKERY
20 PAPADOPOULOS D DRY FRUITS
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS ICECREAMS
20 THIUVERIS I.& P RICE-MILL
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS
21 I.B S A E SOFT DRINKS
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS
21 SIFNEOS K & CO VINEGAR
23 BYRON ANDREAS TEXTILES
23 HABALOGLOU BROS TEXTILES
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES
23 HARODAKIS 1 TEXTILES
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS TEXTILES
23 lOANNOU K & CO TEXTILES
23 KONSTADINOU S & CO TEXTILES
23 KRIKOPOULOS M TEXTILES
23 KRI-KO TEXTILES
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES
23 PADAZOPOULOS TEXTILES
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A & SON TEXTILES
23 PAULIDIS M BROS TEXTILES
24 AKRIDAS BROS CLOTHING
24 ALMA SHOES
24 AMALIA KODRAROU KNITWEAR
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING
24 DICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING
24 EFSTATHIOU P & CO CLOTHING
24 FESKOS CLOTHCTAMPING
24 HARISIOTIS & CO CLOTH FINISHING
24 KAPADAIS F & SON COTTON-RAGS
24 KEISOGLOU BROS CLOTHING
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1 SILK LININGS
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES
24 LEVADEAKI COTTON PROCESSING
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING
24 LYMNEOS K QUILTS
24 MAKE CLOTHING
24 MARKOPOULOS N EMBROIDERIES, THREADS
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING
24 NATHANAEL P CLOTHING
24 NEOTEX SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES
24 PADEUDIS D SHOES
24 PAPAIOANNOU S KNITWEAR
24 PAPALEODIOU BROS CLOTHOYEING 4  STAMPING
24 PAPANDREOU D CLOTH-STAMPING 4  FINISHING
24 TRAGALOS D & BROS CLOTHING
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S. WOOD FACTORY
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS 0 FURNITURE
28 ASLANOS FURNITURE
26 GOVESIS E -PETRAKIS S & CO FURNITURE
26 KAGALOS P FURNITURE FOR TV SETS
26 LARO FURNITURE 4  WOODEN TOYS
26 NEONAKIS S FURNITURE
26 PANANI BROS FURNITURE
26 PAPATHANASlOU E F  & SON FURNITURE
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE
26 VARELAS K FURNITURE
26 VIELEX FURNITURE
27 AGYRA PAPER
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS
27 HART-PAK CARTONS
28 DIKAIOS 1 PRINTING
28 KYRIAKIS E PRINTING
28 PERIS G PRINTING
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS
30 ARVANITIS M PLASTIC
30 ATANALIS P I &CO PLASTIC
30 BITSOU BROS & BLAZADONAKIS E PLASTIC
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC
30 EUROPE PLASTIC
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS & CO PLASTIC ROPES
30 HAIPLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES
30 KASIS G PLASTIC
30 MANESIS T PLASTIC ROLLS
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC
30 PISKITZIS V 4  CO PLASTIC SACKS
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P V C)
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS
WATER AND SEW- TELECOMMUNI- ELECTRIC POWER TRANSPORT 
ERAGE SYSTEMS CATIONS SUPPLY NETWORK
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FABLE c. 10
M.I.A; FIRMS* PROBLEMS WITH THE PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS
Coda FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASRC
30 VEEM PLASRC
30 VOPAR PLASRC
31 ANONYMOUS COSMERCS
31 BENCKISER HELLAS DETERGENTS
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS
31 GEFEX PESRCIDES
31 HELP MEDICINES
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS WATER-RGHT MATERIALS
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMERCS
31 MANKO COSMERCS
31 MERKOLA MEDICINES
31 MONOPORA INSULAR NG SLABS
31 ODESSA PAINTS PLASRC.INSULATORS
31 PAPOUTSANIS P D COSMERCS
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU & CO GLUES
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES
31 STOHOS COSMERCS
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES
31 VIAFREL GLUES
31 VIANEX MEDICINES
31 VIKENT PAINTS
31 VIOBEN PAINTS
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS
33 BILLYS & SON MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 BISDOULIS TH . BONITSIS D MARBLE-CUTTING
33 GRIGORIS BROS MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 HATZIPETROS K MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 IKTINOS HELLAS MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 KIOSEPIDIS H. SAFETY CRYSTAL
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS & CO MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES MARBLE-CUTRNG
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS MARBLE-CUTRNG
34 ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF E BRASS FOUNDRY
34 SOUTZOGLOU SMELRNG WORKS
34 SOULTATIS A. METALLURGY
35 AFEDOULIS S METAL CONSTRUCTS
35 ALOUMINKO IRON 4  ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS
35 ANALCO OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PROOUCTS
35 ANONYMOUS ANOaZEO ALUMINIUM
35 BELLINOX STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH CONVEYER BELTS
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTRNG TOOLS
35 FINIKIS M METAL MANUFACTURES
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PROOUCTS
35 KOLIOS G 4  KYRIAKOULIS S STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS
35 KOUNOUPAS 4  CO. ANODIZED ALUMINIUM
35 KREOUZIS G BROS METAL PROOUCTS
35 LEFAS P 41 ALUMINIUM PROOUCTS
35 MEKAMO METAL PROOUCTS
35 PAGONAS E METAL MOULDS
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K METAL MOULDS
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT
35 POLYZOIS TH 4  CO METAL ACCESSORIES
35 SABANIS METAL PROOUCTS
35 SOFIANOU E METAL ATTACHMENTS
35 TECHNOSOL METALLIC SHELVES
35 TSONOPOULOS P 4 CO HOT-WATER RADIATORS
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S. ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS
35 VOULGARIS A. METAL MANUFACTURES
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS
36 AGRIC MACHINERY AGRICUL MACHINERY
36 ARPA K BARGERS 4  CO AGRICUL MACHINERY
36 ELKAMAS MACHINERY
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFRNG MACHINES-CRANES
36 HADJIKONSTADINOU TH, BAKERYS MACHINERY
36 PAPASTAMOU 1. MACHINE-WORKS
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY
36 SALTANIS N. MACHINE-WORKS
36 STATHAKIS BROS BULDING MACHINERY
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS
36 VOUNATZIS G 4  CO MACHINE-WORKS
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS
37 DRAGARDIS K 4  CO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS
37 KYRIAKOULIS V CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS 4 CO LIFT-CAGES
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS 4  CO ELECTRICAL KILNS
37 PETROPOULOS G 4  CO ELECTR SOUND-BOXES
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
36 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES)
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEIUNGS
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS 4  CO SCHOOL REQUISITES
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS
WATER AND SEW- TELECOMMUNI- ELECTRIC POWER TRANSPORT 
ERAGE SYSTEMS CATIONS SUPPLY NETWORK
SOURCE Questionnaires
TABLE c. 11
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M.I.A: VARIOUS PRODUCTION INDICES OF PLANTS
CAPITAL LAND FLOORSPACE/
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT INTENSITY (1) INTENSITY (2) WORKER (sq.m)
20 AGROTSIK CATTLE FEED 50.0 7.5 320.0
20 ANONYMOUS MEAT INDUSTRY 5.0 75.0 100.0
20 ANTHOS KIFISSIAS JAMS 7.1 30.0 125.0
20 EKONOMIDIS & CO. BUSCUITS 4.8 20.8 92.9
20 FAGE MILK PRODUCTS 132 15.7 36.4
20 GEREDES V. 4 CO. OLIVE OILS 2.5 357.1 210.5
20 KALAMARAS OLIVE OILS 7.5 66.7 60.0
20 KATSELIS H. SONS BAKERY 6.7 25.0 15.6
20 PAPADOPOULOS D. DRY FRUITS 50.0 60.0 200.0
20 TELEION-DELIOLANIS ICE-CREAMS 222 3.3 37.0
20 THILIVERIS 1.4 P. RICE-MILL 60.0 16.7 200.0
21 GREEK BOTTLING COMPANY SOFT DRINKS 12.6 22.5 78.5
21 I.BSAE. SOFT DRINKS 5.7 35.3 57.1
21 METAXA ALCOHOLIC DRINKS 4.5 37.0 47.3
21 SIFNEOS K.4C0. VINEGAR 8.0 56.3 90.9
23 BYRON ANDREAS TEXTILES 13.5 151.9 100.0
23 HABALOGLOU BROS. TEXTILES 30.0 93.3 116.7
23 HAMILTON TEXTILES TEXTILES 5.0 60.0 107.7
23 HARODAKIS 1. TEXTILES 12.9 19.4 57.7
23 ILIOPOULOl PROS. TEXTILES 31.3 31.9 350.0
23 lOANNOU K. 4 CO. TEXTILES 12.5 30.0 128.6
23 KONSTADINOU S. 4 CO. TEXTILES 9.7 25.9 97.1
23 KRIKOPOULOS M. TEXTILES 13.3 75.0 137.5
23 KRI-KO TEXTILES 5.9 32.0 388.9
23 MIKROPOULOS-SPARTINOS TEXTILES 5.5 100.0 260.0
23 NOVOLAN TEXTILES 2.9 125.0 88.0
23 PADAZOPOULOS TEXTILES 3.5 142.9 26.7
23 PAPARINOPOULOS A. 4 SON TEXTILES 16.3 46.2 81.3
23 PAULIDIS M BROS. TEXTILES 13.4 8.7 68.2
24 AKRIDAS BROS. CLOTHING 8.6 37.5 115.4
24 ALMA SHOES 1.5 20.0 30.5
24 AMALIA KODRAROU KNITWEAR 1.1 200.0 55.0
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 7.5 70.0 200.0
24 ANONYMOUS CLOTHING 14.3 48.8 250.0
24 ARGOTYP CLOTH-STAMPING 4.4 75.0 80.0
24 DICOSTA HELLAS CHILDREN SHOES 0.3 300,0 33.3
24 EBEY CLOTH-STAMPING 2.1 70.0 66.7
24 EFSTATHIOU P. 4 CO. CLOTHING 18.0 69.4 115.5
24 FESKOS CLOTH-STAMPING 3.3 140.0 95.0
24 HARISIOTIS 4 CO. CLOTH FINISHING 10.0 25.0 76.9
24 KAPADAIS F 4 SON COTTON-RAGS 14.3 40.0 94.4
24 KEISOGLOU BROS. CLOTHING 73 43.2 53.6
24 KONSTADINIDIS 1. SILK LININGS 30.0 83.3 500.0
24 KOROSIDIS CLOTH FOR SHOES 14.4 41.2 109.1
24 LEVADEAKI COTTON PROCESSING 13.5 9.3 80.0
24 LEVEDAKIS CLOTHING 17.6 4.2 159.1
24 LOUVRE VELVET CLOTHING 26.7 23.0 400.0
24 LYMNEOS K. QUILTS 2.7 250.0 116.7
24 MAKE CLOTHING 18.8 60.0 150.0
24 MARKOPOULOS N. EMBROIDERIES. THREADS 3.3 150.0 66.7
24 MEDIKA CLOTHING 9.1 21.7 43.6
24 NATHANAEL P. CLOTHING 26.0 21.2 314.3
24 NEOTEX SYNTHETIC FURS FOR SHOES 3.6 214.0 111.1
24 PADELIDIS D. SHOES 53.3 15.6 17.0
24 PAPAIOANNOU S. KNITWEAR 8.3 28.5 62.5
24 PAPALEODIOU BROS. CLOTH-DYEING 4 STAMPING 13.3 20.0 127.8
24 PAPANDREOU D. CLOTH-STAMPING 4 FINISHING 26.7 8.8 105.9
24 TRAGALOS D. 4 BROS. CLOTHING 0.8 321.4 32.4
24 TRIA KAPA CLOTH-LININGS 12.6 47.6 133.3
24 TSIAPAS-KONIARIS CLOTHING 7.5 73.3 150.0
25 DIAMADOPOULOS S. WOOD FACTORY 10.0 29.3 47.5
25 KASTRI WOOD FACTORY 7.4 48.0 80.0
26 APOSTOLOPOULOS D. FURNITURE 5.0 177.8 88.9
26 ASLAN lOIS FURNITURE 5.0 83.3 76.9
26 GOVESIS E.-PETRAKIS S 4 CO. FURNITURE 8.8 121.2 178.6
26 KAGALOS P. FURNITURE FOR TV SETS 1.1 125.0 52.6
26 LARO FURNITURE 4 WOODEN TOYS 5.9 45.0 209.5
26 NEONAKIS S FURNITURE 0.8 298.4 109.6
26 PANANI BROS. FURNITURE 3.8 37.3 82.1
26 PAPATHANASlOU E F 4 SON FURNITURE 22.7 6.4 95.0
26 SILVESTRIDIS FURNITURE 16.0 10.1 57.9
26 SKORPIOS FURNITURE 33.3 8.0 83.3
26 VARELAS K. FURNITURE 3.1 29.5 75.0
26 VIELEX FURNITURE 2.9 135.0 80.0
27 AGYRA PAPER 8.3 46.0 93.0
27 GOLDEN PACK CARTONS 10.3 56.7 120.5
27 HART-PAK CARTONS 7.3 454.5 137.5
28 DIKAIOS L PRINTING 32 102.8 87.5
28 KYRIAKISE PRINTING 122 11.5 100.0
28 PERIS G- PRINTING 15.0 33.3 60.0
431
TABLE C.11
MAA: VARIOUS PRODUCTION INDICES OF PLANTS
CAPITAL LAND FLOOFISPACE/
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT INTENSITY (1) INTENSITY (2) WORKER (sq.m)
29 TZEVELEKOS BROS. LEATHER WATCHSTRAPS-BELTS 1.4 77.9 71.7
30 ARVANITIS M. PLASTIC 17.1 13.3 25.0
30 ATANALIS P.l. & CO. PLASTIC 100.0 35.0 250.0
30 BITSOU BROS. & BLAZADONAKIS E. PLASTIC 14.0 13.4 50.0
30 COMER-PLAST PLASTIC PIPES 21.3 23.5 130.0
30 EL-PLAST PLASTIC 10.0 33.3 57.1
30 EUROPE PLASTIC 25.0 15.0 70.0
30 FIALOPLAST PLASTIC BOTTLES 13.6 30.7 78.9
30 GORGOGIANNIS BROS. & CO. PLASTIC ROPES 25.0 11.0 37.7
30 HAIPLASTIC PLASTIC BOTTLES 14.7 11.4 28.5
30 KASIS G. PLASTIC 21.2 11.8 53.3
30 MANESIS T. PLASTIC ROLLS 3.3 96.2 72.7
30 PIGOPLASTIKI PLASTIC 31.5 83.5 288.7
30 PISKITZIS V.& CO. PLASTIC SACKS 8.3 40.0 55.8
30 PLASTIN PLASTIC (P.V.C) 10.5 119.0 400.0
30 PTOTEX PLASTIC BANISTERS 15.8 14.0 38.0
30 REKOR RUBBER AND PLASTIC 3.5 25.2 32.2
30 RICOMEX POLYOURETHANE 5.8 31.5 82.8
30 SUPERCAR-LAVDAS L. POLYESTER CONSTRUCTS 37.5 10.0 78.0
30 SYSKEUASTIKI ELLADOS PLASTIC 34.7 14.4 55.8
30 VEEM PLASTIC 93.4 1.8 175.0
30 VOPAR PLASTIC 90.0 38.9 250.0
31 ANONYMOUS COSMETICS 1.3 200.0 53.8
31 BENCKISER HELLAS DETERGENTS 9.4 29.4 84.4
31 DALCOHEM CHEMICALS 1.1 310.0 24.0
31 GEFEX PESTICIDES 7.2 147.2 108.3
31 HELP MEDICINES 5.0 15.0 53.3
31 lOANNIDIS AIMILIOS WATER-TIGHT MATERIALS 172 19.4 133.3
31 KAVALIERATOS (ROC-RILKEN) COSMETICS 3.8 31.3 172
31 MANKO COSMETICS 0.8 186.7 35.5
31 MERKOLA MEDICINES 20.0 80.0 73.3
31 MONOPORA INSULATING SLABS 0.8 86.7 42.1
31 ODESSA PAINTS.PLASTIC.INSULATORS 15.0 286.7 500.0
31 PAPOUTSANIS P.D. COSMETICS 18.9 12.8 75.4
31 PETKO. TOUSOUNIDOU 4 CO. GLUES 72.5 19.3 56.3
31 SANDOZ HELLAS MEDICINES 5.0 25.5 33.8
31 STOHOS COSMETICS 3.0 111.1 53.3
31 TRYLET DETERGENTS 8.3 34.7 58.5
31 UNI-FARMA MEDICINES 3.3 33.7 88.6
31 VIAFREL GLUES 13.2 31.5 67.3
31 VIANEX MEDICINES 3.2 43.7 80.8
31 VIKENT PAINTS 15.0 86.7 150.0
31 VIOBEN PAINTS 25.0 40.0 200.0
31 VIORYL CHEMICALS 20.7 35.1 200.0
33 BILLYS 4 SON MARBLE-CUTTING 83.3 4.7 90.9
33 BISDOULIS TH.. BONITSIS D. MARBLE-CUTTING 28.0 15.4 37.8
33 GRIGORIS BROS. MARBLE-CUTTING 49.8 23.4 71.4
33 HATZIPETROS K. MARBLE-CUTTING 50.0 10.2 30.0
33 IKTINOS HELLAS MARBLE-CUTTING 28.7 12.5 28.3
33 KIOSEPIDIS H. SAFETY CRYSTAL 11.5 7.8 21.3
33 NIKOLOPOULOS BROS. 4 CO. MARBLE-CUTTING 72.2 12.3 31.8
33 PSOFAKIS MARBLES MARBLE-CUTTING 25.2 19.0 82.5
33 SKOUROGIANNIS-SIGALAS MARBLE-CUTTING 100.0 10.0 137.1
34 ELVIOR- PAPAIOSIF.E BRASS FOUNDRY 2.9 46.0 38.9
34 SOUTZOGLOU SMELTING WORKS 100.0 10.0 415.0
34 SOULTATIS A. METALLURGY 23.2 5.1 40.8
35 AFEDOULIS S. METAL CONSTRUCTS 20.0 25.0 100.0
35 ALOUMINKO IRON 4 ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 3.3 300.0 42.1
35 ANALCO OXIDIZED ALUMINIUM 10.0 13.3 105.3
35 ANONYMOUS IRON PRODUCTS 12.7 52.8 25.0
35 ANONYMOUS ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 21.7 23.1 125.0
35 BELLWOX STAINLESS CONSTRUCTS 83.0 31.7 500.0
35 DIAKINISI BITHAS TH. CONVEYER BELTS 3.0 133.3 33.3
35 DIAMAND STAR MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 44.4 8.3 17.0
35 FINIKIS M. METAL MANUFACTURES 10.0 50.0 50.0
35 KARAGIORGIS-LYKOU-BAKLATZIS STEEL PRODUCTS 21.7 30.8 82.5
35 KOLIOS G. 4 KYRIAKOULIS S. STAINLESS STEEL PRODUCTS 14.3 40.0 222.2
35 KOUNOUPAS 4 CO. ANODIZED ALUMINIUM 22.7 2.8 37.5
35 KREOUZIS G. BROS. METAL PRODUCTS 1.9 186.7 37.8
35 LEFAS P.4 1. ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 5.8 86.0 70.0
35 MEKAMO METAL PRODUCTS 1.1 300.0 40.0
35 PAGONAS E. METAL MOULDS 70.0 57.1 540.0
35 PANAGIOTOPOULOS K. METAL MOULDS 20.0 100.0 900.0
35 POLMETEX NOBLE METALS REFINEMENT 17.5 34.3 86.7
35 POLYZOIS TH. 4 CO. METAL ACCESSORIES 10.8 30.8 44.3
35 SABANIS METAL PRODUCTS 12.0 33.3 128.8
35 SOFIANOU E. METAL ATTACHMENTS 22.7 44.1 150.0
35 TECHNOSOL METALLIC SHELVES 24.5 15.3 90.9
35 TSONOPOULOS P. 4 CO HOT-WATER RADIATORS 8.3 180.0 108.0
35 TYPAL-HALKOUSIS S. ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS 12.1 24.7 114.0
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TABLE c.11
M.l A: VARIOUS PRODUCTION INDICES OF PLANTS
CAPITAL LAND FLOORSPACE/
Code FIRM'S NAME PRODUCT INTENSITY (1) INTENSITY (2) WORKER (sq m)
35 VOULGARIS A. METAL MANUFACTURES 7.5 33.3 66.7
36 ADAMADOTECHNIKI MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 8.9 46.8 45.0
36 AGRIC.MACHINERY AGRICUL. MACHINERY 6.4 16.7 66.7
36 ARPAK.BARGETIS&CO. AGRICUL.MACHINERY 12.1 11.4 22.6
36 ELKAMAS MACHINERY 3.5 125.1 76.4
36 ELLINIKI TECHNIKI LIFTING MACHINES-CRANES 30.0 3.3 33.3
36 HADJIKONSTADINOU TH. BAKERY’S MACHINERY 23.3 40.0 162.5
36 PAPASTAMOU 1. MACHINE-WORKS 35.0 40.0 150.0
36 ROBOKAS BUILDING MACHINERY 3.7 101.4 51.1
36 SALTANIS N. MACHINE-WORKS 15.0 133.3 250.0
36 STATHAKIS BROS. BULDING MACHINERY 25.0 40.0 162.5
36 TECHNODIAMAD MARBLE-CUTTING TOOLS 4.3 69.8 125.0
36 VOUNATZIS G. & CO. MACHINE-WORKS 50.0 20.0 75.0
37 BARBY ELECTRICAL GOODS 0.0 29.4
37 CAYZER SOLAR HEATERS-THERMOSTATS 15.0 133.3 150.0
37 DRAGATIDIS K. & CO. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0.6 200.0 55.2
37 ELCO-VAGIONIS ELECTRICAL GOODS 5.9 20.8 60.4
37 KYRIAKOULIS V. CENTRAL-HEAT BOILERS 4.0 100.0 112.5
37 METELCO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0.3 400.0 32.5
37 MIHALOPULOS-THOMOPULOS & CO. LIFT-CAGES 8.3 40.0 92.3
37 PANAGOPOULOS SONS & CO. ELECTRICAL KILNS 37.5 20.0 120.0
37 PETROPOULOS G. & CO. ELECTR. SOUND-BOXES 5.0 400.0 375.0
37 SOLE SOLAR HEATERS 5.7 45.0 41.3
37 TEVHELLAS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 0.6 222.2 46.4
38 ELVIFREN AUTO SPARE PARTS (BRAKES) 24.3 36.1 80.0
39 INTERNA LIGHT CEILINGS 6.2 37.5 77.4
39 LYKOGIANNIS BROS. & CO. SCHOOL REQUISITES 1.4 100.0 84.0
39 TECHNICAL SWIMMING POOLS 3.0 208.3 88.9
SOURCE: Own calculations from tables C.4 and C.9 
(1 ) Plant's horsepower (HP) per worker
This index is a rough estimation of tf>e Capital/Labour ratio (see Giannitsis 1983:187-8) 
showing the extend at which tf» planfs capital equipment is used extensively 
(2) Plant's plot size (in sq.meters) per horsepower. This index expresses
tfre degree at which the plant's land is used extensively for production purposes
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APPENDIX II 
THE FORMAT OF QUESTIONNAIRE
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PLA N T'S IDENTITY
Firm’s activity -------------------------------------
SIC code n u m b e r---------------
Name of the firm —-----———— —— —— — —
Tel number ------------------------------------
When did the firm establish this plant in the area?-
Did this plant come from relocation? YES  NO--
if YES from where?-----------------------------------------
Which were the most basic reasons for chosing the area to locate/relocate this 
plant? (please specify according to importance):
(D-
(2)-
(3)-----------------------------------------
(5)--------------------------------------------
etc--------------------------------------------
Does the firm have other installations in other areas of Attica? YES—  NO—
If YES: (a) production plant? -------
(b) distribution c e n t r e ? -------
(c) administration offices?-------
(d) Warehouses? -------
PR O DUCTIO N CH A R AC TERISTICS
What is the plant’s installed horsepower?------------- (HP)
Which raw materials are used and where they come from?
Does the plant use fuel? YES  N O --------
If YES, is fuel used fo r  (a) production purposes? --------
(b) plant’s central heating? --------
(c) electrical energy generators?--------
What kind of fuel is used? (a) crude o i l ? ---------
(b) diesel? -------
(c) p e t r o l ? -------
(d) gas? -------
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Does the plant have chimneys? YES NO------
If YES which are their measures? Height (m ) Diametre (cm) —
Is there air pollution from plant’s production activity? YES NO-----
If YES, of what kind? (a) d u s t ? ----
(b) g a s e s ? -----
(c) sm ells?-----
(d) n o is e ? -----
Does the plant have installed anti-polution technologies? YES  NO-----
Are there (solid/liquid) wastes from production activity? YES NO-----
If YES, what kind of waste?
(a) s o l id ------ In what quantity/per day?----------------------
(b) liquid In what quantity/per day?-----------------------
Does the plant need a liquid waste treatment system? YES NO-----
EMPLOYMENT C H AR A C TER ISTIC S
How many employees work in production? (Total number)----------------
(a) Men? ---------
(b) W omen?---------
How many employees work in administration? (Total number)------------
(a) M e n ? ----------
(b) W omen?----------
What percentage of the plant’s employees travel from home to work 
(and vise-versa) a distance of:
(a) less than 1 k m ? ----------
(b) 1.1 to 5 km? ----------
(c) 5.1 to 10 km? ----------
(d) 10.1 to 20 k m ? ----------
(e) 20.1 to 30 km? ----------
(f) more than 30 k m ? ----------
What percentage of the plant’s employees travel to and from work by using;
(a) public means of t r a n s p o r t ? ---------
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(b) firm’s means of transport? -----------
(c) private means of transport? -----------
DISTRIBUTION C H A R A C TER ISTICS
What percentage of annual production volume (at the average) is directly dis­
tributed from the plant to the market ( r e t a i l ) ? ------------
What percentage of annual production volume (at the average) is transported 
for sale (wholesale):
(a) in central Athens?---------------- ------------
(b) in other areas outside Athens?------------
(c) abroad? ------------
What means of transport are used for distributing the plant’s products?
BUILDING-INFRASTRUCTURE CH ARACTERISTICS
When the plant was built? ---------
How many floors does the plant have? ----------
How many square metres is the groundfloor s p a c e ? ---------
How many square metres is the total plant’s floorspace?---------
What is the total plot’s size (in sq. metres)? ---------
How the uncovered plot’s space is used?
Does the plant have warehouse spaces? YES  NO------
If YES of what kind?
(a) sheltered? -------  or open-air?-----------------
(b) near the plant? -------  or away from plant?------
How the plant’s building condition could be described? (to be filled by the 
interviewer):
(a) good? -------
(b) average?-------
(c) bad? -------
Is the existing plant’s floorspace satisfactory for the current 
production needs? YES  NO-----------------
Does the existing legislative framework allow for the plant’s expansion (if 
and when needed)? YES  NO— ——
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How many cars can be accommodated in the plant’s car parking space?--------
Please tick on the infrastructure networks that are not considered adequate 
for the plant’s orderly operation:
(a) water and sewerage sy s tem --------
(b) electric power supply --------
(c) telecommunications --------
(d) transport infrastructure --------
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